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INDIA'S MUSLIMS: A DIVIDED ALLEGIANCE
Anatol Lieven

POLICING A MULTI-RACIAL COMMUNITY
Sir Kenneth Newman

TOWARDS A NEW IRELAND
Jonathan Marcus

THE SAD DECLINE OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE
John Elsom

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

# Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

July 1984 Vol. 245 No. 1422 Founded 1866

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*Editor*:
ROSALIND WADE

*Associate Editor*:
BETTY ABEL

*Editorial Advisers*:
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PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

*Fine Arts Correspondent*:
ERNLE MONEY

*Music Correspondent*:
DAVID FINGLETON

*Finance Director*:
LEONARD SKIPP

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## IMPASSE AT THE POLITBUREAU

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### by Alan Huet Owen

THE recent Stockholm disarmament conference has brought, among other things, one more confirmation of the Kremlin's technique of using every opportunity on the world stage to convey to the Soviet peoples a message of a 'peace-loving' Soviet government's resolute defiance of a virulently threatening 'capitalist-imperialist' *enemy*. Simultaneously, in the privacy of the diplomatic arras, the Kremlin seeks both to reassure the West that the worst 'need' not come and to ensure that the West is not alarmed into an undesired solidarity. Above all, however, the Kremlin will, for internal reasons, not risk giving its subjects any ground for believing that the West is not implacably hostile to 'Socialism'.

Two essential lessons of the Stockholm conference for us are that, with the increasingly senseless capacity of 'first-strike nuclear overkill' shared by both sides, our future strategy must shift increasingly towards new techniques of effective nuclear defence and retaliatory deterrence; and that what the Kremlin would like above all is a free hand for 'conventional' military diplomacy, under a guarantee of no nuclear retaliation from the West.

An illusion that may be in our eyes. However, the Kremlin has to accept the fact that the Russian people has become too responsive to unrelenting Party propaganda about a growing threat by a ruthless enemy, and thus (in the popular mind) of an increasingly 'inevitable' nuclear holocaust. A dangerous feeling has spread that there is less 'point' than ever in entertaining any hope of a somewhat easier and more prosperous life. The entire economy is suffering in consequence.

Certainly, there is only negligible overt resistance to the regime. No alternative to it is even remotely imaginable from 'grass-roots' opposition.

For all ordinary folk the removal of the present system is simply unthinkable, for that would mean the horror of total disappearance of all jobs, sustenance, and order overnight. But these beliefs also form part of the ingredients of a serious 'giving-up syndrome'...

The temptation to dismiss that interpretation out of hand may, after a few moments' reflection, yield to the insight that, risible as the interpretation may seem, it points to the one hope a paranoic government may have of diverting general public attention for as long as possible from a developing serious internal impasse. The present hiatus in the Kremlin leadership reflects very much more than Mr. Andropov's death. Whether that hope has much prospect of indefinite internal success is, however, a different matter.

The emergent truth is that, whichever course the fossilising Kremlin may feel driven to pursue in internal affairs—whether small reformist economic and political devolution, or a return to extreme 'Stalinist' coercion of individuals, or just trying to keep things as they are—the prospective outcome for the leaders in each case is now latently disastrous: there is no longer a way out for the received ideology. There are also profound objective dangers for the Russian masses here, too, through the increasing convergence of many realities which have long been creeping up, but are now approaching an apparently ineluctable synergism.

Four generalised trends of central significance are discernible here—the requirements of future industrial technology in the dawning age of microelectronic revolution; the impact of developing new techniques of biotechnology on agricultural production; factors of political demography (the 'minority' peoples, the pensioner problem, etc.); and a growing social, economic, and political demoralisation as an 'impotent' protest.

The rapidly conflating issues of 'post-industrial' organisation, of computer technology, and of industrial automation pose no less grave problems for Soviet society than for the West. However, the hardening ideological carapace of the established power base forbids all necessary anticipatory action for effective two-way cybernetic interaction between 'inside' and 'outside'.

Indeed, that would have to be preceded by a major political and nuclear *détente* with the West, which would in turn have to be preceded by important internal concessions in a sense passively demanded by the growing clandestine, though patriotic movement of 'westernising' or 'semi-westernising' groups. From the present Kremlin leadership neither prospect is thinkable. Indeed, the leaders may desperately decide to move in the opposite direction. That is the main danger which the world today faces.

Meanwhile, there can be little doubt that the Soviet economy is getting into a very bad way.

For instance, because of the concession of freedom of movement now enjoyed by agricultural workers, there has been a substantial flight from the land to the bright lights and better (industrial) pay of the towns, and thus also a developing shortage of labour on the collective farms. The

seriousness of the situation may be judged by the decision of the authorities to counter the effect of migration of the young to the towns by 'encouraging' pensioners to take up work on the land. Indeed, the marked trend of the severely defence-distorted Soviet economy seems to point to a still more forceful policy for recruiting retired workers into the production process. (Retirement ages in Russia are 60 years for men, 55 for women.)

Recently, the official Soviet health services bulletin[1] revealed that serious deterioration of the badly neglected and obsolescent agricultural-machine park is significantly increasing dependence on manual labour in the fields—at a time when there is an exodus of the young and youngish to the towns. The bulletin also reported the finding that between 35 and 90 per cent of pensioners' 'part-time' work on collective farms (up to six hours a day officially 'permitted') is 'heavy labour'.

Of late the Soviet authorities have claimed rises in food production.[2] However, they are lower than planned, and are largely the result of expensively imported technological advances. Indeed, the gains are in effect camouflaging an accelerating deterioration of productivity in all other respects, independently of the unhappy vagaries of the climate.

In general terms, there is very little for people to buy with the wages they earn, outside a very narrow and surprisingly unreliable range of necessaries, apart from a remarkably reliable supply of vodka. Even so, the Kremlin, like General Jaruzelski's Poland, is facing—or rather, hesitating to face—the increasingly heavy pressures of economic logic to reduce the austere basic standard of living by substantially reducing the subsidies on, and thereby substantially raising the cost of, necessaries in the shops.

Continuing heavy dependence of the Soviet system on 'labour-intensive' —that is, overmanned—industrial production and on growing armies of low-grade officials (in order to maintain a picture of 'full employment'); the increasing drain of the East European satellites on the Soviet economy; the growing demands for aid by overseas 'anti-imperialist' regimes; the rapid growth in the proportion of Muslim citizens over the ethnic Russian population; rising discontents of various kinds among the 'minority' republics; the scale of entrenched economic corruption and inefficiency within the cumbersome system; the increasing gravity of drunkenness and alcoholism—at work as well as outside; and the growing cynicism and apathy towards the Soviet version of 'Socialism', leading to further economic deterioration—these are some of the convergent problems which are bound to bring about increasingly tense internal situations.

Among dissident circles of the well-educated, both inside and outside the Communist Party, and even in the KGB, there is a widening, though tacitly and cautiously communicated consensus that even modest material improvements which would make life bearably comfortable for the 'toiling' masses are never going to be enjoyed under the Soviet system, to judge by the signs of economic deterioration. However, more and more ordinary people today know that such improvement is attainable, because

the 'capitalist' West proves that the longed-for amenities can be made universally available. Hence the growing protest of apathy—almost as if people had taken to heart Sir Thomas Browne's line: *'Tis too late to be ambitious, the great mutations of the world are over*... There is a growing sense of having been trapped by Fate.

For the overwhelming majority of people, any protest is only passively expressed by failing to do officially expected things. There is widespread popular conviction that the Kremlin is deliberately keeping people scurrying about ceaselessly for a barely tolerable standard of living, in order to leave people no time to think much about anything else.

Meanwhile, the scale of speculation of State materials, now also increasingly well organised, does not diminish. It has reached the dimensions of a separate 'national economy'. Although it endangers economic viability, it is beyond all hope of effective control by the authorities (indeed, officials are themselves up to their necks in it). Necessary trenchant measures would go unacceptably far beyond the modest reforms which Mr. Andropov outlined before his long illness.

It is recognised by numerous international experts that the Soviet economy and policy are moving into a situation where the present leadership can afford neither to reform on any significant scale (without losing central control), nor to revert to extreme naked 'Stalinist' coercion, nor even to stay put. It is, therefore, no wonder that an increasingly dissident intelligentsia is beginning to speculate about a 'fourth solution' from some other quarter—a palace revolution.

If it ever comes, such a solution can come only by a take-over by the Red Army. It has been widely rumoured that such a take-over very nearly came about after the shooting down of the South Korean airliner. Be that as may be, more and more eyes are covertly turning on Marshal Ustinov, whose crucial support of Andropov's succession to Brezhnev was widely seen as a reflection of the military leadership's 'reformist' inclinations. Just what the full scope of the military leadership's ideas on economic reforms could entail is, however, unknown.

Leaving aside present uncertainties, however, nothing has recognisably changed in the Kremlin's centralist obsessions since, for example, the courageous reformist dissident, Roy Medvedev, wrote in a famous book circulating clandestinely in the Soviet Union around 1970, and later published in translation in England[8]:

> The arms race is becoming an increasingly onerous burden. Growing military expenditure damages the economy, and this makes a change in foreign policy absolutely necessary—there must be improved relations with Western countries and Japan. But stable changes in foreign policy, necessitating a display of greater tolerance, can hardly come about in the absence of similar concessions at home.

In 1984 all this is coming to a head. However, interests of self-preservation at whatever cost continue, fourteen years later, to dictate to the Kremlin leaders that they must exploit internally, to their own advantage, any sign of Western hostility or 'guilt', such as the unilateral-disarmament movement. Thus, while the most hopeful among Soviet citizens may privately dream of a successful *putsch* by the Red Army (on

the premise that generals are more peace-loving than politicians under severe stress), the Kremlin desperately hopes for an attention-distracting future of successive and successful 'Afghanistans' or 'semi-Afghanistans' in suitable parts of the world, without incurring the risk of a nuclear response.

There is much factual evidence to support this hypothesis. It is not only President Reagan who thinks along such lines. The distinguished, now exiled Moscow University logician and satirical novelist, Professor Alexander Zinoviev, says as much in his newly published study of the Soviet system[4] in unequivocal terms:

> The attempt to rule over the whole world is a schizophrenic idea of vain communist leaders only because the tendency to world-wide rule has an objective existence in the social organism itself. The Soviet Union has already acquired such a momentum of inertia in this direction that only a world catastrophe is capable of stopping it.

Or perhaps an internal convulsion, such as a take-over by the Red Army as a transitional phase? Meanwhile, although the internal situation will continue to present the West with accumulating dangers, it is also appropriate to remind ourselves that time is not on the Kremlin's side, as evidenced by the revealed continuing need for brinkmanship propaganda for internal consumption.

The professed Hegelian claptrap of Communism is now catching up with the Kremlin. Independently of Hegel, we can agree that cumulative small changes do eventually become a big and irreversible change in quality—a mutation. All of a sudden it has become a different scenario for the Kremlin leaders and a lot worse is yet to come. In short, the problems of Late Industrialism are seen to affect the Soviet system at least as much as they do the incipiently post-capitalist West. In both systems there are recognisable signs of convergence, but away from what both are today.

The Kremlin knows that not only a world catastrophe could stop the aggressive momentum of inertia which Zinoviev sees. The Kremlin knows that given time—an ever shortening time—it could also be stopped if the proceeding convergence of internal trends reached a critical state, a prospect not all that far away. The Kremlin's only hope of riding out, if not entirely avoiding an internal debacle, would be by sufficiently distracting the nation (if it still could) by a propaganda barrage about grave external threat, accompanied by Soviet successes in supporting the 'defence' of selected Third World countries against the common enemy.

For that, however, the Kremlin would need a guarantee of no *nuclear* intervention by the West in any circumstances—in short, a free hand for 'conventional' military adventures, if such became unavoidable or evidently expedient. Should the West, then, forego even retaliatory nuclear capacity? The issue has been exquisitely put by an American reader of *The Economist*[5]:

> If the Russians were to destroy New York or London, would we do the same for Moscow? If we should ever awaken to the fact that the only sane answer is 'no', and if we should be so indiscreet as to let the Russians find out, what would happen to deterrence?

So, absolute sanity, as envisaged in that letter, is something that the

West cannot, alas, permit itself. What if, having foresworn even retaliatory nuclear response, we found that the Kremlin, because of enormous internal pressures, decided, say, to use overwhelmingly superior 'conventional' military might to invade West Germany? Should NATO be ready with equally massive 'conventional' rearmament? Would there be any sense in trying thus to turn the clock back in that sense in an age of ever more precisely directable ('homing'), electronically controlled, and increasingly destructive, 'conventionally' explosive missiles?

For the foreseeable future, it seems, the West must rely on what protection *détente* efforts and increasing reliance on new techniques of effective defence and retaliatory nuclear capacity may bring to deterrence. That is all we can hope for, until the gathering implosion of internal pressures in Russia reaches some new resolution, as it eventually must.

However, there is also something else which we should not ignore in the face of Kremlin unpredictabilities. It may be true that the Russian people has been so conditioned that it can today envisage only a frightening void if the present system were to fail. On the other hand, the Russians also have a deep traditional religious conviction of having a great mission for the world's moral uplift. For nearly seventy years the Kremlin has exploited that sense of mission, and it has been a powerful reason for stoic acceptance of the excesses of Soviet rule.

There was, however, once also a general confidence that the excesses would pass and that humanitarian 'Socialism' would then flower. Today, little is left of that expectation; yet that is not to say that the deep belief in Russia's 'mission' (consider, for example, Solzhenitsyn) has been extinguished. Interpreted in contemporary socio-economic and socio-political terms, however, there is only one direction in which the sense of mission could hope to fulfil itself in Russia.

An important corollary for us here is that worker-owned industrial establishments are also the only conceivable evolutionary course for the West, as we begin to move beyond moribund Capitalism and sterile Socialism.[6] In short, the only evolutionary path for both Russian and the Western democracies is the emergence of a new Phoenix of Liberalism from the ashes of the old. Meanwhile, we must await the influence of the new leader, Konstantin Chernenko; grin and bear things which we cannot change—but without becoming Red rather than dead...

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NOTES

1. *Soviet, zdravoochraneniye*: No. 4; 1983.
2. Statistical yearbook: *SSSR v. cifrach v. godu 1982.* (Latest source of published information. However, the information given is patchy and selective. The yearbook is cited here, therefore, only as a general source of information, rather than as a specific reference.)
3. Medvedev, Roy: *On Socialist Democracy* (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977).
4. Zinoviev, Alexander: *The Reality of Communism* (Gollancz, 1984).
5. Letter from Mr. Ivan Rainer, in *The Economist*: 21/1/84.
6. Williams, Raymond: *Towards 2000* (Chatto Windus/Hogarth Press, 1983).

# ZIMBABWE: FOUR YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

## by Stephen Chan

EARLY in 1980, when Zimbabwe achieved independence, all those who had supported the armed struggle hoped for the measure of economic equity the struggle had promised. After four years of independence, what has happened? Why has the promise faded? Has the revolution been abandoned, and the direction of government changed; or is the administrative machinery simply overloaded? Is the revolution in a bottleneck?

Firstly, the drought which has affected Southern Africa, and much of the entire southern hemisphere over the past two years, has reduced the livelihoods of people in the rural areas. Secondly, inflation and new taxation measures have curtailed the spending power of those in the cities and, in addition, reduced their remittances to their families in the countryside. Many communal areas—the new phraseology for the tribal trustlands, the designated areas for black farming under the old regime—now survive only because of government handouts. The recently announced budget for 1983-84 inaugurated a dramatic slowdown in the purchase of new land for black settlement and enshrined, for the current financial year at least, a system of fiscal prudence which affects particularly Zimbabwe's lower income bracket.

The budget, which was drawn up between the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's office, was shielded from public debate until its official announcement. It appears to incorporate many standard IMF austerity measures—although it is claimed that these have been voluntarily adopted, rather than imposed. In much the same way the devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar was claimed as a voluntary measure; the devaluation, by 17%, is probably closer to 25% in real terms, due to its floating nature. But, in the depressed world market, there has been no increase in exports to take advantage of this; imports, naturally, have become more expensive—fuelling inflation. In fact, the balance of inflow and outflow of hard currency has worried the government for some time. Shortly after independence, in order to encourage international investment, the repatriation of profits ceiling was raised to 50% of total profits. This meant a surge in the outflow of funds; but there was no compensating inflow. Foreign investment was not forthcoming in nearly sufficient measure. At the same time, there has been no increase in company tax—again to encourage industrialisation and investment. Consequently, the 25% of total revenue which company tax used to generate has significantly declined.

In order to raise revenues, the government has increased sales tax (15% before independence; 10% immediately after independence; raised successively to 15% and, now, 18%, with 23% on certain items; only essential commodities such as mealie, oil and sugar have been spared). In the 83-84 budget, it has also introduced income tax at the rate of 2%

for everyone earning at least $100 a month. In total, the average worker probably pays an additional $10-12 in taxes now, than at independence. This, plus inflation, has eroded his pay increases.

The new budget slashed funds for the land purchasing and resettlement programme. Unless the government opts now for land nationalisation at low or no compensation, the division between communal areas and white farming may become fixed, leading to a Zimbabwean version of the Kenya Highlands. This may or may not be agriculturally sensible, but it is essentially against equity in the rural areas.

One of the reasons for this state of affairs has been the inexperience of the Zimbabwean political and administrative machine. The Zimbabwe cabinet and repopulated civil service has an amazing number of PhDs and other higher degree-holders—usually gained in some form of exile during the independence struggle. But this academic training has not been corroborated with administrative and policy-formulating experience or training. A new society cannot emerge through political fiat. But the new laws, administrative codes, and regulations that otherwise help to usher in a new society have not been enacted or promulgated. The former regime's legal machinery is essentially intact.

An interesting observation can be made with regard to the cabinet's qualifications. For the first four years of independence it was extremely difficult to find an MP of the ruling party who was not a minister or junior minister. This situation was somewhat redressed at the beginning to 1984, but the allocation of ministries up to then had followed a sort of pattern. The educated 'technocrats' were assigned technical ministries where, perhaps, their education and international contacts predispose them to orthodox methods of government. The field officers of the guerilla army, largely lacking the education of their counterparts, but needing to be visible in the governing apparatus, were assigned ministries such as youth and sport, women's affairs and social development.

Even though lacking the funds, clout, or programme-level of its sister ministries, the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Recreation received a significantly larger budget than its counterparts in all of Commonwealth Africa. But it was in that ministry that the scent of corruption was first picked up. The trial soon spread to other ministries, including Defence. But, if a general suspicion could be aimed, it would be that many of those who fought for independence or who were exiled during the struggle have now, in one way or another, become the new fat cats of the nation; that independence has brought a new black bourgeoisie; that this new bourgeoisie cannot be trusted to mid-wife a revolution, or even a discernible measure of economic equity for the mass of the population.

These are serious charges but, four years after independence, the discernible thrust of government is of economic orthodoxy, if not outright conservatism; of poorly administered social programmes, some of which are tainted with the brush of corruption or sheer bloodymindedness; and of some frustration. Hence the rather frantic search for straw men who may be knocked down easily. The real problems of government and deve-

lopment are more intractable.

In terms of the Lancaster House constitution, the government must face an election before the expiration of the period before constitutional change can be effected. In terms of the political trend in Zimbabwe, elections must be held before the move to a one-party state can be made. Will Mr. Mugabe's government maintain its majority, and through it the sanction of the people for such change? The crafted diminutions of Nkomo and Muzorewa point to a policy of demeaning, if not destroying, leading opposition figures.

None of this is to deny the serious external forces the government faces. There is certainly a degree of South African interest in destabilising or, to use the prevailing term in Harare, sabotaging the revolution. The international recession has made it extremely difficult to stage a one-nation attempt at economic prosperity. The international financial and commercial community has, through excessive caution or sheer cussedness, refused to take a chance in Zimbabwe. No one can stand against the forces of nature, such as drought.

Despite all this, the government must closely examine itself and accept a degree of censure. There are still many idealists and selfless people working for change, but the machinery for change is not in place, still less overloaded from the pace of it all; the direction of change has been rendered indistinct, if not compromised—although it would be premature to say it had been irrevocably compromised; the discipline of government members and public officials requires strenuous policing, although there are indications that this may be attempted; but the formation of a black bourgeoisie, essentially an addition to, or replacement of, the European minority, is perhaps irreversible. The government may yet see through its long-term objective to enable all to have more. But a minority will remain—probably not much larger than the pre-independence minority—who will have more than most.

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[Stephen Chan lectures in international relations at the University of Zambia. He was a staff member of the Commonwealth Observer Group at Zimbabwe's independence.]

# INDIA'S MUSLIMS: A DIVIDED ALLEGIANCE

## by Anatol Lieven

AT the time of writing there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan, the country which was carved out of the British Indian Empire at Partition to provide a homeland for India's Muslims (some 80 m out of 700 m Indians, or 11.5% of the population). Partition was accompanied by terrible massacres on both sides, and a large part of the Muslim elite from all over North India fled to Pakistan. Since then Pakistan has become increasingly a more rigorous 'Islamic' state. Very few Hindus were left in West Pakistan; those who remained in East Pakistan were subject to continual harassment and occasional massacre from the late '40s until the Bangladesh War, by which time almost all had left. Finally, India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and India still regards Pakistan as her principal enemy. Under these inauspicious circumstances, how have India's Muslims fared?

The answer is very much better than one might have expected, even if not so well as the official Indian version would have one believe. At the time of Partition, not surprisingly, the extremist Hindu organisations picked up much support. The Hindu Mahasabha and the fascistic volunteer organisation linked to it, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, opposed Partition but also felt that, if it was unavoidable, all Muslims should be expelled from India, other minorities should be 'taught their place' and India should become an overtly Hindu 'Rashtra' or state. They were, however, fervently opposed by Gandhi, and his martyrdom at the hands of a Mahasabha fanatic helped to discredit them in the eyes of many Hindus who might otherwise have been sympathetic.

Nehru, India's first Prime Minister and the father of the Indian state's official ethos, was also firmly non-communal (this stemmed from his personal atheism and 'progressive' ideology. Gandhi's tolerance, of course, came from very different roots). Thanks to him the principle of secularism was written into the constitution. He repeatedly stood firm against any attempt to write the beliefs of the Hindu majority into the laws of the land.

For example, the resentment of orthodox Hindus at the slaughter of cows by non-Hindus in India has long been a major cause of communal strife. 'Cow Protection' movements probably have the sympathy of the great majority of higher-caste Hindus, and have attracted the support of senior politicians like Morarji Desai as well as spiritual leaders like Vinoba Bhave. Nehru's successors have, however, from principle or expediency, followed him in refusing to allow a ban.

The State's non-communal stance dates from British times, but it was also strengthened by the 'secular' nationalist ideology of the anti-British Congress movement, an essential part of its claim to represent the united will of the Indian people against the British claim that Indians were hopelessly divided by religion and only the British presence kept

the peace. Congress itself has always been overwhelmingly Hindu and contained many Hindu Communalists, but it also contained several distinguished Muslim nationalists whose names are high in the pantheon of national heroes—Syed Mahmud, Asaf Ali, Abul Kalam Azad.

There was and is also the fact that so many vital elements of Indian society come from other religious minorities: the Sikhs, for example. Troublesome as they are being at the moment, in 1947 all Hindus regarded them as defenders and saviours (from the Muslims). Despite their relatively small numbers—c. 1.8% of the population—they have contributed enormously to India's economic progress and provided many senior officials (including the present President, Zail Singh, businessmen and, above all, soldiers. Even more remarkable are the Parsis—less than 100,000 strong, yet they have given India her biggest business empire—Tatas—her most famous scientist—Homi Bhaba—and her only Field Marshal—Sam Maneckshaw. Christians too (c. 2.6%), partly because of their better access to education, have a disproportionate share of many professions as do the Jains (0.5%) who also play a very great part in business. Finally there are the Untouchables (Harijans or Scheduled Castes—c. 14%) and tribals (c. 7%) who are recognised by the State as standing out from the main body of Hindus, and given job and educational reservations. If they are excluded, the percentage of 'caste Hindus' in the population drops to c. 62%.

Then there is the oft-cited 'Hindu tolerance'. One Muslim remarked to me, 'They can afford to be tolerant—nobody's threatening them'—but this has not in the past made for tolerance on the part of majorities in Europe, for instance. Hinduism is, of course, a syncretic religion which has absorbed influences from many sources. Moreover its tremendous diversity, the mutiplicity of castes and beliefs, and the lack of any general structure, organisation or hierarchy make it very difficult to imagine an all-Indian religious movement about or against anyone or anything. Communal riots and their causes tend to be highly localised, and to flare up and die down quickly. The syncretic aspect of North Indian culture which developed under centuries of Muslim rule has been exaggerated by some Indian historians in a praiseworthy but unhistorical attempt to cement tolerance and the intellectual bases of the modern Indian state. Nevertheless, it does exist. Akbar's was the only attempt to promote officially a new syncretic religion, but at a lower level there used to be and are a good many kinds of shared religious behaviour, particularly in popular devotional religion. The Muslim Sufi tradition influenced the Hindus, the Hindu Bhakti cults did the same for the Muslims. Both communities would frequently take part in each others festivals and pray to each other's gods and saints. It is not known whether one of the most popular recent 'Hindu' saints, Sai Baba, was born a Hindu or a Muslim. A great part of the effort of communalists on both sides since religion became a matter of politics and antagonism in the later nineteenth century has been to destroy these syncretic aspects by 'purifying' their religions.

As a tribute to Indian tolerance and the public triumph of the secular ethos, the example of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty may be cited: Nehru himself was an avowed atheist. His daughter Indira married a Parsi; one of her sons married a Sikhni, the notorious Maneka; the other, Rajiv, married a Westerner, an Italian. This is almost never remarked on, let alone attacked, in India. (There was an attempt recently to ban Mrs. Gandhi from a Hindu temple on the grounds that she was a Parsi, but it was overruled and regarded by everybody as in extremely poor taste). This despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of marriages in India are still arranged firmly on caste and communal lines.

However, although the Muslim community escaped any formal disability in the new India, and distinguished Muslims continued to be appointed to senior and 'visible' state positions—two Presidents of India, Dr. Zakir Hussain and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, have been Muslims, as is the present Vice-President, Muhammed Hidayatullah—the loss in status of the community as a whole at Independence was very marked. (The British had deliberately favoured the Muslims in many areas).

Many educated Muslims fled to Pakistan, and there were determined efforts, backed by members of the Government, to reduce the community's share in the army, police and other services on grounds of security. The Muslim presence in many branches of the bureaucracy was reduced to almost nothing, and still remains disproportionately low, as it is also in the legislatures. In 1978 Muslims were around 11.2% of the population, but only 5.3% of I.A.S. officers, 1% of the Central Civil Service and 5.5% of M.P.s were Muslim. (Figures from Dilip Hiro; *Inside India Today.)*

There have also been internal reasons for the Muslims' relative backwardness and poverty. The far greater structure and authoritarianism of the Muslim religion, with its rigid doctrine set out in the Koran, extended in the Shariah to cover all aspects of life, and expounded and interpreted by the powerful *imams* and *ulema,* made it very difficult for Muslims in the nineteenth century to adapt themselves to new ideas and make use of the new education in the way that many Hindu castes did. In a country where opportunities for economic and social change are limited, and education and government jobs closely linked, the Muslim failure to keep up in this field has had very serious consequences.

Muslim economic backwardness has meant that until recently there was far less social mobility among them than in Indian society as a whole, and Muslim notables continued to be drawn from the *Ashraf*—broadly speaking, the traditional Muslim elite which is now divided from the bulk of Muslims by 'westernised' education and attitudes. This, however, is now beginning to change: Largely under the impact of remittances from the many Indian Muslims working in the Gulf, a new Muslim middle class is emerging.

This has in turn contributed to a certain increase in the number of communal disturbances in recent years, after a time in the 1960s when they seemed to be dying down. (In 1982 there were 474 incidents, leaving

238 dead and 3,025 injured). Muslims have almost invariably been the chief sufferers. In several riot-hit towns greater Muslim cultural, social and economic 'visibility' had been at the root of Hindu unease. In Moradabad, which suffered terrible riots in 1979 after a brutal police assault on a Muslim crowd, Muslims have been entering the brassware market, challenging the Hindu bosses who run it.

The genesis of the Moradabad riots also involved local Hindu alarm at the use of Arab financial aid to build a number of Muslim religious colleges in the area. This issue involves two Hindu communalist fears: the first being that Muslims are engaged in a secret plan to concentrate themselves in certain areas so that eventually they will be able either to claim autonomous statehood (like the Sikhs) or make a bid for seccession. The second is of the 'Foreign Hand', of India's Muslims acting as a 5th Column for foreign states, especially Pakistan.

Fears over Muslim loyalty are being exacerbated at the moment by trouble in Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state which is claimed by Pakistan and which was annexed to India without plebiscite following the Pakistani-backed invasion of 1947. Relations between the Kashmiri Muslim party, the National Conference (itself claiming to represent all Kashmiris, regardless of religion) and the Centre have been bad ever since. The K.N.C., now in power in Kashmir, professes absolute loyalty to India, but there are many Kashmiris (especially emigrants) in bodies like the Kashmir Liberation Front, who are overtly secessionist and are undoubtedly Pakistan-backed. Some have turned to terrorism, of which the murder of India's Vice-Consul in Birmingham has been the most striking example. In the run-up to the imminent general elections in India Mrs. Gandhi is using this and stories of oppression of Hindus in Kashmir to rally Hindu support to the Congress (I) and perhaps topple the Kashmir government. In return, issues in Kashmir may have drawn some Muslims in India proper away from their previous support for Mrs. Gandhi, but on the whole their loyalties are determined by their own local concerns.

The riots in Bombay and Maharashtra in the course of May, which rank among the worst of recent years (except for Assam), demonstrate both the predominantly local immediate causes of communal riots in India, and the deeper calculations which frequently underlie them. Among recent local reasons for tension in Maharashtra are the disgrace and arraignment for corruption of the Muslim ex-Chief Minister, Antulay. His choice by Mrs. Gandhi was taken at the time as a sign of decreasing tension, but it unfortunately led to Hindu backlash resulting in increased support for a local volunteer body, the Shiv Sena—there is a tradition of mingled Maratha nationalism and Hindu extremism in Maharashtra going back to the very start of mass mobilisation against the British in the 1890s. Antulay's disgrace then antagonised the Muslims. All this took place in the context of increasing local Muslim prosperity and confidence. This has intensified latent Hindu hostility, further exacerbated by Mrs. Gandhi's exploitation of the fear of Muslim Pakistan as part

of her campaign for the General Election due later this year.

The belief that Muslims cannot be both good Muslims and good Indians is fundamental to the Hindu communalist code (as, for that matter to the old extremist Muslim one). 'An Indian Muslim can be an Indian nationalist only when he is not fully conversant with the fundamentals of Islam' (Balraj Madhok, in *The Statesman* of 28th November 1982). This view is based on those passages in the Koran which advocate the conversion of conquest of infidels and upon the contrast set out in the Shariah between a 'Dar-ul-Islam' (Islamic Country) and a 'Dar-ul-Harb' (land of War). It might seem to have been given some credence by the contemporary growth of political Islamicization in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, the great weight of modern Islamic 'theological' authority in India is against it. The conservative *ulema* of the Deoband School and the *Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind* opposed the formation of Pakistan and stood for a mixed society in which Islam would stand (and prosper through conversion) by its own strength, not through the support of the State.

Another major Hindu communalist fear relates to the growth in Muslim population and the potential for conversion. The Muslim birth-rate has been consistently higher than the Hindu since Independence, Muslims being on average even poorer and less amenable to birth-control than Hindus. (Their percentage increase was 30.84 to the Hindu 23.69 in the decade 1961 to 1971, and the Muslim proportion of the total population has gone up by between 1.5 and 2% since 1947). More important is the fear that the vast masses of Harijans (Untouchables) might convert to Islam—or Christianity—as many did in the past. But Harijans now stand to do better, through Government aid, if they remain Harijans.

What of the general belief that the Muslims always stick together, and think and vote en bloc? Will they do so in the forthcoming general elections? Pilloo Mody, the Janata leader, once commented that the R.S.S. was 'God's gift to Mrs. Gandhi' because it made all the Muslims vote for her. Despite what I said earlier about the 'siege mentality' of the Muslims in cultural matters, politically this is no longer true. They have always been an important part of Congress (I)'s electoral strategy, which works through the careful manipulation and balance of castes, communities and interest groups but since the 1967 elections the Muslim vote has been split among most of the main parties, (in that year 13 Muslim M.P.s were elected for Congress, and 16 for other parties ranging from the Communists to the conservative Swatantra party.) In fact, remarkably enough, in the Delhi municipal elections of 1983 the bulk of Muslim votes seem (for local reasons) to have gone to the B.J.P., the R.S.S.-linked descendant of the Mahasabha (which has fielded Muslim candidates to appeal to the Muslim urban lower-middle classes). Similarly in the area round Delhi well-off Muslim peasants, like their Hindu equivalents, now vote for the Lok Dal, the largely Jat, 'Kulak' party. In politics, class and local interests have to a great extent won out over any nation-wide Muslim perception of themselves as a distinct community. The power of All-India organisations like the Muslim League, and the poli-

tical power of religious leaders like Imam Bokhari of the Delhi Jama Masjid are on the wane.

All in all then, and in view of the importance of religion in India, the traumas of the past, and of what *might* have happened to them, India's Muslims present a fairly successful picture of integration into India's polity; even if socially and culturally they continue to stand apart. The flow of educated Muslims to Pakistan ceased with the Bangladesh War, and every Muslim I talked to said that Partition was now so long ago that younger Muslims found it easy enough to view Pakistan as a purely foreign and enemy country. To a great extent Muslim backwardness is due to Muslim conservatism, not Hindu discrimination—though this certainly exists. On the Government side, despite the still unfairly small numbers of Muslims in the civil service, the appointment of Muslims to positions like that of Air Marshal Latif as Chief of the Air Force (now Governor of Bombay) and Nul-ul-Hassan as Ambassador to Moscow, as well as to 'honorific' posts such as President, shows that it is willing to trust Muslims in the most sensitive posts.

Undoubtedly it is justified in doing so. India in this way—as in many others—is more of a unity than it has often been given credit for. In the event of a future war with Pakistan, most of India's Muslims would certainly stand by their country. In the longer term, however, it might be unwise to be too complacent about the prospects for a smooth process of 'integration'. The example of Europe shows that economic development is in itself very unlikely to remove 'communal' differences and their political expressions—they merely take different forms. At the moment Indian politics are dominated by interest groups, bosses, and manipulation from above. But Congress in the 1920s and 1930s learned the bitter lesson that if it wished to mobilise the Indian masses against the British, it had to do so by means of religious motifs which were inherently divisive. Gandhi was passionately anti-communal by conviction, but his all-important spiritual and ethical aspect, so successful in appealing to the Hindus, was incomprehensible to the Muslim masses and repellent to the Muslim elites. If mass movements and mass emotions once more become truly important in India, the politics of religion will also come back into their own. The present 'ethic' of the Indian State bears very little relation to the beliefs and attitudes of most Indians. On the other hand Syed Shahabuddin has spoken of the Hindu ethos being 'in search of a state'. That search might be a very uncomfortable one.

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[Anatol Lieven, a graduate student in History at Trinity College, Cambridge, has spent the past year researching the subject of the Indian National Movement and the transfer of Power in India. He has also been attached to the Jawaharlal Nehru University and has interviewed the Vice-President of India, M. Hidayatullah, the former Prime Minister, Morarji Desai and the 'untouchable' leader Jagjivan Ram.]

# POLICING A MULTI-RACIAL COMMUNITY

## by Sir Kenneth Newman

BRITAIN has traditionally provided a home or refuge for minority groups; the Jews, for instance, have been established here since the thirteenth century and are now well integrated into the community. The Irish, too, are a distinctive group in some considerable numbers in London which has achieved an interesting balance in blending with the indigenous population yet retaining strong themes of cultural identity. But the situation changed radically with the substantial increase in the volume of immigration over the last three decades creating what can be described as a multi-racial society. Economic or class factors have produced what many commentators refer to as the 'under class'—a group which is beneath the working class and which suffers from deprivation, unemployment and poor housing. The black community is among the worst to suffer such disadvantage. This situation is not unique to the United Kingdom and similar difficulties can be found in a number of other European countries.

In Germany, for example, ethnic minorities total almost 5 million, and comprise Yugoslavs, Greeks, Turks and a small number of people from Arab, Asian or African countries. The first generation of immigrants did not emerge as significantly deviant in respect of the law but now the predominant theme in German discussion about ethnic minorities is crime and crime control in relation to second and third generation newcomers. In the Netherlands there has been a large influx of people from Surinam, Morocco, and Southern Europe. In France, the immigrants are from the Maghreb and Southern Europe. In some of these multi-ethnic societies, tensions have at times given rise to disorders coming close to, or equalling the situation which occurred in Britain in the summer of 1981.

In fact the difficulties of multi-ethnic communities throughout the Continent and in the USA differ only in degree rather than in kind from those of Brixton and the seats of other disorders in Great Britain. The considerations involved in establishing a balance between order and freedom in multi-ethnic inner-city areas, therefore, are generally applicable in Europe and in the USA. There would, probably, be general agreement in Western societies with Lord Scarman's proposition that:

> The police do not create social deprivation, though unimaginative inflexible policing can make the tensions which deprivation engenders greatly worse. Conversely, while good policing can help diminish tension and avert disorder, it cannot remove the causes of social stress, where these are to be found, as those in Brixton and elsewhere are, deeply embedded in fundamental economic and social conditions. Any attempt to resolve the circumstances from which the disorders this year sprang cannot therefore be limited to recommendations about policing but must embrace the wider social context in which policing is carried out.
>
> If the police are to secure the assent of the community, they must strike an acceptable balance between the three elements of their function which are:
>
> 1. The prevention of crime.

> 2. The protection of life and property.
> 3. The preservation of public tranquillity.
>
> Of these the maintenance of public tranquillity comes first . . . the second duty of the police is, without endangering normality, to enforce the law . . . if law enforcement puts at risk public tranquility the policeman will have to make a difficult decision, for there will be situations in which the public interest requires him to test the wisdom of law enforcement by its likely effect on public order.

Lord Scarman was talking in the context of Brixton. The police, worried by a disturbing increase in street robberies, had mounted saturation policing operations involving a high level of 'stop and search' activity. Lord Scarman identified this as one factor among others, including unemployment, which contributed to the riots. But this situation typifies the problem of achieving the balance between law-enforcement on the one hand and the maintenance of public tranquillity on the other. The police were under heavy pressure from the majority of the law-abiding community to do something about street robberies. In the circumstances our response was perhaps understandable, but it was perceived by a significant minority as being oppressive and insensitive.

Our current response to street robberies is based on a sophisticated system of intelligence and surveillance which concentrates on the accurate targeting of street robbers. This has produced substantial benefits in detection rates and incidentally reduces abrasive street contacts brought about by more generalised stop and search tactics. In this way, law enforcement is shaped to take account of the tensions in multi-ethnic communities and the risks of precipitating disorder, yet remains highly effective.

While Lord Scarman's view on the general strategy of balancing law enforcement with the preservation of tranquillity is creditable, it must be recognised that it is an approach which raises difficult moral, legal and political dilemmas for the police. There are, for example, in multi-ethnic areas some popular locations for the congregation of unemployed black youths. These locations are associated with the sale and purchase of drugs, the exchange of stolen goods and illegal drinking establishments. The youths take a proprietorial attitude to this location; they regard it as their territory. In general they will regard police as intruders and as a symbol of that authority in white society which is responsible for all their grievances about unemployment, prejudice and discrimination. A neighbourhood policeman who is perceived as lenient and does not interfere will be tolerated. But let him arrest someone for an offence and immediately the likelihood is that a score or more of youths will surround him and attempt to release the prisoner, if necessary assaulting the officer to do so. Perhaps he will call up reinforcements, in which case the number of youths will multiply rapidly and there will be a confrontation with potential for the most serious levels of disorder. However, there are encouraging signs that matters are improving. As we have seen, some locations assume a symbolism which requires careful handling. With tact and some thoughtful liaison with other agencies who share our concern for a peaceful and law-abiding community, tensions have diminished and a less volatile relationship between the police and black youth is

returning.

One heartening example of enhanced co-operation occurred recently when two black youths were arrested for possessing drugs. The crowd which gathered was dispersed by local black people and the youths were taken into custody without difficulty.

A similar position obtains in many mixed housing estates and, given the same potential for disorder, special techniques of policing have had to be developed. Immediate pursuit and apprehension of a suspect is not always the most effective tactic in sensitive areas. Police officers are now encouraged to note an accurate description of the offender and arrest him later in less conspicuous and tense circumstances, or to delay action until reinforcements can be called and a well-controlled operation mounted. Drug trafficking and illegal drinking present a special problem. Though by no means typical of behaviour in the mainstream of the black community, the two activities are productive of many of the confrontations between police and black people. The persons involved will represent these activities as harmless, a part of their street culture, and necessary to mitigate the squalor and misery of their lives. They will often bitterly resent police interference.

The police, guided by the principle that the law must be enforced evenly and impartially, and often responding to complaints or pressures from resentful neighbours, will feel obliged to intervene. But any raid on an illegal drinking club or any arrest for drugs can be productive of serious disorder and operations have to be planned with meticulous care to avoid or at least reduce this possibility. In the case of drugs, the arrest of dealers will provide only temporary relief; other dealers will take their place. The arrest of customers for possession of small amounts of drugs is undertaken on the basis that it deters persons seeking drugs from frequenting the areas, thus helping to dry up the source of custom and put the dealers out of business, and also because long-term or consistent failure to respond to one variety of law-breaking in a neighbourhood will create the impression that other lawlessness may be allowed to proliferate. But there would be many people who would view such action as petty harassment, unnecessarily productive of friction and a mismanagement of police resources.

Such operations by police, especially when they take place at or even near 'symbolic locations', often attract disproportionate press interest, with the media using the cachet of the place-name to add a degree of sensationalism to what is a comparatively minor level of police activity. This reinforces confrontational attitudes in both police officers and other members of the community, strengthening the symbolic nature of the site and thus forcing an extra twist in the spiral of aggressive/defensive postures. This complexity is usually aggravated by small numbers of self-styled 'political' agitators, who are ever ready to question the levels of police resources deployed and to exploit the minutiae of officers' conduct to the benefit of their own cause. In such circumstances, police acting alone are faced with the gloomy prospect of appearing to be

constantly at war with one section of the community on behalf of the remainder.

In order to dispel the atmosphere of 'war', the police are discussing policing issues with locally established consultative committees comprising local councillors, MPs and members of other social agencies. The consultative committee in Lambeth, for example, has evolved on very constructive lines and helps in reducing tension. The patience and restraint required from the police, however, should not be underestimated. There have been occasions when the District Commander has had to discuss policing strategy with the consultative committee in the presence of scores of angry youths and demonstrators hurling abuse from the public galleries at both the police and members of the public. The risk in all this is that substantial sections of the London population, and indeed many policemen, will see an element of unfairness in that the law is enforced unevenly and according to different standards in different parts of the capital.

In the complex, pluriform society of today, however, it is quite clear that problems of reducing crime and maintaining a peaceful community cannot be handled by police alone. They must be addressed through the co-operation of all interested agencies working within a framework of a clear social policy which provides alternative options to straightforward law enforcement. It is not sufficient to think in terms only of police and control of crime. We need to view the achievement of tranquillity within the community in a wider context of social organisation and recognise that the strategies and activities of the police and other agencies must be co-ordinated.

This leads to a consideration of our ability to uplift and regenerate inner-city areas with high concentrations of minority ethnic groups. Research suggests that the fear of crime enjoys a significant correlation with the process of neighbourhood decline, instability and lack of investment. People's fear of crime is connected not just with actual offences committed but also with the appearance of a neighbourhood. In this way, features of the environment such as vandalism, litter, graffiti, 'menacing' youths on street corners, derelict buildings, all combine to create the perception that the area is one where no one cares, is going downhill and is crime prone. The result is that in a district with an atmosphere which is perceived as lawless or disorderly, retail profits become depressed, shops and businesses move elsewhere, property values decline and the municipal rate base is eroded. Lower investment feeds on itself by encouraging even less investment. So crime and the fear of crime join with other social factors and accelerate the downward spiral of decay and apathy. It goes without saying that the police must act properly and within the due process of law, but, paradoxically, it is in such areas of decline that political activists can use a basis of real grievance to exaggerate and exploit issues of civil liberty, play down issues of general communal security and make it difficult for the police to promote those feelings of security and confidence which are the

precondition for economic investment, a more stable, cohesive and socially mixed community, a more effective integration of minorities and that freedom which most people prize above all—freedom from fear.

In November, 1983, a document was published by the Policy Studies Institute—the *PSI Report*—which studied relations between the Metropolitan Police and the community it serves. This was the most comprehensive independent scrutiny of a major police force ever conducted in Europe, covering almost every facet of police work. One section focussed on racial attitudes and included interviews with people of Asian and Afro-Caribbean origin carried out in 1981, and a study by participant observation of a group of young black people based on a self-help hostel, which was completed early in the year 1982/3. The PSI's findings on the relationship between police and black Londoners was welcomed as it threw additional light on a subject previously characterised and complicated by widespread myth and rumour.

The report found that many officers were racially prejudiced and used racist remarks as a matter of course. To set these findings in a proper context it is worth mentioning that the attitudes were found to be marked during the 1981 disorders when officers had been the target for bricks and petrol bombs from black adolescents. It says a great deal for them, in fact, that in the circumstances they were observed to be extremely fair operationally, not allowing their prejudiced attitudes to spill over into acts of discrimination.

A psychologist, who was asked for an independent view on the matter, warned that if racist talk were to be removed from the canteen careful thought would need to be given to what would be likely to replace it. It could be a verbal safety valve and must be seen additionally in that context. Nonetheless, a robust stance has to be taken in respect of even conversation in police officers which drifts towards prejudice and hostility. In formulating policy to counteract adverse attitudes, it is essential to distinguish between levels of conversation which are simply bad-mannered and thoughtless, and those which are deliberate and offensive. One requires education; the other, discipline.

The need to take account of officers' racial prejudice was recognised long before the PSI research began and substantial changes have been made. From 1981 training in policing skills has included three key elements: self awareness, community awareness and interpersonal skills. Lecturing has been reduced and replaced by small group discussions, role-playing, combined with use of video play-back, and participative, experiential exercises. The Metropolitan Police have played a leading role in this new type of race relations training, informing themselves through reference to instructive examples of incidents on the streets where relationships with the black community have proved difficult, and also by tapping into the expertise of black citizens in putting together training material.

Major changes have taken place in the training of cadets, and now there is a far greater emphasis on service to the community. Cadet

entrants now spend increased time on helping in mental hospitals, and assisting the elderly, the young and the handicapped. Disability knows no racial frontiers and service to these groups does much to bind the community together.

It is important that officers through their actions reflect the critical importance of maintaining at all times and to all people, the most rigorous standards of courtesy and professionalism, especially when responding to agreed community policing priorities. The purpose of the Force has not been redefined since 1829, but now my Policy Committee has produced a new statement of the Principles of Policing and a Handbook of Professional Police Conduct, each of which will help to guide officers towards being committed proponents and practitioners of internationally recognised human rights.

Determined efforts have been made to recruit more officers from minority ethnic groups. These include regular visits to areas with high density ethnic communities and contact with schools, clubs, and local job centres. The reasons for a reluctance to join the police by certain groups have also been studied. One barrier to recruitment, of those admirably suited within the Asian community for example, was the attitude towards police officers in Asia, where policing is regarded as a low status job. This is being overcome and the number of recruits from these and other minority ethnic groups have increased steadily from 11 in 1978 to 74 in 1983. A significant pointer to the degree of acceptance is the number of Asian girls applying. If applicants are promising in other respects but not up to the required educational standard, the police will counsel them on a personal basis about how to reach the desired state of preparation. It would also be fair to say that we pay particular care to the passage of a successful candidate's application to ensure that motivation for continuing is kept high.

Ideally, I should like to aim at the presence of two or three black officers of our present high standard in every weekly recruit class of forty joining the Force. We are putting considerable effort and resources into the ambition, which must now be matched with equal enthusiasm from other quarters of our community.

The overwhelming evidence is, that whatever police officers think or say, their racist views do not carry over into action. Many contacts between police and black people are relaxed and friendly and the PSI Report established that officers go out of their way on behalf of black victims of crime to ensure adequacy of service. The presence of black colleagues will reinforce the similarities between white and black rather than emphasising any differences and will serve to give a visual indicator of our being representative of the London community.

Initiatives in the field of race relations by police and other constructive agencies are now abundant. In August 1983 the Home Office set up a training support centre at Brunel University which will specialise in the systematic study of relationships between the community and police. Other agencies such as the prison, and probation and after-care service,

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education and Civil Service have begun to expand their training. Police retain primacy of place in organisation of social and sporting activities, all of which contribute to meetings of police officers and youth groups —black and white—under circumstances which are free of confrontation and which led to discussion of wider issues.

The Metropolitan Police is proud of its achievements to date in facilitating greater social harmony and will continue to enhance its sphere of influence both directly and indirectly encouraging other agencies to share a common responsibility.

The task of keeping the peace in a multi-racial community is not only demanding but, much more significantly, not one to be discharged by the police alone. Our responsibility is predominant but not exclusive.

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[Sir Kenneth Newman is Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. He was Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1976-1979, and Commandant of the Police Staff College, 1980 to 1982.]

The August issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Position of the Japanese Constitution* by Kazu Ota, *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and the Future of West European Security* by Joseph F. Pilat, *Orwell and Liberty* by Stuart Shanker (held over from the July issue) and *Sponsorship and the Arts* by Edward Grayson.

# PEACEKEEPING?

## by James Avery Joyce

THE word 'peace' has performed so many gyrations recently that only the topsy-turvy language of *Alice in Wonderland* can usefully accommodate it—especially when it is associated with 'peacekeeping'.

Historically speaking, modern 'peacekeeping' has a very respectable ancestry. Without going back much further, I recall very vividly the sense of relief which swept across the all-night session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York when at 4 a.m. in the morning of 4 November, 1956, the Canadian representative, the Hon. Lester Pearson, introduced into the General Assembly debate, that had been going on heatedly all the previous day and night, a proposal to send a contingent of 'neutral' soldiers, selected from some half dozen smaller states, to stand between the Israelis and the Egyptians who were then fighting as a result of Israel's aggression in Sinai, backed by the British and French Governments.

Thus, UNEF (UN Emergency Force) was born. It was actually a child of Dag Hammarskjöld's brain, for he planned its 'modalities'. And it stayed in position as a go-between along the Israeli-Egyptian border of Gaza and Sinai for eleven years, until the fateful day on 4 June, 1967 when peace was broken again and another Arab-Israeli war had begun.

These remarkable UN-controlled 'police' forces, selected from friendly nations, have now been in operation—without fuss or noise—for over a quarter of a century. They have been peacekeepers in Kashmir, Cyprus, Congo, Syria and Egypt, and now in Lebanon. Their role has not always been a safe or easy one and they have thus far been assembled on an *ad hoc* basis. But in that quarter of a century, techniques have been improvised and developed, political obstacles have been overcome, and finances provided by the Security Council. Thus, the world community has gained a new and flexible instrument to fight the peace-breakers and the warmongers. The UN peacekeepers are here to stay.

This is only a beginning. Many proposals are on foot to develop UN peacekeeping operations into an effective and permanent stand-by policing system to outwit and, one day, replace the militarists altogether.

Such UN peacekeepers differ fundamentally from national military forces, though for the time being they are being drawn from them. Here is a capsule list of some of the ways in which they must be differentiated from national armies:

(1) They are servants of the world.
(2) They do not take sides in an armed struggle.
(3) They are selected from national forces having no direct interest in the conflict.
(4) They 'police' the local situation, while the Security Council decides on the political issues involved.
(5) They serve under a UN Commander, who is responsible to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(6) They must not shoot or use military weapons, except when under attack and in personal self-defence.

(7) They are selected and specially trained in techniques to anticipate and prevent local violence.

(8) They come at the invitation of the country concerned, not as an army of occupation.

Hence, more and more attention is being given today to the selection and training of peacemakers and peacekeepers. One of these organisations, the International Peace Academy in New York, directed by General Indar Rikhye, one-time military adviser to the Secretary-General, operates on the basis that 'UN peacekeeping is essential to any future settlement' —anywhere in the world. General Rikhye has stated:

> Peace-making is defined as the process of using all peaceful means to resolve conflicts. This may require direct and bilateral negotiations or the mobilisation of regional and multi-national institutions in support of such efforts. But... since peace-building encompasses the entire environment of mankind and is best left to the expertise of the social scientists, the International Peace Academy has devoted its primary attention to the study of peacekeeping and peace-making.

The Academy designs and conducts professional international training seminars for diplomats, military officers, academicians, and policy-makers in the subjects of peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation. It also produces publications and teaching materials of immediate practical use by professionals in governments, and teachers at institutes of higher education, both national and private.

Dr. Kurt Waldheim, when Secretary-General of the United Nations, referred to the Academy's training efforts in the following terms:

> The activities of the Academy are complementary to the endeavours of the United Nations in the pursuit of peace. These important undertakings are complex and delicate operations, and the Academy has played an invaluable role in furthering the practical skills and procedures necessary for them to succeed.

But is the world ready for peace? Can the science of peace be taught? Just how revolutionary this training has to be is shown by one of the Academy's expert advisers. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, former chief of UN staff in Cyprus, and now director of the British Disarmament Campaign, sums it up in his book, *The Blue Berets* (1971), as follows:

> It might be hard to believe that without the authority of a rifle a soldier can achieve very much in the way of peacekeeping, when the contestants are so obviously anxious to get at each other's throats; but he can and he does. The rifle he carries provides him with his means of self-protection, not a passport for violence... Peacekeeping is an impartial act and impartiality in this context means non-alignment with either side in a dispute, ideally to the extent of total detachment from the controversial issues at stake.

It is significant that one of the UN's practising peacekeepers should now be heading the peace movement in Britain. When I was last in Cyprus I specifically asked General Prem Chand of India, who was then the Commander of the UN's peacekeeping force in the island, standing between the Cypriots and the Turkish invading army, what he considered to be his most valuable operating techniques. He assured me that they were simple and they were two, namely, (1) to anticipate when and how

trouble might arise, and (2) to avoid any unnecessary publicity.

For, though the genuine peacekeepers suffer their casualties—landmines, accidents, snipers, insults from frustrated peace-breakers—they have never deliberately been attacked. Why should they be? They are not invaders; they cannot be a menace to the law-abiding civil population they are there to safeguard. They represent a new order in the world. For the first time, men are being trained and equipped for peace.

Thus, as in other areas, it is the UN's neutral 'silent service' that gets results; whereas invading national military forces, sent in under various pretexts to bolster outside foreign policies, destroy the very meaning and moral foundation of peacekeeping and are doomed to fail.

This contrast is already evident amidst the shambles of Beirut which was once one of the most charming and peaceful cities to visit in the Middle East—where the foreign forces of NATO had installed themselves under the sobriquet of 'peacekeeping' in defiance of the principles laid down in the UN Charter, which alone give moral validity and legal authority to the genuine peacekeepers, who are still keeping the peace in South Lebanon without publicity or political scandals.

The fact must be faced that the unfortunate US marines were imposed on the internal confusions left behind by Israel's initial aggression, with the obvious intention of taking sides in pursuance of external power interests and in defiance of repeated condemnations by the UN Security Council and the recent General Assembly resolutions in New York.

One day, people will come to understand that the UN way is not only cheaper for their governments in financial costs, but in human lives and human dignity as well.

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[A sequel to Dr. Joyce's widely read and controversial *Broken Star*, his new book, *One Increasing Purpose: The United Nations Since 1945*, was published in March, 1984.]

# TOWARDS A NEW IRELAND

## by Jonathan Marcus

IT is 'business as usual' in Ireland's Parliament, the *Dáil*, as Deputies busy themselves with the staples of the political diet, unemployment, inflation and the balance of trade. Irish politics has returned to normality, following an uncharacteristic period of uncertainty and instability. The three years from the summer of 1981 to the autumn of last year witnessed three General Elections and a divisive constitutional referendum on abortion. A fragile minority administration, a coalition of *Fine Gael* and Labour, came into office in June 1981, but was replaced some eight months later by an equally shaky *Fianna Fáil* government dependent upon the support of Workers Party and independent deputies. The November 1982 election saw the return of the *Fine Gael*/Labour coalition, this time with a small overall majority of six seats. Despite the clear divisions within the administration caused by Ireland's economic difficulties and lengthening dole queues the present coalition partners look set to see out their term of office—albeit with the accent upon providing much needed political stability, rather than inspired leadership.

The recent turnover of governments is due in part to the weakening in the appeal of the once dominant *Fianna Fáil* party; its internal problems owing much to the personality of its leader, the great survivor of contemporary Irish politics, Charles J. Haughey.[1] *Fianna Fáil* has been unable to turn its traditional strength into a stable parliamentary majority. However, underlying the difficulties caused by such factors as personality and those contingent upon the vagaries of day-to-day politics, stands a more fundamental problem. Developments in Ireland's political system have not kept pace with the rapid and profound changes that are taking place within Irish society. There is a growing disjunction between the demands of an increasingly urban and youthful population and the ability of the political system to articulate and respond to such demands. Ireland's basic party political divisions owe more to the old rivalries of the Civil War period than to contrasting views as to the management of the economy or the ordering of social institutions.

Irish society is emerging from a period of fundamental change: the transition from a predominantly rural to an increasingly urban and industrialised society. This transformation has imposed new strains and tensions. Today, this 'modern' society of urban-dwellers coexists with the more traditional rural culture from which it emerged.

The late 1950's and early 1960's represent a watershed in Ireland's development—economic growth and modernisation having profound social consequences. Emigration declined and after 1961, Ireland experienced its first sustained population growth since the Famine. The industrial labour force expanded, whilst the number employed in the agricultural sector declined markedly. A majority of the population became town dwellers; Dublin, with over one million people, embracing nearly a third of the nation's population. This population has become increasingly

youthful. In 1979 nearly 48% were under twenty-five years of age. Thus, Ireland has had to confront the recession with a rapidly expanding labour force and with a dependency ratio far higher than other EEC nations.

The expansion of higher education and the creation of a national television service in 1962 served to open up this developing urban society to new influences and pressures. Whilst religious observance remains high, there has been a degree of secularisation in Irish society. Survey data indicates that in urban areas the Church is finding it harder to attract the young and opinion polls show evidence of more liberal attitudes towards issues such as divorce and contraception. Moves are under way to review the Republic's present constitutional prohibition of divorce and the Minister for Health, Mr. Desmond, has promised to introduce a new Family Planning Bill.

Questions of public morality continue to arouse an emotional response, as evidenced by the bitter campaign surrounding last year's referendum to introduce a constitutional ban on abortion. The outcome, an overwhelming vote of two to one in favour of enshrining the existing legal strictures against abortion, within the Constitution, indicates both the continuing strength of the Roman Catholic Church, and the limits to the Hierarchy's influence. The victory of the pro-amendment camp must be qualified, given the low turnout, despite calls from the Catholic Church to vote 'yes'.[2] The result strikingly displayed the deep division between urban and rural electorates. Though welcomed by the Church, the result may prove a pyrrhic victory; the establishment of a respectable anti-clerical lobby is likely to be damaging to the Church's influence in the long-term. Nevertheless, marital and sexual issues are likely to continue to present thorny probems for Ireland's legislators.

Churchmen have also pointed to the damaging social consequences of Ireland's burgeoning unemployment problem and have noted that 'ticking away in the statistics is the time-bomb of youth unemployment'. During February of this year, the overall level of unemployment rose to an all-time high of 216,000. This represented an increase of 15% in one year and there was a disturbing rise in the numbers employed on short-time working—often a prelude to redundancy. Although there was a slight fall in unemployment during March, there is little room for complacency. The most that may be hoped for in the short-term is a stabilisation in the jobless total. Indeed, the Government's Book of Estimates, laying out its spending plans for 1984, allocates an extra £75 million to fund unemployment benefits, envisaging an average level of some 225,000 over the course of this year.

Ireland's peculiar demographic structure exacerbates the problems of youth unemployment; nearly one-third of those unemployed being below 25 years of age. The social impact of the recession is serious with an increase in mugging, vandalism and drug abuse. The escalating level of urban crime, together with the spill-over of armed robbery and violence from the North has over-stretched the resources of the police. The Government has sought to provide the Police with increased powers through

a new Criminal Justice Bill, in an attempt to come to grips with organised drug racketeers and renew public confidence in the Police. The proposed Bill inflamed civil liberties campaigners, some of the more draconian clauses having to be amended by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Noonan.

A recent EEC report designated the whole of Ireland as an area of serious social and economic problems, ranking Ireland ahead of Merseyside in the league of European blackspots.[8] Unemployment has not surprisingly hit established industrial areas the hardest. In Cork, the closure of the Dunlop factory in September of last year, was followed in January by the announcement that Ford was to end its car assembly operation, the two closures resulting in the loss of some 1,500 jobs. Other industries in the area, notably Irish steel and ship-yards, are also in jeopardy.

The Government's response to these difficulties has been far from satisfactory. There has been, as yet, no strategic plan to address the central problems of unemployment and job creation. A national economic plan is promised for September. To date, apart from piecemeal proposals, such as a Bill to limit overtime earnings, the Government has relied upon traditional exhortations to increase productivity and competitiveness, and the need for wage restraint and cuts in public expenditure. This year's budget was relatively mild compared with its predecessors, being viewed by many commentators as a sign of the Government's economic policy marking time. Overall, there were cuts of some £407 million on the proposed spending plans for the coming year, involving cut-backs in capital investment programmes, some welfare benefits and increases in university fees. The Finance Minister, Mr. Dukes, allowed no provision for increases in public sector pay. The target budget deficit for 1984 was set at £1,089 million, greater than the figure that would be required to meet the Government's aim of eliminating the deficit by 1987.

The target for this year may be unattainable, due to a reported shortfall in tax revenue which may push the deficit up to £1,400 million, raising the spectre of a mini-budget during the summer. It is highly unlikely that the Government will be able to accomplish the elimination of the budget deficit by 1987. A recent report from the National Planning Board underlined that such an aim could not be achieved without imposing a new wave of recession on the country.

There are few glimmers of hope on the economic horizon. The discovery of oil reserves below the Celtic Sea held out to some people the hope of a bonanza and rumours and speculation on the stock market flourished. Government spokesmen and responsible commentators counselled caution; oil, though welcome, would prove no panacea for Ireland's economic ills. Indeed, with the British economy's experiences very much in mind, it was realised that oil was in all probability a mixed blessing. It is not yet clear if there is enough oil for it to be exploited on a commercial basis. Gulf Oil recently dashed hopes for an early answer to this question by announcing the abandonment of its appraisal well and the moving of drilling to another site.

The achievement of a favourable compromise at the Common Market milk super-levy negotiations in Brussels must rank as a notable success for the FitzGerald Government. The Republic will be allowed to expand milk production by 4.7% during the coming year, whilst other Community nations must cut back. It was felt in Ireland that a rigid ceiling to milk production would deny to Irish farmers the full, long-term benefits of Common Market membership, the Irish Government's stance reflecting the importance of dairy farming in the national economy. At home, the Government and trade unions are squaring up to do battle over the new public sector pay-round. Both sides' initial positions are uncompromising. The last pay agreement ran out in May for the majority of the 300,000 public service employees. The Government wishes to see a wage freeze for the rest of 1984, with perhaps a small pay increase of a few percentage points early next year. The unions have reacted angrily to government threats to impose its pay guidelines, arguing that inflation has resulted in a fall in living standards which must be redressed. They have castigated the Government's association of wage increases with the level of employment by retorting that wage restraint seems to be the principal and perhaps the only plank in the Government's job creation strategy!

The Government's economic difficulties pose particular problems for the junior partner in the Coalition, the Labour Party. It is hard to discern the influence of Labour's hand in Government economic policy and the Party has had to struggle to retain its own distinctive voice. Labour's role in Coalition has been described as that of an 'invisible Santa Claus', ameliorating the harder edges of the *Fine Gael* economic programme.[4] Although there have been public disagreements between the Coalition partners, Labour seems to have signed on for the duration.

The most serious rift came with the resignation of the Labour Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism, Frank Cluskey, in December of last year. His departure was due to a disagreement over arrangements for the supply of natural gas from the Kinsale field. Cluskey argued that Government financial aid to the privately owned Dublin Gas Company benefitted the company and its shareholders at the expense of the State. The Labour leader, Dick Spring, received a new portfolio as Minister for Energy in the subsequent Cabinet reshuffle, which went some way to reassure Labour's sceptics as to the manner of the future exploitation of the nation's natural resources. The Coalition weathered this storm, but a warning had been given to *Fine Gael* not to trample upon Labour's susceptibilities. As one Labour Minister commented—'What he (Mr. Cluskey) has done is to signal that this is a two-party Government, not a *Fine Gael* Government supported by a minority Labour Party'.[5] Labour's problem is to ensure that this statement accurately reflects the political reality.

The 1984 Budget contained few specific concessions to Labour policy. There was no new capital taxation and Labour had to seek consolation in the general mildness of this 'political budget'. The Labour Party is

also uneasy with the approach adopted by the recent report of the National Planning Board, regarding its findings as but one of a number of advisory documents, rather than as the sole foundation for a White Paper on economic development. It remains to be seen if the proposed National Development Corporation, one of the main planks of the Joint Programme for Government in 1982, will be merely a symbolic gesture on the part of *Fine Gael* towards their coalition partners; or whether, with commitment on the part of the Government as a whole, it will develop into an effective agency promoting industrial expansion.

Labour's participation in the Coalition has not passed without criticism. Anti-coalition delegates at Labour's annual Conference last April narrowly missed introducing motions onto the agenda, which would have resulted in a divisive public debate on Labour's role in Government. The Labour leader, Dick Spring, strove to emphasise Labour's independent stance and separate identity within the Coalition, although he was loudly cheered when he stated that he would be prepared to lead his ministers out of the administration, should circumstance change. The opponents of coalition are particularly strong in Dublin, where Labour is facing a dangerous challenge from the Workers Party. Last November's Dublin Central by-election served as a grim warning to both Labour and the Government, Labour's candidate being pushed into a poor fifth place behind representatives of both *Sinn Fein* and the Workers Party. Labour must be seen to have extracted some policy concessions from its *Fine Gael* partners if the Party is to maintain its electoral base at the next general election.

Labour is traditionally a rural workers party. Although the Party's rhetoric became more avowedly 'socialist' during the 1960's, Labour is yet to complete the transformation into a modern social democratic party, equivalent to its West European counterparts, representing and responding to a predominantly urban electorate. Labour's organisational structure is weak; nationally the Party is best characterised as a series of constituency fiefdoms, each ruled over by an individual deputy. Labour's internal difficulties have not been aided by the rapid succession of party leaders over recent years, and structural weakness has exaggerated the significance of the Party's problems with Ireland's own variant of the Militant Tendency, who are especially strong in Labour's youth wing. A number of trade unions, critical of the Party's performance, have threatened disaffiliation. However, whilst this might have a symbolic impact and some financial consequences, the majority of trade unionists do not presently vote Labour, thus the electoral consequences would be minimal.

The anti-coalitionists argue that Labour's participation props up a *Fine Gael* administration, affording Labour responsibility for unpopular Government measures, without any real power to implement its own policies. In reality, given the present alignments in Irish politics, Labour's coalition dilemma resolves itself into two stark options; either to give the country an alternative administration to that provided by *Fianna Fáil,* or

to remain an isolated and increasingly marginal party of permanent opposition. Ireland's modernisation has also posed problems for the two dominant electoral forces in Irish politics, *Fianna Fáil* and *Fine Gael*. Together, at the last general election, they attracted some 84 per cent of the first preference votes and won 145 of the 166 seats in the *Dáil*. Although traditional patterns of political affiliation have tended to survive the movement into the towns, electoral volatility is greatest in the Dublin area, where *Fianna Fáil's* traditional working class vote is under attack. The Party's vote in the Dublin constituencies fell by over 4% in the November 1982 election, *Fine Gael* becoming the strongest party in the capital.

*Fianna Fáil* spokesmen tend to present their party's difficulties in the Dublin area in organisational terms alone. However, the abortion amendment referendum threw an interesting light on *Fianna Fáil's* constituency; the Party has acquired a conservative image, particularly on moral issues—its supporters showing up as being increasingly older and rural, whilst the electorate is becoming predominantly younger and urban. This 'image' problem is not aided by the smouldering personal rivalries within the Party and the frequent controversy surrounding its leader, Mr. Haughey.

Under Garret FitzGerald's leadership *Fine Gael* has attempted to reflect some of the changes taking place in Irish society. The centre of gravity within the Party has shifted from the Right towards the Centre, prompting one stalwart fundamentalist to declare that *Fine Gael* is no longer the party of traditional values.[6] When Liam Cosgrave resigned from the leadership in 1977 the Party had 43 deputies. Today, *Fine Gael* can muster 70 representatives in the *Dáil*. This renewal at the parliamentary level has been accompanied by the rejuvenation of the Party's apparatus throughout the country. However, change has resulted in a more heterogeneous party; moral issues such as the abortion referendum highlighting the distance between *Fine Gael's* liberal and conservative wings. FitzGerald, in his speech to last year's party conference emphasised the electoral advantages of *Fine Gael's* new strategy, and in a thinly veiled rebuke to dissidents, asserted that—'. . . this broader spectrum of support means accommodating ourselves to a wider range of views than was necessary in the past.'[7]

Social change has thrown up other political forces. The Workers Party, with two seats in the *Dáil*, is presenting a strong challenge for Labour's urban electorate, particularly in Dublin. The Workers Party has its origins in the official *Sinn Fein;* it is a marxist party, having renounced nationalism and emphasising the need to overcome sectarian divisions in the North so as to allow the development of class-based politics. In the South, the Workers Party calls for a political realignment, claiming that the true coalition should be between *Fianna Fáil* and *Fine Gael*. Thus, they claim not to be seeking Labour's votes, rather a constructive relationship between the two parties of the Left. However, their marxism is too heady a brew for many in the Labour Party, ruling out any relation-

ship in the immediate future. The Workers Party has undoubtedly picked up support from beyond Labour's constituency, though their condemnation of the present coalition should be set against their own 'pragmatic' support for Mr. Haughey's administration a few years ago.

Provisional Sinn Fein has announced its intention to pursue a planned offensive at the ballot box in the Republic; though, as at Westminster, the organisation's present policy is to refrain from taking up any seats obtained in the *Dáil.* The electoral impact of *Sinn Fein,* except under special circumstances, is likely to be minimal. However, their score of 7% in last November's Dublin by-election, together with the extension of *Sinn Fein's* 'community politics' to Dublin's inner city areas, has provoked concern. Against a backdrop of recent terrorist incidents, Government ministers have refused to meet with any local delegations including *Sinn Fein* councillors.

A difficult period of adjustment to the strains imposed by modernisation has been exacerbated by the impact of recession. The Coalition claims to be grappling with the problem of unemployment though, its critics might argue, without gaining a firm purchase upon the subject. The Coalition partners' differences on economic policy promise difficult choices in the months ahead. Fudging the issue will leave the Coalition open to the criticism that it is more intent on surviving than on governing. Irish politicians must grasp the nettle of change. The political class has sometimes displayed an unwillingness to lead, abdicating this task in favour of vocal pressure groups. The postponement by the Government of local elections due in June of this year, indicates a certain reluctance to face up to the electorate. This summer's European elections have been seized upon by *Fianna Fáil* as a mid-term national test of the Government's popularity.

The Northern question is likely to occupy a prominent place in the minds of Dublin's politicians, following the publication, during early May, of the report of the New Ireland Forum. This document represents a major new initiative and is the outcome of nearly a year of deliberation and evidence gathering. The Forum's work has thrown an analytical spotlight on the social and economic costs of the violence and unrest in the North.

The Forum, initially greeted by cynical observers as being little more than a life-belt for John Hume's SDLP, has proved itself to be of greater significance. It has brought together the leaders of the four constitutional nationalist parties to address the future of Ireland as a whole. It has made Southern politicians look at their own society from a new perspective.

The Forum's report, characterised by Dr. FitzGerald as being 'not a blueprint but an agenda', sets out three options for the future political configuration of the Island: a unified state; federal government; or joint sovereignty over Ulster exercised from London and Dublin. The option of a unified state remains the preferred choice. This reflects the need to present an agreed report: consensus requiring a compromise to *Fianna*

*Fail,* the traditional bearers of the mantle of nationalism. However, the Report emphasises the need to obtain the consent of the North's Protestant community for any new constitutional arrangements and asserts that their legitimate rights should be safeguarded. Much must depend on the response that the Forum's report provokes from London. The British Government's initial reaction has been cautious and mixed—in marked contrast to the predominantly favourable reaction from the British press. Britain's reticence may prove the rock upon which the Forum founders. Should no comparable initiative emerge from London the new-found consensus amongst the South's political parties may soon fragment. The Forum has seemingly 'shaken up' the mixture of Irish politics, though if left to stand this blend of options may again settle into its component parts. Mainstream politicians in Belfast, Dublin and London bear a heavy responsibility; if the constitutional path is blocked the gunmen will seize upon the opportunity to proceed with their own 'remedy', so escalating the toll of violence. Words must be followed by actions on the part of the Dublin Government. The Forum stopped short of endorsing Dr. FitzGerald's 'Constitutional Crusade' to remove from the Republic's Constitution those clauses inimical to the North's Protestants. This process must continue if the Dublin politicians are to be seen as meaning what they say.

Ireland is a nation in transition. There is a growing disjunction between the political system and the society it seeks to represent. The political institutions and cleavages of a small, conservative and predominantly rural nation, must come to terms with the demands presented by a more modern, youthful and liberal society. This is the challenge facing Ireland's politicians for the 1980's.

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1. For the controversy surrounding Charles Haughey, see Joe Joyce and Peter Murtagh, *The Boss* (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1983).
2. *The Irish Times,* 9 September, 1983.
3. *The Irish Times,* 18 October, 1983.
4. See Olivia O'Leary, *ibid.,* 8 December, 1983.
5. The new Minister for Labour, Mr. Ruairi Quinn, reported *ibid.,* 14 December, 1983.
6. Mr. Oliver J. Flanagan's words, reported in an article by Dick Walsh, 'The Change in Fine Gael', *ibid,* 22 September, 1983.
7. *Ibid.,* 24 October, 1983.

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[Jonathan Marcus has written widely on contemporary West European politics and is a frequent visitor to Ireland. He is currently working as a research assistant at the House of Commons.]

## POEM

### RHODES AND ASIA MINOR REMEMBERED

#### UNDER SAIL
from Hellas to the Asian shore

A gentle Zephyr filled our sails: at first
Each wave encountered sounded like a kiss;
But when Boreas blew, our caique *fled*
From Grecian Rhodes to Turkish Marmaris.

It is 27 sea miles from the harbour of the Greek island of Rhodes to the Turkish port of Marmaris, on the mainland of Asia Minor. It was from Marmaris that Sulaiman the Magnificent, in July 1522, launched an assault in overwhelming strength on the great fortress of the Knights of St. John at Rhodes. After a fiercely-contested siege lasting five months, during which both Turkish and Christians suffered appalling losses, Villiers de l'Isle Adam, the Grand Master of the Knights, was forced to agree to an honourable surrender, in accordance with which he, with his surviving Knights and servants-at-arms, sailed out past the Fort of the English Knights at the harbour entrance (below which *our* caique anchored) to seek, and eventually find at Valetta, a site for another island-fortress, over which the crimson-crossed banner of St. John would fly—and never again have to be lowered.

#### ASIA MINOR
A Brief History

Byzantium was master of this land
Long after Greece had given way to Rome—
Until the Anatolian Turks contrived
To snatch the crucifix from Saint Sophia's dome.

The magnificent domed church of Santa Sophia in Constantinople, built by the Emperor Justinian, and dedicated in A.D. 532 to The Holy Wisdom, was converted into a mosque by the Turkish Sultan Mehmet immediately after he had captured the city in A.D. 1453.

## THE TEMPLE OF ATHÉNE
Priene, Western Turkey

Below, a Turkish village slumbers in the sun;
Above, throughout the cricket-haunted day,
The grey-eyed Goddess in her desecrated shrine
Remembers Greece, and tastes its salt sea spray.

It would be difficult to imagine ruins that breathe more of the spirit of Classical Greece than those of Priene, which stand on a rocky ridge above a wide plain formed through the centuries, by the carelessly wandering river Maeander. Alexander the Great, in B.C. 334, while on his way to win the resounding victories that destroyed the Persian Empire, paused here and contributed generously to the building of the beautiful, but now ruined, Temple dedicated to the Goddess Athene. Since Priene possessed a harbour—for the Aegean Sea then lapped the base of the mountainside below the city—it is, perhaps, not too fanciful to imagine the Goddess savouring the salt sea air!

## KAVAKLIDERE

Come back, some wild-rose day in June, to where
A grove of poplars whispers all day long—
To where, despite the heat, the nightingales
Enrich the noonday silence with their song.

These lines describe a remote mountain valley in Eastern Anatolia, which I discovered by chance one summer day while looking for a rare crimson paeony. *Kavaklidere* means 'The Valley of the Poplars', and is the name of a famous Turkish white wine.

J. C. E. BOWEN

# THE SAD DECLINE OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE

## by John Elsom

IT may not seem to matter, since the state is tottering already, but a BBC presenter distinctly said, 'If I was you . . .' on March 25, 1984, and went on to compound the error an insert or so later with 'If that was so. . .' In Good Lord Reith's Golden Day, he would have received a curt note of dismissal and left to pack his dinner jacket in mothballs alone; but times being what they are, he was back on the same programme the following week, and the next, and the next presumably (although I could not bear to listen), forgetting his subjunctives all over the place, as if there were no much thing as family audiences and Standards to Maintain.

Gradually, the subjunctive is being withdrawn from service, like the sixpenny bit and branch lines, and of all the now familiar grammatical lapses, this is the big one, the one that matters. To carelessly split an infinitive harms no-one but oneself. And to start a sentence with a conjunction indicates nothing more than a somewhat breathy use of full-stops. To ignore the subjunctive, however, means that we no longer consider it important in our speech to separate fact from possibility, that which has happened from that which could occur—or prefer to do so in awkward parenthetical phrases, such as 'hypothetically speaking . . .' or 'theoretically'. 'Let's spray around a little conjecture!' said a friend of mine from the film world, as if wishes came in aerosol cans, not grammar.

Nowadays we few who care about such matters tend to blame the craze for self-expression in the 1960s for such losses. Kingsley Amis has complained that students arrive at university to read English Literature who cannot parse a sentence. But I suspect that 'self-expression' like permissiveness is blamed for far too much and in any case, was never quite what it seemed, not so much an abandonment of rules as an attempt to overcome obstacles, of which a pedantic attachment to grammar was one. It was a terrible experience to teach at a well-behaved secondary modern in the old days before self-expression, and to hear the sudden hush in the classroom as you entered, and to look at the ugly, second-rate textbooks, lovingly clad in brown paper, from which you were supposed to explain to thirty impatient kids how to talk and write to one another, that useful behavioural habit which you had suppressed by your presence. If that classroom atmosphere could be changed, where authority met resentment and neutralised it through boredom, then there was a chance, a slight chance, that syntax itself could be seen as something not negative and formal, but positive and playful—and the subjunctive could triumphantly come back into its own as a trick which extends the opportunities of speech.

But self-expression dwindled to laxness, and the end was forgotten by indulging the means, and having just laboriously explained the difference between 'was' and 'were' in the singular and plural senses, and pointed out that syntactically 'you' was a plural although factually you could be

singular, so that your pupils were not persistently grating your ear with 'you was', you were simply not in the mood to go on to explain that in some cases 'were' need not signify the plural at all but the subjunctive, as in the phrase, 'If I were you . . .' and retained its subjunctive inflexion, if the pronoun just happened to be plural, as in the phrase, 'If you were I . . .'—still less were you inclined to point out that the subjunctive marks the boundary between fact and fiction, reality and theory, and that the language which has lost its subjunctive has lost its soul. And in any case, the bell had gone.

It was simpler to say that the subjunctive was an anachronism, preserved in ceremonial phrases ('Long live the Queen!') and religious ones ('Peace be with you.'), but of no practical purpose whatsoever. In those days too, we were all for directness in speech. It was part of the post-war egalitarianism. To express yourself in too flowery a manner was suspect, as if you carried with you the manner and habits of the old world. How quickly Christopher Fry's plays fell out of fashion in the late 1950s, how tired Enid Bagnold's *The Chalk Garden* seemed in 1956, despite its respectful reviews, when compared with the angry tirades of Jimmy Porter! These changes in verbal usage could be interpreted politically, as if only decadent aristocrats had time to construct exquisite sentences, or socially, as representing the gaps in class and education which we were struggling to fill; but the effect was to simplify, popularise and clear the language of unnecessary clutter. Nor was that clutter just sound and fury, signifying nothing, for it did signify something which we were struggling to ignore or root out of our speech, the clutter of colonialism, of racism, sexism and sometimes that air of overwhelming charity which leaves the beggar worse off for receiving it.

A master at my old school always referred to Indians and Africans in the same breath as 'our dusky brethren', innocently, trying to teach us not to be racist. We pounced on such circumlocutions and tore them to shreds. 'Our'? The possessive? Over two-thirds of the world's population? He must be empire mad. 'Dusky'? Why the prissy euphemism? Why didn't he call them black, if he had to draw attention to their skins, if not, then by their nationalities? But the poor old master, who was trying so hard to be broadminded, had seen too many nations come and go, too many borders and frontiers changing, to be absolutely sure as to which was which. And 'brethren'? Why not 'sorority'? Only men can be brothers . . . and so on. But what angered us most of all about this inoffensive man who was only trying to do his duty was the care in which he kept reminding us that we should be tolerant, Christian and charitable, while all his verbal nuances proclaimed the inheritance of a bigotry to which none of us, his pupils, could ever aspire.

All of that had to go. And with it, something else, the use of language as a means of defence or attack, not in straight battle, but in unfair snobbery. Those who looked, from our angle, like losing the battle sought the high ground, and the high ground in English was less clearly marked than in German, where High German contrasts so strongly with

the vernacular. In Germany, throughout this century the vernacular has mounted an assault against High German, which was accordingly driven into tight little enclaves of reaction. In English, however, the high ground was defined partly by verbal usage, but more by the pervasive irony, that other English vice, which finds little put-down phrases to discourage enthusiasm, commitment, passion and anything else too inconvenient for the order of the state. Noël Coward, who so abruptly fell out of fashion in the late 1950s, was a master of the high ground, if of nothing else. He could make Surbiton sound like a dirty rag dragged in by the dog—and Norfolk? 'Very flat, Norfolk'.

Language can be warfare and military campaigns are waged over syllables. Those of us who smarted on the plains, raked by the guns of irony from the cliffs above, comforted ourselves with the thought that it was only position which gave them the advantage—not what they actually said. Draw them down from their eyries and these eagles of sarcasm would be no better than pigeons. On the plains below, we revelled in our new simplicity of language, no rank, no side, except that even we had a snobbery of a kind, for we affected to despise those who needed to seek the high ground. Wasn't it a sign of retreat? Unable to conquer us at sea level, they had run to the mountains and were living rough in desolate caves in Eastbourne and Hove, clinging to forms and customs, which had long since lost their meanings. High English was a mark of inferiority, even when it held useful little habits like the subjunctive. We on the plains compensated for any lack of subtlety by straight-from-the-shoulder, man-to-man and woman-to-woman crudity. The subjunctive, we concluded, had no balls.

The significance of a war can be measured not just by the gains and losses of the winners and losers, but also by the sudden disappearance of those who were scarcely involved in the battle at all, but ran away, were trampled underfoot or were simply bypassed by the campaign and thus proved to be irrelevant. The war pushes aside that which is of no concern to it, and for the next generation or so, and maybe forever, the countryside is so scoured by its trenches and ambuscades that the absences are not noticed or held to be of little importance. Countries become involved in wars where there is no advantage to themselves, either in winning or losing, simply because they do not want to be overlooked. And so it is with language. The subjunctive was overlocked because it was of little usefulness to either side. It was left behind in its quaintness and confused construction, and when the war was over, if it be over, there was little left of it to be found...

...and yet that little, fossilised in small stones of habitual phrases, speaks of another world lost as eloquently as the footprint of the first man ever to walk upright...

...for we have now become the prisoners of fact. Our language has adjusted itself to emphasise fact, which is one form of perception, over all others. The victory of plain speaking over high English left us intolerant of that which could not be expressed plainly, of that which had

not palpably demonstrated itself as 'fact'—and fact became the test which we now apply to all other kinds of understanding.

Let me offer an example. A series of Guides to Literature has recently been published, under the title, *Literature in History*. These are informative and useful books, and I would not want (nor have I space) to quibble with its scholarship, only with its general approach. They all start from the same premise—that all works of art can only be properly understood if they are seen within the context of their times. We need to know something about the politics of the period, the economic movements and social conditions, before we can understand what the writers are writing about. It sounds very reasonable, until we start to consider its implications. History is being presented to us as 'fact', literature as opinion commenting on the 'facts'. But unfortunately, history is not 'fact': it is the work of historians drawing what conclusions they can from the evidence available. History is an imaginative process undertaken by historians, akin to other forms of writing. The facts chosen by Namier to consider were vastly different from those of other historians of the period, just as his methods and conclusions were different. If we start to believe that 'history' is 'objective' in a way that 'literature' is not, then we are drawn into making assumptions about these two activities which discredits them both. Writers too can be objective and tell the truth about the facts of their times, which they perceive more immediately than historians writing a few hundred years or a few hundred days later. Historians on the other hand not only can and should, but must, use their imaginations. We could easily and with greater justification reverse the title of the series (although it would have to be a different series) and talk about *History in Literature*.

But we don't. We prefer to maintain the fiction that 'fact' is of pre-eminent importance, that it exists, that it can be established without controversy and that fact embodies the truth of our lives, unlike thought, imagination and sensitivity which do not. And linguistically we stress this attachment to fact by withdrawing the subjunctive from service, so that even if we wish to rebel against the tyranny of fact, we lack the means to do so. We have to lie, speak fantastically, exaggerate, indulge ourselves in metaphor to distinguish something which is an imaginative hypothesis from its linguistic form which offers it as fact. And of course, after a time, since there is no difference in the verbal form, the distinction between fact and hypothesis becomes a little blurred in our minds, and when we wish to convey simply a factual message, we have to stress what we are doing with awkward little phrase, such as 'Objectively speaking . . .', 'to tell the truth . . .' and 'if you study the facts. . .'

Does it matter, since the state is tottering already? Well, I've been conscientious over the past few months. I've tried to discover what the miners' strike is all about. It's not just about the closure of one Yorkshire pit, it's not about the phasing of the closure of uneconomic pits, it's not simply about whether the uneconomic pits should be closed or not, or about what is meant by 'uneconomic'. It's not simply a battle

against Mrs. Thatcher, or vice-versa, or of 'miner against miner'. It's not just a battle between capitalism and socialism—or communism. It's not just Arthur Scargill's fault—or Mr. McGregor's. It's not just Yorkshire versus Nottinghamshire, or the TUC versus the CBI. It is, as far as I can tell, the clash between one hypothesis about our future and another—except that neither side will allow that their points of view are hypotheses. They present them as fact. You cannot count the number of times that the phrase has been used. 'The facts are these...' And by confusing fact with hypothesis, then language starts to spiral downwards into mere fantasy—Thatcher or Scargill become fascists, the police or the pickets are thugs who want to plunge Britain into a neo-nazi state, Auschwitz is around the corner...

Well, even the subjunctive can't stop people from making fools of themselves, but I can't help wondering whether if we'd been more conscientious with our teaching of grammar in the '50s and '60s, the state might totter more slowly.

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[John Elsom's adaptation of *Malone Dies*, the second novel in Samuel Beckett's trilogy, written between 1947 and 1949, will be presented during the 1984 Edinburgh International Festival at the Church Hill Little Theatre on August 21 and 22, 1984 directed by John Elsom with Max Wall in the title solo role.]

# TOPOLSKI'S MEMOIR

## by Michael Leech

THE gloomy arches beneath the railway at Waterloo would seem a grim place to present an artist's work. This latest venture of the Greater London Council is no shabby art market, or selection of spurious works hung on railings, however. It is in effect a brand new gallery—dedicated to the work of one man, Feliks Topolski.

The artist himself has always been closely associated with this area and his studio is a few steps away beneath another brick bow of the former Southern Railway. It looks like an art warehouse—dusty, dim and littered with unfinished works. The new gallery is housed under these same Hungerford Railway Arches but like its neighbour, a new restaurant, it presents a gleaming face—no doubt this linear patch of urban ugliness needed a lift, and the GLC saw a double purpose in cleaning it up. The entry, with large dramatic type reading *Feliks Topolski—Memoir of the Century,* is next to a sort of show window through which one can see something of the extraordinary melée of works within. With the grimy trains caterpillaring above and the flat, baleful façade of the Shell building beyond, it gives a sudden lively lilt to the South Bank, and since entry is free it ought to provide a popular entertainment for the many sandwich-munchers of mid-day as well as more serious gallery visitors. The show is permanent and, we are promised, constantly changing, as long as Topolski is around to effect more additions and perhaps erasures. On the day I went he was watching people come and go, a genial gnome under the cone of his grey fur hat, ever curious to hear dropped remarks or to watch faces as they surveyed his canvas.

For a canvas it is—although composed of many faces and impressions from a long life of travel and constant observation. Painted on a variety of media the works spread and jostle over wall and partition and stretch at times onto the ceiling and around corners.

The impression formed, as probably intended, is of the stream of images received by all of us at every moment of the day, yet rarely recorded. In this continuous and contiguous parade Topolski never lets up on energy and invention. Much of the area may seem scratchy, sudden, ill-planned, yet if for 'memoir' one reads 'diary' (which it also seems to be) and since a diary is by nature random, private impressions, then this aspect falls neatly into line with the idea. Topolski's diary unlike most, however, is stuffed with famous faces and a host of these make up his memoir. This diary, like that of Oscar Wilde's heroine in *The Importance of Being Earnest,* is indeed intended strictly for publication. Just as well—it would be a shame if the old charmer kept all these gems to himself.

He is a consummate observer. You can't help doing the recognition game as you wander round this maze of paint. Every so often a famous face leaps out across a space—a leering Sacha Guitry, a pain-pinched

Valéry, an Augustus John with bathroom-paper eyes. They are sometimes mere caricatures, at other times subtle portraits, as with the large canvas of Baroness Budberg scattered with eagles and crests, or the commanding face of Lord Olivier as Othello. At another turn you come across a stinging satire—the writer William Burroughs hovering hawklike over his naked lunch, a quirky-faced nude boy. Toyah Wilcox with strawberry hair and a tiny pinched raspberry of a mouth; Bernard Shaw like a Gothic statue (yet still talking) in mauves and greys; Iris Murdoch with stoned eyes; Jerzy Kosinski, jut-jawed in a frame of hair—they are all there, and more, all caught in Topolski's time trap. His ability as a caricaturist is uncanny, catching more than just the dominant feature as with cartoonists, for Topolski shades in subtle depths of character. In his notes for the exhibition the artist elucidates the two levels—the sense of parade to be immediately enjoyed as what he calls 'panoramic progression' followed by 'hints of the human-scale tragi-comedies'. In this comment he strikes an important note—Topolski's work is in essence a thing of theatre.

To assist the visitor there is a folder of notes which chart the progression of his life from birth in Poland early in the century, through two wars and the London blitz with side visits to Burma, Africa, India; on to the Vietnam war and vivid views of the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago; Asian trips, European journeys, South America—a view of the USSR and then the panoplies of British state occasions. All through this vast and jumbled procession faces lean out and because of their urgency it becomes at times impossible to take in the sweep of events the artist documents.

'*The Memoir* evolves naturally out of accumulated and overflowing testimony,' Topolski writes in an introduction that has been placed at the entrance. 'Its raw material; experiences, understood or enigmatic/on-the-spot drawings/to-and-fro associations/dreams. Never documentation of events unwitnessed. It is a painting, not a potted history—thus its chronology is skeletal and it oscillates between images and abstractions of memories'. His desire to be truthful and to depict events and people as he sees them is poignant. As you go forward, you carry this impression of the artist as a recorder and unique commentator. Topolski's comments are never blatant, but they tumble in over the viewer in a welter of tiny detail and an occasional grand heroic gesture as in the really beautiful procession of Youth.

The Memoir is carried out in carefully worked-out colour in a thematic range using a number of kinds of paper, cloth, canvas and board. There are abstract sections and he is not afraid to add bits of work on to an edge, to make a collage, or to stab, cut and slash material into shapes, or to frame a subject. He is wonderfully free in his use of materials and his modes of expression. In fact this ingenuity is one of the pleasures of *A Memoir of the Century*. On the debit side there are dense areas where the subjects seem drowned, but part of the reason for this could be the lighting which is not always very successful. Such a theatrical

spectacle could perhaps do with more of a touch of the theatre in its lighting.

In addition to the ongoing images there are some artefacts—a genuine cell door from old Newgate Jail at the entrance to a dark circle; a curious wheel; shining sheets of metal. There is also film of the 'Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II' now in Buckingham Palace and not on public view. Accompanied by a paean of music we see the panoply as the camera pans the long panorama, only reminded of the fact that this is a static work by the occasional gilded frame uprights. The Abbey seems wonderfully florid, almost Jacobean, finishing with the Queen like an hieratic figure with crown and orb. There is a sense of attending the event, and the feeling is only broken by the occasional rumbling of the landlord's conveyances overhead.

Some may find this look at one man's life too sombre and heavy; take time and let the whole thing take you in, reflecting on the realisation that Feliks Topolski has refined his art to the merest squiggle, to seeming jumbles of lines that still convey an impression at once economic and strong. A banal description of the event might be that it is an Aladdin's cave—but there is more than a touch of Pandora's box here too. Impressions linger—glowing African scenes, military men in South American capitals, a parade of punks, gaunt models in leather, a luxuriously draped dame in yellow somewhere in the Andes, a ganglia of figures menacing as bundles of barbed wire, an American politician like an ancient, begoggled iguana. Exotic and telling, livid and vivid—perhaps it's as well if these curious people from that valley between the artist and the caricaturist do stay safe in their embrasures beneath the brick arches of British Rail.

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Feliks Topolski's *Memoir of the Century* presented by the artist to the Greater London Council, is on permanent exhibition at Hungerford Railway Arches, a few minutes' walk from Waterloo Station, every day except Sunday from 5 to 8 p.m. There is no charge for admission.

## A FESTIVAL OF ART AND MUSIC

Each year Cyril Fradan opens his spacious studio in London's Holland Park to show new works. This is the sixth year of his own private festival during which on six days each week a musical programme is presented. Guests may wander round before and after the concert to view a showing of the artist's paintings—mostly acrylics and some crayon drawings. Entrance is free, open to all, and the objective is to sell the works—an idea he had originally to bypass the high commissions dealers charge in the West End galleries, often effectively doubling prices for an artist who has no other way of showing his work.

> I stayed for long periods in Venice in the early 'eighties (Cyril Fradan explains). These works are a direct result of what I've taken out of the Venetian experience with elements of buildings and sometimes water. It's gone in the direction of the abstract without human figures. I hope they convey the feeling you have in Venice of looking down narrow alleyways to a vision of sea. As with many painters that element of clear air played a part in earlier works, but with these colours the feeling tends to be London now—it's almost two years since I was in Venice. You are seeing with these new works two elements at the same time which keep on swapping, changing relationships. There should be a sense almost of breathing as they exchange places.

Of the thirty paintings plus drawings on display, all are recognisably Fradan in style—soft, shimmering effects, a pleasure in shaded shapes and sinuous line, a depth of glazing to give colour intensity on the often large canvases. The sense of Venice is subtly conveyed in ripple and reflection, across nacreous areas of pale colour as well as the angular dark stripes of abstracted buildings. He seems to be progressing towards his own form of individual impressionism, yet always with that curious air of mystery and magic, with melting areas of colour, often ravishing in intensity and hue, suggesting veiled curtains swathed about something yet to be revealed.

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[Michael Leech is a freelance theatre and art critic, contributing reviews and features to many publications in Great Britain and the US including *The Times* and *The Guardian.* His poetry has been published in the *New York Times:* his theatre articles in *The Stage, Plays and Players* etc.]

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

### by Rosalind Wade

*The Two of Us.* John Braine. Methuen. £7.95. *The Hawthorn Goddess.* Glyn Hughes. Chatto and Windus. £8.50. *Havannah.* Hugh Thomas. Hamish Hamilton. £9.95. *Thursday's Children.* Rumer Godden. Macmillan. £8.25. *The Wall Jumper.* Peter Schneider. Alison and Busby. £7.95. *Focussing.* Vickery Turner. Gollancz. £8.95. *Mycroft Memoranda.* Ray Walsh. Andre Deutsch. £7.95.

John Braine's new novel, *The Two of Us,* is a sequel to *Stay with Me Til Morning,* and it is interesting to speculate how often a second instalment of a novel comes across satisfactorily. The problem is that the reader who comes freshly to the sequence is vaguely aware of having missed out on some vital clues.

So it is with *The Two of Us.* A nagging certainty lingers that the nerve-shattering affair between Robin Lendrick and Stephen Belgard, the strains of which for Robin's husband, Clive, in *Stay with me Til Morning* resulted in a heart attack, was stronger stuff than we are offered in *The Two of Us.* It can be fascinating to view the participants in a major domestic drama some time after the event. And yet, in this case, the persistent and often tedious pursuit of love seems to be of very secondary importance.

The characters are doughty Yorkshire men and women, set against a background of J. B. Priestley country which John Braine also knows so well. Industrious managers and company promoters' wives discontented with themselves and their surroundings are presented in lengthy dialogues and thought sequences. Sometimes, it is difficult to keep their identities clearly in mind, yet in their limited way they are convincing, and the continued domination of t'mill, from which for centuries the nation has derived much of its wealth, is not to be belittled or ignored. Tasteless interior decor, heavy meals and indifference to international politics or the activities of the Arts Council do not detract from the power of a Yorkshire community. So at any rate admits Stephen Belgard, now a successful TV writer, returning in search of his 'roots' to the moors after a brief session in well-heeled Surrey. Inevitably, he and Robin resume their relationship. The reunion has a bitter-sweet quality and cannot be expected to last, since Stephen now has a wife and baby son.

The activities of the Lendricks' daughter, the curiously named Petronella, provide a sub-plot, although the rebellious teenager is not very convincing and merely provides yet another stereotype for the adolescent portrait gallery. Yet despite some misgivings and reservations there is much to enjoy and admire in *The Two of Us* with its more measured and objective view of the John Braine scene. It would be unfair to admit that we are still hoping for a return to the brash self-confidence of his first novel, *Room at the Top* which, during the early fifties, like John Osborne's *Look Back in Anger* and Kingsley Amis' *Lucky Jim* became part of the mind's furniture.

And the wool trade dominates Glyn Hughes' novel, *The Hawthorn Goddess,* although in a different and far more sinister manner. In a remote valley of the Yorkshire moors, towards the end of the eighteenth century, a strangely volatile community lived at odds with itself and the outside world. At a time

when in other areas of the kingdom a civilised society wore fine clothes and patronised the Arts, the inhabitants of Holywell subsisted in conditions rather worse than those provided for their livestock. Yet there were strong basic religious convictions along with a robust acceptance of the inevitability of hell fire, responsible for the merciless persecution of anyone who did not conform to the Wesleyan code of conduct. Women were 'unclean' and no knowledge existed to make them otherwise. A hapless mother who concealed an illegitimate birth was subjected to degrading punishments. Lack of essential foodstuffs, medical care and even adequate shelter meant that quite young people hobbled around as incurable cripples. The lucky ones worked in their own homes to weave and produce the famous yarn and dyes which made possible the profitable export of Yorkshire cloth as far afield as Russia.

The action of the novel centres around Benjamin Greaves, founder of a famous line in Yorkshire woollens, who had built from his earnings the bleak mansion known as Makings Hall. It was a momentous day for all concerned when the village girl, Anne Wylde, was enrolled at Makings as a domestic servant. Anne had once been the local May Queen, and acclaimed as a popular local heroine, but now generally believed to be a witch. Her good fortune was certainly short lived, particularly as she became a desired sex object by Oliver, the poet son of Benjamin Greaves. Yet the pattern of such liaisons did not run true to contemporary form, for Anne refused to become Oliver's mistress over a long period of time and her only child was the result of brutal rape. Based on a true life story, this astonishing tale is told in deeply wrought, consistently satisfying prose. The historical detail is accurately conveyed without any sense of the obvious intrusion of 'period' atmosphere. It is a frank and often shocking account of a way of life not so far removed from our own times, and confirms Glyn Hughes' growing reputation as a major historical novelist.

Despite a veneer of politics and high society, Hugh Thomas also has an unsavoury tale to tell. *Havannah* is about the nineteenth century attempted conquest by the British of the island of Cuba. A group of noble lords, Lord Albermarle foremost among them, were eager to deploy the English fleet in pursuit of new colonies, particularly those which might yield a rich harvest for the slave trade. Logistic, transport and other problems did nothing to deter their enthusiasm for victory and ships were duly despatched, manned by brave, uncomplaining men living in deplorable conditions, exposed to undiagnosed diseases on landing. Thus was an Empire gained, and the narrator, young Tom Luxmore, son of a well-to-do Liverpool family, who accompanied the expedition, was innocent of doubts or misgivings. Despite catastrophic losses the campaign was deemed successful; yet, ironically, by parliamentary decree, Cuba as a British possession was returned to Spain and inter-trade prospered for generations to come. The early scenes, set in Liverpool, are interesting for their glimpses of the development of the cities' docks, canals and famous buildings. But when the scene shifts to the sea battles Tom Luxmore's recollections, with their interminable description of battles and war-strategy, tend to swamp him as a genuine personality.

Rumer Godden moves in a very different world and often it is the lives and problems of young people which concern her most deeply. *Thursday's Children* is the story of two young ballet dancers, Doone and Crystal Penny, offspring of crude and under-educated parents to whom the 'bally' is unknown and therefore dangerous territory. True, 'Ma' Penny pushed Crystal into 'dancing' as a kind of status achievement, with the result that the child

becomes affected and conceited, although finally winning through to success; but it is on the pitiful Doone that the action centres, a frail little boy, last-born of a sprawling family, who receives scant encouragement to develop his unexplained talent for music and dancing. The path is thorny. His lessons are arbitrarily cancelled and he is victimised and even whipped by the outraged 'Pa' Penny. Yet in the end, both he and Crystal achieve stardom, even dancing before the Queen, to the admiration of the belatedly converted Ma and Pa. There is nothing inherently improbable in this documentary-type novel with its meticulous attention to detail and accuracy. Obviously, child prodigies do emerge from the most unlikely backgrounds, are spotted by panels of conscientious judges and eventually make the top of the bill at Covent Garden. But it must be acknowledged that this account of the rise of two of them, embellished by lengthy and contrived conversations, does not always carry the necessary conviction. Once again, it is the problem of conveying exceptional talent onto the printed page.

*The Wall Jumper* is an unusual novel by Peter Schneider, a German writer who has lived in Berlin for a number of years, dividing his time between the two portions of what he calls his 'Siamese' city. To most people, Berlin is a territory divided by the killer wall, and a casual interchange of visits between the two sections is unthinkable. And yet *The Wall Jumper* describes a traffic of this kind, so apparently motiveless as to bewilder those whose task it is to monitor entry and exit. Nor does the difference in living standards—Western goods in the shop windows, the uncensored TV coverage—dismay those humble residents who wish, for their own private purposes, to retain a foot in both camps. This situation is unfolded in jerky, self-contained sections, unrelated to any basic plot. It seems not to matter, for what emerges is a curiously compelling picture of Berlin as it is today, remote from the decadent climate so memorably described in the early Isherwood studies. People are now permitted to leave East Berlin, the administration is more relaxed, and yet the wall, we are told, is being rebuilt. Peter Schneider, a widely acclaimed German novelist, has the ability to transmit all this and much more in a terse, immediate survey of all that is going on in this unique European double territory.

*Focussing* is a first novel which raises high hopes of excellence and originality. Told in the increasingly popular mould of the first person singular, it is the unusual story of an American film star, Leon Pike, who marries a run-of-the-mill journalist working on a London suburban newspaper. The journalist, née Alex Zebedee, is a bright young person, though without outstanding talent and when, after encountering Leon and his children on a trans-American train journey, she pursues him to his hotel in the hope of a drink or square meal, she could not have anticipated that he would propose marriage. But marriage it was to be and the problem was that Leon, following the pattern of at least one USA film actor, turned with considerable success to politics; whereupon, the trouble began. Alex would seem never to have been genuinely in love with Leon: his first wife, Katerina, continued to live with them in the palatial Californian villa, making for an uneasy triangular relationship, and the trips on location filming were to the young Englishwoman unbearably tedious and uncomfortable. With Leon's successful transition to a more serious role at the heart of USA affairs, Alex's indifference turned to resentment, even though Leon still desired her companionship and wifely support. Thus, turned in upon herself, Alex became immersed in a strange personal area of research—the whereabouts and identity of a long lost

Zebedee uncle who had disappeared from family view at some time after the Spanish Civil War. Her search reaches the proportions of an obsession, so that her sanity is in question, coupled with her determination to leave Leon in California and return to England. It even involves a physical attack on a man she believes to be the missing uncle and a prison sentence in Switzerland follows. All this and more is accepted by the stoical Leon, yet to no avail, and the last we see of Alex, after an explanation of the long drawn mystery, which proves to be something of a damp squib, is boarding a plane—not to Washington where Leon eagerly awaits her, but presumably to her native England.

Through numerous flash-backs and time changes the scene builds up. The background of the thirties Croydon family home, in contrast to the luxury of Beverly Hills, is full of interest. The pity is that the same cannot be said for Alex. The autobiographical style of novel may be revealing of much which is barred from an objective narrative, yet it has its limitations. Vickery Turner has been unable to find the right 'voice' for her heroine, that is to say if we are intended to like and sympathise with her. She comes through as a drearily arrogant person of limited talent or appeal, unable or unwilling to respond to Leon's genuine need of her loyalty and approval.

And finally, yet another attempt to discover a solution of the nineteenth century Jack the Ripper murder mystery. In *Mycroft Memoranda* Ray Walsh introduces an original diversion by bringing in the legendary fictional detective Sherlock Holmes and his companion, Dr. Watson. Although this device might seem to have threatened any suggestion of verisimilitude, it proves to be less fanciful than might have been supposed. Had Holmes been a real person Queen Victoria might well have called upon his services, particularly as rumour had fastened on a royal suspect. Ray Walsh uses Holmes and Watson as a useful monitoring system to record the facts in so far as they actually are known from police reports and records at the London Hospital. A valuable exercise, considering the wealth of fantasy and speculation which has grown up around the identity and motives of the sadistic killer of East End prostitutes.

Sherlock's elusive brother, Mycroft, is also in the picture, a useful sounding board, assumed as he is from sporadic mention in the Conan Doyle stories to be 'high up' in the government. It is scarcely surprising that successive generations have been intrigued by the half dozen or so bestial murders which ended as abruptly as they began. Although it is generally acknowledged that no satisfactory explanation will ever present itself it is natural that amateur criminologists will go on trying. Ray Walsh jumps in with an ingenious theory that the murderer was neither a Polish emigrant nor the Queen's cousin but Dr. Watson's brother, who sailed away to the other side of the globe before the police caught up with him. Did Watson and Holmes know? It seems that they did, after a confrontation at the scene of the last attempted murder. And certainly Watson suffered a nervous or mental breakdown, nursed by the real Dr. Conan Doyle, after which his memory of that horrific encounter became mercifully blurred. It is not—it cannot be intended to be—a final comment and there will be many more. Inevitably, *Mycroft Memoranda* has some spoof elements yet it provides provocative and interesting light relief.

**Also received:**

*So Say Banana Bird.* Jon Wynne-Tyson. Pythian Books. £8.50. The strangely titled *So Say Banana Bird* is a first novel by the publisher Jon Wynne-Tyson. It is a straightforward and interesting story of Caribbean comic-opera politics as seen from the vantage point of a literary man's inexperience. There are

also emotional and personal tensions, and the whole picture adds up to an absorbing piece of escapism.

*Best of Friends.* Kathleen Conlen. Hodder. £8.50. An established and justly praised novelist, Kathleen Conlen, has chosen an unusual theme for her eighth novel, *Best of Friends.* This is the value of friendship between women by comparison with the stronger motives of passionate heterosexual love. Perhaps a little over long, it is nonetheless a carefully wrought study of the different ways in which people form attachments.

*Rubicon One.* Dennis Jones. Hutchinson. £7.95. Dennis Jones, a novelist specialising in war themes, has chosen for the background of his new novel, *Rubicon One,* the strife-torn Middle East. With Israeli Elections so recently held the theme is one of topical interest. As always, Dennis Jones weaves a credible story from espionage and counter-intelligence activities.

*Solitudes.* Goffredo Parise. (Translated by Isobel Quigley). Dent. £7.95. In *Solitudes* Goffredo Parise, winner of the Italian Strega Prize in 1982, has produced a highly readable collection of short stories and sketches deployed in an unusual manner. All are linked to the condition of solitariness under different headings, i.e. 'Happiness', 'Laziness', 'Melancholy' etc. In her introduction Natalia Ginsborg analyses and explores the varied scope of the work.

# NON-FICTION REVIEWS

## THE VIEWS OF ALEXANDER HAIG

*Caveat.* Alexander M. Haig Jr. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.95.

General Haig's use of words was at one time derided by diplomats. He was credited with a jargon of his own known as 'Haigspeak'. There is nothing of 'Haigspeak' about this poignant book (more about its poignancy in a moment). The writing is quite excellent. It is what the late Victor Gollancz would have called an unputdownable narrative. Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador in Washington during the Falklands crisis, has suggested in print that if it had not been for the activities of Haig, the American Secretary of State, the indispensable support for the war would not have been forthcoming from the United States. The majority of the British public have, up until now at least, approved the general line of Mrs. Thatcher before and during the war. Her attitude since the war may or may not be so popular. Those who feel this way should look upon General Haig as one who has rendered exceptional service to Britain.

Certainly no one could be more enthusiastic than he is about Mrs. Thatcher. She was by far the strongest, the shrewdest and the most clear-sighted player in the game. It is the Leader who, knowing where the true interest of the nation lies, perseveres in his principles who deserved the name of statesman. Mrs. Thatcher belongs in that company.' Unfortunately for Haig, the American President and his closest advisers did not see Haig's services to the British cause in quite that light. Haig soon found himself resigning. Even if he had wished to he could not have long survived.

Which brings me to my description of this book as 'poignant'. Anyone who resigns from a lofty office after eighteen months without ill-health or any difference of principle must be regarded either as a failure or as very ill-used. Haig certainly feels that he was very ill-used. He is scrupulously loyal and indeed generous in what he says about President Reagan: 'As the end of his

first term approaches, it is possible to say that he has contributed greatly to the revival of America's confidence and pride in itself, and in the restoration of the economy and in beginning the process of rebuilding the nation's military strength'. 'Thanks to the President's fundamental good judgement and his many acts of political courage the United States is stronger now than it was in 1980, its voice is more clearly heard and on the whole more clearly understood. . . .'

But he goes on to say that 'in the conduct of foreign policy President Reagan has accepted *flawed* (my italics) results. This did not have to be. It need not continue. Indeed, it must not continue'. He implies that at the highest level of foreign policy the situation in Washington is fairly chaotic. His solution is simple. 'The President must decide who will be his vicar'. It does not matter whether the vicar is the Secretary of State or the National Security Adviser or some other official. 'What does matter is that the person chosen by the President must be seen to have his total confidence and that he be his sole spokesman.'

When Haig accepted the position of Secretary of State he was under the impression that he himself would possess the President's confidence in just this way. In the event that never came about. From the beginning he was kept at arm's length from the President by the latter's intimate advisers Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver. The one thing he wasn't was the President's 'vicar'.

It is a hard luck story unless one reminds oneself that Haig had had an extremely sophisticated experience of life on the highest level. He had more or less run the White House in the last days of the Nixon decline and fall. One is left wondering how a man of such experience and seeming astuteness should have been guilty of so much naiveté. One is left reflecting that soldiers seldom succeed as politicians. Eisenhower is a glorious exception. But then he was always described as a political soldier. The Duke of Wellington is in this, as in all other matters, a law unto himself.

FRANK LONGFORD

## GRIEVANCE AND TERROR

*The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.* Jillian Becker. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.50. Eight illustrations; two maps.

Jillian Becker is a novelist; but it was her best seller, *Hitler's Children* on the Baader-Meinhof that established her reputation as an authority on international terrorism, the curse of our times.

With signal courage and endurance of hardship she travelled the tortured Lebanon, slept under fire and found that not all was as was featured in the mass media of the world. In the 1980s, as in the 1840s, (remembering those days the Druses made no attack upon the British contingent in the multinational peacekeeping force) Western Christians showed ignoble indifference to the sufferings of co-religionists who were often stigmatised as 'Rightists'.

The history of the Middle East is the history of massacre. Many who rightly condemned the Lebanese President's private militia, the *Kataeb*, and Israeli neglect, for the atrocities in the Sabra and Chatilla camps in September 1982 never mention the greater massacre of Christians at Damour in Epiphany 1976.

The 'Butcher of Damour' was Zuhaya Muhsin, chief of the Syrian-backed *al-Sa'iqa*, one of the several terrorist bands comprehended by the PLO. The organisation was founded in 1964 by President Nasser in furtherance of

Egyptian aims. It was intended not so much to fight Israel as to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Another PLO faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, twice attempted the life of King Hussein who in 1970 crushed the *fedayeen* with Bedouin troops.

When President Sadat executed his *volte-face*, expelling his Soviet advisers from Egypt and turning to the West, Moscow, despairing of finding a reliable Arab ally, resorted to the PLO instead. In 1972 the Russians began regular deliveries of arms; in 1974 Yassir Arafat was first invited to Moscow and then, with Soviet sponsorship, to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly—an armed warrior in the temple of peace. Covenanted to destroy a member state of the United Nations, the PLO yet achieved a degree of diplomatic recognition and international respectability. It has trained Irish and Libyan terrorists; but has its mission in London. Oil talks. As for the oil states of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, they have financed the 'vanguard of the Revolution' whose murderous technique and elaborate structure are detailed in this well documented account of a meteoric and bloody history.

Those are a nation who feel themselves to be a nation. The Palestinians manifestly do. For Israelis to deny them the right to self-determination would be to dishonour the philosophical and spiritual basis of Zionism itself. They cannot accept an irredentist PLO state. Camp David did however point a way to the replacement of Israeli military administration on the West Bank and in Gaza by Arab authority, to 'full autonomy' and an eventual right to secede from Israeli rule.

'The tragedy of the Palestinians is that they were led by people who despised or were devoid of political realism.' They were manipulated in their misery. Soviet patronage of the shattered PLO continues. The Russians strive to close the rift between Arafat's old guard and the Abu Mussa faction favoured by Damascus. Jillian Becker concludes that 'If hope lay anywhere it was in the dissolution of the PLO.'

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

## AMERICA TODAY

*The Book of America: Inside Fifty States Today.* Neal Peirce and Jerry Hagstrom. Norton. $25.

For anyone about to visit the U.S., who has by a miracle a large empty space in his kitbag, this book is an essential *vade mecum*. There is a summary and analysis of every one of the 50 states, each reduced to a pen portrait in some 25 pages. It draws, however, on a vast archive of material, and is indeed the nearest there is to a new edition of John Gunther's *Inside America* of forty years ago.

It is impossible to summarise so sustained, meaty and evocative a book. It makes plain how far from a monolith America is. One culture, one mass market, one citizenry, yes; Macdonalds hamburger chain, Holiday Inns and Sheratons coast to coast, certainly. But how distinct and variegated the fifty states are. Some are growing in population at remarkable rates: Nevada, Arizona, Florida and Texas and the Sunbelt generally, but Alaska also. But this pattern has not been uniform: i.e. the 'Black Belt' areas of Mississippi and Arkansas, Georgia and Tennessee have not shared in the South's growth; some areas of the North, notably those helped by the high-technology industries of outer Boston, have had a renaissance of their own. But there has been also a distinct emphasis from coast to coast on urban renewal, and alongside it a movement of population into rural areas, even if they take urban or

suburban life-style with them into the Ozarks of Missouri or Michigan's upper Peninsula.

The book is equally vivid on City and State politics, with the emergence of younger manager-type executives. It would appear that the days of colourful and exotic and diverse personalities are passing, of men like Harry Byrd in Virginia, John Lindsay in New York City, Richard Daley in Chicago—and of the Kennedys. And Blacks are now making a mark in politics, as mayors, and even in the person of Jesse Jackson on the federal scene. This book is a testament not only to a constantly changing country but to the constant changes in every one of the component states, and to their remarkable and captivating diversity.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## MARGOT ASQUITH

*Margot: A Life of the Countess of Oxford and Asquith.* Daphne Bennett. Gollancz. £12.95.

Macaulay said of Warren Hastings that he was 'tried by both extremes of fortune and never disturbed by either'. Margot Oxford was certainly tried by extremes of fortune. The great break in her glorious career occurred at the end of 1916 when she was 52. Asquith was removed from the Premiership. She could never accept the fact that his dismissal had any possible justification. She never forgave those concerned. But four years later she was emerging as a popular author in her own right. On the publication day of her first volume of autobiography there was a 'rush to buy the book.' Before the end of the following day it was a best seller. 'Very soon Margot was in the bewildered state of not knowing whether to believe the vitriolic abuse of some papers or the wild congratulations of others.'

Daphne Bennett in this absorbing biography records: 'As the author of a successful book she began now to lean more towards the literary world where she was soon held in high esteem not so much for her talents but for her success, and many a struggling writer deeply envied her.' It was many years later when I met Margot, though I am not sure that she was aware of meeting me. By that time she seemed to me impossibly old though younger than I am at the time of writing. In those later years her physical charm which was once compelling had much diminished. But I am glad that Daphne Bennett is able to quote an impression formed by the actor and playwright Sir Basil Bartlett in July 1936: 'There is a small family party here (Herstmonceux Castle), and Margot Oxford. The odd girl is, as usual, in tremendous form. She told me this evening all about . . . her hatred of Lloyd George, and the glories of the late Victorian fancy-dress parties . . . She is an old horror, but has beautiful manners and great vitality and is, in general, very stimulating except at the Bridge table, where she becomes a menace . . .'. As a personality I cannot help comparing her whom I did not know with Nancy Astor whom I knew at one time very well. The same incredible vitality. The life enhancing quality. The provocative style which was tremendous fun as long as you were on the right side of her. I was interested, therefore, to read about the relations of these two astonishing women (Nancy being 15 years younger).

At first Margot found Nancy 'honest, open, warmhearted and kind' but when she heard that Nancy had said that Asquith ought to 'resign or be kicked out' she declared the friendship over and said of her 'she is a typical female of a noisy and light material without the instincts of a gentleman . . . no two people were ever born so differing in nature as Nancy and I'.

The great days which began when she and her sister captivated London society could never be recaptured once Asquith had been ejected from office. For eight years previously she had been the most striking woman who ever lived in No. 10 Downing Street (till Mrs. Thatcher arrived) and just about the most famous woman in England. But she had a lot to put up with. Asquith emerges in a more and more unattractive light, with every new account of his mania for friendships with young women. Daphne Bennett, I would think rightly, is convinced that he never climbed into bed with these young persons, but Margot suffered agonies nonetheless. She bore up nobly. Having once decided that Asquith was her 'god' she was not going to admit any defects. It is not necessary to accept all Daphne Bennett's verdicts. She insists, for example, that my wife is wrong in accepting Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's assertion that Blunt, greatest of amorists, successfully seduced Margot. In my, no doubt, biased view the evidence that Daphne Bennett produces for her conclusion seems to me somewhat slender. But it is one of the joys of this book that she takes us through the story at a splendid rate, yet scatters challenging assertions on page after page. Above all she brings Margot vividly and unforgettably before us.

FRANK LONGFORD

## WELLS AND SON

*H. G. Wells: Aspects of a Life.* Anthony West. Hutchinson. £12.95.

This fascinating biography of one of the best known writers of the first half of the twentieth century, H. G. Wells, possesses the advantages and disadvantages of having been written by his son. It is a species of family history as much as it is the story of a single life. Its opening section deals with the most controversial aspect of that life; the facts about Wells's much-publicised love affair with Rebecca West, a novelist of at least as great a fame as his own, even though her true genius was not fully realised until after Wells's death. If the account here given by their son seems to clear up all the misapprehension that has hitherto surrounded his birth and his parents' relationship it does so for two good reasons. One is that Anthony West has clearly inherited the gifts of both of them in the clarity and mordant wit he brings to bear on the story of his bizarre upbringing. The other is that he has spent many years of meticulous research to ascertain the accuracy of his childhood recollections, particularly of his early memories of his mother.

It is soon made clear that the affair was largely kept alive by Rebecca West. Her given name, Cicily Fairfield, early on transmuted by her into that of Ibsen's heroine from *Rosmersholm,* was thought inappropriate for a writer and, perhaps, even more unworthy of the misunderstood, romantic girl she saw herself to be. They were, in her account, star-crossed lovers, she struggling to help him retain his sanity, he depending on her when his unsympathetic wife and family failed him. The case was quite other than this and yet the legend as published in that form has persisted in many people's minds. In his valuable corrective version Anthony West has perforce given the lie to many of his mother's well-known fantasies woven round the lover-like figure of Wells, who cannot, in the nature of things, come out of the tale in a much better light than she does. Both of them were fantasists and fabulists on a grand scale.

Amongst his many lovers Wells must have had an especial regard for two of them; Rebecca West, mother of the boy who loved him and Amber Reeve, mother of the girl who did not. Amber's marriage precluded the possibility

that his daughter would ever know him as Anthony West did. As for Rebecca, Wells's treatment of her was, to say the least, unthinking. He announces that he will lend her his favours, but only to a strictly limited extent will she enter his private and still less his public life. The birth of her baby causes Wells to toy with the notion that they will thereafter be closer together and will even have a permanent home of their own. Rebecca, in enforced exile from London, gradually comes to understand that this 'promise' had merely been a kind of thinking aloud on his part; and that the pact which he had already made with his wife Jane about affairs of the heart still endured. The marriage did, indeed, possess a tensile strength which not only kept it firm for Jane and her two sons but suited Wells, the eternal philanderer, and did little to tarnish his ascendant fame. He could continue to play out this and countless other sexual dramas whilst the unmarried mother of his child had speedily to come down to earth. Small wonder that she couldn't manage the servants.

A strong admiration for his father causes the author of this biography to show up many of his mother's weaknesses in a fairly cruel light: but he surely had some reason for feeling thus since much of this young life was spent in uncertainty as to his identity and in listening to her plaints, as well as being actually 'punished' by her for the circumstances of his existence. There must have been in his unconscious mind a mythical guilt for having been born at all. It is 36 years since Anthony West began to write the book that was to be his revenge on his mother. His autobiographical book, *Heritage,* brought forth from Rebecca West *The Fountain Overflows,* an incomparably better transmutation of the painful experiences of early childhood than her son's bitter exercise in self-pitying reminiscence. Curiously, Anthony West seems almost blind to his mother's literary talent whilst blaming her for a lively imagination and self-dramatisation in her domestic dealings.

This book is certainly not a purely personal story. In it the author makes serious assessments of his father's many relationships with the literary and political figures of his age. Remarkable men and women such as George Bernard Shaw, the Sidney Webbs, Lord Beaverbrook, Teddy and Franklin Roosevelt, Lenin, Trotsky, Maxim Gorky (whose mistress was one of Wells's more lasting *inamorata*) are shown at work in his company and as recognising the genius of his ability to persuade the populace of his genuine desire for their welfare in a peaceful world. He bore the brunt of the drafting of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights after the Second World War, when he was ill and already failing. Nothing ever dimmed his belief in the essential goodness and peaceful intentions of human beings and for this reason his welcome in Russia as well as in America was always warm. His working class origins were no political disadvantage, except when he penetrated the thinly disguised patronage and pretensions of the Fabians whose downfall as a credible political force was largely owing to Wells's challenge of their shaky administrative arrangements.

Unfortunately for him, it was easily possible in the 20s and early 30s to discredit some of his most right-thinking enterprises by whipping up one or other of the all too obvious scandals that were almost made to measure for any enemy who happened along. But the author of *An Outline of World History* could not for long be discredited and he had to be reckoned with as a serious force in world politics as well as in English literature. His son has done full justice to this aspect of Wells's story.

BETTY ABEL

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**The South Country.** (Hutchinson. £6.95). Edward Thomas reached maturity as a poet in the war years before he was killed at Arras in 1917. He had written his prose work, *The South Country,* in 1907 when he was striving for recognition as an author. This is now reprinted with an Introduction by John Wain. Edward Thomas was devoted to the Sussex Downs and Southern England, which he knew intimately. Unlike the 'lands of wild coast, of mountains, of myriad chimneys' which offer no such welcome, 'the South is tender and will harbour anyone'. Mr. Wain refers to 'the peculiar emotional intensity of the passages of natural description' in this book. This applies also to his accounts of village life. Mr. Wain fairly points out *'The South Country* is not as interesting as Edward Thomas's poetry'. On the other hand, there is the spirit of poetry in his prose books. They deal with the same subjects and 'we hear in them, especially in the more mature ones such as this, the same voice that we are later to hear in the poems'.

**Sir Robert Taylor.** (George Allen & Unwin. (£10.95, Paperback £5.95). Mr. Marcus Binney has written the first and valuable account of the work and life of Sir Robert Taylor, 1714-1788, one of the most sought after architects during the eighteenth century. Today, he is little known or considered, due partly, as the author points out, 'to the remarkable lack of drawings and papers . . . the only sizeable groups of Taylor's drawings to survive are three volumes in the Taylor Institution in Oxford'. Furthermore so much of his work has failed to exist in its original design, or at all. In the result, Mr. Binney has sought and identified the great corpus of his achievement in this erudite study. Taylor is particularly associated with his development of the Palladian villa. In addition some of his finest work was in London, including the Bank of England, which has not survived in any great degree. Mr. Binney concludes that 'Taylor took Palladianism a long way down the road to neo-Classicism.' There are a large number of excellent illustrations.

**Boys Together** (Hutchinson. £15.00). 'English public schools 1800-1864' is the subtitle of this erudite study of life in the leading English public schools before the Clarendon Commission 1864 and the resulting and reforming Public Schools Act 1867. The schools in this most private and exclusive institution dealt with are Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Westminster, Winchester, Shrewsbury and Charterhouse. Eton receives proportionately the most attention because there are more records and information available. The pattern of each school is much the same. It is largely the story of uncontrolled brutality, bullying and cruelty between boys and often against outsiders, uncontrolled by the masters. Their interference was not tolerated. It is these early phases before reform 'which are the subject of this book, tribes of self-governing boys that waged irregular warfare, generation after generation, against titular adult overlords endeavouring to entrench upon their independence'. Even Dr. Arnold of Rugby did not eliminate this behaviour. He became a legend of authority nonetheless, striving to implant morality and religion into his pupils. As the author states, 'Arnold sought to control and change, and his chosen medium was not compulsory games, but compulsory religion'. He had an influence far beyond his own school, Rugby. Mr. Chandos has included a long and

valuable bibliography.

**Salerno.** (Hutchinson. £12.95 hardback). The Allied invasion at Salerno, which was intended to shorten the war in Italy, was very nearly a military disaster due to inadequate planning, preparation and a fundamental lack of liaison between the American and British and Commonwealth forces involved. Eric Morris has faithfully recorded the recollections of key combatants on both sides ranging from Generals down to Privates, bringing out fully the bravery displayed by the Allies in the face of adverse conditions. It is very apparent that important lessons were learnt at Salerno which were put to good effect in the Normandy landings ten months later. (M.H.)

**The Undiscovered Country** (Sawbridge Enterprises Ltd. £3.60). Is there life after death? In this very sincere study, Howard Murphet puts together the results of an investigation 'spread intermittently over a lifetime.' He concludes that 'the evidence is surely overwhelming' in favour of an after life, although he has to concede that 'most researchers agree that it cannot be proved by the rigid methods of modern science.' No doubt, the confirmed atheist will treat this volume as nonsense in its conclusions. Others will regard this wide ranging survey with much interest. He discusses, for example, the experiences of clinically dead patients who have recovered and the evidence of persons who have received messages from beyond. Incidentally he is critical of 'constant attendances at spiritist séances'. Re-incarnation appeals greatly to the author, and he deals at some length with the theosophists, Rosicrucian concepts, the Swedeborgia doctrines and the Eastern religions, including forms of Buddhism and the Tibetan Book of the Dead. Mr. Murphet attempts a description of what he believes the after life to be in the light of these beliefs. It is a study which provides much room for thought.

**The Good Film and Video Guide** (Consumer's Association and Hodder & Stoughton. £7.95.) Over 5,500 capsule reviews of films likely to turn up as Videos or on the TV screen. David Shipman's style is, as ever, engaging as he combines plot and comment in a few dozen words per film. Half the fun is to disagree with the star ratings he gives the films. (J.M.)

**Memory Hold the Door.** (Dent. £4.95). John Buchan's 'journal of certain experiences . . . rebuilt out of memory' was written in Canada, when Governor-General, in 1939 shortly before his death. It is now published in paperback, with a new Introduction by David Daniell. Although Buchan describes the chapters as 'brazenly egotistic', the book not intended as an autobiography; the external details of his life are not included. He describes the book as 'a record of the impressions made upon me by the outer world', during a life of great richness, variety and distinction in many fields from writer and novelist, publisher, soldier, to politician and Governor-General. His assessment of events and people, like Ramsay Macdonald, are of great interest. The background and sometimes the foreground of his life is nature and his love of the Scottish Lowlands. Mr. Daniel in his pertinent appreciation concludes rightly that the book 'is unique. Quiet and beautifully written in classically spare evocative prose, it catches at memory . . . and communicates it with a range of feeling'.

**The Power-House.** (Dent. £2.50). John Buchan's thrilling novel of a world conspiracy, involving intrigue, politics and villainy, was first published in 1916 and is now republished as a useful paperback.

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



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**Joseph F. Pilat**

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# Contemporary Review

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## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Joseph F. Pilat

THE security interests and sensitivities of the West Europeans—particularly the West Germans—were instrumental in the formulation and further evolution of the dual-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) taken by NATO on December 12, 1979. Four years later, deployment is proceeding as scheduled, while the Geneva INF talks have been 'discontinued' and anti-nuclear discontent is evidenced in all countries scheduled to receive the Euromissiles. This unstable situation could endure through the decade of the eighties, and full deployment is by no means ensured. Not surprisingly, fundamental questions about the future of the INF deployment, and the effects of the more probable INF outcomes on West European security, have arisen. Has West European security been endangered or enhanced by the INF process? Will the political costs of INF deployment outweigh any military benefits? Has the Alliance on which the defence of West Europe has depended for over three decades been seriously undermined?

These troubling questions are perhaps unanswerable; they are not unprecedented. All revolve around the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of NATO Europe, and reflect an endemic defence problem of the Alliance. Indeed, ever since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established, it has had a dependence upon US nuclear weapons for deterrence and, ultimately, defence that has been a source of recurrent tension and occasional controversy.

Once it was recognised that the force objectives for the conventional defence of Europe put forward at NATO's 1952 Lisbon Conference could not be realised for political and fiscal reasons, NATO adopted in 1957 a strategy that relied in the last instance on the threat of retaliation by US strategic and theatre nuclear forces. Publicly perceived as inflexible, this doctrine began to appear increasingly incredible, especially in light of Soviet deployments in the 1950s of intercontinental bombers and IRBMs targeted on Western Europe, and the Soviet development of ICBMs. In response to growing doubts about grounding NATO's defence strategy in 'massive retaliation', the US developed and demonstrated a range of strategic nuclear options, and deployed nuclear weapons in continental Europe or in adjacent waters to link the defence of the European theatre to the US strategic deterrent and to reassure the

Europeans of the credibility of extended deterrence. These doubts also engendered a host of abortive proposals in the 1950s and 1960s for a NATO nuclear force. Among them, only the Multilateral Force (MLF) was not stillborn, albeit it too ultimately was unrealised.

European concerns over the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and transatlantic differences over the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance persisted, and were exacerbated by US adoption of flexible response doctrine in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the Alliance itself adopted this doctrine in 1967. As NATO nuclear doctrine, flexible response embodied a fragile compromise between European interests in absolute deterrence (i.e., virtually automatic escalation to US central systems) and assured coupling to US strategic nuclear forces, and the American interest in avoiding immediate recourse to a strategic exchange with the Soviets in the event of conventional conflict in Europe.

The flexible response formulation, which remains NATO nuclear doctrine, was able to dim transatlantic differences over the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence primarily because of US nuclear superiority at both the strategic and theatre levels. But developments in the 1970s radically altered the Eurostrategic landscape. During the 1970s, the USSR achieved parity with the US in central strategic systems. Furthermore, with modernisation of Soviet intermediate-range forces, and in particular the introduction of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers, the balance of nuclear forces in the European theatre shifted towards the Soviets. The US had already undertaken a modernisation of its theatre nuclear forces. But under pressure from the Europeans, especially the FRG, NATO acknowledged the need to develop and deploy INF.

In May 1977, as part of its Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP), NATO established Task Force 10 to undertake a review of remedial measures required in the Alliance's theatre nuclear posture. This task force came under the aegis of the NPG. At the NPG meeting in October 1977, held at Bari, Italy, a High Level Group (HLG) was established at the urging of the FRG, whose growing concern about the Eurostrategic balance in the age of superpower strategic parity and SALT was eloquently stated in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977. The HLG was directed to address the need for the modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear forces, and the technical, military and political implications of various modernisation proposals.

After two years of deliberations in the HLG, during which the discussion of options came exclusively to focus on the long-range theatre nuclear systems preferred by the Europeans, a consensus was created within the Alliance. On this basis, a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of NATO decided on December 12, 1979, to modernise NATO's INF through the deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Belgium, the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. It was also recommended in a communique of December 12, 1979, that US-USSR arms control negotiations should

include certain INF systems and that the US should propose to the USSR to begin such negotiations in the near term. Finally, the unilateral withdrawal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe during 1980 was announced.

As indicated, European concerns about the Soviet theatre nuclear build-up, and about the credibility of US willingness to utilise its strategic nuclear forces in the defence of Europe, were crucial in the decision to deploy INF. European politicians and pundits held that INF were necessary to assure coupling and to preserve the viability of flexible response strategy, but understood that these NATO systems could not and need not mirror those of the Soviets. Clearly, the decision was driven by European concerns about the direction of the SALT negotiations, particularly their treatment of 'grey area weapons' such as cruise missiles, and the implications of those negotiations for America's commitment to the Alliance. It may also have reflected European concerns about the continued political existence of the Alliance.

Not only the need to deploy INF, but the capabilities of the systems to be deployed, the manner in which they were to be based and other aspects of the decision reflected West European security perceptions and domestic political constraints. This was evidenced by the rejection of sea-based options in the belief that the deployment should be land-based and visible in order to ensure coupling. It was evident in the decision to deploy systems capable of striking Soviet territory, which was also conceived as enhancing coupling. And, it was suggested by the decision to deploy 572 systems, which was held to be extensive enough to ensure the viability of flexible response but not (in the near term) to establish a Eurostrategic balance that would be suggestive of decoupling. Concerns about European domestic opinion were reflected in the perceived necessity of fusing the INF modernisation proposal to an offer to initiate arms control negotiations; the choice of single-key systems (which was also affected by financial concerns, notably in the UK); and the requirement that the FRG should not be the only non-nuclear-weapon state member of NATO to accept deployment.

In this light, it would appear that the dual-track decision was tailored to West European security interests. However, if the Europeans sensed triumph, it was ephemeral. The fragile consensus created within the Alliance on INF modernisation was threatened almost immediately. The divergent security interests of diverse allies asserted themselves in varying interpretations of the 1979 decision. Morover, it has been noted that the multinational nature of the modernisation track of the decision coupled with the bilateral nature of the arms control track inevitably provided a tenuous foundation for the decision. More direct factors were involved, however, including the deterioration of East-West relations in the aftermath of Afghanistan, which was furthered by events in Poland and, most recently, by the downing of the South Korean airliner; the decline of detente and the demise of SALT II; the perception in Europe of a 'nuclear warmongering' Reagan Administration contemplating limited

nuclear war in Europe; the direct Soviet involvement by 'carrot' and by 'stick' in the European nuclear debate, most obviously in their overt interference with the March 1983 German *Bundestag* elections, in their withdrawal from the Geneva negotiations, and in their threats of counter-deployments against the US and Western Europe.

In the shadow of these developments, the dual-track decision has taken on a different cast, creating deep rifts in West European domestic politics. The domestic political stability of Belgium, the FRG and the Netherlands has been eroded by vociferous anti-nuclear minorities among their publics and in their parliaments. And, in the wake of massive anti-nuclear demonstrations throughout Europe, politicians and political commentators in the US and Europe have become less sanguine about resolving NATO's nuclear problems through deployment of the Euro-missiles. Indeed, for the FRG and other non-nuclear members of NATO, their unprecedented role in the decision on the INF modernisation has created considerable domestic political difficulties that have clouded the dual-track decision's original military-strategic intent to ensure coupling and to enhance the credibility of NATO nuclear doctrine. This has been evidenced in the conditions West European governments placed upon the NATO decision, and in the manner in which the priorities of the two tracks have been perceived and presented in domestic circles particularly sensitive to the resurgent European nuclear disarmament movement. Particularly damaging to the future military requirements of the Alliance has been the tendency to justify the Euromissiles in public as a counter to the SS-20s rather than in their appropriate strategic context. Even the government of the UK, a nuclear-weapon state that has played an active role in developing and defending the INF decision, has been influenced by such factors.

Not surprisingly, in this atmosphere the questions of whether NATO should develop a new nuclear strategy, and what the potential effects of such a decision would be upon the ability of NATO to defend Western Europe, have arisen. Although these questions do not appear adequately to have been addressed, increasingly serious warnings have been voiced on both sides of the Atlantic, and 'modest proposals' are receiving extensive public hearings—proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones; for no-first-use declarations; for greater reliance on advanced conventional weaponry that would raise the nuclear threshold; for further radical, perhaps unilateral, reductions in short-range tactical nuclear forces (SRTNF); and for arms control initiatives such as considering British and French nuclear forces in INF talks or merging the INF and START talks.

Very different in their approach, in their scope, and in their potential impact on the future of the Alliance, these diverse proposals would all result in a restructuring or redeployment of NATO forces; some would also involve a redefinition of NATO nuclear strategy. But none of these proposals seem to recognise that West European security interests and policies differ, and are different from those of the US. Nor do these

proposals seem directly to address the dilemma of nuclear weapons and West European security—the perceived dangers, and the dread of European publics, of the weapons on which Western Europe depends for its defence. European concerns about the costs of providing for conventional defence, and their fears of the destructive potential of protracted conventional warfare exacerbate this dilemma and suggest it will persist.

If all of these proposals seem limited in scope or substantively flawed —some fatally so—it is precisely because they are not fully responsive to NATO's nuclear dilemma. Proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones or no-first-use declarations are superficially appealing. However, during a period of deteriorating East-West relations and of ever worsening conventional and nuclear force imbalances in the European theatre, which has intensified the Warsaw Pact's military threat to NATO, these proposals could offer only a dangerous illusion of security. They appear insensitive to West European, especially West German, geopolitical realities and security policies. They imply a fundamental restructuring of NATO's force structure and strategy, without suggesting viable concrete alternatives.

Arms control initiatives that would bring the British and French nuclear forces into US-Soviet negotiations, or merge the superpower negotiations on intermediate-range and strategic nuclear systems, have been advocated with increasing vigour recently. Designed to restore the derailed arms control track of the 1979 decision, they could revive West European hopes for negotiated limits or elimination of INF. To the extent that they did so, they could conceivably reduce domestic controversies over deployment in certain West European countries. However, these proposals are as likely to exacerbate domestic discontent, and they ignore fundamental security interests of the West European member states of NATO, particularly those of the British, the French and the Germans. They have the potential for decoupling and, depending on how they are presented and pursued, they could threaten the planned modernisations or erode the legitimacy of the British and French independent nuclear deterrents. As they more closely reflect Soviet negotiating stances on INF than those developed by the Alliance, they could divide NATO. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they seem too uncritical in attributing to the USSR the best of intentions and a sincere interest in reaching an equitable and verifiable agreement in the suspended INF negotiations in Geneva.

Unlike the preceding proposals, those advocating greater reliance on conventional weaponry, and lesser reliance on battlefield nuclear weapons, are limited in scope but not intrinsically flawed. NATO has recently decided unilaterally to reduce its SRTNF by some 1,400 systems. And, there is undoubtedly a need to strengthen the Alliance's conventional defence and thereby to raise the nuclear threshold, which is recognised by the FRG, France, the UK and other European member states of NATO. However, European interests and perspectives pose serious limits to a conventional approach for NATO, as hostile French and polite

British and German reactions to General Rogers' proposals for greater reliance on conventional weaponry in the Alliance's force posture demonstrate. Not only would the major European members of NATO be concerned about increasing the prospects for conventional war by developing the Alliance's conventional capabilities—a course which has been perceived as degrading absolute deterrence and effectively decoupling European defence from US central systems—but the UK and FRG are concerned about the costs of increasing reliance on a new generation of weapons that would probably be developed and produced in the US. Unless NATO improves its conventional capabilities, however, further reductions of its SRTNF could be dangerous, and would probably be opposed by the West Germans.

Clearly, none of the modest proposals that have appeared or reappeared in public recently appear likely to resolve NATO's nuclear problems. What then, are the prospects for the INF process, and how are the more probable INF outcomes likely to affect the security perceptions of the major European members of NATO?

Despite a growing sense that the dual-track decision was politically unsound, and that the deployment may constitute a Pyrrhic victory, the situation now appears manageable if not propitious. To be sure, for the Alliance, and particularly for its European members, the expenditure of political capital associated with the deployment decision has been enormous, given the limited military capability involved. Whether or not full deployment is successfully implemented, the military policy and posture of the Alliance will require reassessment. The Alliance will have a new nuclear capability that will have to be addressed in its nuclear strategy, and it will be faced with political problems concerning modernisation or further reductions of SRTNF in the wake of the INF controversy. Further, NATO's flexible response doctrine has been subject to such intense scrutiny that its credibility and utility may have declined.

There will nevertheless be considerable anxiety in the UK and the FRG if the doctrine should be reconsidered in NATO councils. The British and the Germans will undoubtedly feel that their interests in absolute deterrence, and in assured coupling to US strategic nuclear forces, will be sacrificed to US desires to avoid a strategic exchange with the Soviet Union. As well, the FRG would fear that NATO's commitment to 'forward defence' could be eroded by the appeal of more easily realisable defences that traded German territory for time. France would welcome a reconsideration of NATO nuclear doctrine that renounced the 'illusory' ideal of flexible response and replaced it with a more 'realistic' doctrine more compatible with that of the French. Fortunately for the Alliance, flexible response is so flexible that it might be modified to accommodate the Alliance's need for a 'new' defence strategy responsive to European anxieties about nuclear weapons and to European interests.

Deployment has begun as scheduled, and unless the dynamics of European domestic politics or the reaction of the USSR are able effectively to disrupt the deployment process, the political future of the

Alliance will appear reasonably assured to West Europeans in the short and medium terms. For all the major European members of NATO, implementation of the dual-track decision will appear (or be argued) to have demonstrated the unity and political cohesiveness of the Alliance, and to have restored some of the credibility of US leadership in NATO and of the US nuclear guarantee on which it is based.

For the governments of the FRG and the UK, the implementation of the dual-track decision will be particularly reassuring, especially if there has been a negotiated reduction in the deployment. For, successes in the arms control track could work to defuse powerful and politically prominent domestic peace movements. Deployment will enhance the security of these countries, both of which are heavily dependent upon NATO and upon 'special relationships' with the United States. And, deployment will be seen by both the British and the Germans to give NATO a nuclear capability that favours the 'European' interpretation of flexible response—an interpretation that emphasizes the deterrent function of nuclear weapons, and envisions a rapid escalation to US strategic nuclear systems if deterrence should fail. The British will also see deployment as enhancing their prestige, their role in NATO and the credibility of their independent deterrent.

As for France, which is also dependent upon NATO, albeit in a different manner, implementation of the dual-track decision will be perceived as a benefit. It will appear to diminish what the French see as pacifist and neutralist tendencies in the FRG and to re-establish West Germany's position firmly within the Western Alliance. It will indirectly enhance the credibility of the French strategic nuclear force (FNS). It will reduce pressures on France to barricade itself behind a nuclear Maginot line, in the perhaps quixotic quest for the defence of France alone. And it will allow her to continue to develop a range of defence options and, behind NATO's shield, to prepare the long-term path toward greater European defence co-operation.

From a European perspective, then, the implementation of the dual-track decision will have shown the Alliance to have weathered a severe political storm, if not without serious damage. And the Alliance will appear thereby to have achieved perhaps five or ten years to attempt to resolve serious medium and long-term problems between the US and its European allies over the purpose and scope of NATO; the nature of the threat it faces; the doctrine and force structure most appropriate for the defence of the Alliance; and the extraneous political and economic tensions that nonetheless have an adverse impact on the strength and cohesion of the Alliance.

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[Dr. Pilat is currently with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The views expressed are the author's own.]

# AFRICAN MARRIAGE—BY NUMBERS

## by Philip Thomas

ALMOST universally African societies have chosen to practise polygamy—or more correctly, simultaneous polygyny, that is the marriage of one man to two or more wives at the same time. In the west, even though consecutive polygyny (marriage after divorce or death) is customary, it is difficult to break away from our cultural and Christian conditioning, and our western ideas of monogamous marriage, and judge such issues as polygyny from a premise that is not culturally biased. Anthropologists refer to the cultural conditioning and bias used by all cultures to judge one another as 'ethnocentrism', and any reasoned evalution of an emotive issue such as polygyny is difficult, not to say pointless, if arrived at from an ethnocentric starting point. Therefore, any thoughts of Christian, Western Monogamy being 'right' and 'human' must be dispensed with by the observer of African polygyny.

It is difficult to say how widespread polygyny is within Africa as a whole today. There is no doubt that polygyny is, and always was, the preferred marital state, and was by no means compulsory or universal. With the Westernisation of Africa, the coming of Christianity and economic problems, the incidence of polygyny has fallen, but in the rural areas it is still widely practised. The standpoint of nearly all the post-colonial governments has been one of acceptance, many feeling as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania feels, that indigenous culture is important and must be nurtured, and that the days of the 'Black Europeans' as he calls those Africans who try to emulate the west, are well and truly over.

One question often raised, and it is raised here because of its simplicity yet its importance, is how can polygyny be made possible? There must, surely, be a large number of men who have no wives in African Society. In fact, if an ordinary African is asked such a question, he will invariably answer that there are far more women than men—far more girls born than boys, and will look at the interrogator in amusement at his stupidity. While this does seem a simple explanation, a brief look at the facts tells us that although there do appear to be more women than men in Sub-Saharan Africa, the difference in numbers cannot account solely for the practice of polygyny emerging. One of the countries with the biggest imbalance is Guinea where in 1974, there were 122 women to every 100 men, and whilst this seems improbably high, it can in part be explained by the larger number of male child deaths than female. Tanzania also has a larger number of women than men—95.1 men to 100 women (in 1967), making a surplus of 300,000 available for polygamous marriage in that country. In a nation of 15 million, it can be seen that this imbalance alone cannot account for the widespread practice of simultaneous polygyny in rural Tanzania.

In reality, the most important factor in making polygyny possible in Sub-Saharan Africa is the difference in marriageable age span between

men and women. Whilst a girl may be married from any age between 14 and 30, men can only marry when it is clear that they can afford a wife and family, have their own home and can pay the bride-wealth payable to the bride's father (usually a number of cattle). Consequently, the number of eligible men is relatively small, a situation which is compounded by the fact that the richer (and therefore the older) the man, the more eligible he is to be married. The number of men who are economically capable of marriage is therefore much smaller than in many other societies. However, this is not universally the case in Africa. The Yako tribe of South-East Nigeria have a tradition of young men marrying girls of a similar age, yet they still practice polygyny. This is made possible by the practice, now clamped down upon by the government, of buying young girls and children from the neighbouring Ibo tribe, who do not practise polygyny to such an extent.

Because of the difficulty in obtaining a wife, many young men realise that they will, in all probability, not be married until fairly late in life, so the Masai men of East Africa, for instance, will give gifts to a friend and his pregnant wife, in case the offspring born should be a girl, eligible later in life to be wed.

The circle, once started, is self-perpetuating. Older men take younger wives for the very reason that the younger men cannot afford to do so. The wife produces more offspring, which is palpable labour and therefore wealth, and later the husband may take yet another wife, and so on. A girl's family will always choose a wealthy and respected suitor, despite his age, so the younger men are competing for fewer and fewer women. Although very unusual today, a chief of the Nyakyusa tribe of East Africa, for instance, may well accumulate over 40 wives. It should be noted that African polygyny has little to do with Western ideas of male lust—the reasons behind it are far more complex.

The universal human phenomenon of marriage establishes relationships of affinity, and the consequent mating produces relationships of consanguinity. The kinship systems resultant from this are fundamental to African society. Individuality does not effectively exist in itself, an individual's worth is measured only by his worth to the group as a whole. Western monogamy, on a world basis, is a minority condition, as is the western view of individuality. It is important to note that the two are linked.

The immediate social group formed by a marriage is only a part of the other bonds formed. Each new marriage is not only a beginning of a new kinship group, but also a strengthening of ties within the larger clan. Payments, intermarriages, consanguine groups and the social interactions resultant from these all bond together the all-important social group, as new assistance patterns emerge and security deepens in the polygamous household, both within itself and with the larger clan group. The importance of group mentality is central to African polygyny, but there are other factors involved. For instance, it is hard to underestimate the importance of bearing offspring in the eyes of African society. Economic-

ally and socially, children are an insurance against loneliness and infirmity, they are a labour force and an old-age-pension, relatives are an insurance against pestilence and hunger, and a large number of children are a cohesive force within the family, the clan, the tribe and the nation. The ever-present spectre of child mortality hangs over Africa—the average ranging between 100 and 300 per 1,000 live births. Comparing this with the highest rate in the west—(a ghetto in Chicago), which is 50 per 1,000, it can be seen that a high birthrate is not only desirable but necessary. Religion may be involved also. The Bantu people of South and East Africa see procreation as a link between life and death. To die childless would mean eternal damnation.

It can be seen, therefore, that the pressures on a monogamous wife to constantly be bearing children would be enormous. In actual fact, polygamous women bear fewer children, with a longer gap between births. The average time-span is almost three years, as opposed to nearly two in monogamous marriages. Each wife produces less children, safeguarding her health and facilitating more time to be spent with her offspring, and having a natural form of personal birth-control. Yet the family group as a whole will produce the large number of children that are needed for the reasons stated above.

Barrenness is an appalling state to endure for an African woman, for child-bearing is central to their existence. In a monogamous marriage, throughout Africa, she can be returned by the husband to her family, and a replacement sought. In a polygamous household, however, she can be diverted from her woe, helping co-wives, and performing other duties. In Masai society, a fertile co-wife will actually give a barren co-wife a baby to rear. Thus, the joys and sorrows of family life are shared. Loneliness is not a problem, nor is hospitality. There are many hands to cook and grow, and to entertain, which is a criterion for respect. Because of this respect and security linked with a polygamous household, it is said that many African women are very much in favour of the institution. In many tribes, monogamous women will tease their husbands, accusing them of being too poor to take a second wife.

Because of polygamy there is little prostitution in African societies (although urbanisation has increased it), and very little concubinage or male adultery. However, it must be said that polygyny does encourage homosexuality in frustrated young men, and young wives often seek elsewhere what their elderly husbands cannot provide. In fact, in some polygamous societies, sexual deprivation is such a problem that divorce is high. For instance, in a small survey of the Nyakyusa tribe, the divorce rate amongst Christian monogamists was 18%, and amongst polygamists 59%. Despite this, divorce is, generally speaking, limited, because of the distractions and support within the household. Sexual deprivation is very much the most important cause for divorce. Such problems as the dilemma and heart-ache experienced in the west accompanying the arrival of the first child, who threatens the secure one-to-one relationship, do not exist. Jealousy between co-wives is, however, often a problem, and many

societies, such as the Lozi and Zulu tribes, encourage sororal polygyny, the marriage of one man to two sisters, to reduce the rivalry and jealousy. Anthropologist Paul Bohannen wrote that 'women in Africa are not the deprived group they were in the nineteenth-century west.' Many would argue that polygyny has little to do with debasing women, and in fact a woman has a higher social status if a co-wife than if not. They have support, are never lonely, have the security and respect associated with a large, polygamous household, old age insurance and a ready-made group with which to identify. In a society where relationships and respect are placed higher than material possessions or individual goals, polygyny is Africa's answer to many of its social and, economic problems.

In fact, polygyny is declining slightly in many African nations, largely due to urbanisation, evangelisation, westernisation and the economic pressures involved in a young, cash economy. In Kenya, for example, many urban dwellers simply cannot afford to practise polygyny, and therefore the very structure of their society is being weakened. With very little state social security, unemployment high and health and old-age care almost negligible, the demise of the large family unit could be disastrous for the lives of many Kenyans. Despite this, the very fact that young rural men cannot afford to set up home and feed children may indeed perpetuate the practice of polygyny in rural Africa.

Despite our innate cultural distaste for polygyny, it must be said that if our ethnocentric premises can be swept aside, polygyny answered and still answers many of the problems, economic, social and personal, which beset millions of Africans every day.

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[Philip Thomas is a photographer and journalist who has recently returned from East Africa where he has been studying social and family life in Kenya and Tanzania.]

The September issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Gulf in the Centre of Attention* by Leo Mates, *Malay Monarchy Since Yahya Petra* by Roger Kershaw, *Drugs Rehabilitation: the Missing Factor* by Mary Beasley and Don Wilkerson and *A Legislative Nasty* by Stanley Alderson.

# THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION IN A MODERN WORLD

by Kazuo Ota

STUDENTS of constitutional law of the world may already know the Japanese Constitution and its unique nature.

The Japanese Constitution, in its Preamble, says:

> We, the Japanese people,... determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our prosperity the fruits of peaceful co-operation with all nations and the blessing of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government...

This Japan, as a nation, neither has nor will have any military forces. More categorically, Article 9 states not only Japan's non-maintenance of armaments and war potential, but denial of her right to wage war and disapproval of the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes, and even renunciation of war forever. The article states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the the state will not be recognised.

One great problem has been raised by the Constitution: Is it really possible that the Japanese people can create a nation whose political system is, in real terms, accorded with the spirit of the Constitution?

Unfortunately, the political processes of postwar Japan indicate that the noble spirit of the Japanese Constitution has been overlooked. The provisions concerning demilitarisation in particular have been superseded by rearmament under the name of a 'Self-Defence Force'.During the post-war years the government took the view that a nation having no armed forces of its own is an incomplete nation and that the Vatican is the only exception. Successive governments started to hold their own interpretation of the Constitution, maintaining that the use of military forces and even the right of belligerency within the scope of 'self-defence' should be recognised. Unconstitutional undertakings, such as conclusion of a bilateral security treaty between the United States of America and Japan, justification to bear a part of the role of the US military alliance and readiness to meet America's demand for US-Japan military co-operation, have thus been approved. Japan's rapid expansion of military force makes her the eighth biggest military force of the world, causing anxiety and suspicion amongst a large number of Japanese people who basically deny war and uphold peace and yet have had to accept that Japanese rearmament was an unavoidable political choice.

Under the international environment of East-West rivalry, the Allied Nations which first urged Japan to disarm gradually changed their attitude. Even China, who had shown strong reaction against Japan's rearmament, came to recognise the existence of Japan's 'Self-Defence Force'. In the same vein, leaders of the new independent countries in South East Asia weakened their pressure against Japan's rearmament.

In the light of this situation, the doctrines inherent in the Japanese Constitution, i.e. disarmament of central power, anti-war, and absolute peace, appear to be unrealistic. Yet without these doctrines Japan would not have been able to avoid her direct involvement in the regional wars in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. Nor would she have been able to guarantee her economic development by minimising her military expenditures. In the world of today, where the development of military science, space and other scientific technology has made clear that it is obsolete to try to solve conflicts amongst highly industrialised nations through military collision, and where an increasing number of people begin to realise that disarmament by all countries is the imminent problem to be tackled, the image of a nation without arms as prescribed by the Japanese Constitution should be welcomed as a new reality.

Today, the world has emerged into a new era of economy in which availability of the highly industrial commodity production pattern is the key factor for the future prosperity of each and every nation. Highly industrialised nations in particular organise advanced scientific technology to enable them to utilise the world's resources. What is needed for them is not military domination by a certain country or the total market sphere as in the colonial age, but maintenance of the market order.

By accumulating advanced technology, Japan has successfully produced highly desirable commodities. Her economic prosperity is based on the stability of the world market. Any military occupation or threat is meaningless. Japan has no need of defence by military means. Even if an invasion should really happen, resistance in solidarity, ready to be organised, would deal with it.

Like Japanese society today, societies of European countries, the USA, and the Soviet Union have become nations that cannot be defended by military means. However, there is another problem for such nations. They cannot dissolve their military forces or reduce them, although these military forces play a role of huge, wasteful consumption and their function is limited maintaining public peace. What is worse, it enhances coercion of arms purchase and reinforcement of military control imposed on developing countries.

It is important to organise a movement in which all nations begin to recognise that any armament is meaningless, and that a new disarmed nation, with a new constitution, should be established. The Japanese Constitution pre-empts such a nation. By prescribing a constitutional order with disarmament of central power, it is a model worth examining in the course of each country's efforts to achieve a reduction of arms and eventually world disarmament. By prescribing a constitutional order with disarmament of central power it is a model worth examining in the course of each country's efforts to achieve a reduction of arms and eventually world disarmament.

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[Kazuo Ota is Professor of Constitutional Law and Political Science at the College of Dairying, Japan.]

# TO PLAY, OR NOT TO PLAY: THAT IS THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE QUESTION

by Peter J. Beck

THE Falklands War of 1982 has prompted interest in most aspects of Anglo-Argentine relations, and it has become apparent that even non-political links have been interpreted as sensitive on account of the political implications of any form of Anglo-Argentine rapprochement. Sporting contacts provide one manifestation of this problem, while also offering a further perspective upon the inter-relationship of politics and sport in Britain.

Historically, politics and sport in Britain have been regarded as separate, especially in contrast to the past and present experience of other countries, such as Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy or the Soviet Union since 1971. But, whether one likes it or not, recent events have focussed increased attention on political (and other) pressures upon British sport, an experience ranging through such episodes as the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement and links with South Africa or the British government's opposition to British participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

And, in the wake of the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands during April 1982, there emerged the debate about the participation of England, along with Scotland and Northern Ireland, in the oncoming World Cup tournament in Spain at which Argentina would be defending the title won in 1978. The prospect of a match between a British team and Argentina had to be considered, and this prompted arguments concerning the desirability of employing a break in sporting relations with Argentina in order not only to reinforce other forms of sanctions but also to express overt disapproval of the invasion. In addition, complications were adjudged likely to ensue both on and off the field if Argentina was paired during the course of the tournament with, say, England, and at a time when the diplomatic or military position in the war had reached a critical stage. In turn, it was anticipated that victory in such an encounter would arouse in the eyes of world opinion and the media far more than a sporting significance; thus, the match would be interpreted as a test of Anglo-Argentine power in the widest sense. Memories of earlier Anglo-Argentine football fixtures, including the infamous 1966 World Cup encounter, played at a time when diplomatic relations were more normal, gave further cause for caution, as did an appreciation of the manner in which the Argentine military regime had exploited the 1978 World Cup tournament held in Argentina in terms of both its ability to prevent internal disruption of the competition by dissidents and its association with Argentina's victory. For some observers, the World Cup triumph was one of the few achievements of military rule in Argentina—or so it was made to appear.

However, there existed at the same time an inevitable reluctance to

admit that political factors influenced sport, particularly in view of the hard struggle of the British teams to reach the final stages of the World Cup. The threat of FIFA sanctions, including non-eligibility for the 1986 tournament, provided a further reason against late withdrawal. Paradoxically, one argument emanating from footballing circles concerned the desire to use the progress of British teams in the finals as a means of bolstering the morale of British troops involved in the preparations for the recapture of the Falklands. But this was a two-edged argument, and in the event it is debatable whether the lack-lustre performances of England and Scotland did much to boost the troops. The relative lack of success of England and Scotland, in conjunction with an undistinguished performance by Argentina, meant that the much anticipated, and feared, Anglo-Argentine confrontation failed to materialise.

In turn, since summer 1982 there have been two more episodes of a similar nature. During 1982-83 the British government persuaded the Football Association against a proposed South American tour in mid-1983, including a match against Argentina, while more recently the postponement of a Brazilian tournament scheduled for June 1984—this was to include England and Argentina—served to remove not only the possibility of an Anglo-Argentine game but also any cause for intervention by the British government against the match. Significantly the three matches arranged for England during June 1984 in place of the Brazilian tournament involved Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, which all border Argentina. The omission of Argentina cannot be excused upon either geographical or sporting grounds, and thus political considerations would appear to provide the answer, even if the reticence of the Football Association upon such matters means that it is difficult to conclude whether the omission resulted either from direct government intervention or from the footballing authority's awareness of the sensitivity of the issue in the light of previous contacts with the British government.

Although such contemporary examples shake confidence in the claim that British sport and politics remain separate, the basic view persists that traditionally British governments have steered clear of sport; thus, if there have been political incursions onto the sporting field, they have been interpreted as rare events characteristic only of the recent period. However, an informed study of the past, such as of the inter-war period of 1919-1939, illustrates that international sport in England has never been divorced completely from politics. For example, in the case of football the British Foreign Office—to quote from a letter sent in 1938 by Sir Robert Vansittart, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser, to Stanley Rous, Secretary of the Football Association—assumed 'a special interest in football matches between British and foreign teams', particularly in matches against teams from Italy and Germany where sport possessed an explicit propaganda role and was integrated into the framework of government.

My study on the England-Germany games held in 1935 and 1938 (*History Today*, June 1982) demonstrates that in international matches the



Football Association was forced to work within a framework determined by the Foreign Office. As a result England did not play Germany in the years immediately following the First World War—this situation was to be repeated after 1945—while the anxiety to cultivate improved relations with Germany in the 1930s contributed to British government refusals to respond favourably to the pressure from the labour movement and Jewish organisations to ban the proposed fixtures with Germany. On the contrary, the British government welcomed the 1935 and 1938 games as part of its appeasement policy of maintaining and developing points of contact with Nazi Germany.

In addition, the British government, aware of the tendency of opinion, media and governments to identify sporting achievement with national power, vitality and prestige, urged the Football Association throughout the 1930s to select strong teams in order to safeguard 'our prestige' through victory. The Foreign Office argued that the British image for sportsmanship and justice depended in part upon the disciplined performances of British players abroad. Therefore, in a very real sense, football matches of the England-Italy or England-Germany nature appeared—to employ the terminology of cricket—as 'test matches', that is, as contests both of sporting skills and of national power and values.

During the early twentieth century football became increasingly a world game, and emerged as the major sport in most European and Latin American countries. Indeed, during the 1930s there were signs that Latin America, led by the recent Olympic and World Cup triumphs of Uruguay as well as by the successes of Argentina and Brazil, was challenging traditional European, particularly British, footballing hegemony. And yet England, acknowledged still during the inter-war period as 'masters of the game', never played any South American team prior to the Second World War. Although the length of the sea passage to South America proved one obstacle, this situation was in reality a reflection of the insularity and arrogance of English football. Some games were played against European sides, but it was difficult to disguise the Football Association's lack of enthusiasm for playing on the continent or beyond, an attitude reinforced by the ever-present pressures of the domestic league competition and of home internationals. Thus, the Football Association's rather abrupt refusal to play in the 1930 World Cup tournament was followed by the absence of British teams from the 1934 and 1938 World Cups held in continental Europe.

The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 constituted an obstacle to further international fixtures, and even threatened the domestic game. However, football continued, and the early months of the war saw the British government devoting serious attention to a proposal for an English football tour to Argentina, including additional games against such countries as Brazil and Uruguay. And, in the context of the increased politicisation of sport during the 1930s for propaganda and other purposes, the matter was discussed largely from the point of view of extra-sporting—or rather non-sporting—considerations.

The episode began on 6 November 1939, when Sir Esmond Ovey, the British ambassador in Buenos Aires, received a suggestion from Dr. Escobar, the President of the Argentine Football Federation and also Director-General of Argentine Posts and Telegraphs, concerning the participation of English and French representative football teams in an Argentine festival of physical fitness and sport scheduled for March 1940. The British government evaluated the proposed match primarily from the perspective of providing a welcome point of contact with Argentina, a country subjected recently to increased German pressure to side against the Allied cause in the war; in addition, the Argentine government was deemed capable of taking advantage of Britain's wartime preoccupations in other parts of the world in order to press its long-standing claims to both the Falklands and the dependencies, including South Georgia. From this perspective it was anticipated that a tour by English and French teams would show the flag and create goodwill, thereby promoting the Allied cause in Latin America in general and in Argentina in particular.

When he passed Escobar's proposal onto London, Ovey advised that 'in theory—and possibly in practice—the propaganda value of a visit of a first class football team will be enormous, for the football fans of Argentina are legion'. He perceived that an England-Argentina game offered a potentially valuable means of improving relations with the Argentine government—and President Ortiz was known to be interested in the match—as well as with the man in the Buenos Aires street in view of the mass enthusiasm for football. But Ovey argued that any advantages in the sphere of 'national projection'—this term was preferred in the 1930s in the light of the pejorative connotations of 'propaganda' —had to be balanced against other factors, which were centred partly on long-standing Foreign Office criticisms of *professional* sport; in fact, there was almost a class prejudice against such a working class sport as football. In turn, officials blamed professionalism as the root cause of the unsporting attitudes displayed by certain British club and international teams abroad, since this reflected unfavourably upon Britain's image in the wider world. During the 1930s this factor, in conjunction with frequent complaints emanating from both British diplomats abroad and the British Council about misbehaviour upon the field of play, led the Foreign Office to send repeated reminders to the Football Association on the subject of improved discipline.

Ovey felt that strict instructions about discipline would have to be issued to any team visiting Argentina, and he added that the demand could be reinforced by claiming that the players were on 'war service' and consequently subject to additional controls. Nevertheless, Ovey feared that even a disciplined performance by the England team would not prove sufficient to avoid complications arising out of such factors as differing interpretations of the rules or the emotions of the crowd. Crowd problems appeared to be a fact of Argentine football life, and as recently as May 1939 a riot at one game in Buenos Aires had resulted in one

death and numerous injuries.

Hence, the theoretical propaganda benefits were likely to be outweighed by serious complications, and the British ambassador's considered advice —'the dangers of disaster are such that I could not possibly advise that the risk be taken'—fell upon receptive ears in London, both in the Foreign Office and in the Ministry of Information, wherein Bonham Carter endorsed Ovey's assessment of the situation. 'From *personal* experience of the behaviour of Argentine football crowds, I can confirm every word that Ovey says, and it is absolutely essential that the whole idea be shelved at once. It would be fatal if a team went out from here to play football in the Argentine, as nothing arouses the passion of the locals so much as this . . . when one knows that the spectators have to be wired in and that the police are armed with tear-gas bombs, and that shootings have been known to occur, there is little need to enlarge upon the inadvisability of sending a team out'. The Foreign Office was in entire agreement, while stressing other obstacles such as of travel and of securing good English and French teams during wartime.

The whole episode of the proposed Anglo-Argentine match in March 1940 ended in a negative manner, but the ensuing debate within the British government illustrates the manner in which international football was seen—to quote Ovey—as 'an international test of athletic prowess' as well as 'a medium of propaganda'. Any match between England and Argentina either during the 1982 World Cup, even if held upon the supposedly neutral soil (in the context of the Falklands dispute, this was a dubious assumption) of Spain, or during 1983-1984 would have raised similar issues to those debated in 1939. In fact, the 1982 War will impart an additional edge to any subsequent sporting fixture between the two countries, and some of the dangers were suggested by Brian Glanville of the *Sunday Times* (2 May 1982) when he referred to 'that nasty, uncouth nationalism, that released hysteria, which seems at the bottom of Argentina's football passions, and which surfaced again when the crowds went wild about the Falklands'. The diffuse and inflammable nature of Argentine 'football nationalism' would have complicated—and will complicate—any Anglo-Argentine match held during the post-1982 period, especially as in England one is encouraged by the media and others to believe that sporting victory is perhaps the most important thing in present-day society.

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[Dr. Peter J. Beck is Principal Lecturer in International History at Kingston Polytechnic, and his recent publications include studies on the future of the Falklands in *The Round Table* (April 1984) and on the Emergence of Antarctica as an International Problem in *The World Today* (April 1984).]

# ORWELL ON LIBERTY

## by S. G. Shanker

THERE is an escalating awareness in post-industrial societies that advanced technology poses a grave threat to liberal traditions, but there is as yet a noticeable confusion on the nature and scope of this menace. Who are the agents of this conspiracy: the Government? Multinationals? The Defence Establishment? The Bureaucracy? Whether merited or not these have certainly become the bogys of popular discontent, yet it scarcely seems credible to suggest that any of the individuals concerned are guided by a blind worship of power such as is the defining characteristic of the Party in George Orwell's novel, *1984*. But then, perhaps the problem with this comparison is that the threat to personal liberty and privacy posed by these institutions is not at all the same as that which Orwell so graphically depicts and that *1984* is thus as much an impediment to understanding this issue as it is responsible for encouraging our discussion of it in the first place.

To be sure, *1984* has played an important role in alerting us to the dangers of centralised authority, but this in itself is a significant reminder of the extent to which Orwell's outlook has been eclipsed. The political argument which inspires Orwell's mature writings is, in simplest terms, that we must distinguish between two vastly different species of economic centralisation: totalitarianism and socialism. The basic difference between them, as far as Orwell was concerned, is that the former is completely opposed to the preservation of personal liberty, the latter fundamentally committed to it. But *1984* was almost immediately siezed upon as a gripping portrayal of the evils inherent in centralisation *per se*, even though this was not at all what Orwell had intended. (cf. Orwell's letter to Francis A. Henson.) Where Orwell had wanted to employ his writings in the service of the socialist cause, we have increasingly come to see the dangers to personal liberty and privacy which confront us today as the direct result of the drift towards socialism which has dominated post-war politics.

Whether 'prophecy', 'satire', or gothic romance, the world described in Airstrip One bears scant resemblance to the England of today. Yet this obvious disparity has not stopped a veritable army of *1984*-watchers from materialising over the past year, intent on the discovery of any possible parallels between Orwell's dystopia and the conditions of modern society. It is often difficult to judge the extent to which these chiliastic warnings are exaggerated, but one can at least feel confident that if there is an element of truth in these perceptions, the considerable media attention which they are now receiving cannot help but act as an effective countermeasure to the always-present dangers of political abuse. Moreover, the very fact that *1984* has elicited such an extraordinary response is an encouraging manifestation of the extent to which the individual in modern society has become politicised. Whatever its defects politics has

become a pressing concern for us all, and the liberal theorist must be heartened by this daunting demonstration of the fact that so many feel a personal stake in the maintenance and orientation of society.

When we turn to *1984* for illumination on these issues, however, we cannot help but experience a keen sense of disappointment. For despite —or perhaps because of—its merits as a political testament of the 1940s, *1984* has only a limited role to play as a contribution to the political problem of post-industrial society. The nature of the dangers to privacy and personal liberty that we are currently witnessing is such that it simply rings false to suggest that Orwell's vision of Oceania remains a potent threat; to insist otherwise, far from being a genuine contribution to the liberal cause, only serves to deflect attention from the genuine problems that have arisen.

This is certainly not to deny that *1984* touched on a raw nerve in the liberal system. As early as 1942 Orwell was describing (in 'Looking Back on the Spanish War') the 'nightmare world in which the Leader, or some ruling clique, controls not only the future but *the past.*' The prospect which Orwell confessed frightened him so much clearly remains the source of widespread consternation. Having become accustomed to the freedom of movement, and more importantly—as Orwell was constantly stressing—of thought, and having managed to sustain our conviction that the truth must be objective—despite the fact that we are exposed to a constant barrage from all quarters of 'expedient distortions', whether commercial or political—we are understandably haunted by the fear that we might one day be forced to relinquish this heritage. *1984* is in this sense the naturalist realisation of our communal liberal nightmare. Hence the reason why *1984* is currently receiving such attention as a political treatise as opposed to a piece of fiction is that there now exists a serious—and well-founded—fear that personal liberty and privacy are in peril in the modern 'computer state'.

The host of writings which we have had on this subject have all made the undoubtedly important point that information is fast becoming one of our most valuable resources, thus enabling those organisations which are already inordinately powerful to acquire yet a further advantage over their small competitors in the markets. Furthermore, there is a growing fear that with the concentration of information there is an increased danger that the unscrupulous or the fanatic might be able to acquire a legitimate power-base from which to operate. Against the former of these worries it must be borne in mind that, in the post-service economy, service itself remains a creative and dynamic possibility. Even if it were to become virtually impracticable for the small firm or individual to compete in the manufacturing sector, the areas in which the economy seems most likely to expand are precisely those where economies of scale will have least relevance. But the premise underlying the argument is also suspect, for it is quite possible that advanced technology will actually enable small manufacturers to flourish in markets hitherto confined to large-scale producers.

It is far from being the case, therefore—as various Government spokesmen have been repeating *ad nauseam*—that post-industrial technology poses an immediate threat to the survival of the free-market economy. As for the latter problem, beyond restating the need for society to be constantly on the alert, little more need be said on the principles involved. Of course, the precise manner in which such vigilance is to be exercised remains a matter of careful deliberation. Obviously legal measures must be introduced and institutions created which are designed to protect the rights of the individual. But this is an area which is fortunately beginning to receive the attention which it deserves. As the full impact of computer technology on information gathering and processing becomes more widely understood we can surely expect this development to proceed *ventre á terre.*

One hardly wishes to minimise the hazards involved in a dramatic economic transformation such as we are at present experiencing. But the wholly natural anxiety which this occasions should not mislead us into rashly interpreting these socio-economic trends as signs of an imminent collapse into a modern version of a political nightmare which was inspired by the Depression and the consequent developments leading up to the Second World War. For all of the dangers involved in the State's increased ability to monitor the movements and actions of the individual, we are still a long way off from totalitarianism as Orwell envisaged it in *1984;* as Orwell himself would have been the first to admit.

Orwell saw totalitarianism as a system in which there is complete State control of all economic and ideological activities, and thus where no autonomous institutions are allowed to continue functioning. He vividly captures the spirit of such a regime when he describes how totalitarinism 'not only forbids you to express—even to think—certain thoughts, but it dictates what you *shall* think, it creates an ideology for you, it tries to govern your emotional life as well as setting up a code of conduct.' ('Literature and Totalitarianism') But Orwell was insistent that English society was temperamentally disposed to resist any such political movement. In his 1944 paper 'The English People' he protests that 'the real totalitarian atmosphere, in which the State endeavours to control people's thoughts as well as their words, is hardly imaginable [in England].' However, this was not because Orwell felt that England would preserve its liberal traditions by avoiding the shift towards centralisation. On the contrary, Orwell was convinced that the latter was inevitable (and without question desirable). What he hoped was that by retaining its liberal committments England would evolve into a truly socialist power. Thus he wrote to H. J. Wilmott in 1944: 'I believe very deeply, as I explained in my book *The Lion and the Unicorn,* in the English *people* and in their capacity to centralise their economy without destroying freedom in doing so.' What he had written in *The Lion and the Unicorn* was that England is a nation which values above all else 'the liberty to have a home of your own, to do what you like in your spare time, to choose your own amusements instead of having them chosen

for you from above. The most hateful of all names in an English ear is Nosey Parker.' The same is certainly no less true today, yet the political issues which now consume us can hardly be likened to the titanic totalitarian/socialist struggle which so preoccupied Orwell. So where then does the real threat lie? We can return to Orwell for a key to the answer.

In *The Lion and the Unicorn* Orwell goes on to record his dismay at what seems to him to be the indisputable fact that 'this purely private liberty is a lost cause. Like all other modern people, the English are in [the] process of being numbered, labelled, conscripted, "co-ordinated".' This is a vision which inspires all of Orwell's later writings on personal liberty and privacy. In 'Literature and Totalitarianism' he warns that 'We live in an age in which the autonomous individual is ceasing to exist —or perhaps one ought to say, in which the individual is ceasing to have the illusion of being autonomous.' This thought leads Orwell to formulate a general conception of totalitarianism in terms of a social condition which he sees as the ideological substratum of the authoritarian superstructure. In his essays and early fiction Orwell tries to show how this malign social attitude can be at its most pronounced in a small community where strict conformity is tacitly demanded from all of the inhabitants, and any claims to privacy are rigorously disregarded (as is typified by Knype Hill in *A Clergyman's Daughter).* It is in the stifling atmosphere of everyone's being aware of what his neighbour is doing and even thinking, while a strong ethos exists to punish any deviation from the unwritten social code governing the behaviour of the community, where Orwell finds the latent opposition to liberal principles at its strongest. In this respect an oppressive family existence (such as Dorothy suffers) can be the paradigm for totalitarian behaviour; and it is partly for this reason that Orwell calls the leader of the Party 'Big Brother'.

Like all modern liberals, Orwell sees society *per se* as harbouring an intrinsic totalitarian tendency. This leads him to challenge his illustrious mentor in the art of satire on the most fundamental point in his political theory. The Yahoos and Houyhnhmns are intended to illustrate Swift's Hobbesian thesis that civilisation serves to constrain man's innately anarchic and brutish instincts. To Orwell, however, Swift's conception of an ideal human culture as represented by the society of the Houyhnhmns is perverse. 'They had apparently no word for "opinion" in their language, and in their conversations there was no "difference" of sentiments." They had reached, in fact, the highest stage of totalitarian organisation, the stage when conformity has become so general that there is no need for a police force.' ('Politics vs Literature').

As has long been recognised, internal social coercion is by far the most effective of all the measures that have yet been devised to govern men's behaviour, and the most difficult to subvert. It is all the more necessary, therefore—if liberal principles are to be sustained—to constantly strive to counteract these instincts by cultivating an atmosphere which will foster and encourage the development of freedom of speech, and hence

of thought. 'The secret freedom which you can supposedly enjoy under a despotic government is nonsense, because your thoughts are never entirely your own. Philosophers, writers, artists, even scientists, not only need encouragement and an audience, they need constant stimulation from other people.' ('As I Please', 28 April, 1944.)

Towards the end of his life Orwell deliberately began to run these two distinct conceptions of totalitarianism—the social condition versus the political structure—together. The explanation for this can be found, appropriately enough, in his review of Zamyatin's *We*. What Zamyatin had achieved, he explained, was a 'study of the Machine, the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again.' Orwell was certainly no primitivist (in theory at least, if not in lifestyle), but it is clear that he felt that 'industrial civilisation' itself is ultimately responsible for the fusing of these two themes; for it had created the conditions which had forced economic centralisation on the capitalist nations. Given the tendency to militant conformity inherent in human society, the seeds for political totalitarianism had thus been irrevocably sown.

This argument finds its natural development in the world described in *1984*. Granted there was considerable justification for this depiction, insofar as the two themes are also inextricably bound together in the fascist and communist states (which, of course, provide the model for Orwell's novel). But this is nonetheless the source of considerable confusion when we try to interpret modern developments in light of Orwell's picture, given the radical divergences between democratic and fascist or communist societies which have been preserved. The result of this is that much of the current applications of *1984*—that is, of the pressing need to prevent the impending arrival of a 'Big Brother' society—is focused on a fading danger, while the real problems remain unaddressed. However, the fact that Orwell's political prognosis has been falsified does not in the least entail that he has nothing to contribute to the latter debate; for his conception of the social evils underlying totalitarianism has not been undermined by the survival of democratic principles. It is thus to this side of his argument that we must turn if we are to appreciate the full relevance of Orwell's writings on liberty for contemporary circumstances.

Where totalitarian governments seek to impose absolute conformity by force, the rise to the 'computer state' looks set to accomplish a similar social result from purely internal sources. This has nothing whatsoever to do with tyrranical thought-control or the evolution of an unfettered police state. The threat to personal liberty and privacy to which we are currently exposed is based entirely on the political principles which underpin our society. It is the very dynamics of our democratic system —the moral code which in principle governs our behaviour, and the legal machinery which has been designed to enforce this ethical system—which is forcing this dilemma upon us. It is no fascist totalitarian menace which confronts us, therefore, but simply the State's growing ability to

place every individual under surveillance in order to guarantee that no one violates the State's democratically-sanctioned sovereign laws. In other words, computer technology has created a situation in which the behaviour of every individual can be as closely monitored as is the case in a small community, thereby enabling the various representative authorities to enforce the moral and social code that all have effectively embraced.

We are thus caught in a dilemma purely of our own making. We are all committed to the principle that no one should be allowed to deviate from the laws of the land, but horrified to discover that we now possess the means whereby this can be viably implemented for an entire nation. It would seem that we have long sustained an inherent contradiction in our democratic structure; laws were devised which applied to every individual with no exceptions, but to transgress these laws was widely regarded as a venal rather than a cardinal sin (except when the individual concerned was an official of some sort). This attitude finds its natural expression in a pervasive alienation from the State's regulative institutions. It is not the immediate community (if the term still has any significance) that is seeking to monitor the individual's diligent adherence to the spirit of the law; it is some malevolent body, usually ensconsed in a distant capital. In the modern urban centres it has become all too easy to see the 'Government' or the 'Bureaucracy' as a despotic power intent on interfering with the rights or interests of the 'People'. To make matters worse, it has become all too common for members of these institutions to see themselves in a similar light. With the rapid emergence of the 'computer state', however, the day of reckoning is close upon us.

What we are confronted with are our own laws and democratic principles. This point is entirely ignored in David Burnham's recently-published *The Rise of the Computer State,* a fairly representative example of the burgeoning 'Orwellian genre'. Burnham defines the 'computer state' as 'the welfare agency, the police, the tax collection office, the insurance company, the bank, the telephone network, the security force and the credit rating firm quietly cataloguing all our works and days.' He fails to acknowledge, however, that these are all representative institutions. In a series of detailed case studies he recounts instances where the privacy of the individual has been quite seriously infringed upon by one of these organisations. What he fails to confront is the disturbing fact that in each of his examples the agency concerned was strictly involved in the enforcement of the law. To be sure, other laws were often transgressed in the process; but the problem here is not simply one of a conflict between mutually exclusive laws: at a deeper level the conflict is one which is based on a clash between fundamental principles. Burnham's book makes important reading for anyone who is interested in assessing the full dimensions of the problem, but it can provide no answers because it ignores the logical complexity of the issue. It is only fair to add, however, that it could not have provided genuine answers in any case, for such a deep-seated ethical/political dilemma can only be resolved by a prolonged national debate. But before such a debate can

take place it is essential that we understand the real nature of the issues with which we are grappling.

The self-righteous who virtuously dismiss the dangers thus posed to personal liberty and privacy are precisely those who would be most comfortable in a small claustrophobic community. Conversely, those who argue that the only way to preserve the rights of the individual is by introducing a form of partial anarchy—which goes by the name of 'libertarianism' these days—are merely the victims of a fallacy borne from 'state of nature' confusions. Man is not 'free' in a state of anarchy for the simple reason that freedom and liberty are social concepts: they only make sense against the background of social institutions. The concept of liberty as a natural right is only intelligible in the context of a situation where it makes sense to speak of the individual possessing rights: viz. in the confrontation between the individual and society. By the same token, however, it makes no sense to speak of the freedom of the individual in a society where his every move can be traced.

It must be possible to chart some middle course between these two extremes, although how may be far from clear. Obviously not by a Luddite reflex action: then the fascist threat would indeed become genuine. But how do we encourage non-conformity when there exist so many contrary social pressures? Modern liberal society's greatest strength has proved to be its ability to contain—and indeed, absorb—dissident trends and counter-cultural movements. Its vitality is sustained, not vitiated, by the commitment to freedom of information, the diversity of opinion, and the liberal education where all shades of opinion are canvassed. It is clear that liberal society can not only withstand the buffetting of such internal forces, but that it actually thrives on such cultural vigour and regeneration. The power of technology can certainly be harnessed to serve these liberal principles, but only if the will to do so persists. Our chances of keeping this spark alive, however, will depend above all else on our desire to preserve a forum in which the writings of George Orwell will continue to be read.

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[The final article in the series by S. G. Shanker will be published in the October issue.]

# THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND ITALIAN PRISONS

## by Tim Parks

AT the European elections on 17 June, 1984 Italian eyes were almost exclusively directed to the fate of just one candidate whose name appeared only two days before the final deadline in the list of the tiny ultra-left wing Radical Party.

Enzo Tortora is, or was, a TV game show presenter, one of those fine, smiling, manifestly upstanding, amorphous fellows who seem to do so well in the job. Until almost exactly one year ago his programme, *Portobello*, was never far from the top of the Italian ratings. Invented by the presenter himself it was an inane but harmless affair in which anybody who had anything curious, rare or simply bizarre that they wished to sell would come and talk about themselves and their 'objects' under the watchful eye of a large parrot who made would-be comic remarks. The whole charade, complete with the mandatory musical/dancing interludes, was masterfully bowled along by a decent, grinning Tortora who never forgot to wind up with a 'God bless you all' in the best Hughie Greene traditions.

Had anybody, at the height of Tortora's good-natured success, declared that he would one day be presenting himself as a candidate for the Radical Party, and what's more that he would be elected with a massive vote of over half a million preferences, they might reasonably have been judged certifiable.

But just before the dawn of 17 June, 1983 (exactly a year to the day before the European elections) Enzo Tortora was arrested in part of a vast round-up of more than 800 mafia suspects. It was one of those rare occasions when the scandal-weary Italian public was genuinely amazed. As the country divided itself into two camps, for and against (perhaps more on aesthetic grounds than anything else), it emerged that Tortora's telephone number had been found in the address book of a well-known mafia henchman and that he had been named by two of the precious few supergrasses who break the mafia tradition of silence.

After some weeks Tortora was charged with drug trafficking and has been in detention ever since, most of the time in prison. He was refused bail and only allowed to return home recently under strict house arrest because of his rapidly deteriorating health. Under Italian law he, or anyone else, may be held in prison without trial (and often without charge) for up to five years—indeed, Tortora can consider himself fairly lucky that he has been promised a trial before the end of '84; the Bulgarian, Antonov, accused of involvement in the conspiracy to shoot the Pope, has been in prison for much longer and no trial is as yet planned. There are no provisions for compensation in these cases should the accused be proved innocent.

The Italian law which allows this quite barbaric treatment of suspects is known as *carcerazione preventiva*—preventive imprisonment—and it is this which the Radical Party is determined to reform. As they point out, not only is the law inhuman in depriving an untried suspect of his liberty for an indetermined period of time, but it is also open to abuse. Italian criminal organisations have long since learned that nothing confuses an investigation or discredits the judiciary more than framing one or two famous figures of high reputation and then watching police and prosecution run around in circles trying to scrape a case against them. The result is often that as the case against the celebrity collapses the others also escape scot-free. Typically enough, in the Tortora affair, one of the supergrasses has already withdrawn his accusation, while other sources now claim that the phone number in the address book was not Tortora's at all. It is reckoned that the scandal and furore created by the Tortora arrest have set back the investigations into the mafia a good few months.

Other disturbing aspects of the 'preventive imprisonment' law are the possibility it offers of framing people just to have them out of the way for a year or two and, perhaps more seriously, the way in which, with no people's jury, judges may feel themselves under some pressure to find long-term prisoners guilty simply to defend the reputation of the judicial system.

The Radical Party is led by Marco Pannella, a charismatic and quixotic figure, quite as showy in his own way as was Tortora himself before they dragged him away from his parrot and his dancing girls. Pannella is famed, amongst other things, for his *cappuccino* hunger strikes (nothing but coffee for a month to protest against famine in the Third World).

But the candidature of Tortora, who had never shown even the most remotely radical tendencies, was not entirely a Pannella stunt. The serious side of it was to get the prisoner elected (which, under Italian law, automatically releases him from arrest until the parliament to which he is elected considers his position) and then go to Strasbourg when the new European Parliament met on 24 July, to raise the whole issue of 'preventive imprisonment' in an international setting.

Despite the fact that there was obviously an opportunist side to Pannella's manoeuvre (it was expected to lead to an unusually high vote for the Radicals, quite apart from the extent to which it has allowed them to steal the limelight) it should nevertheless be taken seriously by Euro-MPs. There can be no doubt that the Italian government's response to terrorism, mafia and organised crime in general has been not to streamline and improve the judiciary in order to cope with the weight of serious cases, but to adopt the much easier policy of arrest first and ask questions later.

The system plainly runs contrary to any accepted notion of human rights and does discredit to the Community as a whole. The *affaire* Antonov, for example, has laid Italy, and thus the West in general, open to the same kinds of accusations about political internment that the West is so frequently making against the Soviet bloc.

# BRITAIN'S PAST AND BRITAIN'S PRESENT

## by Stephen Harvey

THE history of Britain has been a unique success story. Perhaps too often people tend to think of this success in terms of having once—rather briefly—had the most extensive colonial Empire ever recorded. Britain's Imperial past is less admired today than it was even ten years ago: increasing tension between Britain's white majority and her ethnic minorities provides a reminder of the racism involved in the system of Empire, and suggests the notion of some sort of poetic retribution for the exploitations of the past. But the truth is that Britain's world empire was always more impressive in outward appearance than in economic and social reality.

More striking was a martial achievement that was largely separate from, and to a large extent even preceded, the establishment of the overseas Empire. Between 1674 and 1941 Britannia really did rule the waves; at the same time British land forces had an unusual record of success. Until the nineteenth century Britain had a smaller population than France, Spain or the German states, and not having land frontiers lacked the incentive, as well as the means, to match the size of the larger continental armies. In the first half of the seventeenth century the military revolution, which professionalised the armed forces of Europe, seemed to have passed Britain by. But in the Dunkirk campaign of 1658, outnumbered English troops proved their ascendancy over what had previously been considered the finest infantry in the world. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain showed again and again that, though she could only infrequently produce generals of the calibre of Marlborough and Wellington, she could nearly always field infantry greatly superior to any enemies. Years before Wellington's victories at Salamanca, Vitoria and Waterloo raised the international prestige of Britain's land forces to an unprecedented height, the conduct of British infantry at battles such as Dettingen, Fontenoy and Minden had astonished all observers. At Fontenoy for example, massed regiments of British infantry advanced for half a mile at a slow march in parade formation, muskets shouldered, under decimating artillery fire, stood a French musket volley at point blank range, and then swept away the French regiments opposed to them, in a display of coolness and discipline which no other army could have matched. It was not until the Boer War that British infantry were seriously outfought, and in 1914, having learnt the lesson of the superior marksmanship of the Boers, Britain's small professional army was again acknowledged to be the best trained and hardest fighting in the world, and Britain was perhaps less successful than Germany in transferring the standards of skill and morale from a small professional force to a vast citizen army. Nevertheless it was essentially under-trained, tactically inept civilian soldiers who, at the Somme, dealt the German military machine a blow from which it never quite recovered.

But even more impressive than Britain's conquests and military triumphs was her success in the arts of peace. People with different linguistic backgrounds are unlikely to agree on the relative merits of literature written in different languages, so it is pointless to dispute whether Shakespeare is the world's greatest dramatist, whether Milton and Wordsworth are Europe's greatest poets, whether the English novel is inferior only to the Russian. Again, technological innovation has a relationship to cultural and economic factors which is still scarcely understood, so that it is debatable whether British technological leadership, particularly during the Industrial Revolution, can be properly cited as an instance of a specifically British genius. But there is one British achievement that is so obvious and fundamental that it is virtually taken for granted, or passed over with bland references—less fashionable today than formerly—to Britain's tradition of political stability. This achievement is that there has been no violent change of government, no revolution in Britain, for almost three hundred years.

The Civil War in Spain, the collapse of the Third and Fourth Republics in France (and the unsuccessful Salan coup of 1962), the unconstitutional establishment and ignominious collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany, the Salò republic in Italy are all matters of living memory. Even countries like Switzerland and Sweden, which in the twentieth century have become by-words for orderly government, had violent constitutional upheavals until the early part of the last century. But only one other country in Europe or the world matches, and in fact exceeds, Britain's record of nearly three hundred years of uninterrupted civil government and peaceful constitutional change, and that is Denmark. Denmark's last coup d'état was the establishment of royal despotism in 1660, since when she has evolved into a social democracy. But Denmark's achievement, as compared to Britain's, has to be seen in the context of the fact that in 1660 her European territories covered nearly 200,000 square miles, whereas today she has shrunk to less than 17,000 square miles, and the population of the areas she has lost—principally Norway, Schleswig-Holstein, Iceland—is at least equal to the population that remains Danish. In fact what is chiefly remarkable about the continuity of Danish political institutions is that no other western-European country has been more frequently and more completely humiliated in war, for it has so often happened elsewhere that military disaster has triggered off the most serious political upheavals.

It seems scarcely probable that Britain's three hundred years of domestic peace has occurred either accidentally or inevitably. On the contrary, it has surely been achieved by Britain's system of government, that is, by the people composing Britain's system of government.

Obviously there have been periods of crisis, but time and again during the past three centuries Britain has withstood pressures virtually identical to those which have made her European neighbours buckle and collapse. Between 1760 and 1830 unprecedentedly rapid industrialisation and population growth put an unequalled strain on British institutions: but

Britain was the only state in Europe not to have even a palace revolution. 1848 was as much a year of political challenge to the government in London as in Paris, Berlin, Munich, Vienna, Milan, Budapest: but all that fell in London was a few railings in Hyde Park. The growth of militant unionism at the end of the nineteenth century was as much a feature of the political scene in Britain as on the continent: in Britain its climax was postponed until the peaceful and ineffectual general strike of 1926: in France the fruits of the movement were the army mutinies of 1917, in Germany the Spartacist revolutions in 1919; in Spain, Italy and Russia the establishment of dictatorships.

Yet if Britain's period of greatness was not an accident or the product of impersonal forces, but the achievement of human beings, so Britain's decline, and her economic and social failures since 1945, must also be seen as the result of human error. Scholarly attempts to trace Britain's present economic problems back to the 1870s relate to notions of impersonal economic forces, and a denial of human agency, which scarcely bear examining. The economic achievement of Japan since 1945, with fewer natural resources than Britain and, in 1945, considerably less technologically skilled manpower, demonstrates the crucial role played by factors such as the quality of decision-making and corporate morale: essentially the same factors as contributed to Britain's success before 1941. One of the ways in which the twentieth century differs from previous centuries is the way in which political systems and national governments have been so much more ambitious in what they have tried to do for the populations they control: and because so much more ambitious, much more disastrous in the scale of their failures. The truth of this is sufficiently evident in the case of totalitarian regimes. The success of Stalin and Mao, and the failure of Hitler and Mussolini as war leaders has rather diverted attention from the failure of their governments as peace-time administrations.

Democratic countries such as Britain, though less dramatic in what they attempt than dictatorships, still seek to do more than was believed either desirable or possible before the twentieth century. It is even arguable that during the 1939-1945 war the state was more powerful in Britain than in Germany: certainly, despite having a smaller economic base, Britain succeeded in mobilising her industry much more effectively, and had outstripped Germany in armaments production by 1941. At any rate, Britain since 1900 has been much more positively shaped by state institutions than was the case before 1900; and it is therefore possible that state institutions have contributed more to Britain's decline than they ever did to Britain's greatness.

Britain's economic achievement during the 1939-1945 war was her last great success, because it was linked with an equally major failure. Despite her economic achievement, Britain dared not challenge Germany head-on, even after the commitment of Germany's main forces to the invasion of the Soviet Union. Whereas in 1916, 1917 and 1918, at the cost of a stupendous slaughter of her young men, Britain had challenged

the main offensive capacity of the German army and finally wore it down, in 1941-42 Britain confined herself to ineptly run side-shows, and after 1943, together with the Americans, attacked only the hopelessly outnumbered German forces that Hitler managed to spare from the vast struggle in Russia. The human cost to Britain of the First World War was considerably less than that to France, Germany, Russia and Austria, and what was achieved, in strategic terms, at this smaller price was considerably more.[1] In human terms, Britain's sacrifice in the Second World War was even smaller, but except for the destruction of Germany's cities, it is unclear precisely what Britain achieved by this sacrifice, other than its survival as an independent offshore island.

The failure of supposedly victorious Britain to match the post-war economic success of defeated France, Germany, Italy and Japan seems to have been related to Britain's strategic eclipse during the war. It was as if there had been a collective failure of nerve. Having, so they thought, won the war, Britain's young men came out of the forces to pick up the threads of interrupted lives and to start a new existence in the broad sunlit uplands of peace, promised to them by Mr. Churchill. Instead they faced increased rationing, fuel shortages, and nationalisation. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951 they did so with a mandate to end the hardships and austerity which people had expected to cease in 1945 and which had seemingly been prolonged by the Attlee Government. As soon as possible they raised living standards and wages, and at a time when all the rest of Europe, excepting only neutral Switzerland and Sweden, was still poor and desperate, scrimping and saving to rebuild and to prepare for the future, Britons were living in a premature tawdry affluence purchased with the resources that should have been invested in long-term reconstruction. Never Had It So Good was built on the economic foundations of out of date factories and under-capitalised labour-intensive technology. When balance of payment and sterling crises began to show that Britain's prosperity was without base, they merely celebrated by growing their hair long and going to open-air concerts: after all, France was having another revolution, and the USA had decided to postpone the Great Society until it had shown the world it could conquer Vietnam and the moon at one and the same time: a balanced sense of priorities developed into a smugness that had never been less justified.

The same timidity which caused Britain during the early 1940s to amass vast arsenals and armies, but not to use them until joined by the even vaster resources of the USA, which caused the Macmillan Government during the late 1950s to seek popular applause by expanding private consumption before the need for investment and reconstruction had been met, has by now developed into the dominant characteristic of British public and private life—pettifogging, cautious, hostile to challenge, readier to blame other sections of society than to admit the existence of problems that can only be handled by the concerted actions of all social groups.

The formula which gave Western civilisation—especially Britain—mastery over the rest of the world, and over the productive forces of technology, was a combination of individualism and organisation. The Aztecs and the Incas, the principalities of India, even the Asante in West Africa, were not conquered by superior weaponry, let alone superior numbers, but by superior drill. Cortes and Pizarro had a few primitive fire-arms which took inconveniently long to reload after discharge, and they subverted the two great South American Empires essentially with cold steel; Clive and Wellesley in India had no better muskets and artillery than the huge, French-trained Indian armies which they defeated: all they had was troops of superior nerve and discipline. In West Africa, in the Asante Wars, the British invaders were faced by tough warriors, trained to fight in the bush and well armed with up-to-date fire-arms kindly supplied by Danish businessmen.

In *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, T. E. Lawrence wrote of 'that feeling of individual obligation to push struggling humanity up its road. The vicarious policemanship which was the strongest emotion of Englishmen towards another man's struggle.' This attitude was usually less altruistic than Lawrence implies, but whether it expressed itself in altruism or in extortion, it was an essential instinct for domination that permeated European —and especially British—culture from top to bottom. But the essential characteristic of this instinct was that it expressed itself in terms of a commitment to standards and consensus that lent themselves to a degree of regimentation of which non-Europeans are incapable: even the Japanese, who, first in war and latterly in peace, seem to have outregimented Europe, have never evolved an efficient system of hierarchy:

The British tend not to think of themselves as being as regimented as their neighbours. A tradition of political freedom, the fact that military conscription has only ever been a short-term institution, and such details as Britons not having to possess identity papers, seem to bear out the notion that Britons dislike regimentation. Yet England was the first country in modern Europe to experience a military dictatorship.

Yet the characteristic of British organisation is—or used to be—its informality. It is—or was—the informality of British institutions that was responsible for their success. Informality meant not merely flexibility, but scope for individualism. The decline of Britain has made the formerly fashionable talk about British Individualism seem dated: and indeed it is difficult to demonstrate how precisely we are more individual than, for example, the Danes or the Dutch, who share our predominantly Protestant cultural tradition and Teutonic racial origin. The antipathy for Germany engendered by two world wars fostered the idea of a contrast between English individualism and German conformism and love of being regimented: but from the viewpoint of 1984 it is difficult to see that Germans are really more conformist: perhaps after all Hitler is to be explained rather in terms of the romanticism so evident in German cultural traditions. The northern European Germanic Protestant country that really does stand out as different from Britain in terms of regimen-

tation and conformism is Sweden. In a recent book by Michael Lindsay the Swedes are described as 'almost machine-like, they were so well integrated into their over-organised society that it seemed it could not be long before they were rendered obsolete by robots'.[2] The cultural peculiarity of Sweden must at least in part be due to the fact that in no other Northern European country has the state been so powerful for so long. Moreover, the power of the Swedish state has, since the sixteenth century, been uniquely tied in with notions formal constitution, and in fact, Sweden has been governed by written, publicly promulgated constitution longer than any other country in the world: the complete opposite of the experience of Britain. In a sense, however, Britain has been becoming more like Sweden. The power of central government has grown rapidly in Britain during the twentieth century, especially since 1945, and though we still manage without a written constitution, the formality and rigidity of an overdeveloped bureaucratic system are today at least as evident in Britain as in Sweden.

The growth of bureaucracy in Britain is more than simply a matter of more unwanted officials and more unnecessary paperwork. From one point of view the growth of British bureaucracy merely brought us into line with societies with a long tradition of large bureaucracies, such as France, Sweden, or Germany. But from another point of view the growth of British bureaucracy represents a water-shed.

Until the 1950s the British Empire provided an outlet for the administrative talent of great numbers of the sons of the professional middle classes. Whether or not they governed India or Africa better than their home-grown successors is less important, from the British point of view, than the fact that they provided a minimum framework of law and order in which the economic exploitation of the Empire could be pursued by businessmen. In the days of Empire, the colonial administrators had held themselves superior to the businessmen who picked over the bones of the carcasses they held down. This sense of superiority eventually transferred itself to Britain.

The growth of public sector employment soon became a popular target for recrimination. Yet the Thatcher Government's attempts to reduce the public sector seem to have been largely unavailing: essentially because the very bodies that it was the government's policy to reduce are themselves responsible for putting that policy into action. Public service unions have been vocal in their abuse both of central government and of municipal governments that have attempted to fall in with central government instructions; but this abuse has been chiefly significant as a smoke-screen concealing a substantial degree of non-co-operation by persons often too senior to compromise themselves by public criticism of their political masters. Indeed it is arguable that the sheer ineptitude in detail of the present government—its inability to translate any of its stated policies on inflation, prices, employment, industry, into any sort of reality other than trebling of unemployment—is the result of theoretically non-partisan civil servants having failed to work out the detailed

implementation of government measures in such a way as to ensure that they had the least chance of success. The inherent nature of bureaucracy is such that it easily accommodates expansion, but is necessarily hostile to retrenchment, because retrenchment means cuts in departmental budgets.

Nonetheless, today, under Mrs. Thatcher, Britain seems as stable as at any time in the last three hundred years. The increasing poverty of Britain as compared to the USA or West Germany or even Japan is still very much less striking than the colossal, luxurious wealth of Britain as compared to the nations of the Third World. The growing frustration of the unemployed and of ethnic minorities increasingly under pressure in an atmosphere of paranoia and prejudice, the bitterness of those surviving believers in free enterprise, the increasing public suspicion of the police and of public employees generally, the general climate of moral panic on both the Left and the Right—all these are still very far from constituting a revolutionary groundswell that might be expected soon to sweep away British Civilisation as we know it. But there appears to be no sign, on any front, of the least improvement. Everyone talks of things becoming worse; few people have the least confidence in things becoming better. It is possible that a better understanding of what has gone wrong in the past will help us to reorganise the future.

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NOTES:
1. Cf. John Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire* (1980) pp. 100-109.
2. Michael Lindsay, *Mind-Sprung* (1981) p. 104.

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[Stephen Harvey is a mechanical engineer specialising in marine diesels. He has travelled widely in Europe, Asia and the Americas in the course of his work, studying contemporary history in his spare time.]

# NATURAL MEDICINE

## by Michael J. Hallowell

IN August 1983, Dr. John Dawson, head of the British Medical Association's professional division, announced that a working party on Alternative Therapy had been set up by the Association. The purpose of this working party is quite singular and pointed; to assess the relative merits of herbal medicine, osteopathy, acupuncture, chiropractic and other unorthodox medical techniques, and determine whether they can be integrated into the whole sphere of accepted medical practise.

The current rise in interest by the general public in the subject of alternative medicine has placed the medical profession on the horns of a dilemma. The profession has no viable excuse for not investigating alternative therapies, and yet to do so immediately makes nonsense of many previous claims that alternative medicine has nothing to offer and is therefore not worth looking at. In short, having been so vociferously critical of 'fringe' medicine in the past, even the slightest acknowledgment of its value now tends to give the orthodox profession a somewhat hypocritical physiognomy. Should the working party discover during its investigations a quite beneficial adjunctive treatment for certain kinds of cancer, for example, the active voices of the alternative medical province will immediately point out to the general public that they could have had the benefits of such 'discoveries' decades ago, had the orthodox profession condescended to take an impartial look at them.

The current climate of opinion is deeply sympathetic towards alternative, more natural forms of medicine. Health-food stores are becoming increasingly common, natural health magazines are currently in vogue, and some faculties that teach herbalism and other unconventional healing techniques are being deluged with applications from prospective students. The BMA is aware of this trend, and knows that the public will not idly tolerate a hierarchical profession that glibly rejects out of hand any viewpoint or technique that does coincide exactly with its own rigidly-held medical doctrines. Hence, we now have the working party on Alternative Therapy, which will—albeit reluctantly—take a 'closer look' at the whole subject of unconventional medicine.

The struggle between the orthodox medical establishment and those who practise outside of it is not a new one. The final parting of the ways —and it was not an amicable parting by anyone's standards—occurred back in the 1500s during the reign of Henry VIII. At that time the three main medical societies—the Surgeons, the Barbers and the apothecaries—had an almost complete monopoly on the treatment of disease. As usually happens when a monopoly is gained, the presiding factions soon realised that they were now in a position to exploit their powerful standing and charge extortionate prices for the benefit of their (somewhat dubious) skills. Before long, the common man in the street found almost any form of conventional medical treatment beyond his

means. Whilst the Surgeons and Barbers curried the favour of those who belonged to the more affluent strata of society, the poorer people were left to suffer whatever disease afflicted them in abject misery.

This appalling contempt for those who were unable to afford their services eventually backfired upon these 'doctors of physic' with a severity they could never have expected.

Bereft of professional medical expertise—which in any case had very little to offer—the towns and villages of England gave birth to a complete medical sub-culture. Every street corner suddenly had an 'old wise-woman' who was adept at using medicinal herbs, or a disgruntled apothecary's apprentice who was prepared to give his neighbours the benefit of his pharmacological experience, and yet charge very little for it. One commentator remarked:

'For now every man without study of necessary artes unto the knowledge of physick will become a phisician. Every man nay every old wyfe will presume, not without the mordre of many, to practyse physick.'

Suddenly, the Surgeons found their interest in the poor rekindled, but for less than pure motives. These untrained lay-healers were now becoming a threat to their livelihood. Medicine *for* the masses was an alarming concept in itself to the Surgeons, but the idea of medicine *by* the masses was absolutely horrifying.

The Surgeons and Barbers moved quickly to block this impertinence. They complained loudly to King Henry and managed to gain the support of his Minister, Wolsey. Henry, plagued by domestic problems and bouts of poor health himself, was eventually badgered into making a proclamation which was passed as an Act of Parliament in 1511. The Act said in part:

> No person within the City of London, or within seven miles of the same, shall take upon him to exercise or occupy as a physician or surgeon except he be first examined by the Bishop of London, or by the Dean of St. Paul's, calling to him four doctors of physic, and for surgery other expert persons in that faculty.

Further extensions to this act were ratified in 1518, 1523 and 1540. For a while the Surgeons, Barbers and apothecaries appeared to have secured their monopoly, but two things happened to change matters. Firstly, the ridiculous Act nearly sparked off a revolution. Enraged at this attempt to remove what little medical help was available to them, the people turned their attention to the doctors who had instigated the move in the first place. Several Surgeons were physically assaulted, and not a few Barbers had their premises burned to the ground.

It soon became obvious that this persecution of lay-healers had touched a raw nerve amongst the common people.

Secondly, Henry himself developed a fascination for the subject of herbal medicine. He read all the available books on the subject and became something of an expert in the 'applying of herbal poultices'. This affinity with those who practised the art of plant medicine gave him a natural sympathy for their cause, and was to be instrumental in the passing of another Act in 1543. This one, however, was not to the Surgeons' liking.

> Be it ordained, established and enacted, by Authority of this present Parliament,

> that at all time from henceforth, it shall be lawful to . . . practice, use and minister in and to any outward Sore, Uncome Wound, Apostemations, Outward Swelling or Disease, any Herb or Herbs, Ointments Baths, Pultess and Emplaisters, according to their Cunning, Experience and Knowledge in any of the Diseases, Sores and Maladies beforesaid.

This Act, commonly called the Herbalists' Charter, was never repealed, and is still the shield behind which herbalists today can practise their skills with impunity. It can be seen, on reflection, that Henry's Charter has profoundly affected the current ways in which the orthodox profession tries to denigrate alternative medicine. The ploy in Henry's day had been simple; have the quacks declared illegal and they will very quickly fade into oblivion. This tactic—an 'argument of law'—failed abysmally. The effect on the Surgeons was so unnerving that it has never been attempted again with any real enthusiasm. Thus, the critics of natural medicine moved on to pastures (and tactics) new.

The greatest criticism that the paragons of orthodoxy have reserved for the medical outlaws—and it has a certain degree of validity—is that those who practise herbalism, osteopathy *et al* are largely people of no orthodox medical training. Until the 1970s very few herbalists had anything more than a smattering of medical terminology. Their knowledge of anatomy and physiology was limited, and their grasp of medical sciences such as pathology was almost non-existent. Of course, the critics capitalised on this weakness. TV and radio debates were arranged between hospital interns and medical herbalists. More often than not, the orthodox spokesman, armed with a bewildering array of facts, figures and statistics, would win the arguments by a landslide.

To combat this embarrassing state of affairs, the practitioners of alternative therapies embarked upon a great programme of self-education. Almost overnight, the National Institute of Medical Herbalists and The British Herbalists Union took on a new image. No longer could their students be ridiculed as a wandering bunch of pseudo-medical mystics. Suddenly, students of herbalism found that they were being taught how to use a sphygmomanometer as well as a mortar and pestle. Armed with this new knowledge, they found that they were able to debate with their allopathic counterparts on the most intricate medical issues.

Yet this self-education programme was not a co-ordinated movement. Rather, it was a natural response, almost a reflex action. The aforementioned faculties, along with most others, realised that if they were to provide a credible alternative to the orthodox system they would have to beat the GPs at their own game by undertaking a drastic overdaul of their teaching programmes.

Since the mid-1970s orthodox critics have attempted to make very little mileage out of the alternative practitioners' lack of recognisable qualifications. The only people whom they could possibly hope to impress by this line of argument were the general public and they, disillusioned by the horrific side-effects of many modern drugs, are not impressed by an impressive display of letters after a practitioner's name. They are only interested in results, and results achieved safely at that. This is why, over the last few years, the orthodox profession has once again shifted

the emphasis, of its attack. Having found that little is to be gained by attacking the 'quack' himself, the big guns of the orthodox armoury have now been trained on the medicines that he dispenses.

The Thalidomide, and more recently Flosint and Phenylpropanolamine debacles have made the public extremely distrustful of modern drug therapy, and now that alternative medicine has proved itself to be a viable substitute for orthodox drug treatments there is a real possibility that people will begin to see herbal and homeopathic preparations as not just an 'alternative' treatment but actually the preferred one. This may well be the prime motivation behind many of the attacks that have been made on herbal medicines recently in the news media. The orthodox profession is determined to destroy the idea that herbal remedies are in any way safer than their own.

In turning their attention to herbal medicines, the critics have already made two incalculable blunders. Not only have they gravely underestimated the ability of the medical renegades to provide coherent, logical retorts to the attacks that are made upon them, but they have also greatly overestimated their own ability to make scientifically justifiable criticisms.

Several critics of alternative medicine have landed themselves in trouble recently by making statements that were unprovable. Several orthodox medical journals have recently made great play of the fact that the herb Ginseng (*Panax quinquefolia*) produces side-effects when taken in excess. Alarmist statements about 'blinding headaches' and 'muscle tremors' occurring as side-effects are common. What these critics so often fail to mention is that to produce these symptoms of toxicity one would need to eat between three and four pounds of the substance at a sitting. Such biased, sloppy and selective criticism has not been allowed to go unchallenged by those herbalists who have a detailed knowledge of plant pharmocognosy, but there is another, more powerful reason why such criticisms are largely impotent. They are made, quite often, by doctors who actively espouse the use of dangerous orthodox drugs. As a colleague of mine said rather scathingly some time ago: 'Ginseng may cause the odd headache if it is swallowed with cavalier abandon, but at least it doesn't cause babies to be born without arms and legs.'

Until the orthodox profession becomes as critical of their own medications as they are of herbal ones and until their own pharmaceutical house is put in order, their pedantic ramblings about the so-called side-effects of Ginseng are unlikely to carry any weight.

It may be 1985 before the findings of the working party are correlated, and it must be said at this juncture that the results are not easily predictable. Just possibly, we may see the dawning of a whole new era of medical enlightenment during which alternative therapies are given their rightful place upon the medical tapestry of this country. Alternatively, the orthodox profession may launch a blistering attack on 'quack' medicine in a final attempt to remove what they see as an irritating thorn in their flesh.

Ironically, it may not be in the best interests of the alternative medical fraternities to achieve what they have fought so long and hard for—official recognition. Those who feel that official recognition would prove to be their professional panacea should study the lesson learned so bitterly by the American osteopaths. After eventually gaining the stamp of orthodox approval, many osteopaths, drunk with the heady wine of official recognition, simply swapped their osteopathic certificates for allopathic medical diplomas. They became orthodox medical doctors in all but name. If the herbalists, osteopaths, acupuncturists and chiropractors of the United Kingdom want to avoid the same slide into vocational anonymity, they must take care to protect their professional identity.

Whatever the outcome of the study by the working party, it will mark a watershed in a long and sometimes bitter feud. Alternative medicine will not go away, but if the BMA and the orthodox profession in general refuse to accept its worth, we may enter a period of medical stagnation. Tragically, the greatest losers will be neither the orthodox doctors nor the herbal practitioners, but the patients who look to them for guidance. To retain its credibility, orthodox medical practice must develop a stronger pioneer spirit and build up a keen desire to explore new therapeutic vistas. If the working party can present a tangible framework to the BMA on which such a spirit can be nurtured, they will have performed a signal service to medical advancement. They have a golden opportunity to heal a wound that has festered for over four hundred years.

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[Michael J. Hallowell is a freelance writer specialising in medical journalism.]

# ROCOCO—THE ART OF FRIVOLITY

## by Muriel Julius

THE idea of an exhibition devoted to Rococo, an essentially decorative and extravagant style, long neglected and thus likely to attract many visitors, is one few Museum Directors would resist. And why indeed should they? Allied to scholarship it can prove both informative and valuable.

*Rococo—Art and Design in Hogarth's England*—a major exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum, South Kensington, London, took three years in gestation. It continues until the 30th September. The excellently researched 333-page catalogue (weighing 3 lbs) is not intended for the casual visitor.

The word Rococo comes from the French *rocaille.* It is a nonsense word coined by neo-classicists in the 1790s as a term of opprobrium. Fundamentally, it is a style of decoration, invented in France for use in private houses. It reached maturity in the period 1729-1740, and in England lasted from about 1730 to 1770. It was a complete break from the style of Louis XIV's reign and is marked by lightness and delicacy. Its decorative forms are composed of small broken curves in wood or stucco, floating on the surface of wall or ceiling. Rococo decorators preferred light colours—pinks, pale blues, cool greens, with plenty of white often touched with gold. Rococo designers eliminate the classic architectural members, columns, pilasters, entablatures. The decoration is often asymmetrical; it incorporates the shell as a favourite motif.

Even before his death in 1715, Louis XIV, that most intelligent monarch, recognised a reaction against the excessive pomp and splendours of Versailles. A new, rich merchant class had emerged, anxious to transfer the centre of French life back to Paris, and to build smaller houses that would incorporate *la commodité, la beauté et la bienséance*—(comfort, beauty and propriety.) Rococo moved across Europe. Rome would have none of it, but Venice and Piedmont responded. If Spain and Switzerland were lukewarm it burgeoned in Germany, especially Southern Germany. There princelings vied with each other in creating their own little Versailles. No other country produced so many absurdly beautiful churches and royal residences.

No career could be more unusual than that of François Cuvilliés. Born in France, he entered the service of the exiled Elector, Max Emanuel of Bavaria, in 1708 as Court Dwarf and accompanied Emanuel on his return to Munich in 1714. Too small for the army, he began working as a military architect and showed such promise he was sent to France to study with J-F. Blondel. He was appointed Court Architect in Munich in 1725. There, in the park of Nymphenburg, he created his masterpiece, the Amalienburg, of an elegance and gossamer delicacy which makes it the supreme monument of the Rococo.

Had I come to the present exhibition with visions of such architectural

fantasies I would have been disappointed. This is an exhibition where scholarship has effaced flair; where the designer fails to reproduce the mood of exquisite urbanity that is Rococo. The promised recreation of the Vauxhall Pleasure Gardens, with its colonnade of supper boxes, its tree-lined walks and triumphal arches, obelisks and temples, seems curiously dim and dull.

On entering, however, we catch our breath at the opulence of the vast Bureau Cabinet, inlaid with mother-of-pearl, brass and ivory created in Dresden for Augustus III, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony. This was the Cabinet acquired by the Victoria and Albert Museum at the famous Mentmore Sale in 1977. There is silver by Meissonnier, a design for a stage set attributed to the incomparable Antonio Galli Bibiena. Most striking of all is the white porcelain group of figures modelled by Franz Anton Bustelli at the Nymphenburg manufactory. And then, after a glance at a swift sketch by Watteau of an engraver working at his table; at an extravagantly ornamental engraving of Leda by Claude Duflos after Boucher, and the visitor is swept into the mainstream of English Rococo.

Michael Snodin, largely responsible for the exhibition, writes:

> It appears likely that Rococo was at least as popular among middle-class townsmen as it was among the country house-owning upper classes . . . also that it may have been greatly encouraged by the craftsmen themselves, who would not only profit from the greater complication of the new style, but would have little difficulty in creating new designs in an essentially organic and fanciful style.

By the mid-18th Century, England and France had made peace. There was political stability and great economic activity. These factors and the new prosperity and cultural awareness of bankers, physicians, lawyers, anxious to emulate the life-styles of the landed gentry if not the aristocracy, drew artists of all varieties across the Channel. The sculptor Louis François Roubiliac, silversmiths Paul de Lamerie and Nicholas Sprimont, the cabinet maker Pierre Langlois, the etcher and engraver, Hubert Gravelot, not to mention the dancing masters, actors, coiffeurs, milliners and tailors.

All this aroused a certain resentment. The British Museum has lent a satirical engraving showing all such persons disembarking from a ship. It is addressed to 'The Laudable Associations of Anti-Gallicians, and the generous Promoters of British Arts and Manufactories.' Ironically, the artist was a Frenchman, Louis Philippe Boitard. The Museum has also lent the Badge of the Antigallican Society, a plaque of painted enamel, silver and and rock crystal, depicting, among other devices, St. George on a horse spearing the flag of France.

By 1740 London had become a most convivial city. There were some 550 coffee houses that served as clearing houses for gossip and news; a rich variety of clubs, eighty-seven Masonic Lodges, and for recreation its citizens could visit one of approximately 60 pleasure gardens which imitated fashionable Vauxhall and Ranelagh.

Where does Hogarth fit into this varied scene? His fame rests on his series of satirical engravings exposing the baser morals of the time, yet

his accomplishments were far more far-reaching. A man of energy and resolution, when he suffered from the illegal reproduction and sale of these works by others, he managed to get the first Copyright Act passed. In the same year, 1735, he established his St. Martin's Lane Academy, the precursor of the Royal Academy Schools, a guild for professional artists and a school for young painters. Here Thomas Gainsborough learnt drawing from Gravelot, and Roubiliac instructed in sculpture. Much artistic life centred on St. Martin's Lane. The cabinet makers Thomas Chippendale, John Channon and William Vile established their workrooms there. Alongside was Old Slaughter's Coffee House—'the rendezvous of all the wits and the greatest part of the men of letters in Town'—where they would forgather.

Hogarth was also a man of letters. His illustrated treatise on aesthetics, *The Analysis of Beauty*, caused an uproar when it was published in 1753. Six years later he published *An Apology for Painters* describing the role of artists in 18th Century England.

Hogarth was a Governor of the Foundling Hospital; a member of the Society of Arts; he designed the sets for the first production of John Gay's *The Beggar's Opera*: went on holidays with the great actor David Garrick, married the daughter of Sir James Thornhill, famous as the painter of the frescoes in the Great Hall at Greenwich, and even designed furniture, albeit rather badly. The exhibition has borrowed the President's Chair of the Shakespeare Club, now fortunately owned by the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, DC and probably designed by him.

Hogarth was an exceptional colourist but hardly a rococo painter. He is represented by 12 paintings, including his robust self-portrait, a painting within the painting, a study in still life. Beside him sits Tramp, his pug dog; his palette crossed by a serpentine line which he regarded as necessary to the portrayal of the beautiful; and a pile of books including Milton, Shakespeare and Swift.

There are many family portraits in the exhibition. Those by Arthur Devis, stiff and elegant in their fine rooms are reminiscent of the Venetian painter, Longhi. Francis Hayman is in altogether lighter mood as in his Grant Family and that of Jonathan Tyers, the owner of the Vauxhall Pleasure Gardens. There is a beautiful painting of the Grand Walk in those Gardens by the Venetian painter, Antonio Canaletto.

Gainsborough, a truly rococo painter, is represented but once. His portrait of Sir Richard Lloyd from the National Gallery in Wales was selected to display the particularly splendid brocaded waistcoat covering his ample chest. A welcome addition to this exhibition would have been this artist's portrait of pretty Mrs. Philip Thicknesse seated, head turned, leaning on an elbow and wearing a superb rococo gown. It belongs to the Cincinnati Art Museum, Ohio.

Lastly, a rear view of two ladies walking in a high wind—a delicious chalk drawing by Paul Sandby, lent by the Queen, reminding one of Watteau.

The giant talents of this exhibition are the sculptor, Louis François

Roubiliac, and the Huguenot silversmith, Paul de Lamerie. Roubiliac's marble Handel carved six years after his arrival in England in 1732, made his name. It is rightly placed in a niche of the Vauxhall Gardens section of the exhibition, as intended by the Garden's proprietor who commissioned it.

Roubiliac never flatters his sitters, frankly portraying the ugliness of Martin Folkes, for example, in the bust lent by the Earl of Pembroke. He gives his sitters authority, but the portrait busts of Swift and Pope are a reminder that the manners of the time masked savagery and malice.

In his book *British Architects and Craftsmen*, Sacheverell Sitwell wonders why Huguenots make such wonderful silversmiths. He places Paul de Lamerie among the supreme craftsmen of Rococo. De Lamerie dominated his craft then, he still does today. His silver basket of 1747 in the form of an escallop shell with a pierced wavy border, its handle fashioned as a mermaid rising as if from a wave is beauty reaching new heights. There is also his delightful Tea Equipage, lent from the Leeds City Art Galleries, complete with three canisters finely chased, cream jug, two knives, twelve teaspoons and sugar nips.

Nicholas Sprimont and Paul Crespin, another Huguenot, produced a sumptuous silver gilt service for Frederick, Prince of Wales, from which the Queen has lent the centrepiece, two sauceboats and two salt dishes, incorporating marine subjects which are quite marvellously modelled.

Little English porcelain can compete with the charm of pieces made at Mennecy or St. Cloud; no figure groups compare in grace with those of Bustelli or Kaëndler. A sauceboat in the shape of a shell with a crayfish handle (Derby): a teapot in the shape of a melon (Staffordshire): or a coffee pot taking the form of a strangely elongated cauliflower (Staffordshire) may amuse but would not, I think, sit well with the sophisticated domestic wares produced at Sèvres or Meissen. I make an exception of the charmingly original Chelsea soft-paste sauceboat in the form of a plaice, the handle a twist of seaweed on the cover, and the tail swished up to form the handle of the boat.

The taste for elaborate applied decoration, most fully expressed in silver and porcelain, extended also to furniture. With no Charles Cressent of our own, we look to Pierre Langlois, who established himself in Tottenham Court Road in the late 1750s. According to his trade card (lent by the British Museum), he specialised in *Meubles, inscrulex de fleurs en bois.* A handsome commode with delicate marquetry and fine ormolu mounts was supplied to John, fourth Duke of Bedford in 1760, and is now loaned by his descendant, the Marquess of Tavistock and Trustees of the Bedford Estates.

By comparison the mahogany chest of drawers that Thomas Chippendale made for Daniel Lascelles in 1772 is very restrained. (Earl of Harewood Collection). But only a masterly hand could have controlled the long sweep of that serpentine-shaped front, and the refined elongated scrolls that adorn each corner. This piece accords exactly with the opinion of Lady Holland in 1764: 'Tho' whims and fripperies may have a run,

one always returns to what is really handsome and noble and plain.' Noble and elegant are terms that can readily be applied to this same cabinet-maker's pair of gilt pine Candlestands, lent from the Duke of Atholl's Collection at Blair Castle. Several pairs of wall brackets are unfortunate: one pair is outstanding. From Felbrigg Hall, Norfolk (National Trust) they are of gilt plaster, attributed to John Cheere. One bracket depicts Apollo as God of Poetry and Music seated among foliage, flowers and rocaille; the other in a similar setting is of the winged figure of Victory. Both are modelled to an exceptional standard.

From another National Trust property, Uppark in Hampshire, come two handsome giltwood armchairs by John Bladwell from a suite of eight. The slender frames carved in light relief are upholstered in tapestries depicting Aesop's Fables. By reason of unusual inheritance, Uppark has retained an exceptionally large part of the *original* rococo furnishings and decorations purchased by Sir Matthew Featherstonhaugh and his bride.

Of a sudden one sees an enormous State Bed, hung about with richly red curtains and upholstery of fantastic pretention. Attributed to James Wittle and Samuel Norman, it is conceived as a bower with garlands of flowers pouring down over a dome, surmounted by arched cornices terminating in carved plumes.

Purchased by Charles, 2nd Earl of Egremont, to stand in 'The King of Spain's Bedroom' at his fine house, Petworth in Sussex, it remains the property of the present Earl. A great part of Petworth is administered by the National Trust. They intend opening six of the bedrooms shortly.

Surprises continue: panels of marvellously embroidered silks, ladies' gowns, male attire. Their prettiness adds charm to the exhibition. The silks were woven at Spitalfields to the exquisite designs of the unlikely Anna Maria Garthwaite, daughter of a Lincolnshire parson, who came to London to live with her widowed sister in 1730. Until 1756 she produced and sold eighty fabric designs each year, of which over one thousand survive. There are picture frames—some light and airy as on the marriage portraits of the Beckfords by Sir Joshua Reynolds; others bizarre, as the one carved by Paul Petit for Frederick, Prince of Wales to frame 'The Shooting Party' by John Wooton. Generous scrolls entwine a quiver of arrows, a hunting sword, a powder flask, a dead duck, a snipe and various other beasts, the whole surmounted by the Prince of Wales' feathers atop a lion's mask.

The model of the State Coach for King George III to the design of Sir William Chambers, architect of Somerset House, rates a second glance; as does the little gold plaque, moulded and engraved, that was William Hogarth's ticket of admission for life to the Vauxhall Gardens.

Finally, there are many wonderful engravings and etchings; illustrations for books; trade cards—one for an Elizabeth Godfrey, goldsmith and jeweller, is interesting.

It is a large, comprehensive exhibition, too interesting and provocative to be exhausting.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## THE END OF THE BEGIN ERA

Dear Madam,

May I dispute Dr. Shlaim's assertions that the key to understanding Israeli policies during the six years of Mr. Begin's premiership lies in the revisionist ideology of Jabotinsky. Nothing could be further from the truth. I submit that these policies, just as the policies pursued by the preceding Socialist administration, were essentially determined by the implacable hostility of the Arab world towards the Jewish State. Mr. Begin departed significantly from the fundamental principles of the founding father of revisionism when he agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. He did so on trust for a peace treaty that proved to be little more than the confirmation of the state of non-belligerency which prevailed at the time when the treaty was signed. It is common knowledge that one of the reasons behind President Sadat's much acclaimed initiative was the appalling state of the Egyptian economy and the war-weariness of the country.

Again, one must remember that Mr. Begin abandoned Jabotinsky's claim to a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan. Another fact that Dr. Shlaim conveniently overlooks is that Mr. Begin and his Government tried to eliminate the PLO threat from Lebanon by a short sharp expedition to the River Litani in 1978.

Unfortunately, this warning shot was completely ignored by the PLO and their supporters in Syria and the Soviet Union. The failure of the Arab world to respond to Israel's limited action in 1978 made the subsequent Lebanon campaign inevitable. This was not merely a question of the constant bombardments of the settlements in Northern Israel and the assassination of Israelis abroad. Israel knew that the PLO was being trained and expanded into a large fighting force. This was confirmed when, after Israel entered the Lebanon again, they found sufficient weapons to arm three full divisions, even before they discovered the immense weapon stores that were hidden in the tunnels under the Sabra and the Shatila refugee camps.

The fact that so many Christians and Moslems greeted the Israelis as liberators is perhaps very significant, although it does not exactly fit with Dr. Shlaim's particular argument. Mr. Begin's action in Lebanon was consistent with Israeli policies since the foundation of the Jewish State and would have been undertaken by any other Israeli Government in power. One must remember that in its immediate objection, i.e. the destruction of the PLO as a fighting force, the expedition was entirely successful. Its larger political failure was unpredictable and was caused entirely by the contradictions of America's Middle Eastern policy.

Dr. Shlaim's criticism of the economic difficulties of Israel during Mr. Begin's Government are singularly partisan. Admittedly, the Likud, like any other political party in a parliamentary democracy, did its utmost to win elections and in that context, may have been unduly complacent in

encouraging Israeli consumerism. What Dr. Shlaim completely overlooks are two basic questions underlying Israel's inflation and its economic difficulties:

1. Who are the Israelis who press for an ever higher—not to say unrealistic—standard of living?
2. Why are so many Israelis hellbent on purely material benefits?

The answer to the first question is, that in the forefront of those who fuel inflation are the Israelis of European descent, who have impossibly high western middle-class standards and mean to maintain them regardless of the consequence. It is significant that consumerism is spearheaded by the Israeli trade unions, more than anyone else and nobody can suspect them of being under the influence of Jabotinsky.

When it comes to the second question, one has to realise that the economic impulses of Israel's population are influenced very much by external events. After five wars in 36 years and uninterrupted tension, it is not surprising that so many Israelis live from day to day in a kind of existentialist fever. No Israeli politician, whether of the right or of the left, can ignore this craving for the comforts of life. This attitude is by no means exclusively Israeli and has absolutely nothing to do with revisionist ideology. This is not to say that Mr. Begin's Government have not made the mistakes that any democratically elected government makes from time to time, but there was nothing ideological about these errors. Dr. Shlaim criticises Mr. Begin's West Bank policy, but he conveniently forgets that the policy of building settlements at various strategic points in Samaria and Judea was initiated by the previous Labour Government. Mr. Begin simply advanced that Government's policy a stage further and offered would-be settlers a number of material incentives, which were eagerly taken up by the 20,000 or 30,000 Israelis who settled in those territories. The vast majority of Israelis agree that Jerusalem is not to be divided again and that Israel requires a substantial part of the West Bank for its defensive purposes. If that is so, one could argue about the tactics of placing particular settlements in particular locations, but broadly speaking, one cannot turn the West Bank into a defensive shield of Israel's narrow mainland, without carrying out policies which are bound to displease and antagonise the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank.

In conclusion, I think that Dr. Shlaim shares with some Israelis the delusion that the cause and outcome of the Israel/Arab conflict could be changed by a different 'school of thought' in Israeli politics (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1420, Vol. 244). This is, of course, a notion that is extremely flattering to the Israelis but bears no relation to the power-political realities of the Middle East.

Yours faithfully,
LIONEL BLOCH, LL.B

Wimpole Street,
London W.1.

## CALL FOR AN ALL-PARTY COMMISSION

Dear Madam,

Reading S. G. Shanker's article 'The Challenge of Mass Unemployment' (No. 1415, Vol. 243) I have been wondering if the reason for Britain's decline in the international league since 1945 (from 2nd to 18th place, according to a leading economic journal) is that since 1945 Britain has lost captive markets and resources in what was the largest Empire in history, and has not adapted to this change.

Having Empire markets and resources, all that was required was a strong centre. The drain to the dominant centre of the UK with the weakening of the other parts could be ignored. But now we have to compete on equal terms. This means that all parts of the UK must be made strong. In other words, Britain must adapt to the new situation. An All-Party Commission should be convened similar to the attempted All-Party Conference in 1979 to include all parliamentary parties.

The aim of the Commission will be to find a consensus for action to curb the drain to the dominant centre of the UK and strengthen the weaker parts of Britain. There are reputed to be about 12 ways known internationally for doing this. Emergency action would not prejudice the long-term policies of the political parties.

Yours faithfully,

Haughhead, Uddingston, Lanarkshire. PETER THOMSON.

## SUBSIDY AND THE ARTS

Dear Madam,

Subsidy to the Arts is a subject under much discussion currently, with the BBC's licence fee under continual review and the Arts Council having to look critically at its policies. It is noteworthy that Mr. Alasdair Milne in his article 'Public Service Broadcasting and the Arts' (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1419, Volume 244) points to the virtue of having a long-term licence; thus enabling the Corporation to plan projects ahead.

It seems odd that although this facility can be made available to the BBC, despite the risks of being tied to a fixed fee in inflationary times, there seems to be a high resistance at Government level to do this for the Arts. There have been plans for a triennial rolling grant to enable arts organisations to plan the use of their limited resources more effectively, but these have gone by the board.

If the Arts Council is planning for a decade as John Elsom points out in his article 'The Glory of Whose Garden?' (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1420, Volume 244), then the long-term planning of grant aid ought to be seriously reconsidered, along with the need as Mr. Elsom so correctly points out, to review urgently the charitable status of Arts organisations.

Administrator,
Washington Arts Centre,
Tyne and Wear.

Yours faithfully,
EDWARD GRIST

## BROADCASTING AND THE ARTS

Dear Madam,

It is true as Alasdair Milne says in his extremely interesting article on 'Public Service Broadcasting And The Arts' in the April 1984 issue of *Contemporary Review* (No. 1419, Vol. 244) that the British Broadcasting Corporation in both Television and Radio, has done a great deal over the years to invigorate the Arts, especially music, and no longer can Britain be referred to as the 'Land without Melody' (Gunther).

As Mr. Milne says, in the Arts and in Broadcasting the truth is important, as is cultural and class bridge-building. Indeed, to survive as a valuable part of our culture Art has to remain within the bounds of appreciation by ordinary people. Art should be concerned with communication; in a confused world, Art should tend towards the figurative. It is not enough to present the world with a private language whose complexities can only be appreciated by the knowing few.

Obviously Art appreciation is subjective and, in the past, this has been confined far too rigidly to the judgements of often very insular people. Having said that, it seems to me that generally the greatest use of the imaginative process, as far as broadcasting is concerned, is exercised in Radio. Perhaps that is due to the nature of the medium; not being tethered, as is Television, to the need for over-visualisation and explanation. Even so, BBC television has had successes covering the Arts.

However, recently the BBC and especially BBC2 appears to have gone 'down market', particularly as far as 'literature' is concerned, and now there are certain notable instances where commercial television is more adventurous in covering the Arts than the BBC. *The South Bank Show* is an example, as indeed is much of Channel 4's output. On Wednesdays, Channel 4 has been screening *Six Centuries Of Verse,* a prestige series of 16 half hour programmes featuring an anthology of English and American poetry. There is nothing like this on either of the BBC Channels. Weekly, on Sundays, *Book Four* covers a wide and varied range of literary activity. BBC 2's *Bookmark* emerged only once a month and has now ceased until the autumn.

Obviously BBC television tends to come into its own with series such as Ronald Harwood's interesting, but flawed, *All The World's A Stage* and David Attenboroughs splendid *The Living Planet;* but again, as in series such as *The Jewel In The Crown* and ventures such as *Film On Four* commercial television tends to take over the BBC's 'Arts Mantle'.

Therefore, whilst acknowledging the great debt that the Arts owes to the BBC, I would say that there is tremendous scope, especially in Television, for a wider coverage of the many varied aspects of the Arts

Yours faithfully,

Flamstead, Hertfordshire. DAVID R. MORGAN.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## HAROLD MACMILLAN AND HIS MEDITERRANEAN DIARIES

*War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean January 1943–May 1945.* Harold Macmillan. Macmillan. £18.50.

This collection of diaries and letters were well worth publishing even though they have been freely drawn on in Lord Stockton's six-volume Memoirs. He justly claims that in his autobiography 'he tried to provide an orderly exposition of the great political and military issues and the chronicle of the events as they occurred'. The Diaries and Letters give an equally valuable and still more readable account of the events as they occurred. They certainly convey a more vivid impression of the author. Harold Macmillan was sent out to Africa by Churchill at the end of 1942 with one private secretary and two typists. Thirty months later he had become a kind of supremo of all British interests in the Mediterranean area including Greece and Italy. It was an extraordinary feat of personality and efficiency.

We all know the latin tag 'Capax imperii nisi imperasset'. Is it good Latin to say what is certainly true of Macmillan 'Incapax imperii nisi imperasset?' Not once but twice in his career it needed his actual occupancy of power to demonstrate his supreme fitness.

When he went out to Africa he was a man of 48 who had been in parliament with one slight interval for many years but had risen no higher than Under-Secretary for the Colonies. Indeed till Churchill came to power two years earlier he had held no office at all. Yet everyone knew that he was a man of outstanding ability and integrity. Somehow or other he did not seem to be cut out for success in politics. In Africa, he made the most of a small opportunity with the results already mentioned.

But twelve years after the War it seemed most unlikely that he would ever be Prime Minister. He was supposed to be talking of retirement to the Lords, Then Eden collapsed; Butler cut a very unconvincing figure over Suez and Macmillan who has been described as 'first in and first out' of that adventure was called on to perform a rescue act by the Conservative Party. Six and a half years later his health compelled retirement. Few would deny that he had proved that he had what it takes to be a successful Prime Minister.

There is plenty of wit here which should be acceptable to all who have not a positive distaste for White's Club and Balliol College. The personal judgements appear to be shrewd though no criticism of Field Marshal Alexander is ever permitted. Every now and then he is quite severe e.g. the entry for April 14th, 1944—... '7 p.m. a ridiculous figure one of the great bores of St. James' St. called, He thinks he has the right sort of qualification to be Governor of Rome, a queer delusion which is unfortunately shared by General Wilson' of whom Macmillan writes elsewhere appreciatively.

The lynx-eyed critics will fasten on the entry for May 13th, 1945. 'Among the surrendered Germans are about forty thousand Cossacks and White Russians with their wives and children. To hand them over to the Russians is condemning them to slavery, torture and probably death. To refuse is deeply to offend the Russians and incidentally break the Yalta agreement. We have decided to hand them over...' Macmillan's sense of honesty prevents

him seeking to justify what he must have found most distressing. I think that if I had read these Diaries immediately after the War, I would have been more prepared than I was for Macmillan's later apotheosis.

FRANK LONGFORD

## AN INTERPRETATION OF RONALD REAGAN'S CAREER

*Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism.* Robert Dallek. Harvard University Press, 1984. £14.

Professor Dallek of the University of California, Los Angeles enjoys considerable standing as an American historian, not least for his study of Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy. He is also a Research Associate at the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute and his study of President Reagan—as evidenced by his use of the word 'symbolism' in his title and throughout the book—is written as much as a piece of psychoanalysis as of recent history. The blend is not a happy one, and we have here a highly partisan interpretation of Ronald Reagan's career.

In telling the story of the early career, Professor Dallek covers now-familiar ground: of the poor boy distinguished at his not-very-distinguished college, Eureka in central Illinois, by his passions for football and acting, who after experience as a radio sports commentator, made a mark in Hollywood in a succession of what are always called B movies (there were 53 of them), before moving into the politics of Hollywood via the Screen Actors Guild, and then on to the public stage. The story is told far more vividly by Reagan himself in *Where's the Rest of Me?*, on which all such secondary accounts depend. But, says Dallek, 'For Reagan, politics is a device for dealing with personal tensions that have plagued him since childhood. This may be fine for him, but it is hardly a reasonable way for a nation to wrestle with profound problems' (p.58). 'The needy remind him of his dependent father, from whom he has tried to separate himself all his life' (p.104). 'the Reagan administration's foreign policy is less a realistic response to actual conditions in the United States' (p.141), *et al.*

Leaving aside these and the many similar obiter dicta that mar the book, Professor Dallek seems unwilling to recognise that Ronald Reagan twice won the governorship of his state, and thus far has once won the presidency. Those who voted for him presumably supported his view of the Soviet threat, his campaign for a strong defence policy, for tax cuts and for the cutting back of the power of the Federal government. Are all the members of the Moral Majority supposed only to be concerned with 'symbolism'? and with ministering to their 'self-esteem'? Isn't it reasonable that after decades of Federal largesse and the evident failure of President Carter's policies, they wanted what President Reagan has tried to give them? It is unfortunate that there is so much bitterness here, for in his account of Reagan's manoeuvres with Congress in trying to enact his programme, there is a good story well told. In stressing 'psychic tensions' and 'self-esteem', however, Professor Dallek omits the essence of any politician's story: of his or her skill in cajolery and intrigue, in blarney and blandishment, in pressure and pull—but also of his or her conviction and passion too. Why belittle these, and patriotism and 'old-fashioned values'? He stresses that in 1980 it was only '28% of the eligible voters who elected him' (p.194). He admits elsewhere, however, (p.60)—with some reluctance, it seems—that these same figures represent 50.7% of the popular vote, and that in the electoral college Reagan captured 489 votes from 44 states to Carter's

44 votes from six states. There is symbolism there too. In history as in politics it depends what the story-teller sees as facts, or how he tells his story. There are other ways of telling this one.

There is a heavy dependence on quotations from the *Los Angeles Times* and current newspapers. There is no recognition of the Soviet threat as evidenced in Grenada, no discussion of the role of the Federal Reserve Board, and in particular, no recognition of the recent striking decline of unemployment in key areas or of the fact that more people (some 106 million in fact) are now employed in the US than at any time in its history.

We shall not have long to wait to know how many Americans share Professor Dallek's views. On this reading, it looks as if there is one vote in Southern California that won't be cast for the present incumbent. But then it probably went for Carter in 1980. And what were that President's psychological needs? Or is that a book that will never be written?

ESMOND WRIGHT

## A REVIEW OF POPULATIONS

*Population Misconceptions.* Population Concern Publications, May 1984.

Amongst the major hazards confronting mankind in the final two decades of the twentieth century overpopulation ranks second only to the threat of nuclear war. Overpopulation is a pervasive malady affecting every facet of existence on this planet. In the developed countries it is a catalyst to environmental pollution and resource depletion; in the developing world it exacerbates poverty, contributes to excessive urbanisation and could predispose to the outbreak of armed conflict. Within medicine it is altering the age structure in favour of the elderly, straining food resources leading to malnutrition, deficiency diseases and widespread famines, and is a major factor in the genesis of unemployment and underemployment, the physical and psychological sequelae of which are now well documented.

Given this global setting the publication of *Population Misconceptions* in 1984 is highly germane. This document, compiled by *Population Concern*, discusses population growth in developed and developing countries, concentrates on the population/food dilemma and lists many of the distortions and half-truths which besmirch this general field.

The early chapters review the mythology which surrounds the population issue. 'Overpopulation is a red herring'; 'development is the best contraceptive'; Britain has an overpopulation problem 'because more people are living into their 70s and 80s and there are too few young people to . . . support them'. All these clichés and many others are suitably demolished. The next section concentrates on food production discussing successively Oceania, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Far East, Western Europe, the Eastern Bloc and North America; statistics such as arable and permanent cropland available, the percentage of the labour force engaged in agriculture, cereal yield and the amount of irrigated land are carefully documented. The type of propaganda sedulously fostered by contemporary politicians that the earth could feed ten times its present population is confronted head on and the conclusion is reached that such a proposition has little or no overlap with reality.

This publication is to be thoroughly recommended. The data have been carefully researched and the exposition is cool and clear. No serious student of global issues can afford to ignore it.

JOHN A. LORAINE

## THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION BY THOSE INVOLVED

*The Fire of Liberty: The American War of Independence seen through the eyes of the men and women, the statesmen and soldiers who fought it.* Compiled and edited by Esmond Wright. Hamish Hamilton. £9.95.

The United States ought to be the unhappiest country, for it has more history than most, a point signally made by this extraordinary, insider's view of one extended episode, the American Revolution. Here is history at its densest all reported by the men and women making it, interpreting it at first hand and passing on their comments to posterity. Professor Wright's mastery of the period is apparent everywhere, in the choice and range of material, in his introductions and explanations, in his running commentary. The narrative moves back and foward across the Atlantic, up and down the seaboard colonies and westward into the frontier anarchy. The King declares 'the New England governments are in a state of rebellion'; Private Joseph Martin records a cannon shot passing between the legs of an Artillery wife 'without doing any other damage than carrying away all the lower part of her petticoat'; eighty thousand Loyalists come to debate 'To go—or not to go—is that the question?' Everybody seems to be here.

The work is arranged chronologically, moving by stages from 1774–5 to 1782–3, though beginning very defensibly with the Boston Tea Party. The text consists of short extracts divided from each other by brief explanatory commentaries that also move the story along. The choice of two different type faces to distinguish commentary and excerpt is logical but those chosen do not appear to tone as well as they might. The book was originally produced for the Folio Society which might explain why authors are only briefly identified in the text. We are told that a detailed list of sources is available from the Institute of United States Studies at the University of London but some might think that the compiler has underestimated his readers. Many might have liked fuller citation particularly as Professor Wright appears to be aiming at a readership with a full and developed love of history. Perhaps what is needed is yet another edition of the work for even the most erudite scholars may find themselves frustrated and unable to identify all sources fully.

Having said this, it is difficult to conceive how the American Revolution could be better presented to a general audience. The selections present innumerable worm's eye views of events and illustrate the Revolution in all its aspects. There is necessarily much military history but it does not swamp the text. There are useful maps and some fine illustrations (including the marvellous Reynolds' portrait of Banastre Tarleton that shows him looking like a younger Arthur Scargill). Due attention is paid to the Loyalists whose fears now seem so antique yet who voluntarily chose exile in such numbers rather than live in a nation dedicated to the pursuit of property. Major figures jostle with minor, dry wit with flamboyance and folly. This is the kind of book it is difficult to put down.

R. A. BURCHELL

## AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

*Farming in the Clouds.* Richard Body. Temple Smith. £3.50.

Richard Body, the Member of Parliament for the agricultural constituency of Holland with Boston, is a member of the House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture. He writes trenchantly on the problems faced by his

constituents and by farmers in Britain in general, most of them caused by misguided protectionist legislation passed centrally in Whitehall without reference to or, indeed, knowledge of local conditions and regional ecology. The arguments he deploys in favour of increased productivity and the removal of crippling restrictions are persuasively supported by the facts of farming life and national economy. In a previous book, *Agriculture: the Triumph and the Shame*, Mr. Body drew attention to the havoc wrought by our protectionist and subsidising laws upon certain kinds of farming. In his new book he identifies six main groups of victims: those farmers efficient enough to do without subsidies, three categories of consumer groups, the unemployed and the farmers of the Third World. We subsidise some crops, we restrict others and we dump on an unsuspecting foreign neighbour the results of the subsidised activities.

*Farming in the Clouds* abounds in horrifying examples of restrictive government practices which, in the manner of the house that Jack built, have led inevitably to astronomically high expenditure on wasteful projects, often made necessary in the first place by misguided legislation. Draining the top of an unproductive hill site to make it grow wheat leads to the flooding of the road below; and then to flooding where drainage had never before been called for: this places an unexpected burden on the rates, causing other local plans to be abandoned. But then we discover that the extra wheat is surplus to requirements, and anyone could guess what happens next: in the example described in the book, the wheat is sent from Pangbourne to Southampton, thence to be shipped to Cuba. 'The true cost to us of growing wheat in that rubbishy field at the top of the hill and the true cost of getting rid of it to Cuba must add up to quite a bit', says the author. One of Mr. Body's most interesting chapters is called 'Two Million Unemployed,' in which he traces the course of unemployment and its rising curve from the late industrial revolution to the present day, attributing much of the damage done to farming and other communities to political pressures on British agriculture. These pressures have increased the gap between rich and poor, largely because 'public money has been spent for the benefit of one half of the landowners and farmers to the detriment of the other half'.

Mr. Body does more than preach the pure milk of free trade theory. He brings forcibly home to the reader the full impact of all protectionist policies, especially in the production of food but also in all those other areas of commerce that are affected directly and indirectly by the food supply.

BETTY ABEL

## REQUIRED WRITING—MISCELLANEOUS PIECES

*Required Writing—Miscellaneous Pieces.* Philip Larkin. Faber. £4.95.

It might be thought that a collection of previously published short items on a variety of subjects would produce a rather fragmented whole. With Professor Larkin's 'Miscellaneous Pieces' the very opposite is achieved. Whether the piece is an interview, a book review or an article the probing and stimulating personality of the author shines through. The simplest matter is made significant, the most complex illuminated. The value of what has been called 'continuity of thought' is apparent here. To quote from the Foreword:

> A good reviewer combines the knowledge of the scholar with the judgement and cogency of the critic and the readability of the journalist.

Thus is conveyed in a very few words the required function of writers concerned with the fundamentals of literary and dramatic criticism.

Personal information about the author comes over sparsely but some background detail is given in 'Single-handed and untrained' and 'Early Days in Leicester', covering the period when Philip Larkin set out to earn his living as an unqualified librarian. Much is revealed here and facts and figures given of the very different procedures of borrowing in the forties and fifties before public libraries were computerised and public lending rights became one of the main issues of the day.

A particularly good example of Philip Larkin's succinct approach is 'The War Poet', a review of *The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen* edited by C. Day Lewis. In the course of reassessing Owen's poetry, Philip Larkin provides a valuable summing up of what a 'war poet' may be assumed to have as his objective, as well as the reader's reaction to it.

> A 'War Poet' is not one who chooses to commemorate or celebrate a war but one who reacts against having a war thrust upon him: he is chained, that is, to a historical event, and an abnormal one at that. However well he does it, however much we agree that the war happened and ought to be written about, there is still a tendency for us to withhold our highest praise on the grounds that a poet's choice of subject should seem an action not a reaction.

Biography forms a strong strand in the Collection and despite the brevity of the pieces a remarkable amount of information is conveyed, as, for instance, in the companion piece, 'The Real Wilfred'. Again, here is a valuable guideline: 'A writer's reputation is two-fold: what we think of his work, and what we think of him.'

We are invited to separate the romanticised image and justly praised poetry from the poet's personal situation which was, it becomes apparent, an almost unhealthy dependence on his mother and reluctance to venture out into a hostile world.

The same ability to cut through layers of fantasising about the lives of the famous is demonstrated in the article about Thomas Hardy and his first wife, Emma Lavinia. It might seem that everything relevant had been said about the failed marriage and apportionment of blame, yet in 'Mrs. Hardy's Memories' Philip Larkin illuminates the causes of Emma Hardy's bitterness to prove that there are no clearly defined areas of black and white in the human character but rather a complex admixture which causes some people to behave in an anti-social manner.

The other two Hardy items concentrate on literary criticism. 'The Poetry of Thomas Hardy' reveals Philip Larkin as a life-long admirer of the poetry for firmly defined reasons, and 'Wanted: Good Hardy Critic' is an open and admittedly controversial debate with Professor Roy Morrell over views expressed in Roy Morrell's *Thomas Hardy, The Will and the Way.*

But perhaps the finest example of Philip Larkin's individual approach is 'The World of Barbara Pym'. Once again, the review opens with a concise statement: 'The first thing a novelist must provide is a separate world'. It then goes on to analyse with sympathy and perception the outwardly mundane scene presented by that elusive though strangely neglected novelist, Barbara Pym, whose talent blossomed so briefly in the late and middle fifties.

There are many other contributions to the arts of thinking and writing in *Required Writing.* It is a book to be kept available for frequent interest and refreshment.

ROSALIND WADE

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Putting Up With The Russians, 1947-1984.** (Macmillan. £12.95). Edward Crankshaw is a distinguished Kremlinologist, with unexcelled knowledge of Soviet affairs. He served with the British Military Mission in Moscow, 1941-43; and since then for most of the time, 'I kept up what was in effect a continual running commentary on what I thought the Russians were up to at home and abroad'. This volume contains a selection of such articles, mainly for *The Observer*, together with reviews, essays and lectures, composed during the last 37 years, going back to Stalin and concluding with Chernenko. Mr. Crankshaw points out that to Soviet leaders, 'peaceful co-existence' 'embraces the concept of an unceasing "ideological struggle" aiming at the salvation of humanity' by the substitution of communism, through World Revolution. 'It is impossible to tell how much, or how little, the Soviet leadership still believes this antiquated rubbish, but it is certainly influenced in its behaviour by at least the habit of belief.' Mr. Crankshaw considers it possible that if the younger leadership succeeds Chernenko, it could bring the Soviet Union back 'into the brotherhood of Nations'.

**Atlantis The Lost Continent Revealed.** (Macmillan £9.95). This is a fascinating study by Charles Berlitz, who wrote the best seller, *The Bermuda Triangle.* In this new volume, he is concerned with the vast land mass between Africa, Spain and the Americas which became flooded and submerged by a series of natural disasters, including possibly a great meteorite, about 12,000 years ago. There has been for centuries on both sides of the Atlantic legend of a great and highly developed civilisation existing on this great area before disaster wiped it out. Mr. Berlitz has endeavoured to examine many of these traditions and finds remarkable similarities on both sides of the Atlantic. He finds also similarities in prehistoric craftmanship and building remains. Perhaps most impressive are his underwater photographs which, he claims, show man made walls, roads and walls below the surface. What are now needed are photographs of ruined cities and buildings which can be clearly identified. Mr. Berlitz accepts that many scientists refuse to accept an historical Atlantis. He concludes unconvincingly that 'perhaps one reason' for their rejection is that 'the possibility of accepting an historical Atlantis would cause a massive and onerous reassessment of history'. The work is certainly one of great interest, with the support of numerous illustrations.

**They Called It Passchendaele.** (Papermac. £4.95). Lyn Macdonald presents a horrifying picture of the third battle of Ypres, commencing with the mining of the Messines Ridge in June 1917 and culminating five terrible months later in the capture of Passchendaele only some eight miles away. Her story is told mainly using the words of junior officers and enlisted men which demonstrates their remarkable courage and comradeship in the face of the awful sea of mud and blood where a quarter of a million Allied lives were lost. Their heroism is sharply counterpointed by certain inexplicable actions and decisions of the General Staff, which the author aludes to but does not seek to account for. Some of those decisions undoubtedly pro-

longed and worsened the horror experienced by those in the field of battle. (M.H.)

**Phantom Lovers.** (William Kimber. £6.95). The essence of Mr. Denys Val Baker's anthologies of the supernatural is their readability, and his latest collection is no exception. His authors draw for their tales upon the legendary theme of the demon lover, or, in contrast, upon modern life for wistful stories of hauntings by the lost, where everyday, concrete detail serves to make the paranormal more telling. Unless obliquity is employed, it is only too easy, within the abbreviated scope of the short story, to descend into the risible when attempting convincingly to suggest a relationship between a living person and a dear departed. Such a project is clearly more taxing than the evocation of the more usual insubstantial shades that groan and clank in cave or shuttered room. Derek Stanford's contribution, *Window Dressing,* full of colour and allusion, has a light, mocking quality, which is successful. Rosalind Wade's story, *Guch Cottage,* set enjoyably in a Cornish village itself made substantial, is restrained and intriguing. J. C. Trewin, in *Special Performance,* places his lovers in an authentic theatrical setting which is strong enough to support the basic conceit. All the stories entertain: none frightens. (M.T.)

**Everyman Classics.** (Dent). Included among recent additions to this paperback series are Thomas Carlyle's **Sartor Resartus** (£2.95) which expounds his basic outlook and philosophy of life through the fictional German Professor, Diogenes Teufelsdrockh and his philosophy of clothes, Mr. W. H. Hudson has written a short interpretative Introduction. Another welcome addition is the publication together of Robert Louis Stevenson's three travel stories, **Travels with a Donkey, An Inland Voyage** and **The Silverado Squatters** (£2.95). Trevor Royle has contributed a pertinent Introduction in which he concludes that Stevenson's 'early travel books . . . stand in their own right as pieces of literature that have withstood the test of time and which offer us a highly personal insight into the life of a man with complicated and often contradictory swings of mood'. Arnold Bennett's **The Card** (£1.50) makes delightful and almost fast compulsive reading. It is, of course, the fictional tale of Denry, the irrepressible and endearing 'Card' in the Five Towns, who pulled himself up from being a humble clerk to becoming the youngest Mayor of Bursley, by his own shrewd wits and the capacity to exploit every opportunity that came his way. In his Introduction, Keith Waterhouse stresses that 'The Card is not his best work . . . but it is the best of its kind: a racy episodic chronicle of provincial life, sardonic rather than satirical, and the vehicle for Arnold Bennett's most memorable comic creation'. It is good also to have H. G. Wells's **The Wheels of Chance** (£2.50), the light-hearted comedy in which his hero, a young draper's shop assistant, Mr. Hoopdriver, rescues a girl in distress, while on his cycling holiday from London along the South Coast. In his Introduction, Professor Bernard Bergonzi refers to the unobtrusive but serious social comment. The book was first published in 1896. 'Whatever its historical interest, the *Wheels of Chance* remains a living work of fiction; light-hearted and good-humoured, though tinged with a darker quality when Wells reflects on the needlessly straitened lives and lack of opportunities of the Hoopdrivers of the world'.

## POETS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1945-1960

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


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# Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

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*Editor*:
ROSALIND WADE

*Associate Editor*:
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# Contemporary Review

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September 1984 Vol. 245 No. 1424

## MALAY MONARCHY SINCE YAHYA PETRA: RIDING FOR A FALL?

by Roger Kershaw

JUST over five years ago, I submitted an article to *Contemporary Review* on the subject of Malay monarchy.[1] Five years is the length of one reign under Malaysia's rotating national Kingship, so that having survived a mild heart attack last year, Sultan Ahmad Shah of Pahang, the successor as Agong to Sultan Yahya Petra of Kelantan, has just completed the full term. However, it is not this essentially unremarkable occurrence that merits report but an extraordinary crisis at the end of the reign which arose out of the fears of the present Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, concerning the shape of government-monarch relations in the next quinquennium. It should not be without interest to explore the recent clash of wills and the events of the seventh reign which led up to it.[2]

The more important points in my earlier study included its emphasis on the role of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) as 'the true custodian of Malay privilege'—rather than the Agong or even the Conference of Rulers—side by side with the argument that since the race riots of 1969 'the position of monarchy in general has been subtly strengthened in the short term.' This was the result of constitutional amendments in 1971 which not only extended the protective veto of the Conference of Rulers to a broader range of pro-Malay provision than before, but 'entrenched' the Rulers' position itself as a thing which could not be changed without their consent and which, indeed, it was seditious to challenge, even in Parliament.[3] No conflict with the Agong occurred in the next eight years, or with the Conference of Rulers, but at the level of the States individual rulers began to be more assertive and this had implications for a national political party which was striving to implement national development policies by means of secure majorities of the National Front coalition in the State Assemblies and progressive Chief Ministers nominated from the centre.[4] Material covetousness appeared to be fundamental to most cases of tension, although the assertion of a traditionalist Islamic position on Fasting Month by the Sultan of Kedah looked like a straw in another kind of wind at a time of Islamic revival.[5] By the end of the seventies, criticism of royalty had reared its head in quite diverse quarters of Malay society.[6]

The mainly discreet and diplomatically handled tensions of the 1970s

did not disappear in the new reign. In fact, the new Agong pursued his vendetta against the young Mentri Besar of Pahang even after his election to the national Kingship. The Agong's son (the State Regent during Ahmad Shah's 'absence' at Kuala Lumpur) had contrived to bring State government to a standstill by late 1981 by refusing to sign money bills, and this became the first serious domestic crisis for Dr. Mahathir as Prime Minister after his accession to that office in July of that year. It ended provisionally in the removal of the Mentri Besar—a defeat for elective authority and a bitter lesson for Dr. Mahathir in the workings of 'constitutional monarchy,' Malay-style. But political negotiations with the Agong continued into 1982, general election year, in connection with one of the Prime Minister's own imperatives as a Malay-style party manager. Considerations of stabilisation in UMNO and a debt of honour to a loyal comrade moved Dr. Mahathir to attempt to rehabilitate Datuk Harun Idris of Selangor, who had been imprisoned on corruption charges during the administration of Datuk Hussein Onn. Complete rehabilitation, with the right to stand for public office, would require that Datuk Harun's criminal record be totally expunged by means of a royal pardon. The pardon was granted in August 1982, but only on a number of conditions, including a further increment to the Sultan's already substantial private timber concessions, and the continuance in Cabinet office of one of his State subjects, a rival of Dr. Mahathir: Ghazali Shafie, the Foreign Minister.

The uses and abuses of royal prerogative seen in the above illustrations were alarming less in themselves than in terms of the precedents they might offer to a future King. Dr. Mahathir seems to have been particularly worried by the loose and boastful talk of one of the two Sultans most likely to succeed to the Agongship, about 'putting the politicians in their place' by declaring an Emergency and ruling in partnership with the armed forces. In a radical enhancement of executive power, given effect by constitutional amendment in early 1981 and attributable in no small part to the influence of Ghazali Shafie as Home Minister, Parliament had voted away its own power of ratification of declarations of Emergency, and had abolished rights of judicial review. The formal power to declare an Emergency remained vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. As before, this was not a discretion exercised independently of Cabinet advice. But even if it stretches credulity to foresee an unconstitutional, unilateral use of Article 150 by a future King, he might not even have to act unconstitutionally if he could first secure a sympathetic majority (or work through an existing one) in the Cabinet. At all events, Dr. Mahathir was anxious enough about the power for harm of the Sultans of Perak and Johore to draft an even more radical set of amendments in 1983.

The almost irresistible claims of Perak and Johore to the Agongship at some time in the 1980s rested on the fact that neither State had yet enjoyed the incumbency. Individual unsuitability would have to be overwhelmingly demonstrated to the Council of Rulers for the argument of precedence to be overridden if the two Sultans wished to be considered. Sultan

Mahmood Iskandar of Johore had committed manslaughter a few years before his restoration as Crown Prince by the sensational deathbed decision of his father, the late Sultan Ismail; but upon his succession in May 1981 he had made as if to expiate past misdeeds through religious leadership. If there were any doubts at all regarding his suitability, his appointment as Agong could be postponed a few years without embarrassment, thanks to the fact that Sultan Idris Shah of Perak, so reluctant to step on to the national stage as Deputy Agong in 1975, or as Agong in 1979, had changed his mind for whatever reasons and become an active aspirant to the Agongship by 1983.[7] By virtue of succession to the Perak throne as early as 1963, his claim was clearly superior to Johore's. Moreover, 20 years had afforded many more opportunities than the two years of Sultan Mahmood Iskandar's Sultanate for defending and expanding the royal prerogative; thus at a moment when the Malay royalty were watching a radical new Prime Minister's attitudes and actions with some foreboding, Sultan Idris Shah's stout record and well-publicised plans to 'activate' the office of Agong might seem to fit the bill quite felicitously in any case. But in the eyes of a Mahathir a record of wayward political independence need not be less alarming in a future King than pure lawlessness of a private nature (though be it noted that Sultan Mahmood Iskandar himself took less than a year to ease a long-serving Mentri Besar out of office, and in 1983 emulated the example of Perak, first given in 1982, of returning to the scientific basis of calculating the dates of Fasting Month, contrary to the authority of the national Religious Affairs Council).

All this, then, constitutes the essential background to Dr. Mahathir's desperate but calculated decision to try to concentrate the emergency power (that is, an exclusive and explicit authority to advise the Agong, and advise him bindingly, to declare an Emergency) in the hands of the Prime Minister, and to transform an implied prerogative to withhold assent from legislation into a duty to assent within 15 days, on pain of automatic promulgation of the law in question. The same provision was applied to the Rulers in relation to State legislation. A Constitutional Amendment Bill, incorporating these quasi-revolutionary changes almost casually side by side with many routine or less dramatic amendments, obtained the requisite two-thirds majority in the Lower House on 3 August last year. The Prime Minister prevailed successfully on the local press to censor opposition speeches, and generally to treat the amendments as a non-issue. But he had committed two serious tactical errors. The emergency powers proposals, bestowing an unprecedented, absolute discretion on a Malay Prime Minister, were frightening to the whole of intelligent non-Malay opinion, quite apart from jurists. Simultaneously, the abolition of the power of legislative assent of the State Rulers was likely to unite the royalty as a body in opposition to the Bill. One analyst has made the intriguing suggestion that the latter amendment had been introduced into the draft legislation late in the day by the Attorney-General, simply for constitutional symmetry.[8] Be this as it may, the royal camp has put it about that the provision on Schedule 8 was not in the original draft

perused and accepted by the King prior to tabling in Parliament. In that case, the 'substantive' shock was compounded by a suspicion of deception. Certainly there was no attempt by Dr. Mahathir to consult the Conference of Rulers regarding a reduction of their privileges and powers over which they would have every right to exercise a collective veto.[9]

To sum up, it seems that the Agong received representations about the nature of the full Bill privately, in time to forestall his signature. The crisis gathered momentum slowly, thanks partly to the press blackout, but in October a member of the UMNO 'Old Guard' sent a critical open letter to Dr. Mahathir, and Tunku Abdul Rahman broke the silence of the press in his column in *The Star*, suggesting that the Prime Minister's new emergency power would enable him to create a Republic almost overnight. The crisis now in the open, Mahathir decided to fight for the amendments by mobilising the media and UMNO's rank and file. The latter were to demonstrate the 'strength of popular feeling' in support of 'parliamentary sovereignty' in the course of a series of mass rallies. Unfortunately for Mahathir's plan, these rallies seemed to generate less genuine enthusiasm and emotion than a number of far more spontaneous meetings in support of individual Rulers. The lack of a mandate, by any normal standard, for constitutional revolution; the failure to educate opinion until the government's credibility was threatened by the non-signing of the Bill; the patent rifts in the party (especially in the highest echelons) over this break was UMNO's deeply-rooted, symbiotic relationship with the Rulers; and the fact that the bumper Amendment Bill contained some important matter in its other clauses, needing early gazetting, all contributed to the urgency of a settlement for Dr. Mahathir. In mid-November, a compromise was offered to the Rulers which they felt confident enough to reject. Three weeks later they yielded to the second and more desperate of two ultimatums; but all that Dr. Mahathir demanded, and achieved, was their acceptance of a compromise amounting to retreat on a broad front by Dr. Mahathir. The emergency powers were to be returned to the Cabinet, and the prerogative of legislative assent at State level to the State Rulers, under a new Amendment Bill early in the New Year, on condition that the original Bill be signed into law provisionally. The Rulers gave verbal undertakings never to abuse their prerogative again. Under the new Bill, the principle of a time limit for the Agong's assent was upheld, though the maximum period of delay was extended from 15 to 30 days. In fact, by a further interesting innovation, the Agong's power was superficially or potentially enhanced by allowing him to return legislation to Parliament for reconsideration after the 30 days' delay, if he was prepared to state the nature of his objections. On the other hand, Parliament is not obliged to meet the objections, and after a further 30 days such legislation will take effect whether or not the King gives it his assent.

At the end of January, Sultan Idris Shah of Perak, the most eligible and likely successor to the incumbent Agong, died. The succession was thus bestowed upon the Sultan of Johore at the election of 9 February.

The Deputy Agongship was given to the new Sultan of Perak, Azlan Shah, till very recently the Malaysian Lord President or Chief Justice. Inevitably, some observers have seen an attempt to 'balance the ticket' or even balance the scales by this contrasted second appointment. But, of course, Perak had formal precedence over any other State. More to the point is why Azlan Shah was not made Agong. The majority of Rulers, if they were not blindly following the order of precedence, may have been seizing an opportunity to defy Dr. Mahathir with the election of the man least manifestly suitable to be a constitutional monarch. But as Raja Tun Azlan Shah had played an important role during the crisis in apprising the royalty of what it should stand firm on and why, from a juristic and constitutional point of view, it must not be taken for granted that Dr. Mahathir would have preferred this 'most manifestly suitable candidate.'

Whether the crisis has halted the trend towards self-assertion and greater political independence among the Rulers of Malaysia remains to be seen, and will certainly be conditioned to some extent by Dr. Mahathir's fortunes as leader of UMNO. The formal power and dignities of the State Rulers are all intact, and Malay royalty can still draw on considerable reserves of strength in Malay society. Their interests are well represented within UMNO itself, despite the disappearance of outright aristocratic dominance in recent years. No doubt some more pugnacious spirits will have sworn that 1983 will not go unavenged. Eyes turned towards Tengku Razaleigh, Malaysia's Finance Minister and a scion of the Kelantan Royal House.

British readers who are aware of the Malayan events of 1946 may feel bemused at the radical change of 'historical direction' by the leader of UMNO which we have just seen. Just after the Second World War, certain bright-eyed planners of Whitehall tried to introduce a 'brave new world' of racial equality into Malaya as a first step towards nationhood and independence. The United Malays National Organisation came into being to resist this British plan, known as Malayan Union, which in structural respects would have removed sovereignty effectively from the Malay Sultans to concentrate it at the centre. Britain yielded to Malay resistance and reverted to a federal structure in which States sovereignty was upheld. The Federation of Malaya, established in 1948, was the political entity which received independence in 1957, adorned not only with the trappings of popular sovereignty, but by no less than nine distinct traditional Rulers, collectively empowered to override certain acts of the popular legislative power, but expected to behave just like British constitutional monarchs in the normal course of events. Dr. Mahathir has consistently abused the British in his writings for their deviousness and breaches of trust, especially over Malayan Union. But now, for many Malays, Dr. Mahathir himself has broken faith. The very thought can still evoke horror in a society which, for centuries past, has exalted loyalty to Ruler as a primary political virtue for every Malay.[10]

The crisis of 1983 can be understood partly as a clash between an institutionalised, rather static conception of Malay custodianship and the

vision of a prophet of salvation through dynamic political economy—exacerbated (for the visionary) by the fact that the supposedly 'static' custodians had themselves begun to extend their scope in a self-interested way. There is also an element of conflict between 'the hereditary principle' and a new entrepreneurial and managerial elite, itself the product of changing political economy. Furthermore, Dr. Mahathir may feel obscurely that he is fighting British influence because the constitutional structure of 1957 was bestowed by Britain, to be manipulated by local 'reactionaries' in non-Westminster style (however, he ought then to acknowledge some of the merits of Malayan Union in retrospect). For the British, today, after the very recent Anglo-Malaysian tensions, it may be gratifying that Dr. Mahathir is at least not selective in his mission to root out all influences, indigenous as well as foreign, which he believes impede the full self-realisation and 'redemption' of the Malay race. The great difficulty for a Mahathir in this kind of enterprise is that the 'dead hand of the past' has a habit of proving its vitality and resilience in the total social web when faced with a serious challenge: in fact, the challenge may stimulate a more widespread and conscious attachment to tradition than before.

Thus the royalty of the Malay Peninsula may have lived a little dangerously in recent years, but nemesis has been postponed. If the Rulers do take the fight back to the 'commoners,' it will be more often on ground of their own choosing, employing a variety of new political skills. It is to be expected that they will now try to cultivate a more positive image and not justify the accusation of self-interest. In short, having 'lived to fight another day' under the settlement of 15 December, 1983, they may show themselves to have been distinctly politicised by the crisis. For Dr. Mahathir, retrospectively, it may well appear better to have let a mainly sleepy dog lie. If perchance he is a republican at heart and not really concerned to defend the norms of a constitutional monarchy, why did he not wait a few years till monarchy had discredited itself by its own actions? A genuine obsession about what might befall Malaysia after Ahmad Shah, the seventh Agong, will be part of the explanation. But in that case his impatience and the acceptance of personal political risk do indicate some degree of disinterestedness.

Meanwhile, at the very heart of East Malaysia, but politically separate from it, one Malay monarchy flourishes in traditional style, unimpeded by democratic constitutions or radical politicians, empowered exclusively to pass laws, protect the realm and uphold Malay rights. This is Brunei, whose Ruler withstood the cajolements of Tunku Abdul Rahman to join the new Federation of 'Malaysia' in 1963 and secure its 'independence' from Britain thereby. The Brunei Royal House has never had any sense of having been 'colonised' by Britain, and in the late seventies even resisted British moves (partly prompted by Malaysian agitation) to hand over residual responsibilties. But since 1 January this year, Brunei has taken over full responsibility for its own affairs—and entirely on the basis of a royal supremacy and leadership which Britain, as the 'protecting' but not

'colonial' power, indeed protected and did not insist on modifying.

The State of Brunei which joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a few days after the transfer of functions in defence and foreign affairs, is as firmly committed to regional stability as all the other five members of the grouping. The deliberate 'export' of political ideology is hardly to be expected. Yet ideas flow unresisted across frontiers. It is scarcely necessary to doubt that the viability of royal power in a non-democratic Malay State will be watched by both parties to the recent confrontation in Malaysia, eager to 'prove' a point or two in support of their respective convictions. And if the Brunei model enjoys conspicuous success, republican sentiment in Malaysia will be exercised over such an 'unwholesome' example, allegedly sustained by British gurkhas.

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NOTES

1. Roger Kershaw, 'Three Kings of Orient: the changing face of monarchy in Southeast Asia. Part III: In memoriam Sultan Yahya Petra of Kelantan, Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia,' *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 234, No. 1361, June 1969: pp. 298-304. Repr. in Roger Kershaw, *The Changing Face of Monarchy in Southeast Asia. Three Political Portraits*, London, *Contemporary Review* Reprint, 1979: pp. 28-34.
2. As of late 1983, the office of Yang di-Pertuan Agong had been held successively by the Rulers of Negri Sembilan (1957), Selangor (1960), Perlis (1960), Trengganu (1965), Kedah (1970), Kelantan (1975), Pahang (1979). Under the rules of the Conference of Rulers, the remaining two States should be considered (though a candidate could be declared unsuitable, or refuse) before the Agongship may pass to another State for the second time.
3. Also, the Conference has always had to be consulted on any change of policy affecting administrative action concerned with the Special Position of the Malays. I succumbed to an invidious confusion in the earlier study where it was stated (p. 300, first para.; Reprint, p. 29, last para.) that prior to 1971 the function of the Conference was merely 'consultative' in all respects.
4. Curiously enough, as the earlier study showed, although Yahya Petra was not particularly favourable to the Kelantan Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) at the centre of the 1977 crisis, Datuk Mohamed Nasir, the former's intervention in the crisis in his capacity as State Ruler had embarrassing consequences which made him more amenable to centralising imperatives as Agong. But Mohamed Nasir's predecessor, Datuk Asri, had had problems with the Sultan which necessitated the conciliatory investment in a new Palace ('In memoriam,' p. 304; Reprint, pp. 8, 34: correctly rendered *Istana Ayer Mata*, 'The Palace of Tears'). By 1979, an UMNO Mentri Besar had been forced out in at least one State (Perak) and there had been a less widely publicised crisis in Trengganu. Note that the Malaysian States exercise sovereignty over their land: centrally directed development is thus difficult without control of the State Legislature; a Ruler's access to land is, on the other hand, facilitated, provided only that he exerts influence on the Mentri Besar and Legislature.
5. 'In memoriam,' p. 300; Reprint, p. 30. To be more precise, what happened after 1977 was that a religious ruling, in force already for seven years, that astronomical calculations could be used to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan if, for any reason, the new moon could not be sighted, was substituted by a more conservative *fatwah* making a sighting mandatory if the skies were clear. See Dr. Othman Hj Ishak, 'The new moon should be seen by astronomers' (in Malay), *Utusan Malaysia*, 7 August 1982. This had the effect of putting Malaysia out of step, in most years, with Singapore, Indonesia and much of the Muslim world. For the opinion of a Malaysian elder statesman on this absurdity,

see Tunku Abdul Rahman, 'Time for a rethink on sighting the moon,' *The Star*, 8 October, 1979; repr. in Tunku Abdul Rahman, *As a Matter of Interest*, Petaling Jaya, Heinemann Asia, 1981: pp. 178-182. The Tunku blames certain Sultans without mentioning names; Dr. Othman attributes the reversion simply to the strength of conservative opinion in Malay Islam generally.

6. Apart from Tunku Abdul Rahman, an 'aristocratic constitutionalist,' the earlier study mentioned a veteran of the Malay left, Ishak Hj Mohamed: 'In memoriam,' p. 303; Reprint, p. 33. (I was privileged to meet the Grand Old Man—'Pak Sako'—for the first time in 1982. He could not unfortunately remember—though he did not categorically deny—having recently written in the audacious vein suggested by one of my Malay informants. I wonder, therefore, whether one of his early post-war articles or speeches had not been resurrected by some radical journal. One such speech is cited extensively in Michael Stenson, *Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1980: pp. 123-4.) A republican current is implied, also, in Parti Islam—descended partly from the post-war Malay nationalist left—by the fact that this party's constitution has never made any reference to monarchy. But a much more significant and growing source of puritanical, anti-monarchist sentiment was certainly the 'young modernist' tendency in the Islamic revival, characteristically the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM). And this current was not without its diffuse impact, in turn, on middle-class prophets of Malay economic resurgence such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, whose own reservations about royalty were already visible at least between the lines of his own writings: cf Roger Kershaw, 'Anglo-Malaysian relations: old roles versus new rules,' *International Affairs* 59 (4), Autumn 1983: pp. 629-648 (see pp. 630, 634). Meanwhile, from 1980 onwards intellectual discussion was openly stimulated by a remarkable academic critique of 'feudal attitudes,' completed in October 1979: Chandra Muzaffar, *Protector?*, Penang, Aliran, 1979.
7. On the hiatus over the Deputyship—which in the end went to Negri Sembilan—in 1979, and Perak's hesitations, see the 'preliminary remarks' in 'In memoriam,' p. 304, and Reprint, pp 7, 34.
8. David Jenkins, 'Proud and prickly princes finally meet their match,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 February, 1984.
9. Given the prescribed role of the Agong, albeit vaguely defined, in safeguarding the Special Position of the Malays, it might even be argued that the Conference would have a right and obligation to veto the removal of his prerogative of assent, too. It is difficult to credit, yet (almost anything seeming possible in this extraordinary crisis) Dr. Mahathir may have felt that as his proposals did not entail any reduction of the Rulers' collective veto as such, the Rulers would respond with equanimity. The alternatives to this surmise are either that Dr. Mahathir was deliberately devious; or that he himself was not fully aware of the content and implications of the Schedule 8 amendment, as suggested by Jenkins; or that the Agong betrayed a private deal with Dr. Mahathir. I should record that, although greatly assisted by the reports in *Far Eastern Economic Review* during the crisis, I have had some contact with Malaysian informants passing through London.
10. Mahathir Mohamed, *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1970; and *Menghadapi Cabaran* ('Facing the Challenge'), Kuala Lumpur, Pustaka Antara, 1976. In May 1984, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah failed in his attempt to wrest the deputy leadership of UMNO from Datuk Musa Hitam. In this way, the party has indirectly renewed Dr. Mahathir's mandate. But the party elections this year have been characterised by an extraordinary growth of 'money politics' which must mean, in part, that royal wealth has been mobilised behind the scenes. The new Agong has opened his reign with some fighting statements.

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[Dr. Roger Kershaw has been writing on Malaysian subjects for several years, particularly Kelantan. From 1970 to 1983 he was lecturer in South-east Asian Studies at the University of Kent and is now at the University of Brunei.]

# THE GULF IN THE CENTRE OF ATTENTION

## by Leo Mates

THE war between Iraq and Iran is the most unusual and, one might say, the most tragic event of the last few years. By its duration it is already approaching the length of the First World War. By losses in human lives in relation to the populations of the belligerent countries, this war ranks among the most murderous, although exact losses are not yet known. Neither side has published the precise number of killed, wounded and missing in action so far. The data of 'the other side' is exaggerated in most cases. However, even if the given figures are reduced, they are still frighteningly large.

As regards devastation, the war is also in a special category in terms of the war damage suffered by both sides. Of course, no detailed estimates can be made in this case either, but the damage is out of all proportion to the national wealth of the two sides. Something should, however, be added in connection with this. Both countries are essentially poor and underdeveloped, with the exception of vast deposits of crude oil. It should nevertheless be remembered that this wealth is of a transient character because all these and similar petroleum deposits will probably be exhausted by the end of the century.

In these circumstances, the only chance these 'petroleum-rich' countries now have is to transform this wealth into a lasting base for prosperity. This can be achieved only by systematically pursuing two lines of policy; investing earnings from oil into industries that will be able to operate after the exhaustion of petroleum deposits and, secondly, by capacitating the country to live from work and not from the use of the value of oil. Of the greatest importance in this connection is to use the acquired petro-dollars sparingly and to invest them rationally.

With regard to investments in industry, it is obvious that industrial giants cannot be built overnight. This process must evolve gradually, i.e. parallel with the capacity of the population to take an active part in it. In other words, the most successful policy for the modernisation of a country is the one that concerns itself with the training of personnel as well as creation of a social climate and relations propitious to the development of a modern economy.

Precisely for these reasons, the Gulf war is injurious to the future of both countries. Without making any concrete estimates, it is quite clear that the war has inflicted vast and irreparable damage. The debt burden caused by war is huge, to which the amounts spent even before the war for the piling up of gigantic quantities of war materials should be added. Iraq, which is poorer in oil than Iran, is in a particularly difficult situation. Iraq was the first to feel the effects of the war through the decline of its exports and has run into debt with its oil-rich neighbours. All cash reserves, i.e. deposits in hard currencies, have been spent a long time ago, and, at present, Iraq owes several tens of billions of dollars for

the purchase of war materials and other expenses.

Iran has managed to get by so far without running into large debts mainly because it was not able to find suitable creditors. However, the spending of earnings from oil for purposes of war resulted here, too, in an exhaustion of reserves, giving rise to the need to use all earnings for the war machine. The ability to continue the war depends on current oil exports.

If we project this into the future, we get a really gloomy picture. Even if there is no further large-scale destruction—and it would certainly be too optimistic to expect this—huge financial resources will be needed after the war to repair the damage and to repay the debts. A large part of earnings from the export of oil will have to be used for this purpose over a number of years. Consequently, the after-effects of the war will be felt long after the end of hostilities.

Only then will it become possible to return to the state that existed before the war. It can be said that both countries will lose four years of war and at least two more years after the war. This means that—out of the total period of conversion of earnings from oil to the rehabilitation of the economy—at least six years will have been lost. But if the war lasts longer the period of recuperation will be even longer delayed.

If one takes into account the fact that the period of time during which full use can be made of oil for effecting this conversion is relatively short, from ten to fifteen years at most, then one realises the magnitude of the loss. Even an intensive use of all the available time is hardly sufficient for completing the radical changes in ways of life and education that are necessary for transforming these countries into industrial ones. There is, however, no other way out for them, as nature does not allow them to base their prosperity on agriculture alone. Furthermore, under the given climatic conditions, larger resources are needed for investment in agriculture than for the development of some other useful branches of industry.

The consequences of the war do not relate merely to the material side of the future. It has had the effect of consolidating precisely such social and political relations as are unsuitable for the modernisation of a country. A system at variance with the necessity to release the creative energies of the population in the conditions of an industrial society is being introduced in Iran. In Iraq, both now and before the war, practically all construction work in industry and building has been done by foreign labour, by skilled workers from Europe and unskilled workers mostly from East Asia.

The experience of a number of medium-developed countries has revealed the extent to which a forced tempo of industrialisation has produced poor results in terms of effectiveness of investment owing to the inadequate adjustment of the population to conditions of life and work in an industrial society. Consequently, this has the effect of prolonging the period of time necessary for converting an underdeveloped country into an industrial society. It is to be expected that despite invest-

ment negative financial effects will persist, coupled with serious social disruption due to the creation of a large reserve army of unemployed.

Therefore, one should include into the calculations regarding the future of these two countries not only the expenditure incurred as a result of two transformations, viz. the material base and the human factor, but also a long period of adjustment accompanied by large national losses over a number of years. Consequently, a large part of the wealth obtained from existing oil must be distributed in such a way as to offset the deficit during a lengthy period of transition both in the course of, and after, the laying of foundations of industrial development.

When this is borne in mind, it is not difficult to prophesy that the underdeveloped though oil-rich countries will encounter great difficulties once their earnings from oil begin to decline. This would happen even if all the measures necessary to preserve and safeguard the earnings from oil had been taken. Actually, this does not happen to be the case in either of these two countries. A large part of the resources are spent on luxuries. There is, however, no doubt that the squandering of resources now taking place in the Gulf war surpasses all that could be imagined as an example of a harmful policy.

We have examined the problems involved in the war between Iraq and Iran in the light of current developments and without taking into account all the damage that its prolongation is causing every day and even greater losses that it is liable to inflict. It became clear, at the beginning of this year, that the offensive announced by Iran as the final and decisive one had failed. Iraq's defence in the southern sector was put to a severe test. A breakthrough to the road linking the two main centres of the country, Baghdad and Basra, i.e. the centre of the country with a wide arc along the Gulf, had almost succeeded.

It is difficult to ascertain whether this could have been achieved without the use of chemical agents. Baghdad has not officially admitted the use of poisonous gases, but official spokesmen have publicly declared that they would not hesitate to use them as well as other weapons in order to defend the country. It should be kept in mind, in this connection, that the long-drawn territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran, dating back to pre-war days, has been transformed into a religious conflict between two variants of Islam. It is known that religious wars between members of the same religion are usually the bloodiest and most intractable ones. A case in point is the bloodiest war in European history, the Thirty-Years War in the seventeenth century, which decimated the population of the continent.

In the case of Iraq and Iran, the initial advantages gained by Iraq as a result of the better training of its army have evaporated and are losing their significance in the face of the size of the human reserves at the disposal of Iran. Iraqi troops were compelled to withdraw from the Iranian territories they had captured at the beginning of the war. This resulted in the emergence of a critical situation in which it was necessary to ascertain whether the Iraqi army, in the defence of its own country,

could stem the tide of Iranian volunteers and soldiers. It has succeeded in doing this, but with increasing difficulty.

On the one side, the capability of the smaller Iraqi army to withstand pressure has been eroded due to fatigue and to ever growing losses of the best cadres and human potential. On the other hand, the time is approaching when it will not be so easy to recruit tens of thousands of volunteers marching to death without any military effect. Thus, the war has been transferred to another terrain.

Owing to Iran's dependence on oil exports, Iraq began to attack the ships coming to Iran for oil. Iran retaliated by attacking identical ships carrying oil from the countries that are financing Iraq. This has increased the prices of insurance and of oil on the free oil market. It could, of course, seriously affect the whole world, even though one cannot expect that an interruption of exports from the Gulf could lead to an early collapse of, or serious disruptions in the industrially developed countries. The less developed countries would undoubtedly suffer the most, as is usual in such cases, and find even one per cent of increase in prices hard to negotiate.

Iran had threatened to bloc the Straits of Hormuz, but the Iranian high command must have realised what the world already knew, that it was not in a position to do so. Moreover, this would also stop Iranian exports, so badly needed for the conduct of the war. The reply came in the form of counter-attacks against the tankers of the other side. However, this did not suffice and the bombing of installations in Iran, already announced by Iraq, may be expected. This would be the most effective way of severing Iran's links with the world, while a counter-attack by Iran would be difficult, owing to the already manifest inferiority of the Iranian as against the Iraqi air force which is equipped with modern French 'Mirages' and other means of anti-aircraft defence.

This threat, if it is carried into effect, could impel Iran to launch again a 'final' offensive by throwing into battle a mass of younger and poorly trained fighters. Therefore, what is obviously impending is a new exacerbation of the war and not the peace in which the world places so much hope by sending a succession of emissaries attempting to find a way out at the negotiating table. Actually, viewed in the light of this illogical war, all potentials for destruction have not yet been exhausted. Nevertheless, the oil refineries have been heavily damaged, while the installations for the export of oil have remained intact on both sides, including Kharg island.

There has been tacit agreement so far to leave the installations alone, as each of the two sides believes that it is better to preserve the capacities for export. The intensification of naval warfare and Iraq's belief that it is able to preserve its installations from attacks by the Iranian air force could easily lead to a fresh escalation in terms of ruthlessness and senseless mutual annihilation.

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[Leo Mates is Washington correspondent for Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia.]

# THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION

## by Paul Rose

IT was that arch pragmatist Harold (now Lord) Wilson who coined the much quoted phrase that 'a week is a long time in politics'. A year is aeons longer and the post-election year has been one in which words like 'banana skins', 'defeat', 'humiliation', 'setback', have abounded. 'Ratecapping' has entered the language and Ken Livingstone and Arthur Scargill have overshadowed Neil Kinnock in the media to be hated or loved, while David Owen and his magnificent seven (after the SDP by-election victory) sometimes give the impression of being the official opposition as against more than 200 fairly mediocre Labour MPs.

Indeed, the one consolation for Mrs. Thatcher amid the rubble and rumblings is the failure of the official opposition to capitalise to the full extent on an uncanny series of disasters in the year after her triumph. There is even the scenario, unimaginable a year ago, of a coup within the Conservative Party. The clue lies in the departure of Thatcherism from the traditional one-nation Toryism, mirrored by the lurch to the left in the Labour Party. Every newspaper story and television report reflects the politics of confrontation.

One sees a nation tearing itself apart—miners against policemen: miner against miner: local authority against government: whole communities doomed to unemployment and others enjoying the benefits of a consumer society, public employees protesting at privatisation, Lords in Ermine defeating a Conservative Government, a High Court judge stating that a Law and Order Government has acted unlawfully over GCHQ. There is a sense of tragedy in a society so divided and self-interested. Everywhere sectional interest before national interest manifests itself and consensus politics are brushed aside by the protagonists who have little time for tolerance, compromising or even listening.

It is a new style in post-war politics reflected in industry as well as politics. Nowhere is this more dramatised than in the MacGregor-Scargill battle in the wake of the Ezra-Gormley era. The nation that united over the Falklands and the 'resolute approach' has given way to divisive policies that opponents of Mrs. Thatcher have long forecast. In a sense the Tory 'wets' have been vindicated as monetarist chickens come to roost and the Parliamentary summer recess will be most welcome by a cabinet that looks as if it has emerged from the siege of the Libyan Bureau, been incarcerated in County Hall and forced to parachute from the river building before running the gauntlet of angry miners' pickets.

In the current context, the unhappy personal predicament of Mrs. Thatcher's clean-cut, softly spoken architect of electoral success seems a minor aberration in the wake of later events. It would not be unfair to say that the very qualities that served the Prime Minister well in the immediate pre- and post-Falklands crisis have been her undoing. Where is the line between resolution and bloody-minded ideological and personal

stubbornness? Mrs. Thatcher earned some admiration for belated protests of Britain's treatment over Grenada. However, the affair reflected our subordinate role and added to concern at her assurances on Cruise Missiles. Even in Europe, retreat was disguised as advance while the CAP remains central to the Community.

Nevertheless it is at home that the great confrontation has done the most damage, spreading to the docks and transport workers and dividing those fearful for their own jobs in steel and the working coalfields from the compelling rhetoric and intimidating picketing of the Scargill camp. This was not mindless militancy but a shrewd charismatic style of leadership answering the ill-judged decision of Government to appoint a man with Mr. MacGregor's reputation. The response was untimely and seemed doomed to fail at a time of large stocks in the spring. That was to underestimate Mr. Scargill's ability to manipulate the rule book and rally his supporters. Like Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Scargill has the self-confidence and verbal agility and above all self-righteousness to create the proverbial collision of irresistible force and immovable object. Only the nation has suffered.

The situation has adversely affected the tradition of peaceful picketing and produced mob hysteria. The response was the semi-political role of police looking more like the French CRS and eroding normal freedom of movement as in the classic case of the Kent miners stopped 200 miles from where, hypothetically, they might have caused a breach of the peace. Ultimately the blockade of Channel ports could be causally linked with the Scargill style of enlisting outside support and laying bare the futility of legislation on secondary picketing in the delicate field of what are essentially human relations. Meanwhile the economy, showing no tendency towards picking up slack in terms of unemployment, suffered at the whim of the American prime rate and home buyers once again found themselves facing a less attractive face at the Woolwich. It is hardly sensible to pretend that unlike Lord Wilson after the seamen's strike the Government was not blown off course in its main target of containing inflation.

However, the abrasive style and ill-judged decisions from Number Ten are nowhere more apparent than in the quite unnecessary decision to de-unionise GCHQ. The decision (now overturned) of Mr. Justice Glidewell, a very fair, thoughtful, able judge, permitted the demon Doctor Owen to place Mrs. Thatcher in the dock as a law breaker, thus placing her alongside the women of Greenham Common and the flying pickets as a disruptive element. Her end of term speech on the 'enemy within' revealed more than a hint of desperation and paranoia.

The impeccable Mr. Pym, the House of Lords and other pillars of the establishment had joined the High Court on such varied issues as rate-capping and scrapping elections for the GLC. Ken Livingstone was elevated to the role of Lord Protector of London and, like a would-be Cromwell, has been busy behind the scenes reshaping the future face of the Parliamentary Labour Partly. Not above junketing with Royalty

to celebrate the Thames Barrage, his mixture of militancy and populism ought to make Neil Kinnock watch his back very closely. Despite the recent vote which, in practice, is really meaningless, reselection may yet be a rock upon which the hastily cobbled unity of the Labour Party founders.

For it should not be ignored that even Labour gains in the European Elections were hardly spectacular, other than in the GLC area. By-elections have consistently given the Alliance more joy than the polls. But our perverse electoral system—not for a government but for 'representatives'—in Europe left the Alliance totally unrepresented. While German Greens and French Neo-Fascists have voices, British Liberals and Social Democrats are stifled.

It is a major part of the ideological shift from Toryism to Thatcherism that privatisation of British Telecom or Sealink should shift the balance towards the private sector. The process has extended to local authorities and the Health Service and has become as dogmatic as Clause 4 Socialism. It was one of the reasons for Roy Jenkins' decision to launch the SDP that the shuttlecock should not be industry with all the attendant uncertainties that nationalisation, privatisation and renationalisation implied. It rejected ideology for an individual approach to what was best for each industry.

The current actions of Government have politicised whole sectors of public sector employees and civil servants who prefer the status quo in the same way that Labour's plans to nationalise sugar, road haulage or insurance produced a backlash. Perhaps we should face the fact that as a nation we are not happy at rapid changes that affect us personally and prefer the devil we know. In a sense we are all conservative but the root objection is that the law of the market place has replaced a more humane concept of the duty of Government.

Similarly in its commitment on public spending, Mr. Jenkin (Patrick) met in head-on collision with Liverpool's militant Council. After a shrewd concession the militants were nevertheless able to claim victory and encourage others to follow in refusing to fix a rate. His struggle to abolish the very authorities set up by a previous Conservative administration have also played into the hands of champions of local democracy. He now lives a charmed life although if there is a more desirable scapegoat it is in the rather unconvincing figure of John Selwyn Gummer, whose lack of charisma in a Government with such stimulating figures as Sir Geoffrey Mogadon Howe and a tamed Tebbit flanked by Nigel Lawson—quiet since his much acclaimed budget and Leon Brittan torn between his natural civilised approach to crime and the hang and flog 'em brigade is not an invigorating sight.

Mr. Heseltine, a little chastened by his uncommon experiences facing CND and Mr. Walker, energetic but not producing the coal, may yet come into their own having survived the purge of so many senior figures, that the Conservatives have a 'shadow cabinet' with more talent and experience than the opposition can muster. Pym for Premier may yet

become a rallying cry if bananas continue to fall from above next autumn.

After all, what is the sense or equity of placing a greater burden on local authorities which have the greatest disadvantages in inner urban areas by in effect fining them for providing services to those most in need? As a middle class resident in my Borough recently commented, with the loony left spending wholesale and the Government removing subsidies, we conservative supporters are footing the bill—the result is now a hung council with Liberal Alliance holding the balance of power. It is a picture that could emerge nationally if militants and monetarists continue on their collision courses. Rippon, Stevas, Heath, Gilmour and Co. may yet find work for idle Tory benches to do if the Prime Minister does not fulfil the promise of the Falklands factor—and who knows better than Heath how swift and merciless a Conservative coup can be? The Ides of March 1985 will be a delicate time on the forum for Mrs. Thatcher. On the other hand, the Tiber has two banks and Mr. Powell's bloody vision may produce much foam on the left bank as the likeable, lightweight Mr. Kinnock dons heavy armour and fights to keep the bridge for the traditional citadel of Plebian Power from the plundering polyocracy that is gradually sapping the strength of his loyal legions.

Reviewing events of the past year is very fascinating to the observer but deeply gloomy for those who see Britain's role slowly subside as an advanced productive power playing a powerful part in the world. On the other hand it could be argued that the pursuit of expansion and wealth is of less importance than settling for a sane society without pretensions. Then perhaps, Libyan fanatics would stop shooting our police, Nigerians stop removing their wanted men in crates and US tourists could come and film the natives with their latest Japanese videos indulging in strange rituals such as hurling leather bound balls at three wooden stumps while a helmet-clad man wielding a piece of willow attempts to whack it over a packed pavilion. The trouble is that even there it takes our Caribbean friends little effort to make us look secondrate.

However, five days is a long time in cricket and we still have North Sea Oil and a resilience that has often surprised our detractors. Decline is not inevitable but it will need a major overhaul of our attitudes and institutions to reverse it. It will be not be accompilshed by civil strife in industry, policies that sap our strength and cultivate apathy and personal self-preservation.

# NIGERIA AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

**by S. E. Orobator**

THE early 1960s witnessed large-scale concern both within and outside Nigeria about the question of associate membership of the European Economic Community for the country. The United Kingdom, the largest of Nigeria's single trading partners, had applied for membership of the EEC, generating the debate about the effects her membership of the organisation would have upon the external policies of Nigeria.

Within Nigeria, there appeared to be a unanimous agreement against association with the Community following a three-tier argument (economic, political and military) in favour of non-participation. Outside Nigeria, opinions about associate membership of the Common Market for the underdeveloped countries varied. In the West, there was a general tendency to grant right of association of the EEC to ex-colonial territories as a way of ensuring the continuation of economic and political links between the former colonial masters and their subjects. Britain made efforts to woo Nigeria into the Community just as France did to ensure the association of her ex-colonies.[1] In the East, the picture was at once clear. Arguments were advanced against any measures aimed at promoting such links and in fact efforts were made to discourage them.

The issue of Nigeria's associate membership of the EEC had surfaced in the nation's parliament even before independence in 1960. It was one of the issues on which both the Government and the Opposition were quick to arrive at a decision. There was a unanimous rejection of associate membership. The Federal Minister of Commerce and Industry, Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, argued against membership and described the EEC as a European economic club for perpetuating organised exploitation of the underdeveloped economies. At the same time, the Minister regarded the EEC as a serious problem for the future of Nigeria's exports, especially in view of the level of tariffs agreed by the Six in respect of the commodities forming the substantial part of our exports. The ultimate effect of the EEC development policy in the associated overseas territories was to make the Community virtually independent of supplies from third countries, declaring that 'it is a sad reflection of the state of affairs in the world today that while the industrialised countries are progressing by leaps and bounds we, the primary producing countries of the world, suffer humiliation in financial matters.'[2] The solution to the situation, Alhaji Dipcharima felt, lay in the diversification of Nigeria's exports and imports with the hope that this would lead to higher prices for Nigeria's products and lower expenditure on foreign trade items.

The Minister's reference to the tariffs and the widening gap between the developed and underdeveloped conomies as a result of the enormous differences in the prices of their products received wholehearted sympathy in parliament. Government and Opposition members cast their votes in appreciation of the Minister's suggestion that Nigeria should examine

the possibility of joining other producing countries in forming a counter-bloc to the EEC; and to advertising Nigeria's products outside the Common Market countries. Reacting to the general parliamentary consensus the Governor-General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, declared that 'in view of Nigeria's rejection of associate status with the European Economic Community, a vigorous policy of export promotion would be pursued on a global scale in order to secure new markets for our produce.'[3]

Nigeria's rejection of associate membership of the EEC was a blow to the advocates of such an association. It had been argued in London that associate membership could have offered Nigeria the opportunity to offer her produce in a wider European market and to participate in the Overseas Investment Fund established by the EEC to assist associated underdeveloped countries.[4] Furthermore, the British Government had suggested that 'association would remove the barriers which now divide African countries'.[5]

It is difficult to accept as valid the views of the British Government or of writers like Douglas Anglin. In the first place, it is obvious that Nigeria stood to gain more by trading with the world without discrimination, than by restricting foreign trade to a particular bloc despite the benefit of the Community's so-called Investment Fund. Secondly, there could be no significant advantage in a wider European market for Nigerian products because at the crucial margin they were likely to be subject to duties that exceed those prevailing in Britain. Thirdly, the stimulus of development would be negligible since the Common Market is most generous to those products in which underdeveloped countries such as Nigeria are least competitive.

Nigeria's decision against entering the Common Market was also influenced by political and military considerations. Fears were expressed that Nigeria's association with the EEC would undermine her policy of non-alignment. Nigeria might drift into one camp of the Cold War, with all the attending repercussions in the nuclear age. Mr. J. A. Akinyemi claimed that Nigeria's association with the EEC would 'compromise the sovereign status of the country.'[6] Expressing his concern about this danger he continued, 'We must think of this in terms of political considerations. We cannot avoid the fact that, whether we like it or not, the world today is divided into blocs and these are shrouded with different ideologies in what we call Western democracies and Communist or Socialist democracies'.[7] He described Britain as part and parcel of the NATO Powers and NATO as an 'arm and the right-hand of American military might in Europe against the Soviet Union.' He warned that Nigeria's association with the EEC (a Western Organisation) would put her 'a hundred per cent in the Cold War,' on the side of the West against the East.[8]

Views similar to those expressed in Nigeria about the repercussions of EEC associate membership were also voiced in Eastern Europe. Most East European states also concluded that Nigeria's association with the Common Market would sharply reduce her choice of markets and

diminish her claim to economic, political and military non-alignment. Hence Nigeria's refusal of association with the Community was warmly received in Communist Europe. In Czechoslovakia, a government newspaper, *Rude Pravo,* commented that Nigeria's decision to remain outside the EEC would put her in a position to operate in a wider international market leading to a quicker development of her economy.[9] In Poland the *Glos Pracy* observed that by her opposition to being dragged into the EEC, Nigeria was attempting to pursue an independent economic policy.[10] And in the Soviet Union the EEC and its policy of associate membership received strong condemnation. The Common Market was described by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khruschev, as 'a state monopolist agreement of the financial oligarchy of Western Europe'.[11] He added that one of the main purposes of the EEC 'is to tie a number of liberated countries to the economy of the imperialist states and keep them enthralled under the cloak of pompous phrases about *"assistance"* to the peoples of the backward countries'. The Soviet leader advised the underdeveloped nations 'to set up their own regional trade and economic federations regardless of the imperialist monopolies and in opposition to them.'

The Soviet Union also made references to the relationship between the Community and NATO. A Soviet writer claimed that the Common Market is assigned a central place in NATO strategic plans and that it is regarded as the economic mainstay of this Organisation which, he said, was spearheaded against the USSR and her allies.[12] He went on to add:

> Both NATO and the Common Market are Organisations in financial oligarchy of the capitalist world, one in the military and the other in the economic sphere. These are two sides of one and the same coin. In this closely interlinked and interdependent system—NATO and the Common Market—the latter plays a subordinate part and is called upon to be the economic servitor of NATO.[13]

How strongly based were the fears expressed in Nigeria that association with the EEC meant taking sides in the Cold War? How justified were the East in relating the Common Market to NATO? These questions are important in view of the fact that the United States, the leader of NATO, is not a member of the EEC and appeared not to be in position to gain by that Community's arrangements with underdeveloped countries. True the establishment of the EEC perturbed the United States which saw the Organisation as designed to block American markets in Europe and Africa. During the first half of 1962, fears were expressed in Washington about the adverse effects the EEC would have on the marketing of American products in Europe and Africa.[14] Even the then American President, J. F. Kennedy, in his message to Congress said that to the United States, 'the greatest challenge of all is posed by the growth of the European Common Market.'[15]

American fears about the EEC were short-lived for, within the same year, American opinion had started shifting in favour of the Organisation. By June 1962, the argument surfaced that although from the economic point of view the EEC would affect the United States adversely, it could nevertheless be beneficial to the cause of NATO from the political and strategic aspects. Advancing this point the United States

*News and World Report* explained the circumstances surrounding the change of American opinion in favour of the EEC. 'The Common Market' it said . . . 'figures to play a prominent role in the East-West cold war.' The magazine agreed that the EEC would mean 'tougher competition for the United States in the world market, but the Government's idea is that a strong and united West Europe comes first, if a choice must be made. That's the basis largely, on which the U.S. is pulling so hard for the Common Market.'[16] The opinion of the Government on the matter was soon revealed in a statement made by Francis Stevens, a Soviet expert of the American State Department. According to him:

> The military potential of such a grouping (the EEC) would be great and . . . would lend new vigour and power to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the emergence of a United Europe, in fact, the world balance would be substantially altered to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.[17]

Whatever doubts might have existed regarding the connections between the EEC and NATO, they seemed to have been cleared by the above statement; thus justifying the suspicion of both Nigeria and the East that the Common Market was the economic servitor of NATO.

Nevertheless, with the advent of a military government, Nigeria again started showing interest in the Common Market and the negotiations which followed ended in an agreement signed on July 16, 1966, providing for Nigeria's associate membership. While signing for Nigeria Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe christened the agreement the 'Lagos Convention' in line with the 'Yaounde Convention' which linked the 18 French-speaking African states with the Community. He spoke in praise of the EEC and expressed the belief that 'with her population, her natural resources, her adaptability and liberal attitude towards investors Nigeria offers at once a challenge and an opportunity to Western Europe'.[18] The President of the EEC Council of Ministers, J. M. A. H. Luns, signed on behalf of the Community and the communique provided that the agreement would be valid until May 31, 1969, and that a year before its expiry, the contracting parties 'will examine the provision that might be made for a further period.'

Obviously, Nigeria's decision to join the Common Market was a definite break from the policy adopted by the Balewa government and was probably a result of the non-existence of the once discussed African Common Market. Conditions for Nigeria's entry were much the same as those rejected by the civilian government five years earlier and the internal economic development of the country remained essentially the same as before. Thus, her membership was not motivated by any advantages to the nation, that were not taken into consideration by the ousted regime. It was more likely that the decision to join the Community, taken by Ironsi's military regime, was prompted by the philosophy of breaking with the actions of the past, irrespective of whether or not such actions were in the national interest.

The Soviet bloc, and in particular the USSR, was again concerned with Nigeria's EEC membership agreement. The Soviet attitude to the agreement was extremely critical. Leon Leonov of Radio Moscow, did

not see any advantages to Nigeria in Community membership, since she was bound to align her foreign economic policy to the Common Market and, since she did not have 'the right to enter into customs unions or to sign agreements about creation of zones of free trade with third parties either in Africa or outside it'. This, Leonov emphasised, would greatly hamper the creation of customs unions of African countries, and delay for an indefinite period the setting up of an African Common Market:

> The damage Nigeria voluntarily agreed to by having entered the EEC . . . is bigger than the advantages promised Nigeria by the Common Market. The most significant of the advantages is the lowering of customs barriers by the EEC, but this applies only to unfinished goods of Nigeria's exports. The European Six retain the privilege of processing the raw materials and this is obviously an example of the way African countries are kept as sources of raw materials and markets for the developed countries and of the way industrial development of Africa is artificially prevented.[19]

Leonov's assessment of the situation at the time of the Ironsi regime is clear and needs no further analysis. It is all the more surprising that the Gowon government, apparently aware of the problems before its accession, decided to repudiate Nigeria's EEC membership agreement in 1968. This decision was presumably influenced by the fact that at the time in question the agreement had not been ratified by the French, who seemed concerned about the probable repercussions of Nigeria's associate membership on the economy of the 18 French-speaking African member states of the Community. In a statement, the Federal Ministry of Trade said that associate membership of the EEC for Nigeria was no longer relevant to the needs of the country.

The statement went on to highlight some of the fears referred to by the Soviet commentator, adding that Nigeria would not allow her strong and independent economy to be 'jeopardised by neo-colonialist arrangements like association with the EEC now or in the future'.[20] However, it is unlikely that the decision taken by the Gowon government was in any way influenced by opinions expressed by the Soviet Union. It was more likely to be the result of France's reluctance to ratify the treaty and Nigeria's fear of tying her economy to any particular bloc, a point also noted by a Polish economist, A. Gjegorek.[21]

The prompt support given by the East to Nigeria was expected in view of the continuing East-West manoeuvres for advantages at each other's expense; yet it could be regarded as being in the interest of the economic and political independence of Nigeria. Admittedly, Nigeria's refusal of association with the EEC did not substantially reduce her trade with the countries of the Community or increase noticeably her trade with Eastern Europe, although within the Commonwealth Great Britain remains an important trading partner.[23] Nevertheless, it has presented her as a nation carrying out a policy of non-alignment in the world arena.

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[Dr. S. E. Orobator is Lecturer in History and Politics at The University of Benin, Nigeria.]

The October issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *North-South Relations: the Role of Europe* by Filip Svetic, *The Rome Communists: an Historic Compromise* by Tim Parks, *Policing the Pickets* by Roger Geary and *The Young Matthew Arnold* by Park Honan.

# RUSSIA'S TOP ADMIRAL

## by John A. Broadwin

THE year was 1927. In the city of Leningrad a precocious young man of seventeen was trying to give some direction to his life. He had just passed his first-year university examinations in physics and mathematics, and his family was urging him to become a science teacher like his father and brother before him. However, he simply could not adjust to the idea of an academic career. He longed for adventure, something more out of life. Finally, he marched down Leningrad's main thoroughfare to the offices of the Communist Youth League near the Anichkov Bridge, surrendering to the romance of his youthful illusions, and joined the navy. 'There's just something about the sea,' he told an interviewer in later years, 'once it beckons, nothing can hold you back.'

Mile for mile, that walk surely ranks as one of history's most notable, for that young man—Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov—was destined to become the architect of the modern Soviet Navy and the greatest naval administrator of the twentieth century.

The name Gorshkov is hardly a household word to the average Briton or American. Until now, knowledge about the man and his achievements has been mainly the province of naval specialists and students of Soviet politics. Indirectly, though, he has had a powerful impact on millions of tax-paying Americans; for the Reagan administration is pouring billions of dollars—in fact, the largest defence budget outlay for any branch of service—into a naval arms race with Gorshkov's growing armada.

Basically, Sergei Gorshkov is a compound of sailor, nationalist, and visionary, a fact reflected in the 'decor' of his Kremlin study. There are atlases, blue navigational charts, model ships and aeroplanes, a barograph and other tools of the seaman's trade. Lining the walls are portraits of 19th century Russian seafarers; on a pedestal is a large bust of the tsarist admiral Ushakov ('the Russian Nelson'); and in one corner of the room a huge globe which seems to symbolise Gorshkov's dream of projecting surface sea power over great distances, far beyond Soviet home waters.

Gorshkov himself is a far cry from the stylised Hollywood picture of an admiral—tall, trim, square-jawed. Rather, he is of medium height, slightly dumpy, balding, and broad-faced—a somewhat refined version of Khrushchev. With his sparkling blue eyes and fringe of white hair he seems more like a grandfather figure than one of America's most formidable adversaries; but beneath the genial surface lies a reservoir of cunning, aggressiveness and, above all, determination.

Sergei G. Gorshkov was born in 1910 of Russian parents in the Ukrainian city of Kamenets-Podolski. Afer joining the fledgeling Soviet Navy at the age of seventeen, he graduated four years later from the Frunze Naval School at Leningrad in 1931. His ability to survive and his naval skills were developed during the turbulent decade of the 1930s, with its Stalinist purges and atmosphere of chaos and uncertainty.

In 1939, when World War II broke out in Western Europe, Gorshkov was commanding a destroyer brigade. By June 1941, when Hitler's armies turned east to attack the Soviet Union, he was a captain in charge of a cruiser brigade in the Black Sea.

The performance of the Soviet Navy in World War II was generally poor; it fell into nearly every trap the Germans laid. German observers therefore had little respect for the fighting or leadership qualities of their adversary—with one major exception—Gorshkov.

Gorshkov led one of the most successful Soviet naval operations of the war: the defence and evacuation of Odessa in late 1941. His former naval opponent, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, acknowledged the excellence of Gorshkov's leadership in helping to tie up German forces for six months and save the Soviets from 'complete defeat.'

As a result, the then thirty-one year old Gorshkov was promoted to rear-admiral, after only ten years as a naval officer. He thus became one of the youngest admirals in modern times, having risen to flag rank faster than Lord Nelson.

During the decade after World War II, Gorshkov served in positions of increasing responsibility in the Black Sea Fleet, becoming First Deputy Chief of the Navy in 1955, the year Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, it soon emerged, was contemptuous of traditional navies, calling naval shipbuilding programmes 'metal eaters' and claiming that the new Soviet cruisers were fit only to carry admirals on parade. Consequently, he slashed the Navy's budget and began a process of scrapping most of its large surface ships in favour of building a coastal fleet with a large force of submarines.

The Navy's chief at the time, Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, objected vigorously. So Khrushchev fired him and on January 6 1956 appointed the seemingly more compliant Gorshkov naval commander-in-chief and deputy minister of defence for the navy; at the age of forty-six, the youngest man ever to hold the Soviet Navy's top job. Ironically, his first assignment as the premier admiral of the Soviet Union was to preside over the partial dismantling of the country's naval forces.

However, from past experience, Gorshkov knew how to manoeuvre among Bolshevik bureaucrats and politicians, supporting their programmes and slogans while scoring gains for his much-loved fleet. Eventually, he prevailed on Khrushchev to stop eviscerating the Navy. In fact, during the Khrushchev years, Gorshkov actually managed to add ships to the inventory he had been ordered to reduce; and he accelerated Soviet research into naval applications of guided missiles, nuclear propulsion and other technological developments.

To his Kremlin bosses, Gorshkov argued forcefully and compellingly that a nation with any pretensions to global superpower status had to have a powerful, oceangoing navy. 'History shows,' Gorshkov contended, 'that states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power for long.'

From pre-Soviet Russian history Gorshkov drew numerous examples

(not always accurate) to bolster his case for a navy 'second to none.' 'Whenever the tsarist rulers did not pay sufficient attention to the development of the fleet . . . Russia either suffered defeat in war, or her policy in peacetime did not achieve what it was intended to achieve.'

Analysing the post-1945 cold war confrontation between East and West, Gorshkov concluded that the main threat to Russia's security and international influence came, not as in the past from across its land frontiers, but from a powerful maritime coalition headed by the United States and armed with sea-launched atomic weapons.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 gave proof to Soviet leaders of the correctness of Gorshkov's thinking. In that year, the United States imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, successfully preventing Soviet submarines and merchant ships from reaching Castro's island. The Soviets found they were unable to project their sea forces overseas and breach their adversary's first line of defence, the US Navy. The land-minded leaders of the world's largest continental country were humiliated. At last they realised how inadequate Soviet maritime forces were to carry out Soviet foreign policy in the face of US naval strength. Gorshkov had been right: the world-wide interests of the USSR demanded a fleet with global reach. The Soviet Union, Kremlin leaders decided, would have to take the road to the sea, and Admiral Gorshkov would lead the way.

Despite the turnaround in Soviet policy toward the Navy, Gorshkov still had to fight hard in this army-oriented society for the roubles necessary to achieve his grand design of building an oceanic fleet. He had to use all his strategic and administrative genius to compete with the generals for often scarce resources.

He did a remarkably good job. Within the short space of fifteen years, from 1962 to 1979, Gorshkov redressed a naval balance unfavourable to Russia. In 1979, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, then US chief of naval operations, testified before Congress that 'the Soviet Navy has steadily grown from a coastal defence force into a blue water navy powerful enough to challenge the US Navy in most ocean areas of the world.' A year later, a former CNO, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, warned that Gorshkov 'has led his country into an oceanic strategy and a naval war-winning capability.'

Interestingly, Gorshkov's inspiration for his monumental project seems to flow from a deep-seated ethnic Russian nationalism. As a good Communist he, of course, clothes his ideas in Marxist phraseology. However, those ideas often have more in common with the thoughts of the tsarist admiral whose bust he keeps in his study than they do with the theories of Karl Marx; for example, the belief in a messianic Russian mission to remake the world in its own image; the desire for acceptance of Russia (communist or otherwise) as a great power and the conviction that Russia's future lies at sea. In his voluminous writings, Gorshkov regularly refers to 'the qualities of a seagoing people inherent in the Russians since ancient times.'

Though a member of the first generation of citizens educated and trained under the Soviet regime, Gorshkov became a member of the Communist

Party at the comparatively late age of thirty-two, after his promotion to rear-admiral and probably with an eye to advancing his naval career.

At seventy-three, Gorshkov now stands at the pinnacle of power in Soviet Russia. He is a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and a top official of the Soviet government. For the past twenty-eight years he has been commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, a record of continuity without parallel in any modern navy. America's naval leaders, by contrast, come and go—eight different chiefs of naval operations, the Navy's top job, and thirteen different secretaries of the navy during this same period—but Gorshkov still holds power.

The extent of that power is enough to turn Western admirals green with envy. It allows Gorshkov to make optimal use of resources and undertake the kind of comprehensive planning that is difficult to carry out in a democracy. Not only has Gorshkov personally overseen the build-up of the navy, he has also had a say in the configuration of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets. He has even gained virtual control over a section of the air force through the acquisition of land-based long-range aircraft that can attack unfriendly ships with bombs and cruise missiles.

Besides his length of time in office, what distinguishes Gorshkov from most other naval leaders is his sense of vision and his ability to make his ideas come to life. More than simply lobbying for the Navy, he has speculated, in an almost abstract way, about the history and nature of sea power, translating his perceptions into a well co-ordinated programme of action to expand Soviet use of the sea for military, political, and economic purposes.

Since Gorshkov considers sea power to be commercial as well as naval, he has urged the Soviet hierarchy to press for control of more of the world's maritime transportation. He points with pride to the ultra-modern Soviet merchant marine which has surpassed that of the United States and is now the world's fifth largest; to the Soviet fishing fleet which is already the world's biggest; and to the USSR's huge fleet of oceanographic research vessels that contribute to the long-range Soviet goals of studying the oceans and harnessing their wealth.

Among the various components of Soviet sea power, Admiral Gorshkov naturally accords pride of place to the Navy. He has linked the commercial part of his maritime programme to the needs of the combat fleet in a military-merchant alliance. Most merchant ships have been designed as military ships first, capable of carrying troops or transporting heavy mechanised fighting equipment in case of war or other crises. Soviet fishing trawlers, crammed with sophisticated electronic gear, conduct routine surveillance and collect intelligence off the shores of most Western countries; and Soviet research vessels scour the seas for the oceanographic data needed to operate Russian submarines at peak efficiency and to counter Western anti-submarine measures.

Aside from its strategic nuclear role and the defence of the Motherland in time of war, Gorshkov has assigned to the Navy the equally important mission of pursuing the state's political objectives in peacetime. The Soviet fleet has been ordered to shadow America's overseas forces and inhibit

possible US responses to conflicts in the Third World; to solidify the image of the Soviet Union by showing the hammer and sickle in ports around the globe, especially in impressionable developing countries; and to support Soviet political goals in areas of particular interest to the USSR, such as Angola, where Soviet sea forces helped to set up a communist-influenced government in 1976.

Admiral Gorshkov has boasted that 'the creation of the Soviet oceanic fleet may be put on a par with those developments in the recent past, such as the [Soviet] creation of atomic weapons, that have had a decisive influence on world politics [and] signalled the end of the monopoly of the American imperialists.' A report by chief US arms negotiator Paul Nitze for the Atlantic Council Working Group on *Securing the Seas* agrees with the substance of Gorshkov's claim. Noting the Soviet Union's rise to the status of a major naval and merchant power, the report points out that 'the achievement of prompt and total sea control in the classic sense will probably never again be possible by one nation's conventional forces' and that 'the combined resources of all the navies of the West would be required to promptly neutralise the Soviet fleet.'

In the face of the 'stark contrast between the momentum of Soviet naval development and the relative indecisiveness of the [Western] Alliance side,' the Council's Working Group has recommended that the Alliance meet the Soviet challenge by renewing its commitment to redress the precarious naval balance between the USSR and the West, improving its appreciation of the full range of naval requirements, and developing naval capabilities more in response to likely Soviet threats. The US commitment to a 600-ship navy is an important step in that direction. US allies must establish programmes to maintain their contributions to the security of the West.

Gorshkov is now in the evening of a long and distinguished career that spans five tumultuous decades. He is in a real sense the father of the modern Soviet Navy. He, more than any other Soviet naval figure, has determined the composition of the fleet as well as the characteristics and armament of its ships. He has moved the Soviet Navy beyond the narrow coastal waters of Russia into the vast expanses of the ocean and helped give it the capability to compete with the US Navy on at least equal terms in the ongoing contest for mastery of the seas. More than that, he has expanded the consciousness of his countrymen, transforming many among the traditionally land-oriented political-military hierarchy into sea-minded leaders. He has thus proved himself a shrewd, aggressive, and imaginative naval leader. It is likely that his legacy will long be with us.

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[John Broadwin, a Reference Librarian at Stanford University, USA, writes on military and naval topics and has done a number of translations from the Russian and German. These include *Soviet Bloc Merchant Ships*, and *Axis Submarine Successes, 1939-1945* for the US Naval Institute Press.]

# DRUG REHABILITATION—THE MISSING FACTOR

## by Mary Beasley and Don Wilkerson

'RAMPANT vandalism, alarming school drop-out rates, lethargy, apathy, increasing alcoholism and drug abuse and sky-rocketing crime makes us return again and again to consider probable causes which create the social deviant...'[1] (Dr. Catherine B. Hess, MD MPH FACA ACOG, former Narcotic Co-ordinator for the City of New York).

The content of that statement is hardly unique, but the success rate of the drug rehabilitation programme Dr. Hess describes in the report from which it is taken is certainly worthy of attention. In a subsequent documentary film she said that nowhere else had she found a comparable recovery rate. The suggested reasons are vital to professionals in related disciplines, be they social workers, psychologists or clergy—particularly in inner city areas where such problems tend to be concentrated.

This rehabilitation programme owed its origins to the trial of a gang of youths for murder in New York City in 1958—not insignificantly within weeks of David Sheppard (later to become Bishop of Liverpool) beginning his work among young people in the East End of London. The founder, David Wilkerson, was a young minister working in a country church in America who was so challenged by the circumstances surrounding the brutal murder of a polio victim that he went into full time work among young people in New York's ghetto areas.

Soon a new youth problem reared its head—addiction to heroin and other 'hard' drugs. Medical science by itself could help with the physical dependency and its effects, but a bigger problem was the psychological dependency and the factors giving rise to it.

A one year residential programme, including vocational, psychological and spiritual rehabilitation was therefore set up. Addiction was but one of the symptoms of alienated youth encountered by Mr. Wilkerson's agency Teen Challenge, so named after its origins in the work with teenage gangs. However, it is an aspect of the work which can be evaluated by universally accepted criteria and is therefore a useful base for discussion of the wider implications of the treatment method.

Ten years after the programme had been in operation, New York Teen Challenge estimated that their success rate, based on the percentage of those completing the programme who were found to be drug-free five years later, was 70%. This was challenged by government backed agencies who claimed that the figure was exaggerated. Federal funds to test the claim were obtained and the research was carried out by an independent research body under the direction of Dr. Hess.

Three client groups were followed up approximately six years after leaving the programme; those who had been in the induction phase, but had not gone on to the main rehabilitation centre, those who had com-

pleted the three month induction, but had left before the end of the full year's programme and, finally, those who had completed the programme. For the purpose of this discussion, it is the latter group which is of particular interest, partly because the highest percentage, 97%, were successfully traced, and partly because it was this group which had the highest rate of convictions for non-drug related offences, the highest rate of long-term addiction, and other factors suggesting this group was as socially deprived as the other two.

The 'success' rate was found to be either 70% or 86% according to criteria, Teen Challenge having more stringent criteria than the normally accepted ones which allow for cigarette smoking and social drinking. Among this group, 88% had been in trouble with the police—mostly for offences unrelated to the drug scene, 73% were heavily addicted to heroin, i.e. taking it three or more times a day, 86% were black or Hispanic, only 14% were from the suburbs or country, 59% were from cities of 250,000 or more, 75% were high school drop-outs, over 30% had not been living with their parents at the age of twelve, 29% had been addicted for two to five years, 38% for five to ten years, and 17% for over ten years. The mean age was 24. This group therefore had factors in common with other categories of deviant youth in the larger conurbations.

The treatment programme involved living in groups of eight to ten, each with two group leaders, aimed at simulating a family situation as far as possible. Activities included vocational training, work on a farm or in workshops providing services for the local community, education—both basic literacy for those requiring it as well as preparation for further training—group discussions, individual counselling, and spiritual training.

In the documentary film made as a result of this research, Dr. Hess says that of other agencies working with addicts and known to her, the success rate tended to be considerably lower, though the training facilities were comparable. The one factor that differed was the spiritual emphasis at Teen Challenge.

This poses the question from our own situation in the United Kingdom of the numbers of people who go through detoxification, but then revert to drink or drugs on their return to the community. Dr. Hess's comments in the Research Summation may be relevant:

> As one reviews the Teen Challenge programme, one senses that such a religious movement may offer a revitalisation to those involved in a meaningless existence of self-destruction. The instillation of faith by a forgiving God can offer the addict a firm spiritual support which the socially and physically insecure person urgently needs to shore up his self-image and insecurity. Self-centredness and selfishness of the individual is converted into a mission of outgoingness which takes him out of himself and focusses his actions on something greater than self-speculation. His belief system becomes self-validating, and his basic needs of security, recognition, response and new horizons seems to be met in this specific approach which are totally absent in all other therapeutic community programmes.
>
> Rising into prominence is: faith in himself, faith in his God, faith in mankind, faith makes the difference.[2]

Among those who do return to alcohol or drugs, it appears that, while the physical dependency has been dealt with, the underlying emotional

dependency, particularly that relating to a poor self-image, has not.

The Christian explanation of the root cause of emotional problems, deviancy, and so on, is relevant here. The biblical view of man is that he was created in the image of God, but, following Adam's initial act of disobedience, has been in a state of rebellion. In other words the individual, instead of having his whole existence centred on God, is now intent on 'doing his own thing', which explains the breakdown in interpersonal relationships, family conflicts, and criminal acts when one person decides to do his own thing at the expense of society as a whole. According to the Christian viewpoint, man cannot retrieve his original status on his own; but can do so through Jesus Christ, who took the punishment deserved by man for rebelling against God by dying on the Cross and overcoming the effect of sin and death by rising from the dead. As a result, those who admit their rebellious state or original sin can be reconciled to God.

This reconciliation, this finding of one's true self, does not happen in isolation—it happens within the context of a caring community. The basic needs of every human being include the need to be loved and accepted, hence the existence of the family and community as essential institutions through which such needs are fulfilled.

In the past, the Church served this purpose not only at a human level but above all at a spiritual level, in that those who had been reconciled to God through Christ could go on to realise to their full potential. The Church was the community where those who were united with Christ were united with one another in him, in a relationship intended to go beyond that of any purely human relationship: 'Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us'.[3]

Its Founder, in describing his mission, placed particular emphasis on the poor, the brokenhearted, the captives, the oppressed—and yet these are the people who are often the furthest removed from today's churches.

An essential factor in Teen Challenge's success was the integration of those who had graduated from the programme into churches which would help them make a new start. When a further study was carried out by the agency itself, to establish why the success rate was not 100%, more often than not those who had fallen by the wayside were found to be those who had been unable to find such support. Even among those who had, there were problems in adapting to churches more geared to straight, middle-class members than to people who had come from a criminal or drug sub-culture.

This resulted in heart-searching concerning the discrepancy between a key aspect of the church's stated mission and its inability, in practice, to fulfill that. The conclusion drawn arose from observing the contrast between the different communities in which churches were founded during the first days of Christianity.

The Jerusalem church consisted primarily of Jews who had a religious

background with the social and moral standards that went with it. The modern parallel is the church consisting of people coming from a relatively stable background which, if not overtly Christian, has incorporated a moral code owing its origins to Christianity. With such people basic standards, such as respect for family life and the law of the land, can be taken for granted.

This group contrasts with the majority of those who have had the more serious involvement with addiction and law-breaking. From the findings described above, it appears that Teen Challenge's clients tended to come from 'problem' families and had grown up in an environment where addiction, violence and crime were prevalent. For example, in one neighbourhood from which many clients came, four out of ten of the total population, which would account for the majority of adults, were found to be addicted to either alcohol or drugs.

The parallel from the history of the early Church was seen to be Corinth. We learn from St Paul's letters to that church that every kind of vice and decadence was prevalent—and that considerable problems were encountered among new converts having difficulty in making the break with their former life-style. This reflects historical evidence of social conditions in Corinth.

Teen Challenge leaders were prompted by this to re-evaluate their strategy for integrating graduates of the rehabilitation programme into Christian communities. Instead of attempting to fit 'square pegs into round holes' they, in conjunction with local church leaders, founded churches with a greater awareness of the needs of the communities they served. Instead of sending potential leaders away for conventional theological training, which in many instances is geared more to the structure and culture of suburban churches, they set up their own training scheme. While this included the normal basic theology, it also included courses designed to help leaders meet the needs of converts from a socially disrupted background. As more former addicts and offenders were successfully rehabilitated, some returned to work in their own neighbourhoods as part of the ministry of these churches.

The arrival of people who were remembered by the local population, and who could now be seen to have undergone a marked change, made more impact than could comparative outsiders.

A policy of indigenous leaders for indigenous institutions is hardly new. It is the basis for emerging states in the Third World, and for enlightened missionary strategy, taken from New Testament principles of initiating a work, then training local leaders to the point where they can accept responsibility for it themselves. Nor, indeed, is it new to the church situation in this country where it has been highlighted by work such as that of David Sheppard at the Mayflower Family Centre in Canning Town, London.

The planting of indigenous churches in the inner city is far more than the establishing of a spiritual presence. It provides the focus around which a caring community can grow and, to coin a frequently used

phrase from the New York experience, to provide the 'total cure for the total person'. When a person graduates from a rehabilitation centre, he finds himself part of a community which is prepared to provide ongoing support on every level.

The exiles in Babylon were exhorted by the prophet Jeremiah to seek the well-being of the city, for in so doing they would find their own well-being. That could be sound advice for today's urban situation; the problems created by increasing alienation are not only an affront to the dignity of the individuals concerned, but a drain on society as a whole. To seek a reversal of the present trend, particularly by Christians, to see material progress as an opportunity to leave the inner city, would therefore be in the interests of all.

However, politicians' debates as to the solution will reach no satisfactory conclusion as long as the root cause of 'man's inhumanity to man' is ignored. Those of us who believe that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, also believe that He has committed to us the task of communicating this belief to the world.

This involves being faithful to the task not in word only, but in deed —and that is costly since it involves examining our own goals, both individually and collectively. Are we simply seeking our own material progress—or have we set our sights further afield and seen that if the Incarnation is to be a reality in the inner city that means our goals must be reversed, as were those of many in high places 2,000 years ago?

The fact of crime, deviancy of every kind, and the rate at which these are increasing, is one that hits us each time we read a newspaper, listen to the radio or watch television. It is surely providential that there are now people in places where their voices can be heard who are challenging us with the reminder that there is a divine bias to the poor—and among the poor we include not only the materially poor, but the emotionally deprived and others who may be hurt in a variety of ways. We have shown that, where this divine bias is taken literally, there are unprecedented results. This, surely, is the missing factor.

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[Mary Beasley is a social worker and author of *Back from the Brink* (A. R. Mowbray & Co.). Don Wilkerson is Executive Director of Teen Challenge, New York.]

# A NATIONAL CAUSE?

## by John Elsom

THE struggle to establish a National Theatre in Britain began in 1843, when the restrictions on drama imposed by the Theatres Act of 1737 were lifted, and it continued intermittently until 1963, when the National Theatre Company was formed with Lord Chandos as its chairman and Sir Laurence Olivier as its director. It took up lodgings at the Old Vic, a modest establishment of character near Waterloo Station, but the war wasn't quite over. For the next 14 years there was a struggle to build premises suitable for its status, and by then Sir Peter Hall had taken over from Olivier under circumstances of some acrimony and the National Theatre found itself surrounded by controversies of another character.

I became a kind of unintentional war correspondent to this latter period, for Tom Maschler of Jonathan Cape had asked me to complete *The History of the National Theatre,* started by the late Nicholas Tomalin. Tomalin was killed on the Golan Heights in the Israeli border wars, which he was covering for the *Sunday Times,* and he left behind among his papers a pile of notes on the National Theatre, some press cuttings and cassettes, together with several half-finished chapters, of which the first was virtually complete. It was written in that easy, laconic, debunking style which made Tomalin always so easy to read but which suggested that he thought of the whole cafuffle as high comedy, the Titfield Thunderbolt writ large.

Tomalin was not primarily interested in the theatre. He saw the campaign as an interesting slab of social history and even formed the view that the National Theatre saga was a parable for our times. I was rather suspicious of this approach, for it seemed the journalist's way of inflating the importance of his story. Almost anything can be regarded as a modern parable if you want to do so, housing, blood transfusions, even the building of a theatre. Each facet of an age leads eventually to a contemplation of the whole. I suspected that Tomalin was simply looking at the record of indecision, manoeuvring, lobbying, fixing and dithering, in order to lay this record before the public and say, 'Look, this is how we handle things in Britain. That's why we're a second-class power'—or third, or fourth.

In one sense, however, Tomalin was right, for the battle to establish a National Theatre represented a struggle between the conservative and liberal wings of our society, sometimes expressed in party allegiances but not always. The myth grew up that it was the liberals or even radicals who demanded a National Theatre, people like Granville-Barker, Bernard Shaw and later Jennie Lee. But the conservatives were also prominent—the Lyttons, the Lyttelton family (with Lord Chandos among them) and Lord Cottesloe. The original spur came from a conservative reaction to a liberalising measure. When the power of the patent houses, Drury

Lane and Covent Garden, was reduced in 1843 with the loss of their monopolies, the conservatives led by Bulwer Lytton argued that serious drama should be protected from the competition with catchpenny managements. Similar arguments are heard today to save the BBC from trial by cable vision. Bulwer Lytton expressed what afterwards become a core conservative argument in favour of a national theatre—the preservation of artistic standards. The liberals weren't exactly against high artistic standards either, but their emphasis was directed elsewhere—towards increasing the options for the theatre in general by introducing foreign classics to British audiences, by maintaining the tradition of British classical drama (particularly through Shakespearian productions) and occasionally attempting the ambitious modern play from which commercial managements shied. The liberals also wanted to see a drama school attached to the National Theatre and they admired the continental repertory system, which they wanted to introduce into Britain as a counterweight to commercialism.

'The preservation of standards' versus 'freedom of expression'—those were the poles between which the National Theatre advocates, sometimes conservatives, sometimes liberals, veered for more than a century and long before a National Theatre actually came into existence. It resulted in a compromise between their views which never concealed the fact that at least two different types of National Theatre were being proposed. To Lord Chandos, the National Theatre would become 'a bulwark of the state', influential not just in preserving Shakespeare and the classical tradition, but also the language from corruption. Kenneth Tynan on the other hand, the first literary manager of the National Theatre, believed that most theatre of merit criticised society, and the justification for a National Theatre was that, freed from commercial considerations, it could do so more effectively.

The row between Chandos and Tynan over Hochhuth's play, *Soldiers*, was not just about whether Churchill engineered Sikorski's death, a large enough question in itself, but whether the National Theatre should do that kind of play. Olivier shielded Tynan on that occasion and his presence averted other crises, for he was someone who could bridge many gulfs. Like Chandos, he was a patriot whose reputation commanded general respect; but he was not a reactionary. He was sympathetic to the new wave of writers, directors and actors, had worked at the Royal Court and drew two young, ex-Sloane Square directors, John Dexter and William Gaskill, into his first team. He had also been a commercial impresario and was therefore sympathetic to the problems of West End managements.

One reason why Britain, unlike other European countries, was late with its National Theatre, was that its commercial theatre until the mid-1950s was strong, varied and comparatively open to new ideas. Why did we need a National Theatre (the argument ran) when we could have seen Irving at the Lyceum in the 1880s, Gielgud at the Old Vic in the 1930s or Olivier in Brook's *Titus Andronicus* at Stratford in the

1950s? The peaks of theatre in Britain had been scaled, from Shakespeare onwards, without the help of subsidy. 'Why,' asked Lilian Baylis, who needed subsidy if anyone did, 'do we need a National Theatre? We have one, the Old Vic'—more authentic because it had not been willed into being by governments. The West End managements were more diplomatic in their scepticism. A National Theatre was fine, in theory, but what would happen to the rest of the theatre system if a large new building, supported by taxpayers' money, were dumped down in their midst? Through subsidy, the National Theatre could afford to undercut ticket prices, it could snatch the star actors, it could set standards of opulence which the West End could not match.

The theatre profession was divided as to whether it wanted a National Theatre or not. The most determined National Theatre supporters came from outside the profession—from people like Geoffrey Whitworth, Matthew Arnold, Israel Gollancz—and though the British Drama League, under Whitworth's influence, persistently demanded a National Theatre, the League itself was not fully representative of the theatre. The National Theatre would not have come into existence but for a combination of suddenly favourable circumstances—the urban need to revitalise the South Bank, the arrival of modest subsidies to the theatre which helped the profession generally but did not damage its commercial fabric, the weakening of the power of the West End and not least, the presence of Olivier, who gave credibility to the various claims and promises made on the National Theatre's behalf.

The National Theatre supporters had tried to damp down the hostility of the commercial managements by insisting that, of course, the National Theatre would not be in rivalry with them. Its aims were quite different. It would offer a repertoire of British and foreign classics which could never be financed on box office terms alone. Profit was not its motive. It would establish a permanent or semi-permanent company by offering actors greater security though lower salaries than they could command in the West End. It would be a pioneering but not speculative enterprise; and its subsidies, far from helping it to compete on privileged terms, would save it from having to compete at all.

That was the theory, and it sounded utopian, until Olivier lent his support in the late 1950s. For the next twelve years, Olivier embodied the idealism of the National Theatre movement. He obviously could command high salaries from films and elsewhere in the theatre, but he chose not to do so. His salary at the National Theatre was comparatively modest and he went off-salary if he took on outside work. Tynan also dropped salary when he went to the National Theatre, and his list of some 500 plays which he thought suitable for the National Theatre contained very few which commercial managements would ever be likely to tackle. It wasn't an eccentric selection, although it contained the names of major foreign dramatists still to be seen in Britain. Olivier's first acting company was notable for its absence of star names. Cynics suggested that this was because Olivier wanted to avoid competition, but

Olivier was no Wolfit, dulling the setting to enhance the quality of the diamond, himself. His team, however, included many actors who are now stars—Finlay, Blakeley, Jacobi, Robert Stephens and Maggie Smith. Whatever other criticisms of Olivier's National Theatre may have been levelled, that of trespassing on other managements' territory was not one.

But what would happen when Olivier left? Would the promises be kept? And *should* they be kept—for they were made at a time before the principle of arts subsidies had been properly established. In 1958, when Olivier first lent his weight to the National Theatre movement, subsidies to the theatre were not only very small, rarely amounting to more than £500 per theatre, but also of less moment than the lifting of the oppressive Entertainments Tax, abolished in the same year. But very quickly, subsidies were regarded as almost the only means by which live theatre could be saved in the regions. In 1960, when Peter Hall at the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre took the unprecedented step of spending the accumulated reserves of the company on opening a London branch at the Aldwych, he did so in the expectation that the government would respond with financial help—as it did.

Hall's dashing success in creating the Royal Shakespeare Company impressed everybody. It was so unlike the interminable dithering which had characterised the National Theatre movement. Olivier invited Hall in the early days to join the National Theatre company as his second-in-command, but Hall refused, cheerfully asserting that he would establish a national company of his own. The rivalry between Hall's RSC and Olivier's National Theatre during the 1960s was intense. Both had great successes, but the National Theatre was an 'actor's company' led by an actor, whereas the RSC was a 'director's theatre'. Hall complained if Olivier could afford to pay his National Theatre actors more than the rate at the RSC; while Olivier's defenders (for Olivier rarely criticised other managements) pointed out that Hall had inherited a well-established company whereas Olivier was trying to form one from scratch. Their management styles were in complete contrast, noticed by journalists partly in the difference between the press departments—for Craig Macdonald at the National Theatre was a conventional press officer, whereas John Goodwin at the RSC was an innovative expert in the much wider field of public relations. The RSC board grew with impressive names from politics and the theatre; and although the RSC found itself in controversies, such as over *The Homecoming* and Brook's *US*, it managed to rally radical opinion to its side at a time when, in the 1960s, radicalism was in vogue.

Hall was the brilliant buccaneer, Olivier the almost too respectable Admiral of the Fleet; and so when in 1973 Hall was picked to succeed Olivier, without Olivier's knowledge and with only minimal consultation with the National Theatre's board, the choice was bound to be controversial. The acrimony at first was concealed. Olivier publicly welcomed Hall as his successor and whatever he may have said to friends and perhaps other journalists in private, he never said a word against Hall

to me. The impression left by Hall's recently published *Diaries* is that Olivier tried to undermine Hall's authority. If that were so, I saw no evidence of it. I had by that time taken over from Tomalin and thus been offered a seat in the front row. Olivier had clearly been shocked by his treatment from the National Theatre Board and his pain was there for all to see. But his behaviour towards Hall was scrupulous.

I don't know why Maschler chose me to write *The History of the National Theatre*. I had previously published two well-reviewed but meanly selling theatre books, and was engaged on a third. I was the theatre critic for *The Listener* and the chairman of a fringe theatre, the Bush. Maschler's decision was a reasonable one—but not obvious; and I later discovered that I must have been second or third on his list, perhaps lower down. Benedict Nightingale was one critic who turned the book down, distrusting the hassle involved, and there must have been others—Richard Findlater, Irving Wardle, Philip Oakes, all more likely candidates. In my dark moments, for Hall is not the only one to suffer (as he says) from bouts of paranoia, I sometimes wondered if I had not been chosen as the most vulnerable of the bunch, a modestly paid freelancer on a small circulation weekly, without the resources of *The Times* to back me up and unable even to pay for advice from a libel lawyer if things should turn rough. But the range, on reflection, may not have been so great, for many journalists had already taken sides on the issues involved. Kenneth Tynan was ruled out as part of the Olivier regime, whereas John Higgins of *The Times* was too pro-Hall. In Fleet Street, there were pro- and anti-Hall factions, pro- and anti-arts subsidies, pro- and anti-the National Theatre. My stances were less well-known, for they barely existed. My writings indicated that I was 'pro-Hall' (although I had never met him) and also an admirer of Olivier.

At all events, I was offered the job and accepted willingly, receiving a polite note from Hall, congratulating me on being chosen to write the 'authorised' National Theatre history. The inverted commas were his. There was only one fly in the ointment. The original agreement between Tomalin and Chandos was couched in loose gentlemanly terms: in return for 'special access' to the National Theatre, the National Theatre Board wanted to read the manuscript before publication and comment on its contents. But nobody knew what was meant by special access. My view was that an 'authorised' history, with or without inverted commas, required special access to minutes and budgets. The National Theatre Board under Lord Rayne disagreed, although they offered access in other ways, mainly through interviews with National Theatre spokesmen. It wasn't a satisfactory alternative, but the span of theatre history was so great and fascinating that I simply did not know at first whether it would be necessary to delve into the minutiae of Board decisions during the 1970s.

But the mid-1970s turned out to be a critical period for the National Theatre, transforming it from a radical cause to an establishment bunker. Charges and counter-charges flew to and fro—between the Hall and

Olivier factions, between the nationals and their rivals among commercial and less well-subsidised managements, between the Arts Council and those who, in Sir Roy Shaw's words, wanted to bite the hand that fed them, between the National Theatre Board, the South Bank Board (responsible for the building), the architects, designers and contractors, and the government. The simplest question took on machiavellian proportions. Had the contractors warned the National Theatre Board that the new building wouldn't be ready for the Royal deadline in 1975? Some contractors said that they had, Hall and the National Theatre Board insisted that they hadn't. Who was to blame for the delays? The lazy workforce, the South Bank Board for not pushing them along, Parliament for imposing a ceiling price on the building which was always unrealistic, plain lack of co-operation all round?

The truth of the various assertions could not be assessed without access to minutes and budgets, and so I returned to the National Theatre Board, asking for 'limited access'—that is, not the freedom to roam at will through confidential documents but the chance to check on particular points. This, too, was refused. The dangerous if farcical situation arose whereby the various versions of certain events were all hotly challenged, with the participants threatening legal action if their views were not the ones expressed. And I was continually being fed with information which the National Theatre Board regarded as confidential—such as the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Report on the workings of the National Theatre, extracts from minutes intended to prove the strength of one argument or another, grass-roots gossip sometimes backed by checkable facts. Accordingly, I decided to write a draft of the book, containing this material, and show it to the National Theatre Board, which could comment and offer corrections, prior to publication. At first, there was a deafening silence from the National Theatre Board, but then a furious row developed, which will have to be described in a later article.

Tomalin may have enjoyed such situations, but I hated it, for Tomalin's instinct that this story was a modern parable seemed increasingly to be right. Oh, it was not a question of the delays and dithering, for the pendulum swing between freedom and control, of high ideals tripping on banana skins—but of something more insidious, the unnecessary secrecy, the underlying mistrust all round, the simmering paranoia within Britain itself.

# A LEGISLATIVE NASTY

## by Stanley Alderson

WHAT is the one capital of an industrialised country in which man or woman can wander at will at any time of the day or night without fear of being mugged or sexually assaulted? The answer is Tokyo.

What is the corollary? In Japan 'Photographs of nude women trussed up in ropes appear regularly in mass circulation newspapers; torture scenes are common on television, even in children's programmes; glossy, poster-sized pictures of naked pre-pubescent girls are on display in the main shopping-streets; sado-masochistic pornography is perused quite openly by a large number of men on their way to work on the subway.'[1]

It is true that in Japan, though random killings are rare, 'families wiped out by mothers or fathers going berserk are not.'[2] But such events are so unrelated to the violence in popular culture that they are unlikely to be attributable to it. Rather the berserk killings, the violence in popular culture and the violence in carnivals and masquerades are all compensations for a formal social life which does not even allow the sublimation of violent urges in verbal aggression.

Though it is unsafe to apply lessons from one culture directly to another, the fact that the least violent industrialised country is the one that most exposes children to sadistic pornography must be allowed some bearing on Graham Bright's Video Recordings Act. The evidence is irrefutable that vicarious violence, including vicarious violence of a sadistic nature, can be an alternative to violence in real life. If you ban sadistic pornography, you may avoid stimulating one person's violence but you will deprive another person of a substitute for violence.

Mere personal observation suggests that in western culture violent videos, like violent stories, may have either healthy or unhealthy effects on children as on adults. They may provide a release for emotions children already have. Or they may stimulate in children anxiety and sadism that lead to neurosis, psychosomatic disease and indeed violence.

Though the same videos or stories may have different effects on different children, one can recognise those that are likely to do more harm than good—recognise them more easily than one can define them. Hans Andersen, despite or because of the amorality of his heroes, is healthy. Grimm is unhealthy. So are some stories read to children in Christian Sunday schools: two terrified children see a car with their mother in it slipping to the edge of a cliff; they pray to God for help and it stops on the brink.

The most unhealthy stories and videos are those that take place in familiar environments and involve ordinary children: their audiences lose the protection of 'It's only a story' or 'It's only a film'. Much depends too on who is responsible for violence: the private execution of Milady by the heroes of *The Three Musketeers* is unhealthy reading for children.

There is little doubt that both horror comics and video nasties do harm, at least to some children, though it is questionable whether they do more harm than Grimm's description of pigeons pecking out the eyes of the ugly sisters in Cinderella. Videos are not necessarily worse because they are visual. What is left to the child's imagination can be even more disturbing.

Nonetheless I sympathise with those MPs who watched video nasties in the course of duty and were distressed by them. I also sympathised with the wordly Fleet Street editor into whose office I chanced to walk years ago as he was reading horror comics in order to write a leader on them. He looked up and said: 'One couldn't possibly let children read these things. The trouble is we believe in freedom of the press.' In the event society has coped with horror comics without threatening the freedom of the press.

My own judgment or prejudice is such that, rather than behave as the Japanese do, I should like to protect children from Grimm, Christian Sunday-school stories, horror comics and video nasties. The impossibility of rational and comprehensive censorship is illustrated by the fact that Mary Whitehouse would probably not want to ban the Christian Sunday-school stories and might not want to ban Grimm.

Rational and comprehensive censorship would be impossible even if no one wished to ban anything but porn. But of course the strongest motives for censorship are political. Create powers to ban what is pornographic and it is inevitable that they will be used to ban what is political. Mary Whitehouse wanted to ban *The Day After* on the ground that it contained violence. The journal *Oz* was successfully prosecuted for obscenity when the Establishment was manifestly concerned about its political content.

This is what can happen under the law and with the publicity of a free press. If a Government can censor matter, the public does not even know what has been banned. There is nothing to prevent a Government banning whatever it dislikes.

Unlike censored political matter, censored pornography will find its way on to the black market. Censorship will be the stamp of excellence of a video nasty: it will increase the demand for it and its price. The Home Office knows this.

Whether or not we have censorship, there will therefore be children of irresponsible parents who see video nasties, just as there are already children of irresponsible parents who read Grimm, Christian Sunday-school stories and horror comics.

It is reasonable to have all videos submitted for classification to an independent voluntary body such as the British Board of Film Censors and to have a category which means in effect 'Not fit for human consumption'. It can be made a crime to sell videos in this category anywhere except in restricted outlets such as sex shops and a crime to sell them to children. Admittedly the category of 'Unfit for human consumption' will give them a stamp of excellence, but they will not have the glamour of

illegality. The sensible though unthinkable thing would be to sell them in drab music-less State shops: that would take the glamour out of them as State brothels take the glamour out of prostitution.

Leaving video nasties uncensored does not mean there will be no legal restrictions on their sale. It is perfectly legal to show soft-porn films, those in the category 18R, to adults in licensed cinema clubs and in the rear of sex shops. Despite this David Mellor, a junior Home Office Minister, said in Committee that he suspected the *sale* of many 18R videos would be illegal under the 1959 Obscene Publications Act. It goes without saying that the Act would cover hard-porn videos. Unlike censorship, prosecution is subject to law and is public. This restricts, if it does not entirely prevent, the political perversion of powers designed to suppress pornography.

The urge for censorship, unlike the urge for sadism, seems not to be satisfied vicariously. On the contrary, the mere thought of exercising the powers in the Video Recordings Bill stimulated in the present Government the desire for more. Leon Brittan publicly endorsed an amendment introduced by Sir Bernard Braine which would have banned the sale of all 18R (soft-porn) cassettes. Margaret Thatcher, who it will be recalled recommended Mary Whitehouse for the CBE, exerted behind-the-scenes pressure on members of the Standing Committee considering the Bill to support the amendment.

Until 1984 the argument had been that, though one could not and indeed should not control what people did in their own homes, one could and indeed should control what was done in public places. Suddenly it was being argued that it was wrong not to control in the home, where there might be an exposed child, what was controlled in public places.

In the event the amendment was rejected by 11 votes to 5, half the twelve Conservative members on the Committee, including the Bill's sponsor Graham Bright, voting against it. Some of the arguments against the amendment were that it was an attack on civil liberties, that what happens in the home is a matter for the owners or occupiers, and that it would create a black market in banned videos. Every one of these arguments applied just as much to the Bill itself as to the rejected amendment.

They applied also to another amendment introduced by Sir Bernard Braine, and passed without a division by way of a compromise with the Government, which instructs the censor to determine whether 18R videos are suitable for 'viewing in the home'. This amendment illustrates the danger of having censorship in the hands of a statutory body which will almost inevitably take a lead from the Government. Its ultimate effect may be to undo the rejection of the more extreme Braine amendment and effectively to ban the legal sale of all sort porn, thereby creating a black market in it.

Since the Video Recordings Act does not itself define what is to be censored, there is nothing in it to prevent its use to ban soft porn or, for that matter, *Tom and Jerry*. (One MP did seriously suggest that *Tom and*

*Jerry* should be banned from television because of its aggressiveness.) The rejection of the more extreme Braine amendment at least makes it clear to the judges, to whom it must shortly fall to interpret the Act, that it was not Parliament's intention to ban the sale of soft porn as such. But it is not clear how the matter can be tested in the courts when it is a crime *per se* to sell a video banned from sale by the censor: this is the difference between law and censorship. Nor can one have confidence in the judges when film censorship was introduced in this country by the judges' interpretation of an Act of 1909 intended only to ensure that cinemas had fire precautions.

The certainty that the Act will lead to political censorship, the certainty that the sale of hard-porn videos is illegal under the 1959 Obscene Publications Act, the certainty that neither law nor censorship will prevent a hard-porn black market which will consume the time of an overworked police force and increase corruption in their ranks, and the problematical nature of the harmful effects of hard porn—these are surely sufficient reasons why Parliament should have rejected the Bill. There is, however, one more.

Though the Act does not say who will classify videos, in practice the responsibility is being given to the British Board of Film Censors. This is to say that the BBFC will cease to be voluntary and independent and will become a statutory body. Perhaps because it has been short of work recently and could do with the money, the BBFC appears willing to accept this transformation in its character. Thus video nasties are to be made a pretext for overthrowing a voluntary system of film censorship which has stood the test of time.

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NOTES:

1. Ian Buruma, *A Japanese Mirror: Heroes and Villains of Japanese Culture*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1984, p. 220.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

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[Stanley Alderson is a freelance writer whose publications include *Britain in the Sixties: Housing* (Penguin Special, 1962) and *Yea or Nay? Referenda in the United Kingdom* (Cassell, 1975).]

# NAIVE ART SHOWS IN LONDON

## by Michael Leech

THE curious world of the painter of naïve subjects is revealed in a pair of shows seen in London this summer. *New Frontiers of Naïve Art in Europe* was seen at the Royal Festival Hall and *Naïfspeak* (The Best of British Painters in 1984) at the Barbican as part of the City of London Festival. Both were large shows with a number of artists represented, but I have to confess to a propensity to admiring the first more than the second. The shows were both mounted by RONA (Register of Naïve Artists) and this organisation seems to be composed of four people—it was founded in 1978 by Stanley Harries with 'the aim of discovering British naïve painters and encouraging a positive public awareness regarding the newly emergent frontiers of naïve art in Britain'. This 'meeting place for those extraordinary, uninhibited, but often ignored Naïve artists who express themselves with true originality' (to quote RONA again—they seem to believe in presenting a collective viewpoint, and in the catalogue the useful introduction is unfortunately not individually credited) maintains a space at St. Katherine's Dock in London and works with the British Council on organising exhibitions abroad. They also encourage publications on naïve art, and a current tome on show at the exhibitions is the *World Encyclopedia of Naïve Art*, which you will be pleased to know since it is so expensive (£47.50, Frederick Muller) will also bring you free membership of RONA if you buy the book through them.

The shows have obviously taken a good deal of pulling together with some 22 painters in the Barbican show and almost 450 works in the Festival Hall. I went to the Hall on a Sunday afternoon for my first visit, taking a professor from France. She has always had an interest in naïve art, especially coming from Brittany where there is still a strong tradition of peasant forms. What impressed her most of all, however, was the atmosphere of a British Sunday afternoon out—Festival Hall is quite the antithesis of what visitors expect of us; a trio playing sentimental melodies to diners and drinkers, families wandering around the large under-theatre space and strolling round not one but two art exhibitions —both free. It was sad to point out that despite the flamboyant gestures of the Greater London Council (a current project on the terrace outside was an exhibition room in the shape of a giant candled cake to portray 95 years of the LCC and 21 of the GLC) all this will probably be gone by next summer when the council presumably won't be around to encourage such use of its valuable spaces. But—to the show.

It is set out on the main floor on a series of grey-green hessian panels and features six countries with the largest number of works coming from Yugoslavia. This country seems to have made almost an industry of the form, and there are examples of all of the expected kinds from lurid paintings on glass by Mijo Kovacic (137 is of a man with two boys, bigger

and more grotesque than a Breughel; 138 entitled *Winter* shows houses under a dark sky with venomous puffs of cloud) to endearing primitives of strange figures in contorted postures. Some are precise architectural studies; others bear the stamp of a curious harsh cruelty such as Ivan Generalic's *Crucified Rooster,* another oil on glass work; yet others seem to show origins in such painters as Bosch.

Somehow the works of Hungarian and Romanian artists—and perhaps most of all the lively Greeks—seem most genuinely rooted. Again there are the oil on glass fanciers, producing brilliant shoeshine effects, but also many original talents such as the sugary sherbert colourings of Gheorghe Babet (193 and 194) and the near-surrealistic trees in Maria Mihut's *In The Field.* Slobodan Kesic shows in his work that removed doll-like effect that so charms and intrigues with certain painters. In the Hungarian section there is a selection of naïve sculptures—they reminded me intensely of the naïve workers of the USA, but in all probability that shows a line of descent via immigration. Here there is a real tang of originality—ingenuous yet very real, as in the compelling *Hen-Yard* by András Süli (46). The Hungarians are still close to peasant roots and, unlike most of the other countries, artists are older, with several now dead, so presumably they were in closer touch with traditions and rural subjects. Only in Poland are other older artists shown—here there are pictures as solid as tea-trays often covered with marmalade-sticky glazes. The Poles seem to like texture—hats for example are painted so that you can almost feel the straw. The lighting effects are often remarkable—*Summer Night* by Bazyli Albiczuk (217) for example, or the garden of flowers straight out of a seed-merchant's dream entitled *June Morning* by the same artist. Some of the most primitive in terms of colour and shapes are the most arresting, and the frames (which are sometimes almost as important as the subject throughout the show) are often included in the painting. I paused at 252—*Miner in the Forest* by Teofil Ociepka for it had all the look of an illustration (quite a few of the works from all countries seem to fall into an awkward book-illustration sort of school) from a fantasy novel.

I've left the British for last because I have to confess that in both shows they seemed to be uncomfortable. Not all of them—Mark Baring's works are intriguingly fresh and use form well, as in the spidery shape of men with rods in *Fishing on the Pier;* and in Cleveland Brown's *The Hunt*—but then he is from Jamaica and spent his first 19 years in an exotic land. At the Barbican the big bowed shape of the gallery didn't lend itself so well as the arranged screens at the Festival Hall, and I had a feeling of claustrophobia. Many of the same painters are to be seen in both shows, and it's interesting that some of the more unusual British artists are from other European countries, having settled here. The exhibitions certainly show a lively and continued interest in naïve art, but I'm not convinced that they show the establishment of many New Frontiers.

# QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

## by David Fingleton

GLYNDEBOURNE FESTIVAL: 50th ANNIVERSARY ALBUM. Historic recordings from Glyndebourne Productions 1934-1963 (3 Records) EMI SLS 2900233.
MOZART. *Don Giovanni.* Glyndebourne Chorus and London Philharmonic Orchestra/Bernard Haitink. (3 Records) EMI SLS 1436653.
VERDI. *Otello.* English National Opera Chorus and Orchestra/Mark Elder. (2 records) EMI SLS 1436053.
VERDI. *Rigoletto.* English National Opera Chorus and Orchestra/Mark Elder. (2 records) EMI SLS 2700323.
BIZET. *Carmen.* French National Orchestra/Lorin Maazel. (3 records) Erato (Conifer) NUM 751133.
THOMAS. *Hamlet.* Welsh National Opera Chorus and Orchestra/Richard Bonynge. (3 records) Decca 410 184-1DH3.

UNDOUBTEDLY the major musical event of the summer has been the golden jubilee of Glyndebourne Festival Opera. Few can have imagined when that remarkable English eccentric, John Christie, first opened his purpose-built private opera house to the paying public in May 1934 that the production and performance of opera in this country, and, through Glyndebourne's example, throughout the world would be revolutionised; but it was. For Christie, the former Eton schoolmaster and wealthy Sussex landowner, spurred on by the words of his wife, Audrey Mildmay, formerly a soprano with the Carl Rosa Opera, 'we must do the thing properly', set standards at Glyndebourne which from the outset were unprecedented. Helped immeasurably by the flight from Germany of the conductor Fritz Busch and producer Carl Ebert, neither of whom could continue to work under the Hitler regime in Germany, and beginning with Mozart's three great Da Ponte operas, Glyndebourne proceeded to establish an integrity and authenticity in the performance of Mozart's operas that have seldom, if ever, been bettered over the ensuing half century. Moreover, as Glyndebourne's repertory continued to develop and expand over the years that same care in preparation and performance has been maintained in the works of the many other composers, from pre-classical to contemporary, whose operas have been performed there.

Happily the jubilee has been celebrated not only at Glyndebourne, where a truly vintage season of Mozart's *Le Nozze di Figaro* and *Così fan tutte,* Monteverdi's *L'Incoronazione di Poppea,* Richard Strauss's *Arabella,* and Benjamin Britten's *A Midsummer Night's Dream* has just ended, but also, to our enduring delight, on record. The two sets issued by EMI at the beginning of the summer are both indispensable to any opera-lover's record collection, guaranteed to bring joy and admiration whenever they are placed. First comes a magnificent three-record 50th Anniversary Album which traces Glyndebourne's history from the very outset, for, happily for posterity, the H.M.V. company lost no time in committing Glyndebourne's initial Mozart productions to disc. Thus we can hear on these records just what it was about those performances of *Figaro, Così,* and *Don Giovanni* in 1934 and 1935 that so thrilled the

first Glyndebourne audiences. What it was, first and foremost, was undoubtedly the magnificent conducting of Fritz Busch, bristling with energy, authenticity and affection, despite his use of a piano rather than a harpsichord for the continuo passages, and drawing truly superb playing from the Festival Orchestra, as well as inspired, gripping singing from the casts.

Here we can enjoy substantial excerpts from all three operas, with Willi Domgraf-Fassbaender and Audrey Mildmay gloriously right as Figaro and Susanna, Roy Henderson and Aulikki Rautawaara a splendid Count and Countess, Luise Helletsgruber and Iña Souez singing exquisitely as Fiordiligi and Dorabella, with Heddle Nash a most mellifluous Ferrando, and some of these again in *Don Giovanni,* plus John Brownlee's resplendent Don and Salvatore Baccaloni's unrivalled Leporello. Amongst other glories in this anthology are Britten's *The Rape of Lucretia,* recorded in 1946 and conducted by Reginald Goddall, Kathleen Ferrier singing 'Deh, placatevi' from Gluck's *Orfeo ed Euridice* in 1947, and Sena Jurinac's earliest Glyndebourne performances in *Così* and *Idomeneo* at the beginning of the 1950s. Then comes a selection of Rossini recordings — another Glyndebourne revolution — superlatively conducted by Vittorio Gui, with the young Sesto Bruscantini, Marina de Gabarain, Juan Oncina, Sari Barabas, Luigi Alva, and Ian Wallace, outstanding amongst the casts of *La Cenerentola, Le Comte Ory,* and *Il Barbiere di Siviglia.* Finally comes the great final duet from Monteverdi's *Poppea,* ravishingly sung by Magda Laszlo and Richard Lewis, conducted admirably by Sir John Pritchard, this, in 1963, ushering in Glyndebourne's baroque revival under the aegis of Raymond Leppard, and the classic 1955 recording of Mozart's *Figaro,* conducted by Gui, and with Jurinac, Bruscantini, and the glorious young voice of Graziella Sciutti heading an all-star cast. What riches indeed are here—on no account fail to sample them.

Contemporary Glyndebourne is no less worthily celebrated by EMI's other anniversary release, the recording of last year's revival of Sir Peter Hall's magnificent production of *Don Giovanni,* quite brilliantly conducted by Glyndebourne's present Music Director, Bernard Haitink. Thanks to Haitink and the superlative playing he draws from the London Philharmonic, as well as to the immensely committed and intelligent cast, this recording really does bring into the sitting room much of the drama of a performance on stage, greatly assisted by the splendid clarity and balance of EMI's digital recording, a tribute to the skill of its producer, John Fraser. The cast is headed by Thomas Allen's truly remarkable Don: he is surely one of the great dramatic baritones of our day—a ravishing voice allied to unerring stage sense. Leporello is admirably taken by Richard Van Allan, the American sopranos Carol Vaness and Maria Ewing are splendid as Anna and Elvira, whilst our own Keith Lewis, Elizabeth Gale and John Rawnsley all perform impressively as Ottavio, Zerlina and Masetto. Once again, no opera-lover will want to be without this recording.

Another British operatic achievement on a scale approaching that of Glyndebourne has been the ever-increasing quality of performance and production offered by English National Opera at the London Coliseum since the company moved there from Sadler's Wells Theatre at the end of the 1960s. That there is now nothing second-rate or second-best about this company was acknowledged by their triumphant tour of the United States this summer, culminating in their tumultuous reception by full houses at the New York Metropolitan. Thanks to the Peter Moores Foundation, whose generosity has made an increasing number of recordings possible over the past decade, this is something that, once again, the record collector can also appreciate at home. EMI's two latest releases in their ENO series represent the very best of the company's work in the Verdi repertory.

Both *Otello* and *Rigoletto* had the benefit of thoroughly intelligent and positive productions by Jonathan Miller—his New York 'mafia' *Rigoletto* being one of ENO's recent triumphs at 'The Met'—as well as admirably incisive, sensitively musical conducting by the company's Music Director, Mark Elder. *Otello* was recorded 'live' on stage at the Coliseum, whereas *Rigoletto* was made in the recording studio, but both achieve a similarly high level of dramatic voltage and give equal pleasure. *Otello* has Charles Craig, totally belying his age of over 60, quite superb in the title role, with Neil Howlett remarkably powerful and convincing as Iago. One of our most exciting young sopranos, Rosalind Plowright, contributes a beautifully sung and, in the final scene, deeply moving Desdemona, and Andrew Porter's lucid, very musical translation comes across with great vividness and power. The recording is highly satisfactory, the audience commendably silent, and the whole set yields very considerable rewards.

No less satisfying is ENO's recording of Rigoletto, this in a skilful 'modernised' translation by James Fenton which may produce an occasional jarring note if you have not had the benefit of seeing Miller's production on stage. Elder again conducts and the title role is confidently and persuasively taken by John Rawnsley, with Arthur Davies a golden-toned, vocally seductive Duke. Another of our highly promising young sopranos, Helen Field, sings superbly as Gilda—her 'Caro Nome', here 'Dearest name of my first love', would be a joy to listen to in any language. The rest of the cast, virtually all of them company members, give an impressive show of strength, and neither the choral singing nor orchestral playing leave anything to be desired. This is truly national opera given at an international level, and as such gives enormous pleasure.

A treat in store for opera-lovers this autumn will undoubtedly be Francesco Rosi's stunningly beautiful and exciting film of Bizet's *Carmen*, made on location in the mountains of Ronda and conveying a quite extraordinary power and authenticity: this is a *Carmen* in which you will totally believe and should on no account miss. As a foretaste of the film the recording is already available from Conifer and is an admirable

one—on its own terms, as well as being a vivid soundtrack with no dearth of sound effects. This *Carmen* is splendidly, surprisingly idiomatically conducted by Lorin Maazel, and in the title role has the remarkable Julia Migenes Johnson who seems able to combine an operatic with a popular musical career with equal success in both fields. She herself admits that her voice could not successfully support the role in the opera house, but on this recording, as of course in the film, her performance has a dramatic thrust and sexual power that would be difficult to rival. Her Don José is the eternally impressive Placido Domingo, and Ruggero Raimondi supplies a richly voiced, if dramatically rather inert, Escamillo. Only Faith Esham's Micaela disappoints: far too small a voice for the role, this was clearly visual, rather than vocal, casting. Taken as a whole, however, this issue provides much more than a foretaste, or souvenir, of the film: it is a thoroughly rewarding recording of Bizet's opera and fully deserves to be bought and listened to as such.

As an alternative to France's best-known and best-loved opera you might try another 19th century French composer's operatic treatment of one of Britain's best-known and best-loved plays. Ambroise Thomas' *Hamlet,* with a libretto by Michel Carré and Jules Barbier, was first performed in Paris in 1868 and after initial success has been little heard since the Franco-Prussian war, either inside or outside France, though there have been recent successful revivals both at San Diego and the Buxton Festival. One disadvantage for British audiences has been the libretto, based on Dumas père's 'treatment' of Shakespeare's play, which had the opera end with the ghost of Claudius proclaiming Hamlet king. Happily Richard Bonynge, the conductor of this fine first recording, has changed all that by using an alternative ending which Thomas prepared for Covent Garden, where Hamlet, first wounded in the duel with Laertes, kills the King and then expires himself. In a recorded performance as vigorous and enthusiastic, as well as musical, as this one, I believe that even Shakespearean purists will respond to the opera's melodic strength. Bonynge clearly adores the work and treats it with great enthusiasm and respect, and his wife, Joan Sutherland manifestly has no less a love for it. Her Ophelia is clearly the opera's leading role, not least because it contains a mad scene of an excitement and beauty that rivals that of Lucia di Lammermoor. This Dame Joan despatches with an artistry and wizardry that not merely belies her 68th year but would be an astonishing achievement by a soprano half her age. Throughout the opera her singing and commitment are at the highest level, and her French diction is a massive improvement upon her earlier work. Her Hamlet is Sherrill Milnes, solid and dependable if a little lugubriously mature, and the rest of the cast offer strong, musicianly support. A further attraction of the recording is the excellent work done for it by the Chorus and Orchestra of Welsh National Opera whose clarion response demonstrates that they share their conductor's enthusiasm for the work. Do give it a try, I will be surprised if you regret it.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## FRANCIS PYM'S CONSERVATISM

*Francis Pym: The Politics of Consent.* Hamish Hamilton. £8.95.

To write a book, as distinct from an article or leader on politics, is to take a risk that by the time the book appears—however efficient and lucky the author is with typist or publisher—events will inevitably have dated it. And in politics, timing matters, as Francis Pym recognises. For we have a book here in which (some might say, happily) there is no mention of Messrs. Scargill or Livingstone; and in which indeed one of the few specific proposals is the need for 'an industrial strategy' built, it seems, on a partnership of Government, management and unions that has many of the echoes of the Wilson-Heath years in which the P.M., abetted by an endless supply of beer and sandwiches, played the part of paternalist managing director of G.B. Ltd. —and who stayed in office as long as, in the end, he said 'Yes' to the Trades Unions. Mr. Pym might tell us that he does not mean this but he does not spell out how different his plan is. He is at pains to deny that he is criticising the Prime Minister: 'What I am attacking are extremes'; his darts, he says, are 'aimed generally and not specifically. I do not believe the Government or Prime Minister to be extreme, and to say they were would be to fall victim myself to extremism' (p. 196). Yet in his first chapter after some pages of praise, he criticises the policy of 'black and white', 'the public tone of the Government and its operational style', and the taste for 'centralisation'. And alongside some very general and indeed woolly surveys of the world scene, of British relations with Russia and the EEC, and of late nineteenth-century party history (in which Joseph Chamberlain is cast as the villain) and party tradition, it is to 'monetarism' that he keeps recurring, and which he translates in the loosest sense not merely as control of the money supply but as the preference for economic answers to questions he sees as primarily social. But, as he admits, he is not an economist.

Despite its omissions (hardly any reference to the Labour Party, to the disastrous legacy bequeathed to Mrs. Thatcher by the Wilson-Callaghan Governments, or to the near-sacrosanct power in which they cushioned the unions), despite the striking absence of hard specific policies or analysis of issues, and despite the absence of that important aspect of Tory history, religious belief, this is a useful book, as a guide to the viewpoint of the 'wets'; and a 'wet', he says, stands for 'what everybody thinks.' It is ambitious, since he ranges from recent history to foreign policy; it faces the facts of unemployment, of social problems and their causes, and the challenges of the new technology (indeed, the only Minister Mr. Pym praises without reservation is Mr. Kenneth Baker). It is much less critical of the Government than Mr. Pym has become recently. He sees himself here as the keeper of the true Tory faith, the man in the middle of a party 'broad in its view, national in its interest, tolerant in its outlook, constructive in its debate, and unifying in its aim'. He is better at these Burkeian pieties than in the details, and for one who has held high office under four Prime Ministers over 21 years, it is the 'generalness' of the writing that is striking. The paternalism he admires would,

it seems, be pragmatism and interventionism in practice; dogma and Joe Chamberlain are out but there seems a lot of respect for Disraeli. Were he to revise the book now, he would, no doubt, be prompt to note that Mrs. Thatcher can compromise, as the settlement with the EEC indicates; and he might be willing to agree that, both in confrontation and in debate, you don't begin the round by the compromise. He might also want to recognise that the months ahead will be a test, yet again, of the Prime Minister's will. He does recognise that the Falklands issue 'transformed the fortunes of this Government'. In his party survey, he salutes Macmillan's radicalism disguised as squirearchy, Baldwin's pipe-smoking mastery of public opinion before there were polls, or Dizzy's opportunism. But does he not minimise Churchill's role and the importance of leadership? To him politics ought not to be about dogma. But at Presidential or Prime Ministerial level, the people respect and vote for or against beliefs, creeds—and courage. Politics is not just about crisis-management and compromise.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## COPS AND ROBBERS POLITICS

*The Politics of Law and Order.* Stuart A. Scheingold. Longman. £8.95.
*Local Democracies.* Margaret Bowman and William Hampton. Ingham. £13.95, paperback.

There is an uncanny resemblance in the arguments on law and order currently concerning Britain in the post-Brixton and Toxteth period and that discussed with fascinating insight in the American context by Stuart A. Scheingold. Clearly, law and order is more politicised in a country where so many offices are elective and the theme lies in its folk history to an extent far beyond our own. And yet, on reading Stuart A. Scheingold's *The Politics of Law and Order* it seems American responses to crime and punishment albeit in a more violent context are similar to our own.

Most fascinating to me as one who is in daily contact with the police is the Chapter on Police Subculture. The gap between the 'enforcer', the academic, the practitioner—and I am reinforced in my view that counsel should both prosecute and defend—and public response is frightening. To see crime in the overall context of society rather than cops and robbers, goodies and baddies and retribution is essential: but what do you think when your uniform gives you authority to kill and maim but makes you the main target of those who would kill and maim you? The tug between the administrator and the man on the beat: the insight into the reality that once arrested a suspect in our system is guilty until proved innocent contrary to all we say are two facets of this difficult book which I mention among many other penetrating points.

Rejecting a vulgar Marxist, traditional liberal and/or punative reaction the writer, stripped of sociological jargon and footnotes has a valid message which his last Chapter states clearly and concisely—unlike some of its predecessors.

Crime is the product of two conflicts, firstly over benefits of status, power and material well-being, and secondly values. Subcultures accentuate the problem through lack of communication. The responses are fragmented resulting in unsatisfactory compromises, not purposeful policy-making. The public is preoccupied with the punitive side and law and order is often a mask for certain overall conservative attitudes. None of this affects the incidence of crime but rhetoric is useful to politicians seeking office. The police sub-

culture has a distinctly punitive bias, whereas the courts with their legal subculture depend on compromise—in the USA this takes the form of plea bargaining: here we are a little more subtle.

However, the ever increasing number of prisoners produces a fiscal backlash to relieve prison overcrowding and alternatives are increasingly sought. The novel and key alternative going beyond this system is a concept of neighbourhood justice involving a departure from general rules to the decentralisation of policing and enforcement, sensitivity to cultural and socio-economic diversity, neighbourhood team policing and community network with the formal courts only used as a last resort. Perhaps there is something of a frontier tradition in the concept but it is not far removed from the ideal that Brixton and Toxteth ought to have elicited as a response to what no amount of political rhetoric will destroy, namely the fact that crime has no relationship to punishment and exists in different forms at all levels of society.

For those more interested in local democracy at work itself Margaret Bowman and William Hampton have produced a study that is both valuable and readable, concise and restricted to those countries with English roots. Local Democracies may well become standard reading for the student of the constitution.

PAUL ROSE

## ABORTION AND WOMEN'S CHOICE

*The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom.* Rosalind Pollack Petchesky. Longman, New York, 1984.

The world is becoming increasingly concerned with the politics of reproduction. Areas such as contraception, artificial insemination, *in vitro* fertilisation and the genetics of reproductive processes occupy an ever-rising segment of space and time in the media, and as further advances in a fast-developing field take place, this trend is likely to be accentuated.

This book dealing predominately with abortion is therefore timely. For in the reproductive arena no issue has stronger political overtones and no topic is more divisive and emotionally charged. And in the 1980's the arguments continue to flare—even in countries such as the USA where a liberal policy appeared to be firmly established some years ago. Nevertheless, when one scans the last two decades the global trend has definitely been towards liberalisation and by 1984 some 40% of the world's people were residing in countries which permitted abortion during the first three months of pregnancy without specifying a reason.

As outlined in the preface, this book has two major aims—to analyse and define women's need for safe, legal abortion and to utilise the analysis to discuss the social impact of the feminist concept of reproductive freedom. On both of these topics, Ms Petchesky makes notable contributions and although the text deals mainly with the situation in the USA, the treatise as a whole could well become mandatory reading in this field.

An early chapter considers the relationship of fertility and gender to social class. It discusses the role played by Malthusian bourgeois culture, and outlines the difficulties associated with disentangling 'moral' from 'economic' elements in this ideology. Contraception in the middle-class family in the 19th and early 20th century is also considered as is fertility control in the poor with illustrations particularly from Britain and France.

There follow two chapters dealing with pregnancy termination and the law, the first concerned with the criminalisation of abortion and the general dampening down of reproductive freedom in the 19th century, the second with the radical dawn *vis-à-vis* abortion spearheaded by the Scandinavian countries in the 1930's and followed by many other developed and developing nations in the 1960's and 1970's.

Social and economic conditions of women receiving abortions in the 1970's are next discussed again with special reference to the USA. The disadvantaged position of the working class, the poor and especially the blacks is emphasised and little hope for the future is provided as long as right-wing governments remain in office. Political problems associated with contraception are then reviewed discussing in turn the advantages and limitations of female sterilisation, the Pill and the IUD. The all-pervasive argument between those who would 'substitute' abortion for contraception and those who favour the latter course at virtually any price is systematically and critically summarised.

The final chapters are concerned with the sexual politics of the 1980's. Here the rise of the new Right in the USA with its strong anti-abortionist posture is graphically described as is the rightward drift in the legislative process as evidenced by decisions in the courts. The last topic to be dealt with is the feminist perspective on national and global issues. It is concluded that the need for abortion will not disappear, that as long as ultra-conservative governments remain in office, feminist activities designed to ensure reproductive freedom will of necessity be defensive and that a long road will have to be traversed before equality of opportunity of reproductive choice is established.

This book is erudite, thoughtfully written and provocative without being abrasive. Painstaking research has been conducted in its preparation and the end result is a remarkable synthesis of a highly complex area. All students of reproductive politics should read it: so also should anyone even peripherally concerned with world problems in the 1980's.

JOHN A. LORAINE

## ODE ON ACID ANAGRAM

*The Quest For Sherlock Holmes.* Owen Dudley Edwards. Penguin. £4.95.

Cage a moonbeam. Catch—or light a penny candle from—a falling star. Favourite Hibernian pastimes? *In consimili casu,* anatomise Sherlock Holmes. A broth of a trick for our Edina-Erinesque professor, to be sure. And it's the ingenuity he has, and the 'imperance' to do it. Mr. Owen Dudley Edwards has, in a riveting study, achieved the almost impossible. He has found something—many things—new to say and hazard about well-documented Doyle. The secret is that this is really a 'biography' of Doyle's cerebral processes—conscious, subconscious and unconscious—their development and extension into art. It is an inventive inventory of the furniture, a confidently tentative sketch map of the landscape, of imagination.

Beginning, Dylan-like, at the beginning, Mr. Edwards' opening sleight-of-pen is the conjuration of an Ignatius *fatuus,* sandwiched, all unsuspected these fifty-odd years, between Arthur and Conan Doyle. Mr. Edwards' starting-point, having cleared the ground by the demolition of such as stood thereon—i.e. previous writers on Doyle, is to see in a glass brightly. He spies alcohol and alcoholism. Drink is the key which unlocks part of the creative mystery. Doyle's life, from his birth in 1859 to the time his family quit Edinburgh in 1882-83, was dominated by his father, Charles Altamont Doyle's conquest by alcohol—

a scarring tragedy, 'Altamont in Caledon', uncivil servant of so-civilised Edinburgh declining into alcoholism, epilepsy and institutional death. *In Memoriam:* themes of alcohol, avarice and insanity. In another part of the creative forest we glimpse Doyle's mother, with her resort to historical mythology rather than contemporary piety as escape from impinging reality. *In Memoriam:* tales historical and chivalric. Sir Nigel, Brigadier Gerard *et al.* 'The Hero as Woman' is Mr. Edwards' rather bold head. So far, so simple. But Mr. Edwards' mind—and book—is far more ingenious, complicated and subtle. There is absolutely nothing of the noddy about him! With such minutiae as the naming of Holmes and Watson we are not really concerned, or can, comfortably accepting Doyle's avowals, dispense with Mr. Edwards' determinative postulates. But there are more important areas. Tracings of the formative influence of such Edinburgh environments as Sciennes Hill Place, for example; residence to age sixteen. Hodder and Stonyhurst bring in their excellent harvest for the winnowing, 'The Hero as Jesuit'. What else! Father Francis Cassidy, S.J. The Jesuit as Mother? Are the Yew Alley at Stonyhurst and the Thompsonian Hound the heavenly genesis of the hellish Baskervilles? In terms of discovery one of the most important contributions of the book is the centre stage figure of Dr. Bryan Charles Waller. Mr. Edwards has also found out a great deal about the eccentric Dr. Budd, who enlivens the pages of *Stark Munro* and is surely lurking behind Professor Challenger's Assyrian beard. Novel and important, too, is Mr. Edwards' neo-geography of the Holmesian world. Baker Street is cut up into pieces and redistributed about Edinburgh. Parts of Devonshire move to Lancashire. Previously undiscovered treasure is brought home from West Africa. Holmes is clearly established as a genetic polymorph. (What sex is that, do I hear?) That rather disagreeable corpse-flogger, Professor Robert Christison, of Edinburgh, is identified as one of the Moriarty radices, and Lord Justice John Francis Moriarty of the Irish Bench, celebrated by Maurice Healy in *The Old Munster Circuit,* is joyfully canvassed as original of the criminous Professor.

The book, its 380 cram-print pages notwithstanding, is a construct covering only the first twenty-eight years of Doyle's life. It is nevertheless a book in which it is easy to become totally and pleasurably absorbed. It is a work of investigative subtleties, inspired guesses and some wide marksmanship. There can be no denying that O.D.E. takes poetic licence a metre or two too far from time to time. To base the pursuit of Sir Charles Baskerville up the Yew Alley on the pursuit of pipe-smoking addicted young A.I.C.D. up the Stonyhurst Yew Alley by tolley-wielding Hound of Heaven, Father Kay, S.J., is to qualify as major scholar of the Edinburgh Speculative Society, manipulator-par-excellence of the twisted vastness of the might-have-been. It is fascinating —and revealing—to be made thus aware of the games psychologically oriented biographers play. Games any two can play. 'You know my methods,' says Holmes-Edwards in effect. 'Apply them.' Thus, Owen Dudley Edwards gives us initially ODE. Ha! Watson! Perceive. We are dealing with the son of poetically conscious parents. Hunt the slip-up (psychological). Still playing up, playing up, and playing the game . . . how about A.C.D. being AC/DC, as evidenced by the colonel in the corsets, Cochrane (no comment) in the *Korosko*? He dyed his hair, too! And AICD being an anagram of ACID? Not to mention ART(hur) in the blood. What we have here is the old analyst's couch, free-association, clue-chasing treasure hunt. And Mr. Edwards is away in pursuit of cross correspondences as feverish as any of those celebrated automatic writers Mesdames Verrall, Salter, Flemming, Coombe-Tennant, Lyttelton, Wilson and

Piper. Flexing his (considerable) intellectual muscles, pentathlonist Edwards puts on an impressive display of mental gymnastics—persuasive exercises on the parallel bars of coincidence, fine leaps of deduction and long-jumps of induction, much weight-lifting of body-building inference, and impressive spurts of tape-breasting inspiration. His record book is a rich and rewarding one, in which, oddly enough, I seem to find Arthur *Ignatius* Conan Doyle repaying a tribute to Owen Dudley Edwards.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

## ABERRANT AND DECADENT DILEMMAS

*The Memoirs of John Addington Symonds.* Edited and Introduced by Phyllis Grosskurth. Hutchinson. £14.95.

*The Decadent Dilemma.* R. K. R. Thornton. Edward Arnold. £19.50.

The nonconformism of John Addington Symonds was scarcely in line with that of his progenitors. An aberrant who disguised it down all his Victorian days, Rousseau-like in intent if not in result, he left sealed memoirs, now broken open. Edited, expectedly, by Toronto professor Phyllis Grosskurth, the book is an interesting, I would put it no higher than that, contribution to the literature of the whilom outcast: an item of what booksellers used, in times less liberated, grandiloquently to style *Curiosa.* It is nonetheless an unusual and provocative exemplar of pre-Freudian auto-abreaction. The wonder of it all is the sustained Symonds dualism. The psycho-aetiology is more obscure than the naïveté of the psychiatrically-orientated semi-sophisticate might wishfully think, but the material is all here for the enthusiastic amateur to have puzzle fun working it out. There is no question but a place awaits this volume on the 'Uranian' shelf: that is if you keep an appropriate shelf *sui generis.* Let those who will give thanks for how they were forefated in the chromosome lottery—and those who will not, breathe gratitude to the ameliorative *Zeitgeist.*

Symonds' ultimate position in literature has sifted down to a not especially distinguished one. He is customarily—though questionably—put in tandem with Pater as Ruskinian aesthete. But it is Symons and not Symonds who ranks among the so-labelled 'Decadents' of Dr. R. K. R. Thornton's excellent volume of aesthete exegesis, *The Decadent Dilemma.* Dr. Thornton essays the cataloguing of 'the roots of the brief blossoming of Decadence as a movement in late nineteenth-century England.' This object he achieves by an examination of the nature of the works of writers central to the movement —Ernest Dowson, Lionel Johnson, Arthur Symons, W. B. Yeats and Aubrey Beardsley. Sharp, incisive critical judgments and evaluations of the overall contribution of each of these five seminal aesthetes are set in a useful framework gathering together studies philologic and socio-literary of the climate of declension, the idea of decadence and how it was ordered in France, and the critical significance of the 'Decadence' label in England. The author's conclusion that 'attempts to define Decadence, like Decadence itself, must end in failure' is a shade dispiriting after the expenditure of 187 pages of splendid analysis directed to just that end—although one must perforce concur that a necessary flawing is art and part of so amorphous a movement. Blinking up from perusal, we find ourselves like Dowson's sleeping damsel 'In what dim nebulous lands?' This reviewer's dissenting conclusion is that Dr. Thornton's study of the literature of failure must be counted a signal success.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

## THE PROBLEM OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY

*Teenage Pregnancy in Britain.* Birth Control Trust. Judith Bury. 1984.

It is a truism to state that teenage pregnancy is an emotive theme. It raises much controversy; it is responsible for much moralising, for the wringing of hands and the shedding of crocodile tears. Fortunately we now know much more about it and we care better for youngsters facing this problem. Cassandras imbued with bigotry and replete with evangelical fervour do not care to be reminded that teenage pregnancy in Britain has been falling over the last decade.

This well-researched contribution by Dr. Bury is both topical and germane. The author has had much experience in the field and is also the mother of two daughters. She is wise to stress that the issue of teenage pregnancy pervades society, affecting parents, teachers, professionals and members of the public.

Early chapters deal with the scale of the problem in Britain and how most teenage pregnancies are resolved. She notes that sexual activity under the age of 16 has been increasing but that *pari passu* the availability of better contraceptive techniques has reduced the pregnancy rate. The eventual outcome is generally determined by circumstances rather than by the personality of the individual and here factors such as the likelihood of marriage, the support and attention given by boy friend and parents and the advice proffered by the doctor are important.

Risks in teenage pregnancies are next reviewed and it is concluded that these are probably greater than in older women. However, there has been some improvement recently, noticeably in antenatal care and abortion techniques. Amongst the causes of teenage pregnancy a decline in the age of the menarche, increasing sexual activity, the influence of the media, peer group pressure and changes in parental behaviour towards a more permissive stance are all considered. The point is made that the utilisation of contraceptive technology by teenagers has lagged behind the changing sexual mores in this age group. In the early 1960s there was virtually no contraceptive advice; by 1964 the first Brook Centre had made its appearance in Britain; not until 1968 and after much moral posturing did the Family Planning Association alter its rules to enable contraceptive advice to be offered to unmarried women. Even now contraceptive risk-taking in teenagers remains widespread; certain methods, particularly pessaries and the condom, have a poor image; others such as the Pill, although perceived as more convenient, have still to be obtained from a doctor who is often regarded as an autocratic figure, remote, censorious and parent-orientated.

The prevention of teenage pregnancy presents a difficult problem which Dr. Bury discusses in some detail. Attempts have been made to discourage premature sexual intercourse and to advise that contraception should be more widely used. Sex education is, of course, the touchstone here. But its development in schools in Britain has been slow; head teachers are often inimical to its genesis, claiming that curricula are already overcrowded and fearing parental opposition if they institute such courses.

The author concludes that we do not lack the knowledge to prevent teenage pregnancies or to reduce their hazards. But huge lacunae exist in the societal will to implement these important changes. The bigotry and obfuscation of the past must be jettisoned to be replaced by the more radical dawn of enlightenment and tolerance.

JOHN A. LORAINE

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**The Annual Register for 1983.** (Longman. £40). This is the 225th volume published annually since 1758 when it was first edited by Edmund Burke. The present editor is H. V. Hodson, assisted by Verena Hoffman. It provides an invaluable record of world events, covering most countries. Where there is nothing of particular importance to report, the country may be omitted. Bermuda is an example. The Editor has contributed a useful review, related particularly to the continuing strains between Russia and the West. 'The world needs some new thought —. It has set up a system of mutual deterrence, but it has not yet grasped the implications of that system's success'. He considers 'a start could be made with serious discussion of nuclear-free zones, beginning not with Europe but with the Antarctic and proceeding northwards'. The abiding role of the Annual Register is to provide material for the student of current affairs and the objective writing of history. As the Preface states 'it is the business of the Annual Register to record events, not to pass judgements on them or prognosticate their consequencies'. There are over eighty specialist contributors in a volume of more than 500 pages.

**The New Sociology of Modern Britain.** (Fontana Paperbacks. £4.95). First published in 1970, this extremely useful introduction to sociology, edited by Eric Butterworth and David Weir, is now reissued with new contributions and commentary. It is emphasised that the volume is not a formal text book, but a 'reader'—a source book which offers a point of entry to study, with papers by divers hands, from R. H. Tawney on *The Acquisitive Society* to *Social Conditions in Brixton*, extracted from Lord Scarman's *The Brixton Disorders*. The primal purpose is to provide material which can be used to answer crucial questions about the nature and state of British society. Although highly recommended to sociology students, these essays are particularly accessible to interested persons from other disciplines who will, from their perusal, acquire a tolerable grasp of the preoccupations and modes of sociology. (M.T.)

**Elizabethan and Jacobean Tragedies.** (Benn. Paperback £5.95). Professor Brian Gibbons has written a critical and comparative Introduction to this selection of six plays 'chosen to represent the tragic drama of the English Renaissance from about 1590 to about 1630.' They are Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*, Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*, Ben Jonson's *Sejanus His Fall*, Thomas Middleton's *Women Beware Women*, *The White Devil* by John Webster and John Ford's *'Tis Pity She's A Whore*. Professor Gibbons suggests reading alongside these plays Shakespeare's *Titus*, *Romeo*, *Caesar*, *Othello* and *Macbeth*. There is a companion anthology, also with an Introduction by Professor Gibbons, **Elizabethan and Jacobean Comedies.** (£5.95). That includes *The Old Wife's Tale*, *The Shoemakers' Holiday*, *Eastward Ho!*, *Bartholomew Fair*, *The Malcontent*, and *A Trick to Catch the Old One*.

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The centre of Nuneaton, George Eliot's native town, is in process of redevelopment, and a key site is available for a statue of the great Victorian novelist. Although George Eliot's major writing was done after she left Warwickshire, there is no doubt that a very large part of her inspiration derived from affectionate memories of her early life in the countryside of the heart of England. The George Eliot Fellowship feels that it is appropriate that the first-ever statue of George Eliot should be erected in Nuneaton. A target of £10,000 has been set for an appeal fund and the eminent Warwickshire sculptor, John Letts, will be commissioned to model a seated figure in cold cast bronze mounted on an inscribed plinth.

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# Contemporary Review

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## NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF EUROPE

by Filip Svetic

'THE danger of a world economic crisis is still a very real one despite the recovery of production. Unemployment is still rife. Rates of interest remain excessively high. Although the food situation has improved, famine is spreading in some parts of the world.' This is a brief definition of the current economic situation in the world as contained in the preambulae to what is known as the *Lisbon Declaration* adopted at an international conference organised by the European Council in the earlier part of this year in the Portuguese capital. To this one should add that Europe, together with other developed countries, has a crucial role in the resolution of the economic and social problems with which mankind is having to contend. This responsibility has its roots in European history and its close links with the South. It is for this reason that the following conclusion could be drawn from the first portion of the Lisbon document: There is growing awareness that the future of Europe and other industrialised countries depends on the future of the South and that 'stronger North-South relations and an expanded world market will accelerate economic growth in Europe and reduce unemployment. The strength of a global financial system, in which Europe would play a major role, is linked to the problems created by the developing countries' debts'.

There are no unknown elements in such statements and definitions of the world's economic relations. However, some slight differences in the approach to the resolution of the economic crisis are certainly noteworthy and so is the more elaborate conception of the role of Western Europe's relations with the underdeveloped South, dubbed in Lisbon as a 'new strategy for common development'. The best way to surmount the crisis at a time when the interdependence of the developed and developing world has been accepted as a reality is considered to be a resumption of the North-South dialogue. It is stated in the final portion of the Declaration's preambulae: 'We therefore call for a resumption of the North-South dialogue. We are convinced that without concerted European efforts it will not be possible to master the current lag in global talks and that it is our duty to create a genuinely global approach to constructive North-South relations'. What is more, certain supporters of the claim contained in the Declaration to the effect that 'we must not limit

our vision at a time when our focus must be a global one', consider the latter genuinely to reflect the spirit of the Lisbon meeting and its basic objective, namely encouraging a North-South dialogue with special stress on Europe's role within this process.

It was the basic intention of the European Council to organise an international conference on the subject 'North-South—the Role of Europe', attended by parliamentarians from 21 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Great Britain) as well as the foreign minister of India, Nerasinha Rao, as representative of the non-aligned countries, the chairman of the 'Group 77' of developing countries, Mexican ambassador to the UN, Muñoz Ledo, President of the independent international Commission for Development, Willy Brandt and representatives of some African countries and international organisations such as UNCTAD, the World Bank, OECD, the European Economic Community, the Commonwealth and finally the President of the Ministerial Council of the European Council, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, and some others.

In this context the agenda of the meeting included the following items: importance of North-South interdependence in world economic recovery, reforms of the international economy and negotiations on international financial co-operation and the problem of debts, development factors such as the world food situation, prices of basic raw materials, investment needs, demographic growth trends, the problems of natural resources and interdependence of development and disarmament. Bearing in mind this range of subjects the President of Portugal, Ramalho Eanes, defined the objective of this international gathering as the necessity to stimulate the now completely interrupted North-South negotiations, with special stress on the role played by the European West. This was considered from two aspects, that of one-time colonial powers and that of countries still having major interest in promoting co-operation with the underdeveloped part of the world. The President of the European Council, Karl Ahrens, substantiated this interest by putting the following question: 'Is it not time for the developing countries to be treated as real partners? For that matter, they have a collective share in world trade amounting to thirty per cent, while their share in world production is twenty per cent. Should we not now strive to remove the destructive consequences which would affect all of us if one or more countries should not be able to repay their debts?' He then supplied the answer: 'Only a massive transfer of resources to the South and changes in the direction of a more open and multilateral trade system would help us to weather the existing difficulties. Europe's economic future is inextricably linked to the development of the 'third world' and our own unemployment problems will never be resolved without an expansion of the world market... Our task here in Lisbon is to agree on the basic principles which will promote the political will to master the lag in North-South relations'.

The progress made in this direction can be judged by some of the proposals formulated in the Lisbon Declaration, as e.g. the one stating that 'the European countries should second the idea for negotiations to be conducted in two stages as suggested at the Non-aligned Summit in New Delhi in 1983 and at the ministerial meeting of the 'Group 77' of developing countries in Buenos Aires. The European countries should be prepared to continue detailed negotiations and to implement what has been agreed upon even if no global consensus can be reached on certain measures'. This stand is probably a concession to the non-aligned and developing countries whose familiar stands on world economic relations, the position of the underdeveloped world and arguments for starting global talks on development were elaborated in detail by Nerasinha Rao and Muñoz Ledo, who admitted that the developed countries of the European West appeared now to be more willing to engage in a dialogue with the South and the USA. In this context the Declaration likewise advocates more frequent informal meetings between leaders of the North and South, in order to discuss specific problems and also in order to lend more incentive to the negotiating process and help strengthen political will to find mutually advantageous solutions. The European Council, it goes on, should encourage regular exchange of views on a regional basis as well, while it also appeals to the East European countries to take a more active part in promoting the development of the 'third world'.

Analysts of international economic relations and of the role of the European West in promoting North-South co-operation will probably be particularly interested in the following paragraphs of the Declaration:

> — The European countries could well substantially increase their contributions to multilateral agencies such as FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, IDA and UNDP or alternatively they should increase bilateral aid. They must do their utmost to honour their international obligation to set aside 0.7 per cent of the gross national product for official assistance for development up to 1990 at the latest, or 0.15 per cent for the development of the world's most backward countries, as agreed upon at the special conference held in Paris in 1981;
>
> — The World Bank should have greater possibility for financing development projects in order to keep up with expansion requirements and possibilities in the 'third world'. In this context the countries of Europe must support the strengthening of the Bank's credit capacities by a substantial increase in its capital;
>
> — The countries of Europe must pool efforts in order to prevail upon the United States of America to rescind the decision to restrict its contribution to IDA, and in any case they should jointly strive to ensure a total of 12 billion dollars in the seventh supplementation of its funds;
>
> — Serious attention should be given to alleviating the debt problems of numerous developing countries. Their ability to tackle this crucial problem depends on improving their 'terms of trade', expanded exports to the industrial countries and bringing down rates of interest in the world;
>
> — The European countries should try to strengthen the role of SDR (Special Drawing Rights) as a real international reserve standard and work towards more regular allocations of SDR. What is more they should demand an amendment of the IMF Agreement enabling the distribution of SDR, giving greater attention to the requirements of the poorest developing countries;
>
> — In order to achieve more stable and more comprehensive solutions in dealing with the current shortcomings of the international financial system the countries of Europe should support the convention of a world conference on a reform of the international financial and monetary system. Such a conference,

however, would require careful preparation, while proposals should be studied by special groups of experts from both North and South;

— Admitting that trade revenue is of vital importance to the underdeveloped world, the countries of Europe should (a) oppose protection pressures, (b) cut down protectionist measures which are an additional burden to the developing countries, (c) honour the principles of multilateral trade and non-discrimination and (d) accord greater preferentials to the developing countries, especially the poorest of them;

— Export revenue derived from raw materials should be stabilised and increased by the adoption of a constructive approach in talks on international raw material agreements, seconding the accelerated implementation of UNCTAD's Integral Programme and Joint Fund for raw materials and striving to strengthen international mechanisms such as the compensatory financing of the IMF and the Stabex European Economic Community.

More detailed excerpts from the *Lisbon Declaration*, which has not been widely publicised, should enable the necessary analyses which such a document deserves. This is not because there have been no discussions at European level dealing with similar subjects or because similar stands have not been adopted, but because this is a more consistent document, presenting much more concise and substantive views on the part of the entire European West which undoubtedly has an important role in relations with the underdeveloped South. As Karl Ahrens stressed, the value of the Lisbon meeting is that it has for the first time engaged in discussions at such a level 'with' and not only 'about' the developing countries. True, neither the document nor the discussions were immune to the obsolescent idea that 'the rich are helping the poor', to seeking a way out of West European economic troubles at the cost of the 'third world' or exaggerated stress on human rights as an element which may also affect mutual economic relations. Nonetheless, the ultimate concept prevailed which might be summed up as the 'interdependence and mutual interests' of the developed European West and the underdeveloped world South. Obviously Europe has learned something from the economic crisis from which it has been finding it very hard to extricate itself, largely because of the waning presence on the markets of Europe of the debt and crisis-ridden developing countries as buyers. This has made them more inclined to co-operate, and virtually revive the North-South dialogue. If markets were open to the products of the developing countries, if they were helped to extricate themselves from their debts, and above all if protectionist barriers were removed, observers maintain that this would be the greatest contribution which developed Europe could make towards the desired trend.

There will soon be opportunities to attain this end, for it has been stated in the Lisbon Declaration that the application of its provisions should be systematically undertaken within the European Council. Finally, it is not hard to concur with the observation of the Declaration, namely that 'changes cannot be promoted without the right political measures'.

---

[Filip Svetic is a Political Commentator on Radio Zagreb.]

# THE WIDENING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN CAMPAIGN '84

**by David N. Thomas**

AMERICA is engaged in its fiftieth presidential election campaign. The administration selected this autumn will round out two hundred years of American national leadership under the United States Constitution which requires an election every four years. Over the course of two centuries presidential elections have been conducted on schedule, sometimes in the midst of world wars and economic depressions. One even occurred during the American Civil War in 1864. The electoral system set forth in the United States Constitution and implemented in 1788 has been one of the most stable features of American society.

For the twenty-eighth time an incumbent president is seeking re-election. Historically, incumbency has been an advantage. Of the twenty-seven campaigns in which a sitting president was nominated for a second term, two-thirds, or eighteen, resulted in the incumbent's victory, often by large margins. Because of the variety of executive functions and ceremonial activities reported by the media, an American President can often attract favourable attention from the electorate which enhances his electoral prospects. Moreover, the American presidency exudes an aura of regal splendour that is appealing even in a republic. The American people, therefore, have been reluctant to remove their chief executive except in unusual circumstances.

During the course of two hundred years of presidential politics there have been six distinctive circumstances that contributed to the defeat of nine incumbents. These were: political realignments; adverse economic conditions; a splintering of the president's party; an unconventional loss in the electoral college; the public's reaction to scandal and a diplomatic crisis. Two presidents, John Adams in 1800 and his son, John Quincy in 1828, were swept away by those apparently inexorable movements called Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy. In spite of their competence and patriotism, the two greatest members of the Adams dynasty could not withstand the realigning impact of social and political changes in early nineteenth century American life. A second factor in the loss of an incumbent's bid for re-election has been economic depression.

For over a hundred years after 1820 the United States regularly encountered financial crises leading to bad times in the economy. They occurred about every twenty years. Although no one could be properly blamed for those troubles, the two presidents in office at the time of their occurrence seemed to have been held responsible by the electorate. They were Martin Van Buren in 1840 and Herbert Hoover in 1932. Two presidents, Benjamin Harrison in 1892 and William Howard Taft in 1912 were defeated for re-election largely because of division with their parties caused by significant third party movements that drained off their normal support. Grover Cleveland in 1888 lost in the Electoral College

even though he had won a narrow majority of the popular votes. President Gerald Ford's defeat in 1976 was attributed in part to the public's reaction to the Watergate scandal. His successor, Jimmy Carter, was unable to win re-election four years later because of a number of problems that included the diplomatic crisis involving the hostages in Iran.

None of those six problems was encountered in the eighteen contests in which the incumbents were successful in winning re-election. Among the winners were America's six strong presidents by most reckoning: Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt actually won three re-election victories. The winners also included some of the so-called near-great presidents: Madison, Monroe, Theodore Roosevelt and Truman. Rounding out the list of victors were Grant, McKinley, Coolidge, Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson and Nixon. Some of them were not well regarded as American leaders. However basically distinguished, American presidents seeking re-election have been successful in the absence of unusually adverse conditions. It would be useful to examine Campaign '84 in the light of past presidential elections.

Campaign '84 is perhaps the most nearly polarised presidential contest of the post-World War II era. After 1945 the two major parties were centrist in most presidential election years. The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s generally accepted the main tenets of the New Deal, establishing what might be called an American version of the 'Butskellian' compromise that emerged at the same time in Great Britain where Socialists and Conservatives reached some agreements on public policy. After Eisenhower most presidential candidates of both major parties were generally regarded as moderates. Only Barry Goldwater on the right in 1964 and George McGovern on the left in 1972 were generally regarded as being on the fringe of their parties. Although once considered a politician on the far right, President Nixon later called himself a 'Keynesian' and took the lead in achieving *rapprochement* with Communist China. British and American national leadership remained centrist until the year 1979-1980 when Margaret Thatcher replaced the moderate Labourite, James Callaghan, as Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan defeated the southern Democrat President, Jimmy Carter. And just as Callaghan was being replaced in the early 1980s by one of the left-wing leaders of his party, so the leadership of the American Democratic party was moving away from the centre, coming more under the control of trade unionists, feminists and minorities who were becoming strongly united in their determination to defeat what they regarded as the nation's most conservative president since the Great Depression.

Long before the Democrats met in their quadrennial convention, the former Vice-President, Walter Mondale, was virtually assured of the presidential nomination largely because of the strong support of the big liberal organisations of trade unions, feminists and minorities. As a United States Senator before 1977, Mondale had been on the far left of congressional Democrats according to recognised ideological rating

groups. The convention at San Francisco achieved a degree of unity unprecedented in recent Democratic Party history. Delegates were possessed by an overwhelming sense of commitment to the defeat of Ronald Reagan whose personality hovered over their proceedings. British citizens familiar with the rhetoric of the Labour Party over the last several years would find a similarity between it and the philippics of the National Democratic Convention of 1984. In both countries the quality of political oratory on the left has perhaps been enhanced by an emotional aversion to the conservatism of Thatcher and Reagan.

The Democratic Demosthenes of the National Convention in 1984 was New York Governor, Mario Cuomo, whose opening speech was widely acclaimed as the greatest keynote address of recent years. It was not only an attack on the policies of the Reagan Administration but a sharp criticism of the social philosophy upon which they are based. The Cuomo thesis was reminiscent of a message earlier in 1984 by the Bishop of Liverpool, David Sheppard, in the Dimbleby Lecture presented on British television. In both cases the speakers emphasised the idea of a division in society between those living in material comfort and those who are not so fortunate. Reagan's frequent reference to a prosperous America as a City on a Hill, the Governor declared, points up the administration's insensitivity to the plight of the nation's poor. Reagan's policy of aiding the comfortable and ignoring the poor, he said, was a tale of two cities. Without any political reference, Bishop Sheppard emphasised a similar contrast in British society. Cuomo's impact on the Democrats was profound. The plight of the poor during the Reagan Administration is one of the central themes in the Democratic campaign to regain the White House. Its effectiveness in the midst of a period of economic recovery will be one of the tests in the Campaign of 1984.

American Labour Unions have for thirty years become increasingly allied with the National Democratic Party. Many of them have on occasion endorsed Democratic candidates for president. This year that identification is the closest in American history. One of Walter Mondale's earliest endorsements in 1983 came from the country's largest labour organisation, the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), the American counterpart of Britain's TUC. This was the first presidential endorsement ever made by an American labour organisation before the nomination of candidates. In San Francisco the presence of union members and their leaders was a significant feature of the national convention. About twenty per cent of the delegates were from trade unions. Over a quarter of Mondale's support in his first ballot nomination represented Labour Unions. This is the closest the Democratic Party has ever come to the level of union influence that is exerted over the British Labour Party whose leader currently is chosen by an electoral college forty per cent of which consists of union leaders. The impact of organised labour on the outcome of Campaign '84 could be of historic importance.

An even greater potential contribution to the Democratic campaign

this year could be made by women. Feminism, the organised movement to enlarge the role of women in American society by removing alleged barriers to professional achievement, is now an important force in American partisan politics. While some feminists are Repubicans, the vast majority of them are actively involved in the Democratic Party. Pursuant to party rules, approximately half of National Democratic Convention delegates are women. This year the Convention's presiding officer was Governor Martha Layne Collins of Kentucky. One of the important pledges made in the Democratic platform was strong party support for the Equal Rights Amendment. That is a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution that would bar discrimination based on sex. First submitted by Congress about twelve years ago, the ERA was ratified by most of the states. The ratification time limit expired, however, before the requisite number of states had ratified the proposal. In 1980, before expiration of the time limit, the ERA was an important issue in the campaign because while the Democrats strongly supported it, the Republicans, in a shift to the right, for the first time did not include support of the ratification in their platform. This year the feminists hope to renew the issue which will be intensified by the appearance of the nation's first female candidate for Vice-President on the Democratic Party ticket, Geraldine Ferraro. Democrats hope that the greater number of women voters will enhance their chances of victory in November.

A third group of American electors which always favours the Democrats is the black community. Because of its generally lower participation in the political process, however, the influence of blacks in election campaigns is normally limited. This year for the first time a popular Black leader has attracted enormous political attention. Reverend Jesse Jackson, heir to the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., was the first serious black presidential contender in American history. The enthusiasm engendered by the Jackson candidacy is yet another imponderable factor in Campaign '84.

In 1984 the Democratic Party's advantage of organised support by trade unions, feminists and minorities will be partly offset by a personally popular incumbent president seeking re-election amidst an economic recovery marked by lowering inflation and unemployment. Ronald Reagan has the additional advantages of a united party and the absence of a grave diplomatic crisis. Moreover, there seems to be no insurmountable tide of opposition threatening a sharp ideological change in national leadership. Finally, the electoral college of 1984 will be dominated by conservative members from the Sun Belt who will be probably drawn to the incumbent. By virtually every standard of predictability, therefore, Ronald Reagan is favoured to become America's nineteenth incumbent winning re-election. On the other hand, no standard of predictability has ever applied to American presidential politics which is dominated by one of the world's strongest two-party systems. In America, as in Great Britain, the opposition party stands ready to exploit every circumstance calculated to weaken and defeat an incumbent administration or govern-

ment.

As Campaign '84 enters its final phase before the balloting in November there are two points of Republican vulnerability upon which the Democrats appear to be placing their chief reliance. They could be described as clusters of familiar issues over which there has been partisan debate for many years. One of them is the nature of the threat of world communism and the other is fiscal and monetary policy. Under these general interrelated headings there have occurred unexpected developments during the Reagan presidency which the opposition will seek to exploit. Prospects for a Democratic victory could be determined by the outcome of the debate on these two controversies.

The focal point of this year's controversy over communism is Central America where the Republicans perceive dangers to Western Hemispheric security. One of the principal foreign policies of the Reagan Administration has been military aid for the enemies of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua which is allegedly supported and controlled by Russian and Cuban forces. Without sharing a sense of Communist danger, the Democrats charge that the President in any event is relying too much on military power and not enough on economic support that will improve the social conditions of the area. An autumn crisis in the region, some say, could affect the course of the campaign by placing the Administration on the defensive. Out of such a crisis could emerge public concern over Reagan's militaristic image and the danger of war. After decades of simmering beneath the surface of public policy debate, the issue of Communism in Latin America now threatens to emerge as a major issue in a presidential election campaign.

The most prominent confrontation between the two major parties in 1984 has come over the interrelated problems of federal allocations to defence and welfare on the one hand and taxation policy on the other. They will be among the most sharply debated controversies in the campaign. Reagan's critics charge that he has sacrificed the welfare of the poor in favour of needless spending at the Pentagon. Administration spokesmen reply that the increase in defence spending has been necessary to assure western freedoms in the face of continuing Communist aggression. Meanwhile, a reduction in personal and corporate taxes came to be the centrepiece of what some economists call supply side economics and journalists call Reaganomics. Accompanying the rise in military spending and the drop in taxation has been a steep rise in the yearly deficit of the federal budget. Democrats charge that administration tax policies have favoured the rich at the expense of the poor and middle class while Reaganomics has caused the deficits which threaten the future of the country. In his acceptance speech Mondale surprisingly called for an immediate increase in taxation in order to reduce the deficit. The President's defenders contend that Administration tax policies have contributed to an economic recovery and that the problem of the deficits should be solved by a constitutional amendment which would require a balanced budget each year. Sorting out these extraordinary partisan

claims and counterclaims will be the burden of the American voters in the autumn of 1984.

With an unusually large number of voters this year specific issues seem to be overshadowed by opposing popular perceptions of what might be called the American *zeitgeist* or, the prevailing moral, intellectual and cultural climate of the nation in the late twentieth century. To them ideology comes before party, personality or even principles. Campaign '84 may be one of the most ideologically charged contests in the history of presidential politics. There are millions of Americans with diametrically opposing views on the questions of where the country is and the direction in which it should be heading. Many feel that under Reagan America has abandoned its historic quest for social justice at home and abroad and is drifting backward toward a plutocracy in which the media will be suppressed, public education will be impaired, the environment will be hopelessly polluted and the masses of poor people will be rioting in the streets. Others are equally convinced that Reagan is attempting to stop the nation's drift toward confiscatory taxation, excessive federal domination of the economy, large permanent welfare rolls, increasing secularisation of society and steadily declining moral and ethical standards.

The intense ideological struggle between the President and his opposition is reflected by the unusual concern expressed in this campaign over the future composition of the United States Supreme Court. Because of the age of some of current justices, observers speculate that the next president will be able to make enough appointments to so change the composition of the Court as to alter prevailing constitutional law in the fields of abortion, civil rights, criminal justice and education. Since justices are appointed for life and because their decisions can be set aside only by the overwhelmingly difficult process of amending the constitution, Reagan's critics charge that his reactionary attitudes will be imposed upon future generations of Americans. Defenders of the President are equally persuaded that Supreme Court decisions over the last three decades have in fact created the national problem of abortion, added to the rising crime rates and lowered the nation's educational standards. To them a change in the direction of the Supreme Court decision is long overdue.

American historians tend to believe that because of the nature of mainstream politics in America few presidential elections have ever been real crossroads in nation's development. Both major parties, they say, have generally been centrist and selections of presidents have made little difference in the political and ideological direction of the country. New presidents have tended to accept the changes of their predecessors. However, Campaign '84 could be different. It will offer the American people one of their clearest ideological choices in United States history.

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[David Thomas is Professor of History at Oglethorpe University, USA.]

# POLICING THE PICKETS

## by Roger Geary

> It's like the riots . . . we just stood there behind our shields and were seen night after night to be passively taking the bricks and the bombs. It's only after you've been seen by the public to lose at one tactical level that you can escalate to the next level. It's a bit like ascending a tactical staircase; you have to be seen to be pushed up each step. You lose at one level so that you can justify going on to the next level in order to win.—(A Superintendent.)

SO far, the police have responded to the challenge posed by picketing miners with only some of the tactics at their disposal. Following what many Chief Constables regarded as a defeat during the 1972 coal strike, much thought was given to the problem of dealing with industrial disorder. The results of this rethink were made clear in a number of interviews I conducted with senior officers prior to the present dispute. The police, it seems, now have a series of escalating tactics which they can adopt in picketing situations.

As an initial measure efforts are often made to contact local employers and union officials in order to obtain information and to reduce tension. Sometimes these contacts have been used to prevent one side taking action that would undoubtedly provoke the other. For example, a Chief Superintendent told how he had prevented an employer from having the fenders of his delivery vans sharpened so that 'the strikers would cut their fingers off if they attempted to lift the rear wheels off the ground'! In another case the police negotiated an informal agreement between the pickets and their employer whereby the strikers were given free coal for their fires and an assurance that no coal would leave the colliery in return for allowing the free passage of other materials.

In an attempt to avoid provoking pickets most officers agreed that they would maintain only a token police presence on the picket lines. One said he would be careful to pick a physically small and 'even-tempered' man for this duty, while another thought that a single policewoman was ideal. These police officers would be encouraged at briefing sessions to be friendly with the pickets and to establish a degree of rapport; the idea is to 'humour rather than to aggravate'. Of course, this deliberate fraternalisation constitutes a subtle form of social control; as a Yorkshire NUM official pointed out 'while the lads are sharing sandwiches and joking with the bobby they're not stopping lorries'.

Liaison and token policing are preventive measures; when obstruction or violence occurs (most of the senior officers I spoke to said they would ignore mere verbal abuse) other tactics will probably be used.

In a small scale picketing situation involving a dozen or so people the police will often arrest as many strikers as is necessary to restore order. As several officers pointed out, the person in charge of the picketing is likely to be among those arrested. Someone else would then be invited to take charge of the situation and if disorder continued he would be arrested and so on. Of course, this policy of making arrests works very well in a

situation involving relatively small numbers where the entire picket-line can be removed if necessary. However, in mass picketing situations other, more sophisticated, tactics have to be considered.

Intelligence usually provides several hours, sometimes several days, warning of a mass picket and this time will be spent in preparing the police response. A senior officer will visit the site of the proposed picket in order to establish 'what points require protection', 'problems of getting the workforce in and out' and 'a high vantage point for observation and for CCTV' (Close Circuit Television). One described how, following such a site visit, a shingle path, which was thought to provide a possible source of missiles, was concreted over by management on police advice.

In addition to the physical layout, methods of entry into the premises and even working practices themselves may be modified or suspended. One frequent measure that senior officers mentioned was the provision of buses to transport workers through the picket-line, while in some cases employers were 'advised' to give their people 'a day off'.

The District Organiser of the union concerned would also be contacted in order to discover 'the intentions and number of pickets' likely to turn up. The law relating to picketing would be explained and a warning given that intimidation or violence would not be tolerated. Other organisational preparations would then be made. Surrounding forces would be warned that assistance may be required, sites for 'main' and 'forward' controls selected and the operations department contacted to arrange communications and the supply of staff. Officers to command the 'main' and 'forward' controls would be appointed as would a staff officer, a complaints officer (at the main 'charging' station), an administration officer, a press officer and a Police Federation representative. Arrangements for the charging and documentation (photographs and fingerprints) of prisoners would be made 'preferably at a station at least five miles from the scene' and other stations warned that they may be used as 'back-ups'. The Traffic Division will be asked to police the routes to the scene and to direct Police Support Units to designated parking places. Finally, all sector commanders and if possible all Inspectors and Sergeants will be briefed.

On the day of the mass picket the police will try to establish a presence before the strikers arrive in strength so that advantage can be taken of the local geography. In particular, most senior officers seemed anxious to avoid the kind of situation which developed at the Saltley Coke Depot during the 1972 miners' strike where police cordons were positioned at the bottom of a slope and so had to resist pressure from superior numbers by pushing uphill. Once the police have taken up their positions, arriving pickets will be directed to certain areas (e.g. the pavements) but denied access to others (e.g. the road in front of the colliery gate). Cordons will be established to ensure that the strikers stay in the allocated areas but a few union officials will be allowed to stand in front of the police lines to exercise their rights of peaceful persuasion.

In such situations relations between police and pickets are generally quite good despite the pushing and shoving that tends to occur when

non-strikers pass through the picket-line. Indeed, the police are briefed to establish rapport with the strikers in mass confrontations, just as they are during small scale picketing. However, in the mass picketing situation rapport and humour function not so much to prevent picketing but to ease tension and reduce the probability of violence. An Inspector explained how he 'defused' a 'nasty situation' by blowing his whistle and announcing that he had lost his biro; both police and pickets disengaged and spent several minutes looking for his pen on the ground.

Of course, when workers or lorries of coal attempt to enter the premises being picketed the strikers often attempt to push their way through the police cordons. Indeed, there have been occasions when pickets have managed to block the road in front of a colliery or factory entrance by breaking through the cordon or by occupying the ground before the police established control of the situation. At this stage in the confrontation the joking stops and more physical tactics are employed.

The first step, frequently advocated by officers, simply consists of trying to persuade the strikers to move off the road. This request may be underlined by a 'show of force' intended to convince the crowd of the futility of resistance. A Chief Superintendent told me how he cleared the road at a strike-bound factory by smartly marching up several Police Support Units (a PSU consists of thirty constables, three sergeants and an inspector who are younger, fitter and better trained than the average constable). The sudden arrival of so many extra police marching with military precision so overawed the pickets that they obediently moved out of the way.

If the verbal warning and show of force fails to persuade the strikers to comply with police requests than a 'wedge' may be used to split the crowd and clear the road. The wedge is a formation of constables shaped like an arrowhead pointed at the crowd. It is an offensive tactic used to push its way into the strikers and split them into two groups; any number of men can be used, the bigger the wedge the more power it has. Once the pickets have been divided in this way cordons can be established to hold them back. There are basically four types of cordon; the open, the butcher's grip, the single belt and the double belt. The open cordon simply involves men standing close to but not touching each other and can be quickly transformed into the butcher's grip which is where the officers link arms at the elbow, clasping hands at chest height. The single belt involves each constable holding with his left hand the belt of the man in front, while the double belt is formed by each officer holding with both hands the belt of the second man on his left. The butcher's grip is the cordon which seems to be most often used in picketing situations.

The use of formations such as the wedge and the cordon have several advantages. First, they are effective in splitting or containing crowds. Second, they are relatively non-violent in that each officer has a specific job to do and is, therefore, controlled and occupied during offensive manoeuvres. Also, both the wedge and the cordon depend upon officers

maintaining linked arms so depriving them of the opportunity to lash out with fists or truncheon. Thirdly, these formations are not only relatively non-violent but can also readily be seen to be non-violent. It is difficult to portray convincingly a cordon of linked-armed police, possibly positioned with their backs to the pickets, as brutal agents of the repressive capitalist state. Finally, the rapid and disciplined adoption of an offensive formation such as the wedge constitutes in itself another show of force which may intimidate the crowd into retreating without resistance. As a Chief Inspector pointed out the mere sight of the wedge can cause a rapid 'loss of bottle'.

All the officers I spoke to indicated that 'snatch squads' would be used to support the cordons and the wedge. Observers would be placed at vantage points to look, not only for those who are particularly aggressive but also for those who are known as 'rent-a-pickets'. The snatch squads would then be ordered to arrest these people and quickly extract them from the crowd... 'if you've got a good squad, say of three men, and one goes to one side and one goes to the other and one's behind him and takes him through the legs and grabs his balls, you've got him out before he knows it'. One Commandant of a police training college said that he would have his snatch squad mingling with the pickets in plain clothes, but other officers disagreed with this approach. It was argued that plain clothes men would not have the same deterrent effect as a snatch squad of ten or so uniformed men positioned behind the pickets. Moreover, it was thought that the use of plain clothes men could be damaging in public relations terms; 'the media would make a meal of it'. Finally, some officers considered it far too dangerous to use plain clothes men in this way since they would be exposed to 'grave risk of attack from angry pickets'.

Tactics such as cordons, wedges and snatch squads are probably very effective as long as the police do not become grossly outnumbered (most officers advocated matching the pickets man for man) or the violence does not escalate beyond the usual pushing and shoving. If the situation deteriorates in either of these ways then 'we get tempted to try something a bit more military'. A Chief Superintendent candidly noted that it 'all depends on the firmness of the government of the day' and that 'we can all feel the water' and, presumably, under Mrs. Thatcher the water is more conducive to floating the military option than under previous regimes. The actual tactics considered were riot shields, water cannon (generally regarded as rather ineffective), rubber bullets, CS gas and deploying the military itself. Interestingly, one officer thought that the police would use rubber bullets and CS gas in a riot situation as a 'last ditch effort', but not in an industrial situation where 'the military would be given the problem'. However, it should be emphasised that most officers strongly maintained that there would never be any need to resort to these more extreme measures as sufficient manpower using the wedge and if necessary riot shields should be able to cope with any industrial confrontation.

One officer, in particular, indicated that the police operated within tighter political constraints in the industrial context than in, for example, a riot situation; 'public opinion would never support the use of rubber bullets and CS gas against strikers . . . they would support the use of those things against rioters in the inner cities, but not against strikers'. Whether the police are tolerant or repressive in a given situation depends, then, not on personal or even institutionalised prejudice but on the perceived political consequences of their action and these, it would appear, are greater in the industrial context than in relation to Britain's black population.

It is interesting to note that police tactics since 1945 have not generally escalated beyond the use of formations such as the cordon and the wedge. During the present miners' strike riot shields and batons have been used on isolated occasions, but the police have not resorted to water cannon, rubber bullets or CS gas. This, of course, is indicative of the relatively non-violent behaviour of strikers and the reluctance of the police to ascend the 'tactical staircase' beyond a level which appears reasonable in the circumstances. Despite much huffing and puffing about 'violent picketing' and 'para-military policing' industrial confrontation is generally limited to little more than fairly aggressive pushing and shoving.

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[Dr. Roger Geary is lecturer in law at West Glamorgan Institute of Higher Education. Publications include 'Deaths in Prison', *NCCL*, 1980; 'Deaths in Custody', *Poly Law Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1981; and 'From Battle to Match: The Changing Nature of Industrial Confrontation', *The Police Journal*, April-June, 1984, Vol. LVIII, No. 2..]

# MACHISMO AND CHRIST: THE NEW FORMULA

## by Marvin Goldwert

ONE of the unrecognised elements in the perpetual turmoil of Latin American politics is machismo, the cult of hypermasculinity. The macho (virile he-man, male-animal) is not only a Don Juan, but an aggressive, often violent, figure for whom compromise is surrender. The Spanish conquistador is the model and prototype of the modern Latin American macho. Sensual, cruel, individualistic, ruthless, anarchic, and authoritarian, he set much of the tone of masculinity which, today divorced from derring-do glory, is perpetuated in Latin American machismo.

'Christ is El Macho turned inside out,' writes Glen Caudill Dealy. In the past, this formula governed the relationship of the Latin American macho to the 'effeminised' Christ. The manly macho disdained the view of Christ as the submissive Saviour of Love. Such disdain was already present in the ambivalent view of religion held by the conquistador. On the one hand, he believed that he was on a Divine mission to bring Latin America to Christ; on the other, he ruthlessly sought glory and gold in the New World. The modern Latin American macho inherited this dualism. While formally declaring his Catholicism, he womanised and committed acts of indiscriminate violence which flew in the face of the Saviour of Love. Manly assertiveness and virility burst through the bonds of religiosity. And, after all, the Church was woman's concern.

In Conquest and early colonial times the Church, or its representatives of the Saviour of Love, strove to check the rapaciousness of Spanish machismo and its terrible toll on the Indians. Great churchmen like Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas denounced the macho oppressors of the Indians. But as Latin America settled down into colonial stability and respectability, the Church largely forgot the Saviour of Love and opted for the ritualistic allegiance of the elites. Occasionally, the spark of the Saviour of Love surfaced, as it did during the wars for independence (1808–1826), when priests like Mexico's Father Hidalgo tried to arouse the Indian masses. Always, it was the local priest, close to the submerged, rather than the hierarchy who stood for the Saviour of Love. In his humanitarian effort, the local priest faced a wall in the Church hierarchy which, in league with the military and the *hacendados,* formed the traditional trinity of power.

Beginning in the 1960s, with the Second Vatican Council, a new strain of Catholicism, the liberationist, began to surface with a completely different vision of Christ-the-Saviour, sword in hand, beckoning the macho to the struggle for social justice. The reverberations of this new formula were bound to radiate throughout Latin American society. No longer, it was thought, would the macho view Catholicism as the religion of women or the lowly Indian. The violence, often indiscriminate, of the Latin American macho would now be channeled into social currents. In

place of the Saviour of Love, the scriptures now revealed a Christ with a fiery temper. It is this image which the liberationist clergy is today preaching to the Latin American macho. If social protest is man's work, they believe that the fiery Christ will replace the 'effeminised' version. Did not Christ chase the money-changers from the Temple? Are not Marxists also servants of the fiery Christ desirous of lifting the abominable conditions of the poor in Latin America?

However, the Catholic liberationists in Latin America should pause before they abandon completely the Saviour of Love for fiery social revolution in alliance with the Marxists. No matter how justified, social revolution in Latin America can spawn a new kind of machismo, carrying violence, destruction, class hatred, and ultimately one-man or state despotism in its wake. Surely, the Church is not dedicated to breaking one chain of oppression in order to replace it with another. Both bread and liberty must be the twin Christian goals, and these are lessons that the Church must teach the Latin American macho.

There are, in my opinion, two roles that the Church can play in modifying and channeling Latin American machismo. First, while organising the masses into socially-conscious *bases de comunidad* as a lever, the Church should seek to temper both right-wing and left-wing machismo by serving as a social conciliator. In this way it can use mass social pressure to spur the 'dialogue' called for by the Pope. With the socially-conscious masses on its side, the Church can revive the Saviour of Love by playing a conciliatory role in the political arena at large. By filling the mediating role in today's social struggle, the Saviour of Love will also thereby modify the violent and uncompromising machismo of the region. Machismo will splatter on the rock of Church victories as well as spiritual upliftment.

But if the Church's ardent liberationists become too identified with Marxists and their aims, it will serve to polarise Latin American society, already conditioned to machista intransigence, into violent extremes. The Church's formula should be 'dialogue' in all but the most hopelessly revolutionised societies. Furthermore, in societies like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, where a democratic tradition persists, the Saviour of Love should be firmly on the side of pluralist freedom and civilian democracy.

The second role the Church can play with regard to machismo is in the Latin American family. Machismo is ingrained within the Latin American family, where often the husband is an authoritarian womaniser who neglects his wife and children. It is in the dynamics of the male-dominated machista family that authoritarianism, intransigence, and violence are spawned in Latin American society. Therefore, the Church should stand not only for a just society, but also for a just family, which is the fundamental unit of society. Woman should be elevated by the Church to a position of dignity in the family and community, worthy not of a submissive *mariana* but of a proud and caring human being.

# THE ITALIAN COMMUNISTS: AN HISTORIC COMPROMISE

## by Tim Parks

*MARCH 27th, 1944:* Under the pseudonym of Comrade Ercoli, hunted by the Fascists since as long ago as 1926, Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party, landed near Naples. After more than a decade in Moscow, during which time the contacts between himself and the clandestine party in Italy had often been, to say the least, fragile, his arrival was eagerly awaited by those militants who felt that the moment of revolution had come. The Communist Party had been the only large opposition organisation to survive the ruthless political repression of the Fascist period. They had formed and, to a great extent, led the partisan resistance to the Nazis in the last years of the war, a resistance which had given back to the Italians a great deal of lost respect. Their sacrifices had been elevated by martyrdom, by numerous years in prison, often in solitary confinement. At the same time, they were a party for whom the Russian inspiration was still all-powerful. Nothing was known of the true Stalinist style of government; purges and labour camps were unimaginable in that socialist heaven. Stalin was 'the leader of the workers of the world,' a great father. The myth was potent and expectations were high. With Moscow behind him, Comrade Ercoli would surely lead the struggle.

In this potentially explosive situation it was to the amazement of both the revolutionary left and the nervous right that, far from inciting workers and partisans to the barricades, Palmiro Togliatti turned out to be both moderate and diplomatic, respectful toward Marshal Badoglio, then in charge of the provisional government, and cautious even with regard to King Victor Emanuel III. He offered to participate in the provisional government and postpone the constitutional question until after the war.

It was with this great conciliatory gesture of Togliatti's that the style of the modern Italian Communist Party was born—fiercely militant at its roots, extremist in theory and ideology, yet surprisingly pragmatic in the practical sphere, apparently willing to work inside a democratic framework, to accept the verdict of the ballot box, to sit round the table with political parties of the liberal and even conservative tradition.

The unexpected posture brought with it both advantages and disadvantages. Certainly, Togliatti had appreciated that without a stance of this kind, the Communist Party would not be tolerated in an area of Europe dominated at that time by the Allies and, above all, by the Americans. A revolution was not on, would have been crushed directly. Hence his pragmatism allowed him to insert the party inside the democratic process, to allay the fears of at least some sections of the population and so to build up what is by far the largest and most powerful Communist Party in the West, a party that is in no sense on the sidelines of Italian politics but at its centre, controlling many of the local administrations in the large cities, tenaciously

holding on to thirty per cent of the vote and finally overtaking the Christian Democrats at the recent European elections to become Italy's largest party.

Nevertheless, the continued extremism of the party when it comes to theory, the lack of any final break with Leninism, has always created a deep ambiguity as to the real intentions of the party should it come to power; hence it is unlikely that even in the event of a loss of ground by the Christian Democrats the Communists would be able to form a government, given that all the centre parties have built up their vote (at the expense of the Christian Democrats) precisely by making clear their willingness to serve in anti-Communist coalitions.

To trace the post-war expansion of the Communist Party, then, is to follow the development of a stalemate, the gradual intensification of a dilemma. All the major ideas to come out of the European Communist parties in the last decade, Eurocommunism, the Historic Compromise, and Berlinguer's 'the Third Way' can all be seen as attempts to bypass this dilemma and arrive at a position of power in the democratic west without relinquishing the name of Communist.

The early years were marked by great optimism. Party membership rose from 400,000 in 1944 to 1,700,000 in 1946. News of Russia's war effort, Stalingrad, the taking of Berlin were positive psychological factors, the party growing rapidly in the wake of Soviet successes. The Socialists, lacking a codified ideology and the exuberant Soviet myth, accepted Communist hegemony on the left and formed an alliance with Togliatti's party. The alliance led to a split in the Socialist camp with the formation of the Social Democratic Party, a factor which could only increase Communist strength. At the 1946 election the party took 18.9% of the vote.

But almost immediately, early success was followed by an event which, for the far sighted, revealed the true nature of the Communist dilemma. In 1947, with the partition of Europe, the Cold War began in earnest. Despite his conciliatory posture inside practical Italian politics and in particular his willingness to vote for the infamous article 7 of the constitution which accepted Catholicism as the established religion of the state, Togliatti had no hesitation in taking the side of Russia. Indeed, it was difficult to imagine him doing otherwise, given the potency of the Soviet myth amongst party militants and the centrality of the Russian experience in Communist ideology. Yet, at the same time, Togliatti was at least partially aware what the party rank and file still remained entirely ignorant of, the ruthless political repression in Russia, Stalin's purges, the labour camps and the rest. In this new atmosphere of international tension and faced with this declared alliance to a potential enemy, the public became more wary. The Communist Party's rate of growth shrank to just 0.3% a year on average, with recruiting going on for the most part among the new working class of Italy's industrial boom.

The years from 1947-56, up to the Kruschev report on Stalin, mark the darkest period of both Togliatti's and the party's history. That the Communist leader refused to renounce Stalin, knowing what he knew then, is indicative of the ambiguity which still haunts the party's fate at the polls.

Even in 1956, after the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party had condemned Stalin and the cat was very well and truly out of the bag, Togliatti chose to ignore the issue at his own party congress.

It was not until 1976 that the Communists were to make the great leap forward that took them to within a hair's breadth of power. Togliatti was twelve years dead at this point and Enrico Berlinguer (after the brief leadership of Longo) firmly in control of the party. But Berlinguer was often spoken of as a 'reincarnation' of Togliatti, and certainly he embodied many of the same qualities: diplomacy, avoidance of rhetorical extremes, a stance of declared independence from the Soviet Union, though without outright antagonism.

There were two major reasons for the success of 1976. The first was quite simply that which must operate in favour of any opposition party in a democracy, the public's desire for an alternative. This was (and is) compounded in Italy by the poor quality of government that the country has had from the Christian Democrats and their coalitions, particularly in the late sixties and seventies. In 1976 it was further compounded by the energy crisis and a veritable spate of scandals involving Christian Democrats. The other major factor was the end of the Cold War and the advent of Detente, which naturally reduced fears of Communist links with Russia. To add to this positive international aspect was the newly vaunted Eurocommunism and the exchanges between the Communist leaders of France, Spain and Italy, Marchais, Carrillo and Berlinguer, in which they spoke of their autonomy from the Soviet Union. Without anybody troubling to explain quite what it might entail, Eurocommunism got an exceedingly good press in the West in the general eagerness to see Russia isolated from her satellite parties. The Italian communists thus gained a new level of international respectability. Finally, the Socialist Party was still extremely weak and divided in 1976 and with only 6% of the vote in recent regional elections was in no position to offer an alternative government. Hence for the Communist Party the situation simply could not have been more favourable. Any opposition party in any democracy should have been able to sweep away a governing party as compromised and demoralised as the Christian Democrats of that time. And, indeed, the Communists did leap up to 34.4% of the vote, their highest ever poll. Yet perhaps precisely because the Communists were expected to do so well, the Christian Democrats surprisingly managed to retain their relative majority with an astonishing 38.7% of the vote.

It was at this point, with the stalemate confronting Italian democracy now clear to all that the so-called 'Historic Compromise' was proposed. The proportional electoral system in Italy meant that even with its narrow victory the Christian Democrats could scarcely find a majority without the Communists and vice versa. Hence, it was suggested, the two parties should in some way get the country through the crisis by governing together. If alternating governments were impossible, power would have to be shared. In the first instance, from 1976 through to early 1978, the Communists would allow the Christian Democrats to govern by abstaining. Later, when

this situation became untenable, Prime Minister Andreotti negotiated the entrance of the Communists into the government itself.

The Historic Compromise was pure Togliatti in conception, projecting the image of a flexible, responsible, modern party ready to help the country through a crisis while yielding nothing on principle. In truth, perhaps, the compromise only disguised the Communists' own inadequacy to fulfil the function of an alternative governing party. Why couldn't they get a majority in parliament themselves? Why were they never to be trusted to govern alone? The manoeuvre was the first of many bizarre attempts to elude the dilemma.

Fraught as it was with the Moro kidnap, it is difficult to assess the period of the Historic Compromise which continued until the elections of 1979 when the Communists lost 4% of their vote. A number of things were clear, however. The militants found it difficult to understand and ultimately would not tolerate an alliance with what for years had been the avowed enemy. Particularly difficult to swallow was the changed attitude to the economy, criticism of strikes, speeches in praise of austerity, etc. At the same time, for the new, more moderate voters who had come to the Communists hoping that the party would provide the alternative, disillusion was equally great. The fall-back in the elections of 1979 and marginally again in 1983 was inevitable, despite the Christian Democrat losses.

It was at this point that the party turned inwards to contemplate its failure. Declared independence from Russia obviously had not been enough. The electorate remained for the most part uncertain as to what a Communist government might mean; a one-party state, mass nationalisation, the end of private property? Or simply the kind of socialism advocated by the German SDP and the British Labour Party? Yet despite the enormous amount of literature produced by the party in recent years, no satisfactory answer has been forthcoming. Berlinguer insisted in pouring scorn on the German Social Democrats and their achievements (similarly, Togliatti had criticised the British Labour Party for having willingly relinquished power once they had held it). Party leaders courageously criticised Russia over Afghanistan, but have always refused to break with their revolutionary past ('It is absurd to ask us to break with our very roots, our link with the October Revolution and with the work and thought of Lenin'[1]). Likewise, Berlinguer spoke boldly of his commitment to 'pluralism' at the Communist International, only to insist on other occasions on the principle of 'hegemony of the working classes,' two apparently contradictory concepts.

The case of Eurocommunism is particularly telling in its indication of the lack of definition in the Communist camp. Adopted for the first time by Berlinguer in 1976, the term Eurocommunism was taken up in 1977 by Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish leader, in his famous essay, *Eurocommunism and the State*. Basically, Carrillo tried to establish the identity of the European communists through the thorough repudiation of the USSR in which he concluded that the Soviet Union was not a socialist state, was guilty of imperialism and repression. European Communists, on the other hand, would offer pure radical socialism without Russian perversions.

Berlinguer was, at least at first, more tentative and the reason is not difficult to find. Almost immediately after making his declaration, Carrillo found himself forced into a minority at his party conference over a vote renouncing Lenin, and in January 1984 a pro-Russian element of the party split away. This was alright for Carrillo, perhaps, who, with just 10.9% of the vote and a party formed long after the Soviet myth had lost its shine, had little to lose and much to gain. Berlinguer, confronting a larger pro-Russian element, had more to lose and very little to gain. Surveys at that time showed 79% of party members believed that socialism did exist in Russia and, despite the criticism of the leadership, 37% of the rank and file felt that the USSR had 'done well' to invade Czechoslovakia.

If this hesitation of the Italians were not enough to destroy the notion of a united anti-Russian front amongst European communists, the strongly pro-Soviet direction taken by Marchais on the dissolution of the *Union de la Gauche* in 1977 should have been enough to indicate that Eurocommunism was dead, had been still-born, in fact. And yet the term continues to serve, along with Berlinquer's catch-phrase, 'The Third Way,' neither that of Russia, nor of the European Social Democrats, to create the notion of some possible middle ground between Russia on the left and Social Democracy on the right. In short, precisely the usefulness of Eurocommunism is its vagueness, its emptiness of meaning. The term covers up for a refusal to choose between revolution or reform.

The vast crowds who flocked to Berlinguer's funeral, banners aloft, demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt the grip that the party still has on the imaginations of literally millions of Italians. But does that vast crowd really know what to expect from a Communist government?

Togliatti's policy of keeping his party sitting on the fence was a gamble from the very first, the hope being that by holding Leninists and socialists together a majority might one day be reached. That that gamble will not pay off has now become clear to all. For, despite the Communists' marginal superiority over the Christian Democrats in the European elections, the overall anti-Communist vote held up as well as ever. Is it not time, then, twenty years after Togliatti's death and with a new leader, Alessandro Natta, for a shift in direction? The agony is that any clear choice can only mean a loss of votes in the short term; a step toward moderation would make the Communists barely distinguishable from the Socialists, and hence redundant—the lesson of the Spanish Communists. A step to the left and a firm nailing of colours to the Leninist flag would push them out onto the margins of Italian society—the lesson of the French Communists. Natta, academic and 100% a 'party man,' chosen precisely for his similarity to Berlinguer, his judiciousness, his avoidance of polemics, is not likely to take any such decision.

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NOTE:

1. Berlinguer quoted by *L'Unita*, 4 April, 1979.

# THE YOUNG MATTHEW ARNOLD

**by Park Honan**

DURING his lifetime—in the sixty-five years between his birth in 1822 and his death in 1888—Matthew Arnold was considered by his family and later by the English public to be less important than his schoolmaster father. And understandably, as his father, 'Dr. Arnold of Rugby School', was the idol of Arthur Stanley's flattering biography and of several generations of schoolboys and schoolmasters. But in the century after his death Matthew Arnold has seemed more interesting than his father, and there may be two kinds of reasons for this.

First there are his individual achievements. Matthew Arnold is a moving and intelligent lyric poet who reflects the new urban consciousness of industrial Europe. He is a poet of country landscape and city feelings, who is truthful on the topics about which it is easy to tell lies, romantic love and religious faith. In works such as *Essays in Criticism* or *Culture and Anarchy*, too, he seems to define the modern critical sensibility; he lays the groundwork, and proposes the leading attitudes for, much of our own criticism of literature and society.

The second reason for Arnold's interest may be more elusive, since it concerns his tone as a writer and the odd fact that there is a consistent unity running through his poetry and prose. He might be called a 'strong writer', in Harold Bloom's sense, because Arnold, while retaining a certain urbanity and aplomb, manages to be convincingly sincere. He seems to gloss over no difficulty or regret or doubt that may occur to him, and unifies his intellect and feelings when writing verse or prose.

Deeply indebted to him, the finest critical minds in England and America have engaged with him, as if to show despite their reservations that Arnold has meanings for a later time: T. S. Eliot, I. A. Richards, Lionel Trilling and F. R. Leavis carry on running debates with him. More recently, scholarly critics and editors such as the Tillotsons and the Allotts in England and R. H. Super, David DeLaura and others in the US have produced excellent editions of his works, or close commentaries. A. K. Davis, Jr. at the University of Virginia spent much of his life amassing copies of Arnold's holograph letters, which Cecil Lang is now to edit. Perhaps a biographer of Arnold may say that to write about him is exhilarating: he seems to lend his energy to his interpreters, or so I found in my ten years' work in writing *Matthew Arnold: A Life* (1981). Exactly why Arnold's poems and essays lend out their energy has much to do with his audience: his readers through most of his life were few, and his reviewers were normally irritated by him—but his gaiety of spirit was nourished by his feeling that British society needed him and by his sense that the public were his 'concern', as if his family were the public.

This concern is not mystical, but clerical. One finds a later parallel, for instance, in the career of William Ralph Inge (1860-1954), the so-called

'Gloomy Dean' of St. Paul's. Raised in the Tractarian tradition of Anglican piety in Yorkshire, Inge was an erudite scholar, an Etonian with a double-first from Cambridge whose Gifford lectures at the University of St. Andrews on 'The Philosophy of Plotinus' were his *magnum opus*. But Inge was interested in the whole British public, and so he wrote weekly articles in the *Evening Standard* for twenty-five years to attack the superstitions of his day, such as the concept that social progress is inevitable, or the optimism of those who thought the 'war to end all wars' really ended war. If Inge felt (as he said) that 'the Deanery of St. Paul's is the most literary appointment in the Church of England', he helped, in his way, to show as Arnold did that literary people in using their talents for the nation may not be popular but will work with zest.

Lately, the diaries and notebooks kept by Arnold's mother have become available, so that we may have more data about his formative years than we do for any other Victorian. Nothing in biography is simple. But with our fresh information, we can outline an answer to one question: which forces encouraged the young Matthew Arnold and helped to make him not only a fine lyric poet but the greatest critic of his age? I tried to answer this question in my biography, and I wish to return to it here with fresh reflections.

In a fascinating new book called *Arnold and God*, which explores Arnold's debts to late-eighteenth century German figures, such as Eichhorn, Herder and Goethe, Ruth apRoberts claims that the unifying thread in Arnold's thought and feeling was religious, that the 'religious question' was so basic that it moved him to seek in poetry and then in 'culture' those values that the religion of his day could no longer supply.[1] There is no doubt that when he was born at Laleham on 24 December, 1822, his father Thomas Arnold, a deacon, was wrestling with doubts about the Holy Trinity and the literal interpretation of scripture. But we have to see Thomas—or Dr. Arnold to give him the D.D. he earned in 1828—as an energetic optimist, with much secular energy, a curly-haired, smooth-chinned handsome young man with boyish high spirits; athletic, busy, puzzled by pupils at Laleham who defied his schoolmasterly edicts and eager to win boys' hearts by being their leader. Dr. Arnold set up what he called a Campus Martius in the garden at Laleham School. His ten or twelve tutorial pupils had a wide trench for leaping, a 'peg-pole' for climbing, and a tall gallows for chinning (or pull-ups) and target practice; in his shirtsleeves he often threw javelins, even with his friend Whately, the Archbishop of Dublin, an expert in boomerang-throwing. Or Thomas would practise 'skirmishing', running at high speed over the low Laleham fields in and out of ditches, over hedges and straight through bushes.

If the father at twenty-seven was a boy at heart, his thirty-one year old wife Mary had the spirit of a girl. Thin and frail, almost fragile, with upswept hair held by a comb in the Louis-Philippe fashion, and her aquiline nose and bright dark eyes, Mary Penrose had been a pest in her father's rectory; she teased her elder sisters, acted in theatricals, and

after her marriage to Thomas became addicted to reports of hangings, revolutions and disasters in the London papers. She would have loved stories headlined SHOCK HORROR in the *Mail* perhaps; Thomas Carlyle's *The French Revolution* was so bloody that she simply told her Penrose sisters, 'get it'. She was as bored by the plains of northern France as Dr. Arnold would be by Warwickshire and two or three other flat counties. But: 'when you see the Jura', she told her children, 'think of me'. The Arnold parents, as younger children in their own families, were in some respects more childish, dramatic, impulsive and playful than some of their children were to be.

No doubt the so-called 'Celtic temperament' is partly a fiction, though Matthew Arnold believed in it; but the former Mary Penrose of Cornwall almost proves the validity of the myth—in her fondness for storms, heavy seas, mountains, vibrant colours, poetry, pathos, and drama, in her French tricolour sewing bag and bright dresses, and in the poignant entries on death in her indefatiguably kept notebooks, diaries and household journal. Death is God's most precious gift, she believed, as it 'gives *reality* to what in life is often so Phantom like'. She and her husband composed poetry for their household journal, and she responded to her first-born son, Matthew, as if he were a little deity from Olympus. When her husband spoke of the need to 'reform' an unequal society, he epitomised an English mood in the years before the first Reform Bill, and Mrs. Arnold expected dazzling achievements of her son. Thus, when in this active and dramatic household at Laleham, Matthew Arnold developed rickets and had to wear heavy iron leg-braces, she was full of pity and alarm.

But she had nine children of her own to look after. She continued to praise their physical achievements—from their first fearful tottering steps in the garden, to little Susy's trotting about 'in the gaiety' of her heart and her son Tom's heroic walk in infancy from Chertsey all the way to Laleham. Meanwhile, in leg-irons, Matthew screamed. He gashed his head on the claw-foot of a table; he cried at night. At the ages of 3 and 4 he was ugly and slow, whereas Jane and Tom were attractive and agile. 'Literature is born', writes Simone de Beauvoir, 'when something in life goes slightly adrift'. The evidence of the household journals is plain that Matthew did not walk properly even after Dr. Arnold became Rugby's headmaster in 1828, and that while anguishing his mother, Matthew appealed to her in the only ways left open to him—that is, first by being 'obstinate' and wounding himself, and then by writing little poems about poignant topics.

When the Arnolds began to summer at Fox How near Ambleside in 1834, their affectionate friends at Rydal included William Wordsworth, whose green eyeshade, homely nose and lack of 'animation' at first had disappointed Mrs. Arnold (who preferred Robert Southey and his active girls), his sister Dorothy Wordsworth, an obese and bald woman who sat close to the hearth, spoke to her nailbrush, and cried and shrieked on occasion, and the sensible Mary Wordsworth with her intelligent squint, who kept the cult of nature-appreciation alive at Rydal Mount. Matthew and his

sister Jane, as Dr. Arnold records, are often 'over at the Mount.' And again William Wordsworth in his loose brown frock-coat and 'trousers of shepherd's plaid' and brown handkerchief for a neck-tie would come into the Fox How kitchen to recite his works or complain about the railways, the 'iron tide,' which were an instance of modern 'inhumanity' and of the way in which city-folk were destroying the countryside.

By then Matthew had learned to walk, leap, and run; he had built a secret fort on Loughrigg Fell and seen William Wordsworth lean over its parapet one day. Much or little may be made of his few years in leg-braces, but it is clear that his 'bent legs' had given him a little distance from his family, and taught him that in the competition for approval from his elders he might have to excel in the wit and beauty of his writing. Matthew became very affectionate with Dr. Arnold and Wordsworth, and capable of competing with his brothers for his sister Jane's and his mother Mary's approval.

By the time he was sixteen Matthew was making good use of women in his family. As he surprised or slightly shocked his mother without quite horrifying her, he kept her attention. He absented himself from prayers and stayed out late on fishing expeditions; he once convinced his sister Jane that his boat had capsized on Windermere, since he had stayed out all night with his sailing friends in his parents' absence. When he did get in trouble, he chose dramatic means to set himself in the right. When he and his brother Tom attended Winchester for a year and he angered his form by telling the headmaster that class assignments were 'too light,' the form boys intended to punish him. Matthew obliged by setting his hand on fire with phosphorus. Later he told his mother that he could still see his hand burning after lotion was applied to his wound.

Mrs. Arnold responded to these events very predictably. 'Even now,' she wrote to him months after he burnt his hand, 'it is painful to think of that first sight when all alone you had to bear the suffering of so severe a burn—actually seeing the light about your hand from the fire unextinguished by the lotion.' And this shrewd boy went through Rugby School effectively shielded by his mother. Instead of living with School House boys, he slept in his parents' apartment: his mother notes him finishing an essay at the last minute, or drinking champagne in the company of titled ladies, or asking one of the ladies to write out a song, or playing at chess with his beautiful relative Miss Ward. Few Rugbeians in the nineteenth century really benefited from the school less painfully than Matthew Arnold. Refreshed by his mother's attentions, he wrote translations for his composition tutor James Prince Lee. Assured of his father's affection, Matthew made faces behind his father's back in history class in the panelled library tower. There is not a sign that he was flogged for his misdemeanors, but there are many signs that Mrs. Arnold applauded his successes though he was not a dazzling student. He was only fair at German and French. His mark of 10 in Greek Verse (in 1840) is disgraceful when set beside Lushington's 24, Walrond's 21, or Hughes's 20. He almost broke the school's tardiness record one term when despite

his mother's gentle warnings he was late to class 13 times. Virtually only his quick skill in translating between Latin and English saved him, or kept him just inside the upper quarter of his form in his average marks. True, his Latin is lovely. When given the line *And press her wanton in love's secret bower* in his last school year, Arnold for example, at 18, startled the Cambridge examiner by composing this smartly polished verse:

*Osculaque in mediis detque feratque rosis.*

What formed his mind, then? What encouraged his talent? Much of his creative strength derived from the steady and continuing emotional support and approval of his mother, and of his elder sister Jane or 'K'. By applauding his early lyrics and, in her enthusiasm, demanding better ones, Mrs. Arnold helped his talent to mature. And not only her love but her comforting proximity at Rugby gave him assurance, encouraged his optimism and daring, goaded him, reduced obstacles, and seemed to reward him nearly always. A family may motivate creativity, but may also destroy it. Dr. Arnold, a lovable man of strong will, nearly withered his sons Tom, Willy, and Edward who were to suffer and struggle under the influence of his memory. Slightly alien in the family ever since his time in leg-braces, Matthew was able to view his father critically, while yet showing him a puppyish love. 'Matt,' wrote Dr. Arnold in 1840, 'does not know what it is to work, because he so little knows what it is to think. I am hopeful,' adds the father, 'and he is so loving to me that it ought to make me not only hopeful but patient and long-suffering.' The boy who was 'so loving to me' won over Dr. Arnold without being brow-beaten by his morally intense precepts.

Also it is clear that Matthew's lifelong attitudes were fostered by parental habits of mind. Dr. Arnold was too impatient to be a good teacher of mediocre pupils, but the restless comparative tendency of his lessons inspired the best. In history classes the pupils studied two national histories simultaneously—or the teacher illustrated what was said of Periclean Greece or Imperial Rome with reference to Napoleon and modern France, for example. A lazy, bright pupil such as Matthew was seldom bored; his mind was trained to analyse a topic by flying away from it for perspective or illustration, an exercise not unlike that of the poet's work of seizing fresh metaphors from a distance to animate the poem's subject. Within his family Dr. Arnold was emotive, demonstrative, and ready to weep with pleasure, and indeed he feared that his own children might become 'hard'. He would prefer that they 'die,' as he once told Matthew and Tom, rather than see them become *unfeeling*. This seems to us very Victorian—as it was. A social culture unembarrassed by sentiment and admiring family loyalty, hugging, kissing, and tenderness with tears, may give its children chances to explore the whole range of human feelings within the home. Its novelists and poets will pay a small price, in sentimental errors, for the chances they will have to write profoundly of the human condition. This family emphasis on feeling accounts for Matthew Arnold's later weeping over his children, but also



in part for his ability to combine emotive with intellectual qualities in his essays, to produce works with 'felt' structures.

Involved with the question of 'feeling' is the religious problem for many Victorians, since as the religious certainty of younger intellectuals was worn away by waves of the Higher Criticism of the Bible, the advances of science and new theories relating to biology, geology and anthropology, and the schisms within the Anglican Church, no new viable world-outlook seemed profound enough to satisfy the demands of the heart and head alike. Without religion, we yield our feelings to anarchy or, indeed, the feelings wither so that we become arid. Arnold was to explore this dilemma in poems such as 'Memorial Verses', *Empedocles on Etna*, and indirectly in his Oxford elegies 'The Scholar-Gipsy' and 'Thyrsis.' Clearly, his home life and even his school life in the formative years were, in retrospect, to give him a fair sense of the life of the feeling intellect—to support which he is to search in his poetry, and later in his criticism, for an adequate new philosophical outlook or faith. Certainly, the religious and moral emphasis at Rugby tended to make pupils self-conscious—perhaps unhealthily so. Debonair and undisturbed in his parents' rooms at School House, Matthew perhaps inspected his own conscience not very often, but he absorbed the Rugby ethos. At Oxford, especially after his father's death and John Henry Newman's conversion to Rome, he was to confront the difficult problem of the 'self,' perhaps the main epistemological problem of the Victorian age.[2] If, as a whole, romantic writers had asserted the subjective sense of the self, the Victorian tended to question his own identity and even the possibility of ever knowing his deep identity—a theme of Arnold's poems 'The Buried Life' and 'A Summer Night.' Romantics typically had felt at one with Nature. Up at the Lakes near Rydal Mount in the summers, Matthew Arnold in his walks and climbs and trout-fishing had many chances to absorb Wordsworth's semi-pantheistic and almost complacent view of Nature, and time later on to find it inadequate, as he does in his stoical poem 'Resignation' for example. He is typically Victorian in being anxious to differentiate man from Nature. But he is to explore the 'self' and the new sense of man's apartness in Nature with more subtlety than other poets, since he has had a longer and more immediate and affecting experience of the earlier romantic outlook than most Victorians had. That is, he had talked with Wordsworth, heard that poet's recitals, sounded him out, and sympathised with him during the Rugby School years as well as in the second half of the 1840s.

The later serious attitudes of Arnold, then, have interesting origins in the apparently carefree life he led in school and with his family. When he matriculated at Oxford as a Balliol Scholar in 1841, the university was in the midst of its anguishing controversy over the Anglican 'Tracts,' in which Newman and Pusey were said to be leading the Church over to Rome, and Dr. Arnold was praised as a calm defender of the liberal and Latitudinarian cause. Matthew easily kept aloof from the religious struggle, as he had learned how to be a cool fish, and much about the

value of detachment. After his father died, he played rather merrily with his friend Clough (his 'Horatio') the role of Prince Hamlet. He plunged to a bad 2nd class degree after trying to do three years' reading in three weeks, taught briefly at Rugby, won an Oriel Fellowship, gambled with old friends and ransacked Bodley for books, and then transferred his Oxford life to Berkeley Square when he became private secretary to the Whig peer Lord Lansdowne, who usually gave him little to do.

But at Lansdowne House, off an elegant square, in the cool mornings amidst Rembrandts and Gainsboroughs, he not only doodled and twiddled but wrote gravely portentous notes to himself:

> Meeting a cockney on a Greenwich steamer, instead of laughing, say—does this gay unled varmint thing *succeed* with his accoutrements better than I do, or worse.
>
> The rich have art as a mere stimulant: it is only for something else to do that nous autres pauvres are compelled to regard it otherwise.
>
> The artist has not the same power of passive pleasure from sensuous objects as another, else he would enjoy and not *represent.*
>
> Thou thyself, o man, are perhaps to be one of those characters thou hast come across in thy reading, who *fail:* this wilt thou never understand? thou gazest on the successful as so many manifestations of thyself, and on the unsuccessful as on men who have failed to be what thou art: and this, being nothing. Is it that life itself is a present and sensible success, which while thou hast it keeps thee on the level of those who have *wholly existed,* not in like case with those who have failed to exist.

He tried to imitate Carlyle. He tried to aspire to Goethe's mature Weimar wisdom. He tried to be a revolutionary *philosophe.* Luckily, with immense caution he fell in love. His young lady was romantic, with a thin waist and dark blue eyes, and so timid and enticing that Hartley Coleridge—who fondled children and wrote love-letters to them—believed she was as beautiful as anyone he had seen. Possibly Hartley was ready to overpraise her simply because her mother (as Mrs. Arnold did) gave him glasses of beer. But others refer to her beauty and to her fittingly romantic and exotic background. The blue-eyed Mary Sophia Claude was baptised in the French Reformed Church at Friedrichstadt in Berlin in 1821 and taken to England by her father, who describes himself as a 'Marchand á Liverpool'. After this commission merchant died, his very pretty widow, Mrs. Claude, with her five children spent summers in the Lake District at Rothay Bank, a mile from Fox How; Matthew befriended the pistol-shooting Louis Claude, an irreverent truant, and later took 'moonlight walks' with Louis's sister, Mary, who disliked English writers and preferred sentimentalists such as Jean Paul and Ugo Foscolo. He saw Mary Claude a few times in the summers. In 1848, after he failed to meet her at a rendezvous at the Hôtel Bellevue in the Swiss Alps, where it is very likely that she was to be chaperoned by her mother, his friends ridiculed him as a romantic fool. His friends were sensible. He had boasted too often of his coolness, while laughing at their own romances, and in this instance Arnold had worked himself into a romantic froth. 'Matt's romantic passion for the Cruel Invisible, Mary Claude,' wrote Tom Arnold when he read a long report by one of Matthew's sisters, 'amused me beyond everything'.

To defend himself from his friends and portray himself as a sadly worldly and resigned lover, Arnold wrote 'To my Friends, who ridiculed a tender Leave-taking' and, after that, an accompanying series of lyrics, which he was to group in various arrangements under the heading *Switzerland.* By the time all these love lyrics were published, he had married the daughter of an English judge and become a father—his youth had ended. His love-lyrics say too little about passion, but they reveal much about the mood of a son of Dr. Arnold with the weight of a nation on his shoulders, a young man, too, who has meditated on problems of friendship, love, loneliness, and spiritual isolation. Like his honeymoon poem 'Dover Beach,' the love poems dwell on the present failure of religion and on love as a means of spiritual survival. Arnold advocated marriage—and was happy to marry Fanny Lucy Wightman in 1851. But we hardly live on love alone, and he turned to a search for supporting values and attitudes—even as he collected data on his nation as a School Inspector for thirty-five years. His essays develop the ideas of 'criticism' and 'culture' and 'religion' with nerve and energy that remind one of the confidence he had felt as a happy son at Rugby and of the exhilaration he had known in the green Lake District of Southey, Hartley Coleridge, and Wordsworth during his crucial early years.

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NOTES:

1. Ruth apRoberts, *Arnold and God* (University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983), pp. xi + 299.
2. See Michael Timko's useful comments on this problem in 'The Victorianism of Victorian Literature', *New Literary History*, 6, (Spring 1975), 607-27.

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[Park Honan has written many articles about biography and is the author of *Browning's Characters* (1961), co-author with William Irvine of *The Book, The Ring, and The Poet: A Biography of Robert Browning* (1974), *Matthew Arnold: A Life* (1981) and is now working on a biography of Jane Austen. He is Professor of English and American Literature at the University of Leeds. Park Honan will contribute two further articles to *Contemporary Review* on celebrated writers: 'Jane Austen and Marriage' (November) and 'Dr. Johnson and Biography' (December).]

# PARADIGMS OF POLITICAL THEORY

## by S. G. Shanker

THIS is the last article in the series on 'The Perils of Post-Industrialism'. It would be presumptuous, however, to describe it as the conclusion of the arguments which have gone before. For it is certainly not the termination of what can or should be said about the themes that have been raised in the previous five articles. Like any good Aristotelian craftsman I have striven to give this series a beginning, a middle, and now an end. But if the truth be known, this peroration is largely artificial: a printer's device for rounding off the discussion. I myself would far prefer to see this final article as an incunabula rather than a colophon; a starting-point for where I think the serious discussion of these issues should be located.

It was somewhat fortuitous, perhaps, that the timing of the series has so nearly coincided with the passing of 1984. For what could be more appropriate than to write about the political dangers inherent in the post-industrial/post-service economy at a time when public anxieties have already been raised to a feverish pitch by two generations of apocalypse-gazers? However, like every other commentator, I have waited in vain for the great crisis or watershed that was long-heralded to arrive this year. Instead, we have watched 1984 slip quietly into the political oblivion which has so far characterised this decade. Within the indiscernable phases of what in retrospect will no doubt be identified as a transitional epoch, all appears to be in a constant state of flux, yet no particular incident stands out as a milestone or a calamity. But against the background of pervasive disquietude that has been engendered by the advent of post-industrialism, many modern correspondents find even a week, let alone a year, far too large a time-span in which to distinguish political trends; the modern scientific spirit demands absolute precision in its analysis of political developments (in much the same way that Saleem Sinai reluctantly tries to pinpoint the exact moment of the birth of modern India in Rushdi's *Midnight's Children*). But such expectations are not just futile; they are absurd, a delusion borne from the failure to grasp the complex aetiology of social evolution. Neither the moment of Kennedy's assassination, nor of Armstrong's giant step, nor even of Mrs. Thatcher's stirring evocation of St. Francis of Assisi, marks the decisive turning-point in modern history.

I am certainly not complaining about 1984's disappointing lack of political cataclysms. While the dearth of sensational events may be the bane of the leader-writer, it allows—or rather, it compels—the political philosopher to concentrate on the underlying factors involved in the gradual transformation of modern society. For it removes his temptation to dally with the ephemeral issues which satisfy our daily craving for 'news', leaving him with no alternative but to investigate the primary characteristics and implications of modern political consciousness *vis-à-vis*

the post-industrial revolution, and *vice versa*. It is time now to try to tie up some of the loose threads that have been left dangling; to see where the past five articles have taken us, and more importantly, where the fundamental themes which have been broached upon are likely to lead us in the immediate future.

I am certainly not alone in this endeavour to grasp the conceptual implications of contemporary ideological as well as political developments. One of our leading contemporary conservative apologists has recently written:

> Modern conservatism began as a response to the dangerous over-estimation of human capacities. Emerging as a political force in the early nineteenth century, it prided itself on its realism and on its ability to take a long-term view of human destiny and to sacrifice short-term benefits for the sake of the larger continuities upon which political survival depends.
>
> By and large the Tory party has retained its commitment to the long-term view, despite the difficulties involved in conveying that commitment to an increasingly hedonistic electorate. At the same time, the party has fallen under the influence of an ideology which it once rightly resisted as the distillation of all that is most destructive in the short term—the ideology of business. (Roger Scruton, 'Up the junction, down the M1', *The Times*, August 7, 1984.)

This is a striking example of modern 'philosophese': philosophy-made-easy if you like, or journalistic philosophy: it makes little difference. The intellectual development of a myriad of cultures spanning centuries rather than decades is condensed into a single paragraph: a caricature of 'modern conservatism', whatever that might actually mean. To be sure, there is an important element of truth in what the author writes—which is precisely what renders it so dangerous; for a cliché can wreak far more havoc than an obvious falsehood. For that very reason the argument deserves careful consideration.

Although written by a philosopher, this is not an example of philosophy. On the contrary, this is a piece of political writing, and a fairly effective one at that. It would be a worthwhile exercise to scrutinise the various assumptions and distortions contained in this brief passage, for these are the increasingly familiar methods employed by the modern polemicist. Note how subtly it opens with a concealed attack on radical political theories in a manner which seeks to take it as a given that these were borne from a utopian over-enthusiasm which amounted to *folie de grandeur*. Nor is there any question here of 'modern conservatism' having resulted from a concerted effort by a privileged minority to maintain its position by cultivating an attitude of suspicious hostility towards the harbingers of social progress. On the contrary, 'modern conservatism' appears in the guise of the guardian of social stability; a movement which can justly pride itself on its unique insight into mankind's 'long-term destiny'.

What is particularly interesting about this piece of political sophistry, however, is that the target of these hackneyed sentiments is not liberalism or socialism, but rather the Conservative Party itself. Moreover, whatever the flaws of this argument, it must be said that the author has certainly siezed upon an important fact. Unfortunately, because of the limitations which political journalism forces upon him, he over-simplifies and thus

distorts the significance of this issue. It quite clearly is the case that the Conservative Party has become the advocate of business principles. Furthermore, it is quite true that this doctrine departs from classical conservatism in some important respects. Nevertheless, as has been stressed throughout this series, the Tories remain nonetheless committed to the central authoritarian principles which underpin conservative political theory, and it is precisely in this respect that their approach to the socio-economic problems generated by post-industrial structural alterations maintains the continuity of Conservative Party politics.

The crucial point to bear in mind is that 'conservative' does not mean 'stationary'. As a political as opposed to a purely theoretical movement, the Conservative Parties over the past two centuries have continually been forced to adapt their strategies for dealing with the changing conditions in order to preserve their basic ideological commitments to authority and the preservation of the *status quo*. The fact that the present Conservative Party has now become an apostle of business theology is not proof of its sudden estrangement from traditional conservative values but rather signifies the central importance of political considerations in conservative political theory. For conservatism is not an abstraction—a dogmatic commitment to intellectual stasis in the face of social momentum—; had it simply ignored social dynamics it would long ago have withered as a political force. But conservatism's ultimate objective is not to thwart but rather to contain social change in order to preserve as much order and continuity as possible. In other words, conservatism is the ultimate example of political pragmatism.

The fact that the Tories have now embraced a political theory so radically different from the principles articulated by Burke is not the result of a *putsch*; it is the consequence of a revolution; to be precise, of the post-industrial revolution. We must be careful, however, first, not to exaggerate these disparities, and second, not to see this development as the consequence of a group of ideological outsiders taking over the Conservative Party (a right-wing version of entryism); rather, this was the result of conservatism's internal reaction to the external forces of post-industrialism. It is thus the manifestation of a deeper, sociological revolution which has completely altered the complexion, not only of conservative, but indeed, of all contemporary political thought. For what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new paradigm of political theory: a transition from individualism to *kaisha* as the governing principle of socio-economic behaviour.

It is difficult to be certain precisely when Japanese conventions began to have such a dominating influence on Western thought. The more familiar argument is that it was not until the 1970s, when Japanese industries rapidly outstripped their Western counterparts (with the result that Japanese methods were carefully studied and emulated). But there are those who argue that the process began long before, in the pre-war years when Japan began to flood Western markets with relatively shoddy imitations of superior goods. Certainly there can be no doubt that, as far

as Britain was concerned, the gradual shift to profit-maximisation (and all that that entails as far as quality is concerned) had a disastrous effect on industrial performance, and perhaps on industrial relations as well. For Britain had built its reputation on the excellence of its products; the British workforce were universally regarded as the premier craftsmen of the world economy. Yet the British suddenly found themselves forced to compete in markets where the dramatic falls in cost more than compensated (in buyers' eyes) for the sharp decline in standards. In an age of throw-away consumerism, durability was no longer a popular demand. Thus, the artisans of British industry were forced to become deskilled components in the large-scale manufacture of inferior items. Furthermore, in the past two decades Japan has completely reversed its role in the world economy, placing still a greater burden on the British workforce, now forced to catch up as well as adapt.

Surprisingly, for all the attention that has been given to the commercial dimensions of this problem, there has as yet been scant attention paid to the conceptual implications of these transformations. Under industrialism the *idée fixe* of political planning was growth; under post-industrialism it is efficiency. But in the extremely competitive, highly-unionised and capital-intensive setting of the post-industrial economies, there is relatively little room for manoeuvre in the constant struggle to increase productivity by lowering costs. Which is precisely where Japan comes in. For the Japanese social model offers a way of increasing productivity against the background of the above constraints.

The key is *kaisha*: the concept whereby employees are bound to their companies more by familial than by contractual relationships. Thus, the Japanese worker's involvement with his employer is not so much transactional as it is social and emotional. He is acutely aware of his precise status in the organisation, and the behaviour attendant upon this position. This enables the Japanese to create corporate structures which are governed more by internal pressures than by explicit regulations. The result may be a somewhat inflexible or unimaginative institution, but it more than compensates for any such deficiencies by the considerable efficiency thus achieved in the execution of its tasks and the implementation of its managerial decisions. During the 1970s western analysts became increasingly aware of the significance of these cultural advantages, and sought to introduce Japanese attitudes as well as methods into their organisations. The results of these efforts are only now beginning to materialise; not simply in terms of the rising productivity of Western industries, but more importantly, in the basic fact that efficiency and productivity have become virtually the sole criteria of political and economic success.

This conceptual shift is having a monumental—and perhaps a devastating—effect on our basic liberal values. The distinguishing feature of liberalism has always been its unflagging attempt to maintain a delicate balance between the conflicting pressures of individualism versus authoritarianism. There have, of course, been continual swings from the one

polarity to the other, but on the whole a working compromise has always been sustained, and indeed, encouraged. But because of the unique nature and demands of post-industrialism, we are now seeing an alarming shift towards the regimentation and rigidification of society. Where previously there was no pronounced awareness of corporate identity or the fine gradations of professional status, we now begin to find the keen sense of rank among colleagues—of 'superiors' and 'inferiors'—which is one of the hallmarks of *kaisha*. The broad sweep of class divisions is thus being replaced by strict differential, bureaucratic, or hierarchical stratifications.

The converse side of this development is that the small independent firm is rapidly disappearing, while the large corporation is increasingly demanding the strict observance of its company policies and objectives. On the shop-floor or at the coal-face the worker's daily performance is carefully regulated and recorded, and constantly threatened by rationalisation. Nor should we confine our attention to the plight of the manual worker. For the modern executive is no less an endangered species; he faces precisely the same job insecurity: the same threat of permanent redundancy if he should lose his position after the age of forty. Indeed, in some ways his lot is especially hard, for he is continually forced to compete with aspiring newcomers who are equipped with increasingly sophisticated educations and the hunger of youth to succeed. Moreover, the so-called 'rise of the meritocracy'—which was supposed to mark the apex (or some would say, the nadir) of the liberal/individualist system—is really turning into a complex version of *kaisha*, where the struggling executive is expected to be both conspicuous and inconspicuous simultaneously. In the sporting jargon which has become so popular today, he is expected to be an all-star whose sole ambition is to see the team win. Thus, merit will only be rewarded if it is motivated by a visible team-spirit, not personal ambition. In this atmosphere of group success simple obedience to formal rules is not nearly as important as the employee's ability to project his desire to conform to the company's *de facto* thought and behaviour codes.

This clearly explains why Japan has performed so well in the post-industrial arena. For it enjoys an enormous advantage over its western competitors: its workers have long been conditioned to regard conformity as a positive virtue, whereas our labour force has been lumbered with a liberal training which instills a deep yearning for self-expression and personal fulfilment. The result of the clash between this individualist preconditioning and the authoritarian demands of post-industrial efficiency are the mindless acts of industrial sabotage or the suicidal eruptions of management/employee confrontation which have become all too familiar in recent years. But the so-called 'British Disease' is really a euphemism for a profound spiritual ailment that encompasses the inexorable decline of Britain's ideological as well as its commercial hegemony. Where Britain was for so long the father, not just of technology, but more importantly, of the liberal principles which have governed

the development of modern democracy, it is now finding itself forced—if it is to survive, let alone thrive in the new economic order—to relinquish its cultural heritage and embrace a foreign paradigm of political behaviour which is deeply inimical to British attitudes and traditions.

The point of these remarks—indeed, the point of this series—is neither to condemn nor to sanction these economic developments. It is solely to clarify these trends: to grasp the conceptual ramifications of the ideological changes that are occurring. For the manner in which we respond to the dilemmas that confront us is vitally contingent upon how we understand them. Yet the very philosophical exercise which is called upon to meet this challenge is itself contrary to the spirit of the times. For philosophy is the epitome of individualism: it preaches the right—and the duty—of the individual to analyse and judge such issues for himself. Philosophy has enjoyed a particularly illustrious career under the liberal-democratic industrial regime; let us hope that the same holds true in its post-industrial successor. Far more is at stake than our politicians recognise or concede.

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Off-prints of S. G. Shanker's series of six articles will be available. For information please apply to the Editor.

The November issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Devolution and Development in Corsica* by Peter Savigear, *The Two Germanies* by Martin McCauley, *Jane Austen and Marriage* by Park Honan and *Cinema: A Quarterly Review* by David Shipman (held over from the August issue).

# THE EDINBURGH FESTIVAL

## by Laurence Green

EDINBURGH in August is a city bustling with life, for this is the month that the world's largest arts festival takes place, drawing writers, artists, musicians and directors, famous and not so famous, not to mention countless visitors, from all over the world. The 1984 Edinburgh International Festival proved no exception, yet it was different for it marked the first under the directorship of 57-year-old Leeds born Frank Dunlop, who had originally established his reputation as founder director of the Young Vic in Bristol.

Dunlop pointed out that his aim was to overcome the somewhat 'elitist' profile of the Festival, not by changing the nature of the productions themselves but by helping to make them more accessible to the public. 'I think it would be wonderful to make the best of the arts available to everybody and I think this is a Festival that could go towards that', he is reported as saying. Certainly, an innovation this year was a ticket booth near Princes Street on the lines of the one at Leicester Square, where theatre-goers could purchase tickets for a selection of the day's shows at reduced rates and without prior booking. Prices, too, were held down, so that a top seat for a Festival production in most cases cost half of what it would be in the West End of London. Dunlop wanted the 1984 Festival to set a precedent as an event of international significance. 'I don't think this Festival has a place in the world unless it's to do with the world. It should be an international force for world understanding and peace. That may sound grand, but I believe that'.

As might be expected the theatre side was very strong, none more so than in the international category with visits from the renowned Berliner Ensemble performing Brecht's *Galileo, Galilei* and *Songs and Poems*, Goethe's *Scenes from Faust*, the Negro Ensemble Company from America with Charles Fuller's 1982 Pulitzer Prizewinning *A Soldier's Play*, Murray Schisgal's New York comedy *Twice Around the Park* with Anne Jackson and Eli Wallach, the Harold Clurman Theatre of New York with a number of new Beckett plays, the Black Light Theatre of Prague and the *Theatre de l'Oeuvre* in Paris with an acclaimed play about Sarah Bernhardt.

Two distinguished writers who are constantly extending the parameters of theatre and redefining the meaning and use of language are Samuel Beckett and Christopher Fry. Beckett was celebrated in a big way in the official Festival with a special solo performance by Max Wall (remember his memorable Krapp in *Krapp's Last Tape*) in a programme of dramatised extracts from *Malone Dies*, compiled and directed by John Elsom, a regular contributor to *Contemporary Review*, a programme of the author's poetry, prose and drama entitled *From its Beginning to its End* and the Harold Clurman Theatre of New York with two programmes of Beckett premieres. Fry, by contrast, had two of his early plays

*The Boy with a Cart* and *A Sleep of Prisoners* performed on the Fringe and gave an exhilarating talk on his work. But back to the main Beckett event—his 25-minute *Ohio Impromptu*, and 15-minute *Catastrophe* and *What Where* that formed one 90-minute programme. In the first and longest, *Ohio Impromptu*, two ancestral figures clad in black robes and with white flowing hair sit at a table, clutching their foreheads and hiding their eyes from the light. One proceeds to read from a large book, in a gravel voice, drained of emotion, while the other periodically raps the table, ordering the reader to repeat the sentence. The tale he tells is of the loss of a dear friend. At the end of the piece they 'sit as if turned to stone'. Could this wordless exchange be a meditation on death?

In the second and most effective piece, *Catastrophe*, dedicated to the dissident Czech playwright Vaclav Haval, an outcry against tyranny and oppression is forcefully conveyed using the theatre as a metaphor. A dictatorial director knocks his victim—in this case an ashen-faced actor standing like a sculpture on a plinth—into shape using the bullyboy tactics employed by the state to humiliate the individual.

The final piece, *What Where*, provided another shadowy confrontation, this time between four spectre-like figures who obey orders from a booming voice from a microphone. My own view is that this symbolises the aftermath of a holocaust (possibly nuclear) in which the last remnants of society or the new order that has been created still retain mankind's evil desire to persecute and torture others for little apparent reason. Certainly these three short enigmatic plays provided an agonised protest against the human lot and will remain transfixed in the mind.

Mysticism of a more spiritual nature was to be found in Christopher Fry's *The Boy With a Cart*, written in 1950 and performed in Edinburgh by the Cambridge Drama Projects, a legend of miracle and faith in the style of the mystery plays. The story of St. Cuthbert, it tells of a Cornish shepherd's son who, on the death of his father, decides to take his invalid mother to find a new home in the east. He builds a cart in which she can recline and they set off. At one point the rope which runs from the handles of the cart around his shoulders breaks. This causes some mowers in a nearby field to ridicule them, but their laughter is soon dispelled by a heavy shower of rain which ruins their harvesting! Having replaced the rope with strands from the hedgerow Cuthman continues on his journey—until his makeshift rope snaps again. Relieved that his mother has sustained no injury from the accident he determines to build a church at this place called Steyning. Cuthman finds some helpers, but one day the main beam swings out of place and threatens to destroy the structure. However, a traveller appears amongst them and devises a remedy which proves effective. When Cuthman thanks the stranger and asks his name he receives the reply: 'I am he in whose name you are building the church'.

A fusion of music (from a small chamber orchestra), poetry and drama, this complex play is enriched by Fry's eloquent verse evocative of man's harmony with nature and God ('we have felt the joint action of root and

sky, man and God', 'flower and star spattering the sky' and 'man destroying, denying, disputing the land of green'). Peter Florence, the producer, who also played the role of Cuthbert brought the right blend of innocence and sincerity but Rachel Vermont seemed too young to be his mother. The rest of the cast doubling as chorus and shepherds worked hard to infuse life into this difficult play, but were handicapped by the poor accoustics of the Old St. Paul's Church which at the outset seemed a most appropriate venue but in the long run proved otherwise. Still it was never less than interesting. Peter Florence also contributed a solo performance, *The Pity of War*, based on the poet Wilfred Owen's diaries.

How do you condense the life of a legendary actress into a play of just under two hours? The Canadian dramatist, John Murrel, has taken the life and moreover the memories of Sarah Bernhardt as the basis of his play *Sarah et le Cri de la Langouste* but fortunately avoided letting himself become imprisoned by the overwhelming aura surrounding the character. His more general, more generous inspiration allowed him to abandon the exceptional facets of her character, and concentrate on the normal everyday aspects of it. Performed in French, the play dealt primarily with the relationship between the great tragedienne in her twilight years and her devoted confidant whom she coaxes to impersonate various people who influenced her life—from her mother to an English director—in order to complete her autobiography.

Delphine Seyrig brought out the fragile quality of Sarah, her mischievous sense of fun, her fierce temper and her overriding demands to indulge her every whim, but it was Georges Wilson as her long-suffering companion that cut deepest into our emotions, never more so than when he described how he was humiliated by his fiancée as a young man and had lived in fear of his sexuality ever since. What the play lacked in substance it more than made up for in style.

Scotland's main artistic contribution was David Lyndsay's witty 16th century morality play *Ane Satyre of the Thrie Estaites* which so enraged the authorities of the time that it was not performed for nearly 400 years, when it was revived by Tyrone Guthrie for the 1948 Festival. The play seemed to have lost none of its appeal in the intervening years and the spectacular production on the apron stage of the Assembly Rooms, complete with a cast of over 100, orchestra and singers, emerged as a delicious, if rather overlong, parody of the vices and virtues of mankind, especially the corrupt clergy and vulnerability of royalty. Before moving on to art brief mention must be made of two notable Fringe productions. The first was D. M. Thomas's own adaptation of his finely written novel *The White Hotel*, condensing the book into a 75-minute dramatised reading. The case history of one of Freud's patients, this complex and elusive tale dealt with sexuality, mutual dependence and persecution against the grim backdrop of the Nazi atrocities. The second was *Allez Bananas!* featuring the talented six-man vocal group Harvey and the Wallbangers who accompanied themselves on bass, guitars, violins and accordians. The sextet specialises in songs of the forties and fifties but parody, jazz, soul

and rock also mingled effortlessly in this entertaining show.

A diversity of art shows ranging in subject from Dutch Church Paintings to Rodin and his Successors and from the history of the fan to a leading innovator in sculpture today, Eduardo Paolozzi, provided plenty to tempt the gallerygoer. One of the most fascinating exhibitions was the Sculptures of Henri Matisse at the City Art Centre, comprising 60 bronzes varying in size from tiny medallions to the monumental sequence of 'The Backs', The sculptures were mainly small-scale figures and heads modelled in clay and cast after his death in bronze in editions of three or ten. Matisse carved one work in wood, 'The Dance', in 1907, which shows a figure in motion with one arm touching the back of the head and the other to a side. The poses for several early works including 'The Serpentine', 'Two Negresses' and 'Crouching Nude with Arms' derived from photographs. Other sculptures, like the heads of Henriette, were studies of favourite models who also appeared in his paintings. Although Matisse is best known for his paintings there cannot be many people who will fail to be impressed by his vivid and often erotic depictions of the female form in all its imperfections. The most outstanding exhibition was the Treasures of the Smithsonian Institution which incidentally runs until November 4 and occupies the Main Hall and the Exhibition Hall of the Royal Scottish Museum. The Smithsonian was established in 1846 with funds bequeathed by an English scientist, James Smithson. Smithson never visited America but left his fortune to found at Washington, under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men.

Over 250 objects embodying the range and brilliance of this unique national collection are on show including exquisite Chinese bronzes, American Indian artefacts such as buffalo skins, pipes, tomahawks and bracelets, the flight jacket worn by Amelia Earhart, the first woman to fly solo across the Atlantic, hats worn by Jimmy Durante and J.R. of 'Dallas', George Washington's walking stick, moon rock, a test model of the moon buggy, and perhaps most memorable, the last photograph of Abraham Lincoln, taken in 1865, just four days before his assassination. Indeed, no facet of American life and culture has been missed out in this well documented and all too brief trip through history—from portraits of prominent artists, actors, businessmen, and writers, like Edgar Allen Poe, Andrew Carnegie, Ernest Hemingway, Clark Gable, Jean Harlow and Edward Hopper, to a superb picture of actress Tallulah Bankhead by Augustus John that is in itself worth travelling miles to see. Smithsonian also presented a tuneful and engaging song-session held in the Museum's lecture theatre. I should also mention that this exhibition provides an illuminating insight into the American Indians, thanks largely to one artist—George Catlin. At a time when most people saw these people as hostile Catlin revealed the dignity and nobility of this proud race in his portraits. Perhaps next year's Edinburgh Festival will feature a full exhibition of the work of this unjustly neglected artist. I hope so.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## HOPEFUL SYMPTOMS

Dear Madam,

Following the article 'Impasse at the Politbureau' (*Contemporary Review* No. 1422, Vol. 245), various points have occurred to me. To summarise one's conclusions after a seven-day tour in Russia is no simple undertaking. Unable to speak Russian or make direct contact with the local population, how is one to assemble impressions of the true 'Sachverhalt'? Is it possible to salvage in these conditions even a residue of truth from the safety-net of an Intourist hotel? Feasible, however, is to detect changes and make comparisons after a similar trip three years ago, which seem to be somewhat at variance with Mr. Owen's contentions.

Not necessarily drawn towards the tourists' perimeter with its golden Kremlin cupolas and oriental grandeur, nor overawed by silent histrionics in Red Square, I strolled instead through some of the famous streets in Moscow and Leningrad and walked through various department stores, ordinary shops and supermarkets. It was there I noticed the slight improvements—distinct but not dramatic. Motor-cars were more in evidence. A greater variety of women's dresses was to be seen. One was still struck by a drabness, yet it was less harsh than before. In the shops, more consumer goods were available, also more luxury items, though at high prices by Russian standards. Most striking and surprising was a covert convergence of tastes, particularly amongst younger groups, with the West. These were the first explosive signs of a new consumer society emerging from its impenetrable territory of political jargon. Above all, this was no place for nuclear conflicts, but a vast, potential, market for new products.

Oddly enough, within this growing consumer society, advanced stealthily a well-organised black market. Its trade concentrated on currency deals, roubles for sterling or dollars at 3/4 times the official exchange rate. Some of the business was conducted around Intourist hotels in Moscow and Leningrad.

Yet a black market seems basically inconsistent with an increasing volume of goods in Russian shops. As a rule, shortages and black markets sustain each other by indissoluble partnership. Presumably this rapidly developing demand for consumer goods cannot be met satisfactorily by the centrally planned economy. Moreover, locals seeing hordes of international tourists with expensive gear become stirred and tempted. Unfamiliar products create their own demand, but at the end of the day this nascent black market must be seen in terms of natural dissent, more common and infectious than the highly publicised 'dissenters' who currently preoccupy the Western media (Lenin spoke in 1894 of 'the stupid fable of free will').

Nevertheless, luxury goods can be found on the shelves of shops and purchases are primarily restricted by price levels. Their very presence presages new consumer appetites and a new class of buyer with class differences. Granted, there is no bourgeois middle class in the USSR in the sense of commercial ownership or landed property, but all the same different sections of society are in evidence and their demarcation lines are estab-

lished and maintained by disproportionate sources of income. Despite its overall apartment allocations, uniform production lines and programmed periods of output, the Soviet Union possesses its own class infrastructure. Private property on a large scale has been abolished, but the paraphernalia (and 'dull compulsion') of bureaucracy has taken its place. On the surface, privilege is discouraged and is less strident than in the West. However, one is reminded of Karl Popper's assertion that 'destruction of bourgeoisie leaving proletariat in control will not necessarily lead to classless Society.'

In a wider context, Russia remains under the dominance of its icons. Its ecclesiastically orientated temperament survives in modern times despite the October revolution. Only symbols, emblems and doctrines have been replaced. Heroic statues substitute crucifixes, churches are converted into historical museums, sacraments and holy rites become political invocations. Organised mass protests and orchestrated self-confessions provide background and chorus for requisite litany. The inferno is never very distant; but setting and idiom are consciously secularised according to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Unfortunately, by any historical standards, recovery from centuries of Tsarist oppression involves a painfully slow and ponderous process. This has never been acknowledged by the capitalist West. Whether this is done wilfully and by design or through sheer ignorance matters little in the long run as the fate of the world may depend, indeed, will depend, on greater Western tolerance.

As for the current economic situation under discussion, all Communist countries have a short list of priorities. This means their failures can be significant and their successes may entail involuntary hazards. The industrial road they have travelled has been a long one, particularly for the Soviet Union, compared to the West. Viewed objectively, however, Russian progress during the last fifty years has been spectacular, though the price in human terms has been high. Production targets and threshold figures exact a price of their own as the capitalist West is beginning to learn in a series of crises.

Does all this seem inconclusive? Economic assessments are, by their nature, circumspect and unsympathetic. Maybe the point of real departure between *laissez-faire* capitalism (or administration by default) and Communist rigidity are the slogans, procedures and books of instruction. In the final analysis, however, even the shortest of visits to Russia will yield some results. Go there, see for yourselves!

Yours faithfully,

Gillsland Park, Edinburgh ALFRED LANDOR

## CAPITALISM VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

Dear Madam,

Stuart Shanker's article in the December 1983 issue, 'The Challenge of Mass Unemployment' (No. 1415 Vol. 243) prompts me to suggest that the unenlightened are the (unfortunate) victims of their own ignorance. This is all the more evident when one considers the projected image of tech-

nology, an image which is only projected in newspapers of dubious quality, the ones academics refer to as the 'comics'.

There are those who say that by 1990 we will be working from our homes, if we are working at all! Either they do not know what they are talking about or they naïvely underestimate the extreme danger to the capitalist system of technology, and thus overlook the capitalists' attempt to suppress technology in its emancipating form.

Two years ago, the public were told the microchip was the greatest invention since the wheel. Less than a year ago, some of the same illustrious spokesmen suddenly changed their minds. This came as no surprise. At the moment, there are only 713 robotisation systems in operation in the whole of the UK. Considering the speed of the industrial revolution, that can hardly be called an advance. Thus, technology is being suppressed, and will only be introduced selectively into industry.

Considering what was achieved during five years of war, it would be possible in two decades to automate fully 90% of British industry. Given the capability of the chip, no one can say that two decades is not sufficient time. Resistance of the unions has been at its weakest since the formation of the movement, and thus union intransigence cannot be the reason for the delay in automating our industry.

The reason is simple. With a high percentage of industry fully automated there would be nine million more unemployed. Those who say that they would be absorbed by the information and leisure industries overlook the fact that these industries are themselves moving into technology! With an increased number of people unemployed, the purchasing power in the high street would be drastically reduced. Government would have to feed, heat and clothe the 'new' unemployed. Subsequently, it would have no alternative but to increase taxation from industry.

Since industry (automated) will be able to operate 365 days a year, using a work-force that does not need a tea break, cannot go on strike or be accused of pricing itself out of a job, a little extra in taxation will not hurt! Yet here is the rub. The money paid out in what would normally be termed dole, would have to be equal to what was paid to the 'new' unemployed when they comprised the 'actual' work-force, so that they can purchase all that they normally did when they were that work-force.

Some think that automation would emancipate the worker. They are right, but up a gum tree to assume that the industrial capitalist class will allow the emancipation to take place, realising as they do that the chip is more dangerous than bolshevism.

No one should be fooled by observing people behind VDU units and assume that that is technology in its emancipating form, nor be deceived by 'elementary' robotisation systems like those at British Leyland. The average worker knows that, with the chip, systems could soon be in operation with even more sophisticated dexterity.

Yours faithfully,

Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire. JOHN B. COYLE

## THE FALKLANDS WAR

Dear Madam,

I am replying to Dr. Peter Calvert's article 'Britain, Argentina and the Falklands' (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1417, Vol. 242). In a nutshell, the Malvinas are Argentina's and the claim is justified. There have been four Falklands wars in 222 years. There may be another before the year 2000. The 1982 war cost 1,008 lives in defence of 1,800 islanders. The Falklanders suffered most, losing three people out of a population of 1800: or 1 in 600; the Argentinians come next, losing 750 soldiers out of a population of 20 million or 1 in 30,000 and after that the British, losing 255 soldiers out of a population of 55 millions or 1 in 200,000. 21,000 individuals were engaged in the operation including the entire Falklands community.

To break down the figures into more detail—15,000 Argentinians were also involved in addition to 6,000 British personnel and the indigenous residents. The full financial cost of the war has yet to be assessed and must run into billions of pounds sterling.

The main asset of the islands is 600,000 sheep, owned by nine absentee landlords, one of which is the Falkland Islands Company. Historically, the Falkland Islands have suffered a stormy passage. They were first discovered by a Dutchman, Seebaldes, in 1600. They were later transferred to the French count d'Aubuiville in 1764, and handed on to the Spanish government in 1765. The British Commodore, John Byron, was next on the scene. The famous 'Condor' incident took place in 1965, after the rise to power of Peron in Argentina.

Geographically, the islands are part of the continental shelf of America. The Argentinians do not need the Falklands for their assets: they already have 35 million sheep and many other means of producing wealth; yet their claim to sovereignty has become a matter of national pride. It is in the interests of the British inhabitants to allow a settlement. This would surely be preferable to transferring them to another territory? Seen from all angles, the recent Falklands war was a counter productive conflict and the issue should be submitted to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Yours faithfully,

Chelsea, London SW3. BENNO WASSERMAN

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

### by Rosalind Wade

*Voices in an Empty Room.* Francis King. Hutchinson. £8.95. *The Dearest and the Best.* Leslie Thomas. Methuen. £8.95. *Herbert Rowbarge.* Natalie Babbitt. Dent. £7.95. *Orealla.* Roy Heath. Alison & Busby. £8.95. *Swallow.* D. M. Thomas. Gollancz. £8.95. *The Last Otter.* A. R. Lloyd. Hutchinson. £7.95.

Some novelists become well-known through specialisation in a particular region or theme, others by a small concentrated output, in itself deemed to be an indication of excellence. Francis King seems to cut right across these premises. He is prolific in the best sense of the word and the variety of his subject matter is astonishing. So soon after the chilling study of a childhood in India, *Act of Darkness,* comes *Voices in an Empty Room,* set on home ground—Brighton and Chichester. The 'empty room' would appear to be that area of human consciousness which, when bereft of a loved one, seeks to make contact with the dead through spiritualism or other forms of supernatural communication. The performances of mediums, whether genuine or faked, the visitation by spirits which remain of necessity no more than a smudge on the retina, relate to the fundamental question of whether life in any form exists after death. It is a theme which never fails to intrigue, yet the discussion of such matters can very easily become arid. Francis King possesses the narrative skill to direct the debate towards a new urgency.

*Voices in an Empty Room* is, in effect, three separate stories woven into a cohesive whole by the common need to communicate with the 'other side' as experienced by three bereaved women. The first and most effective of the three studies concerns Sybil, an unmarried schoolteacher of high ability, who adores her brother Hugo to the exclusion of all other interests. Brother and sister dabble happily in the paranormal and so when Hugo, while staying with his old friend Sir Henry Latymer, happens on twin brothers who claim the gift of thought transference, he is at once involved with carrying out tests. None of them is likely to be hoodwinked by trickery. Yet for a while they are victims of a cunning deception, and before the nature of it is revealed, Hugo has made ever-increasing cash payments to the boys and, more serious, succumbed to the sexual charms of one of them. Hugo has recently married and the danger of exposure weighs heavily on him to such a degree that he commits suicide by jumping from a hotel window, thus irreparably blasting the pleasant way of life for Sybil and sending her to seek contact by automatic spirit writing, a form of spirit communication at which she and Hugo excelled.

The second subject is Lavinia, an actress so well-known that passers-by recognise her in the street. Yet all is not well with her, for a disastrous private life has left her indifferent to her success on stage. One of her unhappy sexual adventures has resulted in Stephen, her only son, who nourishes deep resentment at the ambiguity of his legal status. For convenience, he has been reared by Lavinia's sister and, as a result, sadly detests his true mother and Keith, her newly acquired husband: yet when Keith departs, like all the other men in Lavinia's life, the situation does not improve and Stephen hangs himself in a

particularly squalid manner. Maybe it was not her fault, yet she is obsessed by guilt and the need to make amends. Thus, in a desperate attempt to reach the unexplored territory beyond the grave, Lavinia is destined to meet Sybyl in the consulting room of a famous medium.

Soon, she is joined by Bridget, a widow of the Falklands War. Her situation is different, for she did not really love the inconsiderate and bombastic Roy, although during his lifetime she was far from realising it. But the abruptness of his departure tempts her to try to 'get in touch.' This, the shortest and least satisfactory study of the three women, could have been an anti-climax, yet fortuitously and unknowingly, Bridget holds the key to the experiment to conjure up the recent dead. In a brilliantly diverse and skilful exploration of many human moods and situations, the reader is left with a distinct impression that there could be—is—at least some basis for believing in spirit communication.

Another novelist who surprises with his choice of theme is Leslie Thomas. Widely acclaimed for his inimitable accounts of National Service in distant parts of the world, *The Virgin Soldiers* and *Onward, Virgin Soldiers,* he has chosen in *The Dearest and the Best* to evoke the world of 1940 at the close of the 'phoney war.' Leslie Thomas, who was a nine-year-old child at the relevant time, has displayed remarkable skill in capturing the mixture of courage and pigheadedness which characterised the attitude of those who lived through one of the most transient and uncertain periods in our history. With the benefit of hindsight we can feel aghast at the amateurish activities of the Home Guard and the complacency of people, rich and poor, who lived out their lives in the green glades of a village called Binford in the New Forest. Inevitably, for the purposes of fiction, the national problems need to be distilled through an individual microcosm. Events centre on the Lovett family—a blimpish bore of a retired father, an attractive, mildly frustrated mother and two stalwart sons, James and Harry, who have already seen bloody action in France and Norway. The delicate interplay of family relationships provides an effective mirror. The same cannot be claimed for the scenes in which a 'real' Winston Churchill is introduced as the perceptive leader who singles out young James for a 'hush-hush' job. The intrusion of 'documentation' slows down the narrative and diverts attention from the characters about whom we wish to know more. Predictably, in the interests of verisimilitude and balance, the Lovett family is destined to receive some devastating blows, one of which is a complete surprise. As a record of a part of our history too recent to be fully assessed as well as a human story, *The Dearest and the Best* stands up well.

A very different scene concerns Natalie Babbitt. She is an American writer and her novels, some of them for children, have been widely praised. In *Herbert Rowbarge* she has sought to develop an unusual theme—the dilemma of identical twins arbitrarily separated soon after birth. The infants first saw the light of day in 1880, in the upstairs bedroom of a seedy pub. Their mother deserted them as soon as she was able to leave her bed, having first named them Herbert and Otto after a couple of confidence tricksters by whom she had been robbed. The children became inmates of the Gaits County Children's Home, and before long Otto was offered a home and so plucked from his brother's side. Thereafter, Herbert suffered from a subconscious deprivation until, seeing his image in a mirror, he believed that he had at last discovered a congenial partner for his games and fantasies. All this could be the basis of an interesting psychological study, but Natalie Babbitt has a different plan. The action of the novel switches abruptly to the little town of Ohio in the year 1952, when we see Herbert as the successful owner of the Pleasuredrome

amusement park. Coincidentally, his only children are identical twins, a pair of mature unmarried girls, Babe and Louisa, who minister in turn to their father and aunt in different houses, while they mourn the necessity of living apart. Thereafter, the narrative becomes interwoven between the two dates. A fascinating picture of Herbert's past is unfolded alongside the pattern of social and domestic life in Ohio. The finale presents us with yet another *motif*. The paths of the long-separated brothers cross and Herbert is mistaken for Otto, who is likely to be charged with a driving offence. The consequences could be dire, yet as an essentially lighthearted writer, Natalie Babbitt ignores the serious implications. The sombre aspects of the situation are barely hinted at, but what emerges is shrewd and diverting enough to please.

Roy Heath is a novelist determined to portray a world which, at first glance, would seem to have few attractions for the modern reader. *Orealla* is set in Guyana, at a time when, in the capital, Georgetown, amenities were rudimentary for those residents we would now describe as "underprivileged.' The central character is Ben, convicted burglar and thief, who is offered employment as coachman and stable boy with a man he detests as an alternative to another gaol sentence. Conditions in the 'big house' of the Schwartz family make life easier, but Ben rebels against his new master, indulging in needless demonstrations of rudeness and arrogance. His own life is a tangle of personal relationships. Tina, his wife, is sufficiently well educated to become a nurse, but it is the earthy and illiterate Mabel by whom he has three children. A complicated situation, yet Ben is the last person to worry about the moralities and nothing is ever going to be sorted out. His main confidante is Carl, Indian by origin, who has migrated to Georgetown from the remote countryside of Guyana, buoyed up by fantasies about his birthplace, the village of Orealla, to which he will one day seek to return. Conversations about this romanticised hamlet and the almost unintelligible utterances by the neighbours occupy Ben's attentions when he should have been bent on improving his own position. Perhaps the death of his employer, Mrs. Schwartz, is the only event which touches Ben deeply, for by her tolerance and courtesy she had won his respect and affection. The finely written sequence of her illness and funeral stands out from the morass of half-realised sentiments and abortive confrontations of the lesser characters, yet it is with them, rather than Ben's opulent employers, that Roy Heath is concerned. The apparent aimlessness of the plot, the oft-repeated descriptions of sordid dwellings and the phonetically recorded dialogues in pidgin English patois, build up surely but slowly into an unforgettable picture of life lived at the lowest level by people who have little to gain or lose in the struggle for survival.

Finally, two very different novels, each deserving attention. With *Swallow*, D. M. Thomas continues and develops his ability to intrigue and tease with the unconventional nature of his forms and setting—this time an international games event which has its inspiration in Italy, although D. M. Thomas places it in Finland. Divisions are made between the judges' thoughts and actions and some items are in verse; others are presumed to be snatches of D. M. Thomas's own childhood experiences; and there are many more. Can such a hotch-potch of ideas be steamrollered into an acceptable whole? As with *The White Hotel*, the success of D. M. Thomas's determination to introduce totally original structures into the novel remains unchallenged for the moment. The question remains, how long is he going to continue his experiments and will they withstand the test of time?

Nothing could be more different than *The Last Otter* by A. R. Lloyd. This well-produced book, one which must stand high on the list for Christmas purchases, decorated by Douglas Hall's woodcuts, recounts the moving story of an otter named Lut, accompanied by various other animals and birds as well as humans, locked together in the eternal struggle between man and nature.

**Also received:**

*Shad.* John William Carrington. Macmillan. £8.95. John William Carrington deviates slightly from the accepted form of the 'tension' novel with this uproarious account of hard-working Shad Sentell, famed for his abilities to deal with even the largest oil well inadvertently set on fire. Shad carries out his dangerous duties with attention divided between the risks involved and the antics of various amorous women of varying ages and appeal.

*The Third Day.* Michael de la Haye. Constable. £7.95. *The Third Day* must be described as a thriller with a difference. Alongside the discovery in Israel of the bones of a long-dead man, who could be Jesus Christ, is an interesting and illuminating comment on the political situation in Israel as it might be in the year 1989. Needless to say, the skeleton has an alarming potential for upsetting nearly two thousand years of Christian belief in the Resurrection, US involvement as well as Israeli home politics. The factual basis to the theme is that, in 1968, such bones were in fact found at Giv'at ha Mivtar without receiving very much publicity. Sometimes brutal, always convincing, *The Third Day* creates a new pattern in suspense novels.

*What Farrar Saw and Other Stories.* James Hanley. Deutsch. £10.95. James Hanley is at his most inventive in *What Farrar Saw*, the strangely unreal yet disturbingly possible disaster of trunk roads being permanently jammed and the nightmare situation of the trapped drivers. Three other stories accompany the novella, all interesting and unusual.

*Something Out There.* Nadine Gordimer. Cape. £8.50. Nadine Gordimer's latest selection of short stories, *Something Out There*, illustrates her conviction that this art form enjoys an endemic life of its own and is not to be regarded merely as a convenient means of gathering together a number of short pieces. All the stories are strikingly original and worthwhile, particularly 'Letter from his Father,' an imaginary correspondence in reply to Kafka's celebrated 'Letter to my Father' (never posted), and 'Sins of the Third Age' in which a retired couple seek fulfilment in Italy—a dream which poignantly fails to materialise in the way they had anticipated.

*Playing the Jack.* Mary Brown. Hodder. £9.95. This mammoth first novel traces the career in closest details of 'Sprat,' a waif adrift in the uncaring world of the late seventeen hundreds. Throwing in his lot with circus folk, suffering all manner of hardships, he finally wins through.

# NON-FICTION REVIEWS

## NEIL KINNOCK—LABOUR LEADER

*The Making of Neil Kinnock.* Robert Harris. Faber & Faber. £4.95.

This is a short but satisfying book. I rose from it with a feeling that I knew far more about Neil Kinnock than previously. I have known well three leaders of the Labour Party. Attlee, Gaitskell and Wilson. Kinnock I have never met but I have been physically close to him more than once when he has been addressing the Labour Peers with plenty of spice and humour. I shall no longer be tempted to think of him as a lightweight except that he is younger and lighter on his feet, altogether more active than the other political leaders. He emerges here as a man with a fine gift of phrase—that one knew already—but in addition as remarkably audacious and possessed of a strong measure of his own form of moral courage.

One knew, of course, that his refusal to back Tony Benn for the Deputy Leadership of the Party in 1982 had angered 'the hard Left'. I had no idea of quite how vitriolic was their reaction or of how vigorously he coped with it. He was attacked unexpectedly in a public lavatory while he was washing his hands. A youth lashed out at him with his foot catching Kinnock a painful blow on the elbow. Kinnock seized his attacker and pulled him in close—'Then I beat the . . . out of him'. In the same period he ran into real trouble in his constituency through his loyalty to his beloved Michael Foot.

As I write these words he has just gone through what, in public eyes, would be his most difficult ordeal. He has been addressing the TUC Conference on the day after it gave Arthur Scargill a standing ovation. Kinnock's views on Arthur Scargill are uninhibited. 'He's destroying the coal industry single-handed,' said Kinnock during the campaign for the leadership of the party in 1983. 'He's the labour movement's nearest equivalent to a First World War general.'

Kinnock came through the Conference test with a fine mixture of courage and rhetoric. He fully earned the headline in the Daily Telegraph next day. 'Sensible and also brave'—a rare accolade from that quarter. Robert Harris sums up in his epilogue the chances of Kinnock ever being Prime Minister. 'Somehow', he writes, 'one cannot feel that Kinnock has come so far to go no further.' Yet he reaches the rather obvious conclusion that Labour's chances of winning the next election are not bright. There is also, however, an election after that. Who says that Kinnock has no chance of becoming Prime Minister in 1988?

In my view there is one large snag. He has long been a committed member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I cannot believe that the British public will ever vote, rightly or wrongly, for their policies. But Aneurin Bevan, Kinnock's great hero, once shocked his supporters by refusing 'to go in naked into the conference chamber'. In other words he embraced the necessity for nuclear weapons. So may it be with Neil Kinnock.

Whatever the future holds for him he will remain a most attractive figure.

FRANK LONGFORD

## SOCIAL SECURITY—A NEW VISION

*The Reform of Social Security.* A. W. Dilnot, J. A. Kay, C. N. Morris. Oxford University Press. Cloth £10. Paperback £3.95.

In post-war years I have had cause to marvel at the advances in pensions and social security in Europe. The post-Beveridge Welfare State was a matter of pride. Now, in an atmosphere hostile to additional social security expenditure and a multitude of regulations relating to tax, social security and supplementary benefits, we have invented the poverty and unemployment traps. Even I only discovered that UB40 was not just a pop group as a result of the number of youngsters I have to deal with who fall foul of the law in the hopelessness of their unemployment.

At the last Election, Dick Taverne's scheme for an integrated system was hardly an issue, but *The Reform of Social Security* examines the haphazard interaction of tax and benefit systems and argues for one integrated simplified system which is at once more equitable and within the existing budget. It is so obvious and yet so radical that it is hard to see the Government or an unimaginative publicist like Rhodes Boyson grasping the nettle. It is easier to patch old clothes and save by whittling away existing benefits.

Beveridge based his concept on social insurance. The failure to sustain economic growth, an aging population and inflation undermined this. Unemployment has destroyed it. Different individual needs were also overlooked. Beveridge underestimated the future problems of low income families and provision for old age, nor did he foresee the one-parent family syndrome. The elimination of poverty involves redistribution and new methods of achieving it. Piecemeal attempts have created remarkable anomalies apart from the low level of take-up. Any system in which one becomes worse off by increasing one's income is flawed.

It is in the well-thought-out structural reforms and distributional changes simplified by a useful appendix comparing old and new that the real meat of this work lies. Numerous tables illustrate the neat and never wordy argument. One may quarrel with detail, but the overall proposition is entirely convincing. Even a glossary is added for those not familiar with the jargon of Social Security. As the law reports daily make Social Security more complex, and form-filling becomes an awesome task, modern technology in an integrated system which does not divide social benefits from taxation structurally and geographically in a patchwork quilt of benefits and authorities must be a correct aim. Negative taxation would be more radical.

This well-researched work points up in the right direction, gives us a compass and slide rule—but the computer, properly applied to individual needs within a single simplified system, would solve many problems. Economic growth and a different political philosophy would not hurt, either.

PAUL ROSE

## A NEW TOWN FOR THE FUTURE

*Washington: Quicker by Quango. The History of Washington New Town 1964-83.* Stephen Holley. Publication for Companies. 1983. £9.95 paperback.

The New Town Movement is a 20th Century phenomenon and reflects very well the remarkable changes in attitudes to the Victorians in the space of 80 years; from one of revulsion to the legacy of industrial squalor to a reassessment of the achievements of the period. The New Town Movement is an expression of that revulsion; the very understandable need to get out and start

all over again. By the time Washington Development Corporation was founded in 1964, the era of the revulsion was to have had its last heady heyday before the recession of the 1970s brought in a new concept of urban regeneration, conservation and rejection of the architectural horrors of the Bauerhaus Movement; the clean lines, the rigid split between work and play. As Washington was being developed as a new town, the ideals underlying its foundations were being increasingly questioned.

Washington occupies a halfway house between a totally fresh start on a green field site and that of urban renewal. Sir James Steele, who was the first chairman of the Washington Development Committee, in his foreword to *Washington: Quicker by Quango* admits that for a moment he coveted . . . so many spacious sites in beautiful country west of the A1(M), free from dereliction that it seemed crazy to build a new town in a welter of industrial waste instead of a 'green belt site.'

It is to the credit of all those concerned that the Corporation did not despoil the beautiful country, rather it concentrated on an area of old mining villages to the east of the A1(M) with their surrounding spoil heaps and wasteland. *Washington: Quicker by Quango* chronicles the transformation, emphasising the role that a New Town Corporation can play in speeding up the way decisions can be made and, indeed, proving a more efficient form of administration than local or central Government; yet, because it is a non-elective body, attempts to be more sensitive to public opinion.

Stephen Holley, the first General Manager of the Corporation, has written this well-illustrated book in a largely anecdotal style, giving the impression that the facts and figures were drawn from a hat without much thought being given to the continuous thread of the story. None of the chapter headlines is treated in any real depth—bar the ones on Finance and Organisation and on Administration—which would have been possible despite space limitations. This is a pity because its effect is to devalue the subject matter, and leaves the reader with the feeling that neither he nor the author has really come to grips with the extremely challenging and complex undertaking that Mr. Holley and his colleagues undertook.

There is no doubt that the book will serve as a useful introduction to Washington and, indeed, the New Town Movement itself. When the Corporation is wound up in 1986, perhaps Stephen Holley would complete its life history and use the opportunity to write a more definitive and substantial record.

EDWARD T. GRIST

## CANADIAN LITERATURE

*The Oxford Companion to Canadian Literature.* William Toye, General Editor. Oxford University Press. £30.

It is almost 20 years since Norah Story produced her *Oxford Companion to Canadian History and Literature*, and the phenomenal amount of Canadian writing in the subsequent two decades has led the Oxford Press, of which William Toye is the Canadian Editorial Director, to produce a volume on Canadian literature alone. It is to be given a warm welcome. That it was done, albeit by 196 hands, in some three years, constitutes an editorial triumph.

The book is a happy marriage of basic brief entries with longer mini-essays on special topics. The range of material is lavish: from French-Canadian and English-Canadian writing to much less familiar but fascinating themes such as Ukrainian literature, Yiddish literature, Indian writing and Acadian writing, and not least to the six notable entries on the regions, especially Newfoundland, the Maritimes and British Columbia.

In all its usefulness and its uniqueness, there remains a dilemma. Individual historians have to be looked for under the heading Historical Writing in English or Historical Writing in French, and, if they are not there, to be hunted down under Biography. There is, to this reviewer's taste, an overtight demarcation between those historians who, to the editors, qualify because of their literary grace and those who do not, and who, in consequence, are not here. There are thus, inevitably, some omissions. In compensation, the essays on the Maritimes or on Quebec are fascinating and fresh. Given the range they have to cover, however, and given the remarkably varied character of the Canadian component national and linguistic groups, this is a new, valuable and unusual reference book.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## PICTURES OF THE PAST

*The Travels of Peter Mundy* 1597-1667. Edited by John Keast. Dyllansow Truran. £3.95.

*Navvyman.* Dick Sullivan. Coracle Books. £5.75.

*Separatism in Brittany.* M. J. C. O'Callaghan. Dyllansow Truran. £6.95.

A growing interest in the Cornish language and history has encouraged Dyllansow Truran to extend their list. One of their most important recent publications is *The Travels of Peter Mundy*, edited and assembled by John Keast, with reproductions of Peter Mundy's own original drawings. In his Introduction John Keast points out that although, surprisingly, the seventeenth century Cornish historian, Hals, makes no mention of Mundy and his travels, a later writer, Tonkin, refers respectfully to Mundy the traveller as a son of Richard Mundy, of Penrhyn. By any standards, the book is valuable for its spontaneous and forthright comments, not only on foreign countries but on home affairs, and much of what he says about now familiar landmarks is relevant today.

A vivid description of his first voyage to India (1638) is followed by journeys to Holland and the Baltic states, Macao, Constantinople and, on the second and third journeys, many more places are visited. These voyages lasted for years in conditions of extreme discomfort, yet there was no reluctance to face the dangers or to remain for so long away from home. Peter Mundy lived through tumultuous times in his own country—the execution of Charles I, the period of the Commonwealth and its dissolution after the displacement of Oliver Cromwell's son and heir, Richard. Because he reports these events in a low key, not even referring to the execution, they are seen as being part of the accepted background experience of ordinary people, rather than dramatic highlights as they seem to us in retrospect.

Peter Mundy was himself a man of considerable enterprise, learning new languages, writing and drawing; yet it is for his remarks on Cornwall that his work is most significant; for it is clear that in his own mind the Duchy was a separate country divided by the River Tamar from the rest of the United Kingdom. The chapter devoted to Penrhyn is a small masterpiece of observation

in which we come face to face with unspoiled Cornwall, free of car parks and unsightly development.

John Keast makes no apology for having taken considerable liberties with the long-neglected Mundy text, whether an advantage or not is difficult to judge without studying the manuscript now housed in the Bodleian Library.

Another equally revealing glimpse into the past is provided by *Navvyman*. It is impossible to travel through a railway tunnel or across a viaduct without speculating on how these miracles of engineering were actually carried out. In *Navvyman* Dick Sullivan supplies the answer. The work was done by a roving, undisciplined and largely unorganised force which moved from one construction site to the next, exploited and cruelly treated as long as the need for their services existed. Inevitably, thousands died in the course of the dangerous excavations and it was many years before society acknowledged a debt to these intrepid workers. The book is based on the recollections of Dick Sullivan's father, who became a navvy in 1903. His spontaneous comments give a vitality to what might have been a flat, rather disjointed narrative. Interesting notes on each chapter and a unique collection of photographs combine to make *Navvyman* an important contribution to a neglected aspect of our industrial and social history.

Both *Navvyman* and *Peter Mundy* pulsate with human drama and, in contrast, *Separatism in Brittany* strikes a rather chilling note. The subject—the inhabitants of Brittany and Wales, their divisions and common ground—is well worth attention yet unfortunately Michael O'Callaghan has chosen to convey it exclusively through the records of his university thesis on the subject. Thus, a superfluity of Notes and a straining after factual information all but stifle the author's good intentions. To have laid the thesis aside and written the book afresh would have been much more acceptable.

ROSALIND WADE

## A PRIVATE VIEW OF PUBLIC LIFE

*Mother and Daughter: the Letters of Eleanor and Anna Roosevelt.* Bernard Asbell (Ed.) Sidgwick and Jackson. £15.00.

Of all American presidential families those of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy continue to fascinate the reading public, perhaps because each of these men married women who, in different ways, were distinguished in their own right. The volume of letters edited by Mr. Asbell contains the intimate record of the relationship between a famous First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, and one of her children closest to her, the only Roosevelt daughter. She revealed her inmost feelings to Anna alone in the family, and to one intimate friend, Lorena Hickok. Against the background of Eleanor's unremitting work for peace and social reform are shown the sorrows and disappointments of her personal life. She had, early in their married life, discovered F.D.R.'s infidelity; and that, not with his own secretary, but with hers. 'The bottom dropped out of my world', she later admitted. According to James, one of her four sons, she and Roosevelt agreed after this confrontation to lead separate lives, continuing only 'as business partners' in an armed truce. What a formidable team of partners they turned out to be.

The most significant aspect of the mother-daughter relationship is the freedom with which they commented on the political figures and world-famous personalities whom they met in the round of entertainment and diplomatic

activity in Washington. Eleanor herself became a greatly admired and influential presence on the world scene, particularly for the work she did for the young United Nations and for refugees. In one sense or another almost everyone she met seemed to her some kind of refugee, so hospitable was she, so earnestly desirous of doing good in the world and preventing harm. 'Mother loved all mankind', said James to Mr. Asbell, 'but she did not know how to let her sons and daughter love her.' Letters to Anna show Eleanor as extraordinarily generous to her children and their partners with gifts of money and goods. The signature to each letter is accompanied by deeply affectionate messages. To the public at large she was a motherly, homely yet impressive and almost awesome person whom they regularly saw and heard on TV chat shows, in radio talks and in a syndicated newspaper column called 'My Day'. And yet in the eyes of her family, like many a famous person before and after her, she seemed to communicate more easily with strangers than she ever did in the intimacy of the home. She might almost have been the Americans' Mrs. Miniver, mixing formality with familiarity in her speeches and writing.

Bernard Asbell is to be admired for making available a 50-year record of letters in which the drama of daily hazards is more frequently met with than is commonly the case. Here is revealed Anna's suffering, through two broken marriages, the price of her parents' fame; and Eleanor's loyal struggle to support one of the greatest of statesmen, in spite of her estrangement and his physical disability. The research done is meticulous and the book makes illuminating reading.

BETTY ABEL

## A GRASSHOPPER OF LITERATURE

*Desmond MacCarthy: The Man and His Writings.* Introduced by David Cecil. Constable. £9.95.

When the throne fell vacant with the slipping therefrom of Sir Edmund Gosse in 1928, the man who donned the figurative velvet jacket and coruscant headgear of 'most important and influential critic in England', Chief Reviewer of the *Sunday Times,* first gentleman of letters, was Desmond MacCarthy. Who he? Do I hear in Rossian echo? *Vanitas vanitatum!* But in that best of all memorials, unforgetting affection, comes forth Lord David Cecil to praise a (once) famous man. That the man happens to have been his father-in-law matters only to make the meed of praise of truer vintage. Eton, Trinity, the Apostles . . . his life *should* have been a charmed one. The fault was not in his stars. In the first part of the book—a mere twenty-two pages—Lord David Cecil neatly effects a nicely mannered introduction to one who was 'one of the most distinguished men of his time . . . as a writer and as a man, a personality'. Coming down with an aegrotat degree, MacCarthy settled into London literary journalism. He married Molly Warre Cornish, daughter of the Vice-Provost of Eton. He fathered three children. He achieved celebrity as a dramatic critic, particularly of the Vedrenne-Barker productions at the Court Theatre. He became literary editor, and 'Affable Hawk', of the *New Statesman,* 1920-1928. In 1928 he founded and edited *Life and Letters,* and then succeeded Gosse, remaining literary critic of the *Sunday Times* for the rest of his life. He moved in splendid—if restricted—circles. Among his friends were Hilaire Belloc, Logan Pearsall Smith, Max Beerbohm, Maurice Baring, the Asquiths, Duff and Diana Cooper, and Winston Churchill, Anybody *except* Desmond MacCarthy would have described him as a success. But looking out from within, MacCarthy saw himself as a dismal failure. He blamed his fecklessness

and laziness for the fact that he never wrote a book. He had planned, even begun, full-length studies of Byron and Tolstoy, not to mention several novels. None was ever completed. He lacked staying power. His mind, brilliant though it was, was that of a very sharply singing grasshopper, springing, always with style and verve, from subject to subject. Fugitive collections of fugitive pieces were assembled and (let us resoundingly mix our metaphors, or metamorphoses!) butterflies of a day, died. We ought to be grateful to David Cecil for resurrecting this MacCarthyian nosegay. Written with grace, albeit no greatness, the selection contains many pieces that are well worth the preserving. MacCarthy is at his critical best on Henry James. Concerning Ibsen he is notably perceptive. The Flint Cottage vignette of Meredith is memorable—

> A December afternoon . . . (Meredith) sitting to one side of the fire, dressed in a soft, quilted jacket, with a rug upon his knees. On a little rickety table by his side stood two candles and one of those old-fashioned eye-screens which flirt out green wings at a touch; a pile of lemon-coloured volumes lay beside it. His face beneath a tousled thatch of grey hair, soft as the finest wood-ash, and combed down into a fringe upon a high round forehead, had a noble, ravaged handsomeness. . ."

There is so much that is so good in this gentle, perceiving, jolly and inspiring book that anyone who cares for the bridlepaths of literature simply must not miss the turning of its pages.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Black and White Britain** (Heinemann. £8.95). This 'Third PSI Survey' is a report by the Policy Studies Institute of 'a survey investigation into the circumstances of the British Black population' under the direction of Colin Brown, research fellow of the Institute. It follows two earlier surveys by the Institute's predecessor, Political and Economic Planning in 1966 and 1974. It is derived from the replies to questionnaires given in 1982 by 5,001 black people and by 2,305 whites. 'Both the survey of Asians and West Indians and the survey of whites are . . . based on a nationally representative sample of households and also on a nationally representative sample of indviduals'. The field work was carried out by Research Services Ltd. and the office of Population and Censuses and Surveys. In the result this volume includes a vast amount of information in 132 Tables. Scotland is excluded. There have been some improvements since 1974, particularly in relation to better educated blacks. Indeed, the initiative of Asians in founding their own businesses successfully is well known. In general, however, Mr. Colin Brown draws a gloomy picture. He concludes that with some exceptions, 'the British job market has changed little in its hostility to black workers, except that it now excludes more of them from work altogether'. It would be wrong to assume, as the word 'hostility' suggests, that this is due to racial discrimination as such. Mr. Colin Brown deduces from the survey material that 'for the most part . . . Britain's well established black population is still occupying the precarious and unattractive position of the earlier immigrants'. After eighteen years 'there is just the same need to pursue equality between

racial groups in Britain'. This is not a problem that can be solved by a wave of the hand.

**The Nuremberg Trial.** (Macmillan. Paperback £7.50). The Papermac edition of this remarkable work, so soon after the publication of the hardback edition in 1983, should attract a much larger readership. The authors, Ann Tusa and her husband, John Tusa, have drawn upon a vast amount of official and private material to provide, in more than 500 pages, a detailed scholarly account of the events leading up to and the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal which met near the end of 1945 to try 22 leading Nazis. In September 1946, judgement was delivered. Three, Von Papen, Schacht and Hans Fritzsche, were acquitted. Twelve were condemned to death. The remainder received varying terms of imprisonment, including of course Rudolf Hess, now the sole remaining prisoner. The judges were divided. 'The French thought twenty years was an adequate sentence for Hess. No one else agreed. As ever, the Russians wanted a hanging'. Both were outvoted and Hess received his life sentence, which for the Soviet Union means life.

**Collected Stories. Isaac Bashevis Singer.** (Penguin. £4.95.) A highly desirable pocket Singer, crammed with forty-seven tales selected by the Master himself, and prefaced by his own note which abhors fiction based upon 'social dialectics', or inspired by greed for fame, or marred by forced originality. Dabbling in psychology is wrong. 'Genuine literature informs while it entertains.' None of Singer's perfectly reasonable maxims, however, prepares the unwary reader for the power of his imagination, his near-mystic apprehension of man's place in the universe, his humanity and wisdom. His familiar themes are here—lonely old age and exile in Manhattan and Miami, or happenings in primitive Polish villages. (M.T.)

**Everyman Classic Thrillers** (Dent). Among recent additions to this series are two John Buchan novels. *The Power House* (£2.50) was first written in parts in 1913 and is a story of intrigue stretching from London to Bokhara. In his Introduction, Anthony Quinton points out that the principal character resembles in many respects Buchan's own career. *The House of the Four Winds* (£2.50) was published first in 1935 when Buchan was appointed Governor-General of Canada. In his Introduction, Simon Rees refers to the novel as 'a gripping Ruritanian thriller with a great deal of period charm'. *The Third Round* (£2.50) by Herman Cyril McNeile, alias Sapper, was first published in 1924 and is the third inconclusive struggle between Bulldog Drummond and the evil Carl Peterson. To many, Sapper's thrillers were adolescent reading, but Jeremy Lewis in his Introduction fairly concludes that 'middle-aged readers contemplating a return trip can rest assured that Sapper holds up very well indeed'. *Drink to Yesterday* (£2.50) first appeared in 1940 and was an immediate success as a spy thriller. It was the first and best novel of Manning Coles, the joint pen-name of Cyril Henry Jones and Adelaide Frances Oke Manning. In his Introduction on the work of these collaborators, T. J. Binyon refers to *Drink to Yesterday*, as 'obviously a beginner's novel'. The construction is clearly faulty, but 'in the end it works triumphantly . . . there is a brooding atmosphere of tragic inevitability'. All these books make excellent holiday reading.

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## NOVEMBER 1984

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Martin McCauley

THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A NEW REVALUATION
Kenneth Medhurst

THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE: A DIFFERENT VIEW
Paddy Ashdown, M.P.

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW
David Shipman

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement

98p

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# Contemporary Review

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## THE TWO GERMANIES

### by Martin McCauley

DETENTE was officially declared dead on 26 July 1984 on Soviet television by Leonid Zamyatin, CC secretary for international affairs. This may be true of the superpower relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States but it is quite untrue when applied to relations between East and West Germany. Despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish situation, the installation of Pershing II, cruise and SS22 missiles and the Olympic boycott the flower of rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG has continued to bloom. Such has been the growth that Moscow's perennial suspiciousness about German intentions has been aroused. Soviet criticism of Honecker's proposed four-day official visit to the Federal Republic, due to begin on 26 September, reached such a pitch that the East German leader was forced to call off his trip on 4 September. A hard blow for Chancellor Helmut Kohl but an even more painful one for Honecker. However, the rapprochement between the two parts of Germany will continue but at a slower pace. Moscow has once again demonstrated that it regards East-West German relations as a subservient part of Soviet-West German relations.

The main reason for the present warmth between East Berlin and Bonn is money. The DM1 billion credit negotiated in 1983 has been followed this year by a new DM950 million credit. In order to create the right atmosphere for the present loan the East Germans had to make certain concessions, one of which is that pensioners need only change DM15 instead of DM25 daily. However, on the day the new measures were due to go into operation the picture changed. Whereas in the FRG pensioners can be as young as 58 years, retirement in the GDR begins at 65 for men and 60 for women. GDR law was applied and this understandably disappointed many West German senior citizens. An oral promise had been given by the East Germans that the above concessions would also apply to West Berliners, but this was later withdrawn. Did the East German negotiators make the concessions in good faith or were they obliged by Moscow to backtrack on some of them?

By far the most important result of the need of the GDR for hard currency has been the decision to allow upwards of 30,000 citizens to move to the Federal Republic. A striking fact about the recent wave of émigrés is that over 20,000 of them are from East Berlin, politically, economically and culturally the leading city in the GDR. For the first time since the

Berlin Wall was built in 1961 large numbers of GDR citizens have been allowed legally to move westwards and this has led many of those left behind to ponder whether they too should try to move out. This problem has directly affected the churches in the GDR. Some members have left, seeing no future for themselves as practising Christians in the GDR. The churches urge their members to stay and have appealed to the government to create conditions which are conducive to public contentment and well-being.

Hence the present climate of East-West German relations contains the seed of social conflict in the GDR. What is at the root of the present policy and is Erich Honecker powerful enough to cope with the pressures which are building up?

When Honecker came to power in 1971 he turned his country's face away from West Germany and towards the Soviet Union. A new ice age in East-West German relations was inaugurated as *Abgrenzung* (delimitation) became the ruling principle. A decade later this policy had been stood on its head. On the occasion of the official visit of Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor, in December 1981, Honecker underlined the responsibility of both German states for the safeguarding of peace in Europe. Honecker assured Schmidt that the GDR would maintain close ties with the FRG in the future. The East German leader's planned visit to the Federal Republic suffered a setback when Helmut Schmidt (SPD) was replaced as Chancellor by Helmut Kohl (CDU) but the disappointment did not last long. At the Leipzig Fair in March 1983 Honecker was all smiles and bonhomie and talked about visiting the Federal Republic, if he could fit it in. He expected his visit to lead to an improvement in East-West German relations. However, a month later it was stated that the GDR leader could not, after all, visit the Federal Republic. Two reasons suggest themselves for this *volte face*. One was the persistent sniping at the Soviet Union and the GDR by Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU) in an attempt to force Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) out of the Foreign Ministry. Strauss, who shortly afterwards was to change his tactics completely, was chafing at having been left out of Kohl's cabinet. Another, much more important, reason was probably Yuri Andropov's lack of enthusiasm for a visit by Honecker to the Federal Republic at a time when the debate about the installation of Pershing II and cruise missiles was reaching its peak. Since it was unlikely that Honecker would cause the Bonn government to change its mind on the missiles a visit by the GDR leader in 1983 could have been construed as condoning their installation.

Warnings from Moscow and East Berlin about the dire consequences the stationing of the missiles would have on Soviet-West German and East-West German relations went unheeded in Bonn. Great hopes were placed by the East in the peace movement in the Federal Republic but all to no avail. A significant factor in the failure of the Soviet Union to secure a delay in the stationing of the missiles was the terminal illness of Yuri Andropov. With the missiles in place the Soviet response of placing SS22s

in the GDR and Czechoslovakia came as no surprise.

Many observers waited for the new ice age in East-West German relations to arrive but it never did. Moscow accepted a diplomatic defeat and the transition to a new leadership in the Kremlin consumed the time of Soviet policy makers. East-West German relations continued quietly to expand. Then came the news of the fresh credit, the GDR concessions and the planned visit by Honecker to the FRG. The response of the Soviet media was to attempt to muddy the waters of East-West German accord. Newspapers and journals, led by *Pravda*, began a campaign in July, accusing the West German government of revanchism, militarism and neo-Nazism. The essence of these charges is that the Federal Republic still harbours hopes of restoring Germany to its 1937 frontiers. In other words, the FRG has territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, including the GDR. Since Bonn has signed treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR accepting the present boundaries, there is no substance to this charge.

Is the main reason for the new credit the weakness of the GDR economy? The performance during the first half of 1984 would appear to belie this. National income rose by 5.1 per cent or 0.7 per cent above plan. Industrial output was also in excess of the plan and the retail trade turnover at 4.4 per cent was double that planned. Foreign trade also expanded at double the rate envisaged in the plan. Nonetheless, this very healthy picture is only a façade. The weak link is hard currency indebtedness. According to the West German journal, *Der Spiegel*, at the end of 1983, GDR debts stood at $11.7 billion. GDR holdings in Western banks, on the other hand, were put at $2.4 billion. The cost of servicing this debt in 1984 was estimated by bank specialists to be in the region of $1-2 billion. This is presumably the reason why the GDR made the political concessions to secure the new loan.

Given the rapid expansion of GDR foreign trade why is the country so deeply in the red? Lack of international competitiveness is the simple answer. Two options are now available to the GDR. Orientate its foreign trade more and more towards the socialist bloc (Comecon) and the Third World and restrict imports from the West. The disadvantage of this strategy would be that technologically the GDR would fall further and further behind world standards with the result that in time East Berlin's position in Comecon markets would also weaken. Hence the other, much more difficult, option is the one which has been adopted. It involves the GDR raising its international competitiveness by importing high technology from the West. This, however, conflicts with the interests of some of the GDR's partners in Comecon. The Soviet Union, for instance, would like to take a greater proportion of the GDR's specialised engineering products and high quality textiles but it is not in the interests of the GDR to accede to these wishes. The Soviets have responded in kind. The number of motor cars exported to the GDR has been declining over time. Moscow has also cut back its exports of oil and forced the GDR to use alternative sources of energy. The main indigenous fuel is lignite or brown coal; but, whereas

in 1960 only 2.85 cubic metres had to be mined to secure a tonne of lignite, it is now 4.4 cubic metres and it is expected in a few years to approach 10 cubic metres.

The difficulties facing the SED leadership might suggest that Honecker is under considerable pressure but all the evidence points in the opposite direction. Against all expectations in May 1984 he was able to add several new faces to the ruling Politburo. The promotions were very significant. The most spectacular was that of Professor Herbert Häber, the leading SED expert on East-West German relations. He also entered the CC Secretariat which now means the department for West German affairs is headed by a full member of the Politburo. Two other promotions to full Politburo membership were those of Werner Jarowinsky, an economist and expert on foreign trade and Günther Kleiber, a specialist on data processing. Hence German affairs and the economy have been accorded greater significance in the present Politburo, reflecting Honecker's own priorities.

The GDR is now asserting its own economic interests *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. How is it to secure influence in Moscow if it does not fully accede to Soviet trade wishes? Honecker has chosen a route which corresponds to the present evolution of the Soviet Union—by upgrading the role of the military in the GDR. The National People's Army (NVA) is now the second best equipped in the Warsaw Pact, after the Soviet Army, and is playing a more significant role in the Warsaw Pact. It has been said that GDR military doctrine is the same as the Soviet—without the mistakes! A creeping militarisation of GDR society is evident, mirroring the same evolution in the Soviet Union. The more reliable the NVA becomes the greater GDR influence over Soviet military policy—such are the hopes of the SED leadership. By having a say in the formation of Soviet military policy the GDR would have some influence on Soviet foreign policy.

Here again Honecker has been able to promote his nominee to full Politburo membership. Egon Krenz, responsible for the military training of GDR youth as well as security affairs, has seen his career take off over the last few years. For instance, he was a member of the small SED delegation at Andropov's funeral in Moscow in February. Indeed, Krenz is beginning to look like a future SED leader.

If East German policy towards Bonn has changed radically during the last five years what of West German policy towards the GDR? What has changed in Bonn to make it a desirable partner?

West German policy, ever since the inception of the two states, has been to work towards the reunification of Germany; yet Bonn never entered into direct contact with East Berlin since diplomatically it did not recognise the GDR government. All this changed in 1966-67 when Willy Brandt became Chancellor in the Grand Coalition. He proposed the recognition of the GDR; two German states in one German nation was the formula he adopted. The rapprochement led to Brandt visiting Erfurt, where GDR citizens gave him an effusive welcome and Stoph, the GDR

Prime Minister, travelled to Kassel, where the West German population gave him a polite welcome. So shocked was the SED leadership by the popularity of Brandt that the rapprochement was brought to an end as the GDR decided to keep its distance. Soviet pressure led to the Berlin Agreement and the exchange of missions by the two German states.

The Berlin Agreement led to a vast complex of intra-German agreements and the GDR's unquenchable thirst for hard currency was the bait Bonn used to exact concessions. The optimists spoke of the two parts of Germany coming closer together through a community of shared interests.

The advent of the Kohl government was a rude shock for East Berlin but it revealed itself to be as magnanimous towards the GDR as the previous social democratic coalition. Hence one now has the extraordinary spectacle of conservative West German politicians trying to outbid one another in their generosity towards East Berlin. One indignant CSU member made the point to Franz-Josef Strauss last summer that it was not the task of the West to prop up a tottering communist regime in the East. Strauss turned a deaf ear to such arguments. Ironically he had himself projected similar views not so long before.

Are there any inherent dangers for West Germany and the West in the developing relationship between the two Germanies? Since the two German states lie at the heart of Europe any significant change would alter power relationships in Europe. A Western fear would be that West Germany might be charmed into a German confederation by GDR and Soviet promises. The price could be the Federal Republic leaving NATO and the GDR the Warsaw Pact. Germany would adopt a neutral stance with the Soviet Union gaining a clear advantage. This type of scenario belongs to the future but as long as a conservative coalition holds power in Bonn there is little likelihood of West Germany making any concessions which would embarrass its Western allies. Indeed, the confidence with which the FRG conducts negotiations and enters into obligations is based on the belief that the Marxist-Leninist ideology, whether as a philosophy of life or as a way of ordering a society, has no attraction for the average West German. Hence, the remarkable unattractiveness of GDR state socialism permits the Federal Republic almost limitless scope for further political, economic and cultural agreements.

What effect has the new-found relationship had on the GDR? Has it changed it in such a way as to promote national understanding?

The GDR has met the West German challenge by rewriting its own history. For instance, it now claims to be the heir of all that is progressive and good in German history. The Prussian state has been cast in a new light. Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and other worthy German military figures have been put in new socialist uniforms. Frederick II has been rescued from obscurity and his statue restored to its old place of honour. In 1982 Goethe was reassessed, in 1983 it was Luther's turn and this year it is Schiller. Next year Bach, Händel and Schütz will be glorified. There are, of necessity, unresolved problems, that of the German

nation, for example. The present SED view is that there is a socialist German nation (GDR) and a capitalist, bourgeois German nation (FRG). Will they ever merge? When did the socialist German nation come into existence and has it fully evolved? Then there is the problem of the legitimacy of the GDR state and the ruling communist party, the SED. An independent peace movement has been formed and the churches are a focal point of a different way of life. Overt political opposition is dealt with severely by the political police and East Germans have learned to conform. However, most suffer from split personalities, outwardly they obey but inwardly they inhabit a private world. The SED has been brilliantly successful at instilling conformity but has failed to convince the vast majority of citizens that its concept of the good society is superior to that in West Germany. A common East German complaint is that there is no genuine debate with the authorities about the goals of society. Decisions are handed down for implementation and everyone is pressured to accept them as they stand.

Comparing the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR one is struck by the fact that in the USSR the legitimacy of the state and government is very high whereas in Poland it is very low. This may be due to the fact that in the Soviet Union intermediate group cohesiveness is underdeveloped, except in republics such as Estonia and Georgia which are non-Russian, whereas in Poland it is very high. The GDR is somewhere between these extremes. Will it develop in the direction of the Soviet Union or Poland? The potential to be more critical of the authorities and to act is there, but the German desire to conform will restrict this. Intermediate group cohesiveness is strong among Christians. Will the independent peace movement and the ecology lobby develop in the same way? One of the objectives of West German policy is not to provoke a head-on confrontation between intermediate groups and the communist party. Developing East-West German relations can help to reduce some of the tension in GDR society. The Honecker leadership will require considerable political skill to manage this relationship since East Germans might come to expect too much too soon. East Berlin now needs Bonn more than Bonn needs East Berlin.

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[Martin McCauley is Lecturer in Russian and Soviet Institutions at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. His latest book is *The German Democratic Republic since 1945* (Macmillan 1983). He will contribute an article on the present situation in Estonia in a future issue.]

# THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE: A DIFFERENT VIEW

**by Paddy Ashdown, MP**

WHEN Atlanticist Establishment voices such as Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt, rather than CND, call for a major rethinking of NATO's military strategy it is fair to conclude that change will take place. Moreover when the British Atlantic Committee describes the idea of controlled nuclear escalation as '. . . impractical nonsense in an unpredictable . . . situation . . .' and Sir John Hackett states that:

> I am totally persuaded that the defence of Western Europe must be, however it is contrived, conventional. . .

and;

> . . . There should *not* be an escalation; there should *not* be a first-use. It is first-use that we have to avoid. . .

it is clear that the change in strategy could be far-reaching.

Yet the present NATO strategy has developed over many years and is embedded in large organisational structures and many people's modes of thought. It may be rather difficult, therefore, to untangle this complex problem and work ourselves through to a more sensible, safer strategy for the future. This article is a contribution to what will, hopefully, be a wide-ranging in-depth process of rethinking.

I focus necessarily on just one aspect of the problem but, I think, an aspect of major importance: I want to examine critically the widespread opinion that the Soviet Union has overwhelming conventional military strength, and therefore that we have no alternative to a 'First-Use' of nuclear weapons strategy in Europe. It is clear that a majority of people in Britain believe, not only that the Soviet Union has stronger nuclear forces than the West (an incorrect view), but also that they have stronger conventional forces. In recent years, for example, Gallup has asked the following question on three occasions:

> Which side—NATO or Russia and the Warsaw Pact—has the strongest military forces?

As an associated question referred specifically to nuclear forces, we can be reasonably certain that the respondents understood this question to involve a judgement of conventional military strengths. The answers received are set out below in Table 1.

Table 1: Popular Opinion on Greater Military Strength

| | 11.79 | 1.80 | 2.83 |
|---|---|---|---|
| NATO ..... | 12 | 13 | 17 |
| Warsaw Pact ..... | 64 | 59 | 55 |
| Both equal ..... | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| Don't know ..... | 21 | 22 | 20 |

I doubt that these responses will surprise many readers.

However, even a cursory glance at the objective situation—say as set out in *The Military Balance*—should call that widespread perception of Soviet superiority into question. The superpowers have about the same

population, but by any measure the United States is vastly richer and has a much stronger economy than the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States has powerful friends outside of NATO (e.g. Japan), whereas the Soviet Union shares a long border with the huge and potentially hostile China. Furthermore the Soviet Union's allies are, in general, small and not economically powerful countries, whereas the United States' partners include some of the richest major countries (e.g. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada) in the world.

In fact, NATO outnumbers the Warsaw Pact greatly in population (about 627 millions to 383 millions), and, contrary to popular opinion, spends twice as much on military expenditure (an estimated $307 to $151 billion dollars in 1983). In terms of military strength, for example, NATO has more total manpower in its ground forces (2,957,000 to 2,643,000) and larger ground forces available in Europe (2,246,000 to 1,714,000). Unlike many official documents I am, of course, including the forces of France and Spain.

Given this broad picture of the relative strengths of the two alliances it would appear that the leaders of NATO would have to have indulged in long-term dereliction of duty for the Pact to be grossly superior to us in military strength. As I do not believe that such long-term malpractice could have gone unnoticed in our open societies I will argue the opposite case—that the Warsaw Pact does not have militarily significant superiority over NATO. I will suggest that the authors of *The Military Balance* are quite correct when they regularly finish their analysis of 'The East-West Conventional Balance in Europe' as follows:

> Our conclusion remains that the overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking . . . there would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory. . .

In short I will argue that the technical literature runs strongly counter to popular opinion on this subject.

It is not difficult to understand why public opinion is as misinformed as it is. Over many years defence establishments in the West have produced simplistic distorted statistics to give an impression of Soviet strength which could then be used to justify larger defence expenditures. Amongst the most audacious of these distortions are the aircraft counts given for Europe. Commenting on the 1982 NATO comparisons, Anthony Cordesman noted in *Armed Forces Journal International* that:

> The NATO aircraft counts—which for some strange reason excluded all reinforcements from outside Europe but included all aircraft in Russia's three Western, Volga, and Urals Military Districts—gave the Pact 7,240 combat aircraft to 2,975 for NATO.
> These NATO air figures seem a bit thick even for comparisons designed to serve the purposes of political gamesmanship. They include most of the strategic defence forces of the Warsaw Pact—which almost certainly would not be committed in bulk to any attack on NATO even under the worst conditions—and ignore America's impressive ability to deploy tactical air power based in the US.

They also ignore the qualitative differences between NATO aircraft and the less capable Pact planes. Thus whilst the 1984 British *Statement*

*on the Defence Estimates* gives the Pact a 2.1:1 advantage in numbers of fixed-wing tactical aircraft (Figure 9, Appendix A, Volume 1), the Carnegie Report on *Assessing the Balance: Defence Spending and Conventional Forces,* after allowing for reinforcements and qualitative differences, notes that NATO has a 7:1 advantage in its ability to deliver bomb tonnage at a 200 mile range (Table 4, page 71). The NATO fighter bombers which give this crucial advantage are, as the report makes clear, also quite capable of taking on the best of Pact fighters in air-to-air combat.

Similarly whilst there has been a great deal of noise recently about the growth of Soviet Naval forces it is obvious that NATO navies are far superior. As far as Europe is concerned, whilst the Soviet Northern Fleet based near Murmansk probably has the primary mission of protecting the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet, it could pose the major naval threat to NATO by disruption operations in the Atlantic. However another respected analyst William Kaufmann commented recently in a Brookings Institute study that:

> . . . standard analyses of the war at sea suggest that while the allies might suffer serious shipping losses during the early stages of a war in Europe, essential tonnage for NATO would get through and the threat to the sea lines of communication would be contained. . .

Indeed other analysts worry more about the inadvertent triggering of nuclear war by Allied attempts at offensive operations near the ballistic missile submarine bases.

Given that we are dealing with an area where data is being manipulated for political (financial) purposes it is necessary to proceed with some caution. As Robert Lucas Fischer, the author of one of the most frequently cited and highly regarded technical studies of the European balance, concluded:

> Some general comments on analyses of this sort suggest themselves. First, and most important, the questions must be posed carefully. . .

Thus I will be concerned primarily with an analysis of NATO's Central Front and not with the Northern and Southern Flanks. For as Cordesman noted:

> . . . NATO can lose many small confrontations or conflicts. It cannot, however, risk more than the most minor loss of territory in the Central Region. . .
> . . . NATO stands or falls on its ability to preserve the Central Region. . .

Moreover I will be very careful about whose forces are counted, what forces are counted and how the quality of such forces is measured (see the Congressional Budget Office study *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance* for a particularly clear and straightforward discussion of these issues).

Fischer continued his review by stressing the importance of assumptions put into an analysis:

> Second, the assumptions about the way a war breaks out and about relative mobilisation and reinforcement rates matter enormously. . .

Most popular opinion is founded on static 'bean counts' of forces, but as we shall see much more must be considered to obtain a realistic military assessment.

Fischer noted also the need for assessments to avoid fixation on

comparing 'like with like'. It really makes little sense to compare tank numbers if one side has invested preferentially in anti-tank weaponry! More importantly still, however, he ended by stressing that:

> Finally, the requirements for certainty and possibility may be quite different. It is easier for NATO to make a Pact commander uncertain of his offensive capability than to feel completely secure itself . . . Creating such uncertainty may in fact be sufficient for many political purposes.

What we are discussing here is conventional deterrence. We want to know whether NATO has, or could reasonably obtain, sufficient conventional forces for Warsaw Pact commanders to be rather uncertain of their ability to win a quick victory on the Central Front. We are not involved in an attempt to equal Warsaw Pact forces at all levels or deal with all possible 'worst cases.' It should be understood, nevertheless, that we are not involved just in a dry academic exercise. Continual over-emphasis of NATO weakness leads to despair of doing anything—save rely on nuclear weapons. Realistic analysis may point to rational means of effective force improvements for NATO.

The Central Front essentially means the inner German border. Thus the troops to be counted first are standardly taken to be as follows; on the NATO side those stationed in the Federal German Republic and the Benelux countries; and on the Pact side those stationed in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Then there is the question of what reinforcements and reserves can reasonably be expected to move to this front during mobilisation. Standard analyses deal mainly with ground troop levels and only later with the effect of air power.

The difficulties of reaching a consensus even on this simple level are obvious. Should all of France's available forces be counted or not? The Romanians probably are not trusted by the Soviets, and they must have doubts about the Czechoslovakians and the Poles. Perhaps the most reasonable, recent, detailed assessment in the open literature is the Congressional Research Service Report on the *US/Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1970-1982.* I will use the figures of Cordesman which are based on this Congressional Report.

Cordesman's opinion, after taking as many of the uncertainties into account as possible, is that:

> . . . the true NATO-Pact manpower ratio in the Central Region is . . . more like 1.113 million to between 890,000 and 933,000.

That is to say, that overall, NATO has a manpower advantage on the Central Front.

In terms of military formations, Table 2 shows that NATO has a total of 26 divisions and eight other formations available on the ground.

Table 2: Committed NATO Forces on the Central Front

| | Divisions | | | Separate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Armour | Other | Total | Brigades or Regiments |
| Totals ..... | 15⅓ | 10⅔ | 26 | 8 |

(From Cordesman's Table Four)

The Warsaw Pact has a total of 57 divisions on the ground, but Table

3 reveals some of the complexities.

Table 3: Committed Pact Forces on the Central Front

| | | Category | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-Soviet | Total | I | II | III |
| Tank ..... | 12 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
| Motorised Rifle ..... | 17 | 10 | 3 | 4 |
| Other ..... | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ..... | 31 | 20 | 5 | 6 |
| Soviet | | | | |
| Tank ..... | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Motorised Rifle ..... | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ..... | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall Total ..... | 57 | 46 | 5 | 6 |

(From Cordesman's Table Five)

Clearly there are 26 Category I Soviet divisions present, and 20 non-Soviet Category I divisions. But there must be a question over the 14 Czech and Polish Category I divisions, and the 11 Category II and III divisions are at best about 75% strength.

Further analysis at this level shows that ready reinforcements and front-line reserves could bring NATO up to 65 divisions and 39 other formations and the Pact up to 89 divisions of which 46 are Category I, 13 Category 2, and 30 Category 3. The limitations of this approach are, however, profound. It takes inadequate account, for example, of the fact that Soviet divisions are smaller than US divisions or of NATO's practice of holding much more non-divisional manpower, or of the differing combat strengths of various formations.

For this reason attempts have been made to devise measures which give a better idea of the combat effectiveness of the armies on the Central Front. One such measure is the US Defence Department's Armoured Division Equivalents (ADEs) method which weighs the mobility, survivability and firepower of each weapon. This method has been widely used in the open literature particularly by John Mearsheimer whose latest account in his book *Conventional Deterrence* (Chapter 6) provides a good overview. The first point to be made is that although the number of ADEs on each side is classified information the ratio of the committed forces at 1.2:1 in the Pact's favour supports the contention that Pact commanders are most unlikely to feel confident of a surprise 'standing-start' attack (for serious doubts on the 'Tanks Rolling over the North German Plain' story see General Polk's article in *Strategic Review*).

Mearsheimer then turns to the critical issue of mobilisation rates. He comments:

> . . . If NATO begins mobilising its forces before the Pact does, or simultaneously, then the force ratios will remain close to 1.2:1 . . . If NATO starts mobilising a few days after the Pact, then the balance of forces should approach but not exceed a 2:1 ratio in the very early days of mobilisation and should then fall to a level close to the premobilisation ratio. . .

Now, as an attacker needs at least a 3-5:1 advantage at the point of attack to have some hope of a quick 'blitzkreig' type victory, the question is whether such ratios overall would allow overwhelming attacks at breakthrough points. Using a realistic model of the Pact having a 64:32 Armoured Division Equivalents advantage overall (2:1) Mearsheimer has little difficulty in demonstrating, for example, that a 4:1 advantage at four points would necessarily leave the rest of the Pact's front bereft of troops—and thus open to effective counter attack. On this analysis therefore, as long as NATO mobilises on time the Pact's military commanders could not be very confident of a rapid victory (and they are unlikely to be interested in a prolonged slogging-match given NATO's much greater in-depth resources). The question that might reasonably be asked, however, is whether NATO leaders could agree to mobilise effectively whilst Europe is full of tactical nuclear weapons which are likely to trigger a general nuclear war if hostilities do break out?

Mearsheimer deals with one other point which should be noted in regard to the possibility of conventional defence on the Central Front. He argues that it is generally agreed that a brigade can hold a front optimally if it is 7 to 15 kilometers long. It turns out that the NATO Northern Army Group has 30 brigades to cover 225 kilometers. Therefore allowing for the standard 'two brigades up, and one back' formation it is clear that each forward brigade has to cover 11 kilometers. The situation on the much more difficult terrain (for attack) of NATO's Central Army Group is about as good. Thus in terms of these force-to-space ratios NATO would be in very good position for resisting attack.

To take this kind of analysis much further it is necessary to attempt to model mathematically what would happen if fighting began under a variety of conditions. This is a difficult process to carry out well, but the essentials of what is required can be followed in Kaufmann's article. It is also necessary to build into such analyses the effects, for example, of NATO's advantage in aircraft. There is not the space to discuss such technical analyses here, but consideration, say of Kaufmann's figures or Cordesman's discussion of Gans' analysis does not easily lead to the conclusion that NATO is in a hopeless position on the Central Front.

Indeed the message from many of these studies is that NATO has a wide range of sensible options open to it which would substantially improve its position. It is, of course, important that these improvements are clearly defensive and not offensive uses of new technology—particularly in view of known Soviet suspicions of NATO strategy (see General Hackett's comments on Soviet understanding of 'Forward Defence'). Yet within these restrictions there are, for example, the possibilities of the use of new sophisticated methods of field defence, major enhancement of ready reserve forces, or even a rationalisation of roles in NATO. Certainly the literature is littered with worries about the state of BAOR and suggestions as to how careful new investment might help there.

My conclusion from this evidence, therefore, is that NATO has, and

can continue to have, a reasonable conventional deterrent in Europe. Consideration of a move to 'No-First-Use' involves many other issues concerned, for example, with technical, political (e.g. French strategy), and arms control matters. Yet it does seem to me that these issues can not be avoided any longer by simple recourse to the statement that conventional weakness in Europe forces us to rely on the first-use of nuclear weapons.

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[Paddy Ashdown is Liberal Member of Parliament for Yeovil. Mr. Ashdown wishes to acknowledge assistance and co-operation from Dr. Malcolm Dando of The University of Bradford.]

# DEVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CORSICA

## by Peter Savigear

AN easy but misleading comparison suggests itself between the political tragedy of Northern Ireland and recent events on the island of Corsica. The government in Paris, like the government in Westminster, grapples with the issue of regional autonomy and the menace of violence. However, the comparison is superficial and erroneous, attractive to those seeking to dramatise and based on a false assumption about Corsica and violence. Events on this French island, particularly during the last decade when the comparison with the six counties has been made, show major differences and quite special political issues. Even the 'violence', an imprecise and confusing word, has been quite different in form.

Corsica is now in the vanguard of French constitutional innovation, and herein lies its importance, not in the incidence of bombings or some romantic association with bandits, guns and crime. The two departments of the island, *Haute-Corse* and *Corse-du-Sud*, form the Region of Corsica and are the subject of the first decentralised institutions in the 'one and indivisible French Republic', an exciting and significant change which breaks with the more or less continuous process of centralisation dating from the seventeenth century and Cardinal Richelieu and Colbert. Corsica became subjected to the central French state when the Monarchy took formal possession in 1768 from the Genoese. This association is now redefined by the Special Statute for Corsica.

The government of M. Mauroy proposed and drafted the necessary legislation in 1981, in effect a derogation from article 72 of the 1958 Constitution. This Statute became operational in 1982. The Region benefits from a greater measure of local autonomy than that envisaged for any other region of Metropolitan France. An Assembly, elected by proportional representation, not the usual two ballot system employed in France in recent years, and a Regional Executive, headed by a President elected from within the Assembly, constitute the government. There is a new regional administration responsible for the matters over which the executive has competence. These include matters of economic development, in agriculture, industry and tourism, the area of employment and *formation professionelle*, infrastructure (especially irrigation projects), cultural issues and education, and a wide competence over the financial administration, including the politically vital element for a truly decentralised region, the authority to raise loans. For example, in April 1984 a loan was raised in order to assist the balancing of the regional budget (of 28 million francs). The transfer of funds from central government has taken place since 1982, albeit too slowly in the view of many Corsicans. In 1982 the first Assembly was elected and M. Prosper Alfoni became the first President of the Region of Corsica.

The first eighteen months of decentralisation have not been easy.

Financial problems and political uncertainty have led to the dissolution of the Assembly. No majority had consistently supported the executive; fourteen distinct groups were represented in the Assembly. The so-called autonomist group, the *Union du Peuple corse* of Dr. Edmond Simeoni, held a balance with its seven seats, but two of their members broke away. By the Spring of 1984 a political impasse had appeared and new elections followed on 12th August for a new Assembly.

The prospects for a more stable majority seemed better. Five per cent of the votes are now needed for a list to be represented in the 61-seat assembly. Instead of 17 competing lists, as in 1982, there have been only 10, and of these eight managed to exceed the 5% hurdle. But uncertainty remains. No single group has a majority. The largest number of seats, 19, have gone to the Union of the Opposition, a coalition of the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) and UDF (Union pour la démocratic française) political parties and the local party, the Bonapartists. This does not constitute a majority. On the left, the MRG (Movement des radicaux de gauche), divided into two lists in the two Corsican departments, have a total of 18 seats and rest on strong traditional suport for their leadership, MM. Giacobbi and Nicolas Alfonsi. The Communist Party retains seven seats, an increased share of the vote from 10.9% to 11.7%, but the revised national attitude of the party prevents a clear left coalition majority. The politics of the new assembly rest on the positions of the remaining party lists. The CNIP (Centre national des indépendents et paysans) might join the main national opposition group and form a block of 25 seats. Such a block could be transformed into a majority of seats, i.e. 31, by the co-operation of the six members of the *Front National.* This party obtained 9.2% of the Corsican vote. Much of its support is found among the 18,000 *pieds-noirs* on the island, and this political strength may mean that the party holds the effective balance of power in the assembly.

The position of the autonomists has changed. The party of Dr. Simeoni, the UPC, has only three seats. Their political critique of Corsican politics, consistent over some 25 years, cannot permit them to join the MRG/Socialist group of M. Giacobbi nor the opposition group led by M. de Rocca Serra. Both these leaders have been castigated by the autonomists for years as the typical clan chiefs of the island's politics. Moreover the autonomist vote has divided. Many of the former supporters of the UPC have now voted for the *Mouvement corse pour l'autodétermination* which also obtained three seats. Although represented, the autonomists are therefore a less significant political force than in the previous assembly. The MCA suporters are the young, wearied by the failure of the UPC to achieve rapid changes since 1982 and perhaps by the lack of change in the UPC message; editorials in the autonomist paper, *Arritti*, in the summer of 1984 still inveigh against *'la Corse de la rouille claniste, de ses fraudeurs'* much as they did in 1967 when autonomists first contested elections. The MCA represents the more extreme and 'hard line' of autonomism. But the division of this broad movement means that the

supporters of the *Front National* hold the most influential political position in the new assembly.

The principle of decentralisation and the belief that Corsica requires some special consideration within the French state have been socialist policies at least since 1976. However, any hope that the new measures and institutions would silence criticism of the relationship between Paris and Corsica and would bring an end to unrest and political uncertainty, must stem from a misreading of Corsican politics. Such hopes were encouraged by the support for the Special Statute coming from the autonomists, especially from Dr. Simeoni. The determination with which anomalies in the electoral registers were pursued, above all by the autonomists, brought hopes of a victory for legality over the politics of the clans. Nostalgia among some Corsicans for the brief moment of independence under the rule of Pascal Paoli, from 1755 to 1769, might be satisfied in the new constitutional arrangements without disruption to the French state or loss of this important base in the Western Mediterranean. Moreover, the support of the autonomists raised hopes of a decline in levels of violence which had been increasing since Dr. Simeoni had himself been involved in the tragic events at Aleria in 1975.[1] Although other groups had also been active in bombings and attacks, notably the *Ghjustizia Paolina*, the *Front paysan corse de Libération*, later *the Front de la Libération national corse* and most recently *Francia* (anti-autonomist) and *Armée de Libération nationale de la Corse*, the support of the major autonomist group and leaders was a hopeful signal for the Socialist government in 1981 and 1982. Any such optimism was a misunderstanding.

The new decentralised institutions are important. Many of the former agencies have disappeared and their work undertaken by the new administration. Planning organisations like the *Société pour la mise en valeur de la Corse*, long attacked for political reasons, have gone. Their tasks are now scrutinised by the regional authorities, ultimately elected by the Corsicans. The electoral procedures are revised. Corsicans understand all this, and almost 70% voted on 12th August, almost the same as 1982. But if these innovations have assuaged some of the political grievances of the past, they are only devices for the resolution of deeper difficulties that remain. Many of the old reasons for discontent remain also. The established political parties, Gaullist and socialist, have a following but there is meagre confidence in their ability to remove the causes of discontent. The UPC has paid the price of failing to produce visibly successful policies and a more extreme nationalism has entered the Assembly with the MCA. It is also interesting that the Communist Party which has directed a clear Marxist argument for the development of the Corsican economy, has not lost support but has increased its share of the vote by almost 1% in August 1984. Many young Corsicans seek the answer to their distress in the communist orthodoxy (the party has its own newspaper on the island, *Terre corse*). Thus the new institutions have not yet brought manifestly new prospects for the future.

Arguments about the future for Corsica have a marxist dimension.

Poverty has stimulated political and cultural demands. But the argument cannot rest there. After all, French governments of left and right have steadily subsidised the infrastructure and economy since 1946 in general, and since 1975 in particular, even if it seemed to require agitation and violence to extract concessions. The regional budget of the French state doubled for Corsica from 1975 to 1980, and has continued to rise. The details are scarcely contested. The principal discontents come from a coherent idea of the political and economic development of Corsica which these funds assist and which is far from being merely industrialisation and proletarianisation. The direction and nature of poverty and decline worry many Corsicans because these threaten an indigenous political and social culture. Government aid is not enough. It may even be used to the detriment of the island, for example, if funds become used for fraud or malpractice. Aid will be tested by the political control to which it is subjected and the use to which it is put.

The region is affected by some special forms of poverty. Insularity, of course, poses a handicap, somewhat eased by subsidies, and difficult internal communications mean further immense expense to overcome the transport of goods and the need to improve. The basic economic reality is the decline of rural agriculture. Terrain is poor and distribution of produce slow. Only a few small, efficient, specialist producers can expect to survive and expand. Such do exist, often producing cheese, honey, some olive oil (a far cry from the large-scale production of oil in previous centuries, especially from the Balagne region where the trees, terraces and fine houses inland from Calvi and Ile-Rousse still exist). Some agricultural producers work on a larger scale. The production of clementines has been a recent outstanding success. On the reclaimed land of the Eastern coastal plain, large wine producers appeared, assisted by the SOMIVAC. The *pieds-noirs* among them became the targets for autonomists who denounced fraud and marketing which worked against small Corsican producers. These changes in the agricultural economy have meant continuing rural decline, emptying villages in the interior, the decay of communities who could once live in substantial houses, worship in large churches, the remains of which can be found in the interior, in the Balagne and the Castagniccia. Rural poverty thus has meant the destruction of a rural culture.

There is little essentially Corsican industry. An efficient, modern and innovative business, the manufacturer of vine harvesting machinery, FEMENIA, has recently been in financial difficulties with consequent worries for the employees. Recession has made industrial employment prospects even grimmer on the island and new investment poor. Demands for work increased by 16% in 1983 over the previous year. Tourism, the largest element in the gross domestic product at 19%, is also in decline, as is the major employer, the construction industry. Although the new regional institutions debate the economy and accord subsidies, for example, to the firm FEMENIA, little dynamism has been created by the decentralised government. Long-standing causes of discontent, therefore,



remain and into this morose atmosphere has come a persistent 'terrorism'.

The changes in regional government have not reduced the violence on the island. The executive and assembly have no direct competence in matters of security and police. These remain the responsibility of central government. Indeed, the result of the continued bombings has been an enhancement of central government authority with the appointment of a special commissioner for policing, M. Robert Broussard, who has the exceptional position as sole head over all security, including the *gendarmérie*. There has been a slight reduction in the number of explosives planted since his arrival at the beginning of 1983, 591 incidents in 1983 as opposed to 804 in 1982. Nevertheless, the incidence is still high, although since 1971 only two deaths and two serious injuries have been caused by explosives up to the end of 1983. The principal targets have been banks, premises, and apartments and cars belonging to officials, *pieds-noirs* and mainland French. An increase in assassination has also begun, but remains minimal despite the killing of Pierre Massimi, general secretary of the Department of *Haute-Corse* in September 1983. The developments have nevertheless been disturbing.

Although some of the violence has been claimed by separatist or nationalist groups like the FLNC (who claim c14%), and a small amount by anti-separatist groups, much of the bombing has no unequivocal political significance. The *plasticage* of a holiday villa, an organised camp site and the daubing of political slogans are no proof of political motivation. The island would appear to be suffering from a spreading violence of more or less purely criminal kinds. In the last two years there has been a great increase in hold-ups and bank and shop raids. These are quite striking. 700,000 francs from a raid in Ajaccio on March 17th, 1984. On the 29th two raids yielded a further 110,000. On the 2nd April 45,000 was taken, and another 110,000 at Bastia on the 4th. On the 7th 150,000 francs were taken and an estimated 1,140,000 francs in five raids between the 9th and 13th April. Two simultaneous trends seem to apply: a broadly criminally motivated pattern of violence, often concentrated in the two main cities, Ajaccio and Bastia, or in a fairly confined area; for example, a series of varied attacks have been recorded in the Propriano area from July 1983, fading out early in 1984. Other incidents are more overtly political, for instance, the strange death of Guy Orsoni which has given rise to accusations of state directed assassination and led to the banning of the *Consulte des comités nationalistes*. The funeral of Etienne Cardi, a nationalist bomber killed while planting explosives in January 1984, had a political dimension reminiscent of IRA funerals. Some violence is clearly political and the threats against mainland teachers working on the island is one of the more recent forms.[2] Decentralisation seems irrelevant and incapable in the face of these developments.

The growing protest and demonstrations by all manner of Corsicans against violence and the bombers is evident. Politicians of most groups have expressed their disapproval, sometimes in the Assembly, or at public meetings, like one at Calvi which brought together the leaders of MRG

and RPR. Enthusiasm has greeted the *Association pour la Corse française et républicaine* strongly against terror and separatism. Some optimism must be accorded this wave of revulsion which has united many Corsicans against the bombers, but such protests can co-exist with the fear of violence. A small number of activists of a political kind or criminals can exploit that fear. Recruits are not lacking. They can be found, by those inclined to hunt them, among the frustrated and disaffected youth and younger workers.

This section has been most forcefully affected by the reduced employment. Opportunities for work on the mainland are poor. Former outlets to which several Corsicans were attracted have gone, notably in the Imperial and North African territories. The opening of a university on the island, at Paoli's eighteenth century capital, Corte, has permitted some 1,200 students to remain on the island and not go to Nice, Aix-en-Provence or Paris as occurred before 1982. The result is a growing body of disappointed youth unable to find secure employment. Decades of publicity about Corsican culture, history and language has immersed this youth in their Corsican identity. They can be excited by the political movements of the island and from the late 1960s until 1983 they were principally attracted to the autonomism of the Simeoni brothers. Some of their magic has faded. Edmond Simeoni has been ill. The leadership of the UPC is increasingly in the hands of his brother, Max, who has no illusions about the shift in popularity. 'Today, the most important new fact is the division of our electorate into two—essentially the youth on one side and us on the other—', was his recent comment to the journalists of *Le Monde*.[3]

Continuing violence and political uncertainty unresolved by two elections to the Regional Assembly, are both results of the deep divisions within the Corsican population. This is no simple distinction between nationalists and those urging close adhesion with France, or between Corsicans and non-Corsicans.

Some elements in the island's population are relatively clear. The *pieds-noirs* are a significant minority, but even many of these are of Corsican origin. They have some cause for anxiety. A few have suffered direct attacks from separatists. The majority of those who live on the island seek no separatism, wish secure and cheap communications, better facilities, more work and opportunities for their families. Those who can trace their origins to Corsican parents tend to be proud of the association and of the distinctive history and culture. But the autonomists and nationalists have long been pointing out, quite correctly, that the composition of the population has been changing. Economic decline and deliberate policy are held to be responsible, though this is open to more question. The essence of this change lies in the destruction of the rural communes of the mountainous interior. The inhabitants of these communities have been obliged to abandon their villages and move to the urban areas and to the mainland. This process has been presented as the destruction of the Corsican people, the erosion of their traditional economy and centres of

habitation. While this population has declined, a new element has appeared from the mainland and elsewhere, taking work and resources. These two elements cannot both survive easily, and all the separatist, nationalist and autonomist groups share the concern for traditional population. Much of the apeal of their movement has been in the search for the identity of a Corsican people, its history, music, artefacts and language. At one level this is a contrived and folksy movement; at another it has become a dynamic political cause. In this latter form it has had both a clandestine existence and formal representation in the Regional Assembly.

However, changes in the population and the diversity of the inhabitants are putting the nationalists and autonomists under pressure. It is increasingly difficult to speak with conviction and clearly of a Corsican 'people'. It is a matter of great urgency for these movements to indentify that 'people', to preserve its culture, before the notion loses all relevance. The influx of foreigners to the major cities, especially Italians who are now the largest foreign tourist population, also has helped to change the composition of Bastia and Ajaccio. North Africans, mainland French, Corsicans interested mainly in employment, the fortunes of the Bastia football club, with the expanding cities and their social life, swell the growing proportion of Corsicans who live in these two urban centres. Some 100,000 of the 227,000 inhabitants of the island live in Bastia and Ajaccio. Both contain strong contingents of autonomist and separatist support, but this is dwarfed by the less sharply defined urban population. The ingredients of political instability in contemporary Corsica are, therefore, found in the coincidence of these many factors, serious rural decline, the growth of Bastia and Ajaccio, few jobs and poor prospects for an unhappy but enthusiastic youth, and a high proportion of retired people hoping to enjoy sun and pensions on the island. Better opportunities enjoyed by a few occur in the tourist trade, despite recent declines, in small skilled production and in specialist agriculture. Yet these more fortunate few are dispersed throughout the island, and do not create a concentration of wealth and growth.

Can the politicians of the newly elected Assembly manage to unite the population? This is by no means certain. However, the fear of violence is beginning to bring people together and is being used to create unity more successfully than any other programme or policy. Whether any of the political leaders can go beyond this and find a way forward to help the development of the island is less clear. The MRG/Socialist group will need considerable assistance from the government in Paris to achieve such a breakthrough. Several others have the chance, the sustained support for the communists, the restructured opposition alliance under the experience of M. de Rocca Serra and the vigorous M. José Rossi; his efforts as leader of the *Union régionale pour le progrès* largely brought about the new coalition. What is more doubtful now is the position of the autonomists. The ability of a united autonomist movement to find the key to the development of Corsica is weaker now than at any time since 1975.

Jean-Paul de Rocca Serra has now been elected President of the

Regional Assembly. He heads a coalition of political groups of the centre and the right, his majority assured only by the support of the *Front National*, led by M. Pascal Arrighi. This does not mean that the island's government rests now on a latter-day fascism. The *Front National* must not be confused with the National Front in the United Kingdom. In Corsica the party's strength lies in the *pieds-noirs*, staunch in their feeling of loyalty to France, and in those who resisted a rupture between France and Algeria in 1954-1962 and who will resist such separatist policies in Corsica. The government in Paris, therefore, may lack a socialist administration on the island, but it does have a regional government which is committed to sound relations between Paris and Corsica, to measured autonomy not separatism.

The more difficult issue is how M. de Rocca Serra will develop policy. He has been in the forefront of Corsican politics for many years, but his name is not immediately associated with any of the striking developments of the last three decades. He is a man of the old guard. Perhaps the more dynamic names supporting him, especially M. Rossi, will have the policies to put before the Assembly. It is to be hoped that this regional government will not seek to hide behind 'terrorism' as a unifying factor. The curious feature of violence on the island has been its fundamental irrelevance to the crucial issues of employment and economic development. As a movement of clandestine 'terror', it has been boring and lacking in logic and development in strategy, however painful and destructive for those immediately affected by it. Too many words have been spent by the politicians in condemning and bemoaning terror. There is a suspicion that these words are partly uttered to disguise a failure to produce policies that will excite the Corsican people.

There is no question that the 1984 elections have changed the political forces in Corsica.

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NOTES

1. At the end of August 1975, Dr. Simeoni and a small group of militant autonomists took possession of the wine cellars of a *pied-noir*, Henri Depeille, on the coastal plain near Aleria. They wished to draw attention to fraud and scandal in the wine trade on the island about which the authorities had done nothing. An attack by some 1,000 *gendarmes mobiles* and other forces ended in shooting and the death of a *gendarme*. Dr. Simeoni and the other autonomists were tried, Dr. Simeoni serving a term of imprisonment.
2. Professeur Marc Tennevin, a teacher at the *lycée* in Ajaccio, left Corsica with his family after two bomb attacks against him. His case is not alone. Other teachers from mainland France have been threatened and their property attacked, e.g. the attacks against property on 24th and 30th January, 1984.
3. Quoted in *Le Monde* 14th August, 1984.

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[Dr. Savigear is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Leicester University. He has written on International Relations and French government, particularly on Corsican politics, in both English and French.]

# THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A NEW REVALUATION

by Kenneth Medhurst

RECENT doctrinal and political controversies precipitated by the newly appointed Bishop of Durham serve as useful reminders of perennial dilemmas characterising the life of England's established Church. Both the doctrinal and the political controversies arise out of the very nature of this Church and ultimately point back to the idiosyncratic nature of its foundation. Equally, they point toward debates about inherited arrangements that could force themselves into still more prominent positions on the Church's agenda.

Obviously the Church of England owes its existence to an assertion of State power during a period when Church and polity were regarded as essentially co-terminous communities. With Parliament's support long standing conflicts between Papacy and Crown were resolved in the latter's favour. The Crown emerged, in principle, as supreme in both Church and State. Equally, all the monarch's subjects were, in principle, to be automatically regarded as members of one officially established ecclesiastical community.

Virtually from the outset this necessarily broadly based Church embraced diverging theological tendencies. Elizabeth I's pragmatism kept such potentially centrifugal forces in check but Charles I exposed the political and ecclesiastical dangers latent in the situation when he sought to throw monarchical power exclusively behind a minority 'High Church' group at the expense of the more militantly 'Protestant' elements well represented in England's governing classes. Royal ecclesiastical policy was then one of the complex of factors that provoked civil war.

Post-Civil War attempts to re-establish one monopolistic state Church soon proved unsuccessful. The same post-1688 constitutional settlement that firmly established constitutional monarchy and explicitly denied non-Anglicans access to the throne also, albeit hesitatingly, conceded the principle of religious toleration. The logic of the situation was only worked out, by fits and starts, over succeeding centuries but from this period the idea of England as a pluralistic society gained acceptance. The Church of England remained a coalition of discrepant theological tendencies but its claim to be co-terminous with the English nation had, in practice, to be abandoned. This was reflected in the nineteenth century admission to Parliament of religious dissenters and non-believers.

These latter developments presented the Anglican Church with serious problems for after 1688 Parliament clearly remained ultimately supreme in all matters affecting the national Church. With the indefinite suspension, in 1717, of the clerical convocations of both Canterbury and York Provinces the Church was left without any distinctively ecclesiastical deliberative body. The immediate result, during the eighteenth century,

was a generally conformist 'Latitudinarian' Church largely uncritical of the prevailing intellectual, moral and political climate. One reaction against this was the religious revival, associated with Wesley which, in the Anglican Church, found expression in the Evangelical movement. Another reaction was the Church's revived 'Catholic' movement which, given its sacramentalism and its correspondingly elevated view of distinctively ecclesiastical traditions or hierarchies, could in part be regarded as one attempt to assert a more obviously Christian identity in face of possibly stifling social and state pressures. The admission into Parliament (the Church's temporal master) of non-Anglicans and non-believers perhaps added urgency to this enterprise.

The advance of 'Romanising' tendencies in the Church made evangelicals, in particular, cling more than ever to the State connection as the surest quarantee of their Protestant vision of England and its national Church. Nevertheless, the Catholic revival contributed to a more general climate of opinion which held that, in changed circumstances, the bond linking Church to State should be somewhat relaxed and the Church should acquire a measure of self-government. The first fruits of this changed perception was the revival of the traditional convocations. Much later, wholly new deliberative assemblies were created, ranging from Parochical Church Councils to, at the national level, a 'Church Assembly'. Such bodies gave laity as well as clergy some share in the articulation of distinctively Anglican opinion. The Church Assembly proved to be the forerunner of the General Synod (launched only in 1970) which sits at the apex of synodical structures reaching down from national level through dioceses and deaneries to parishes. The structures rest on a system of indirect elections that, in principle, permit Church decision makers to claim to speak authoritatively for their constitutuents. By creating a 'House of Bishops' (with veto powers) to sit alongside lay and clerical spokesmen, the structures also try to wed traditional hierarchical understandings of ecclesiastical authority to the new participatory models. For its part, Parliament has delegated extensive decision making powers to the Church and, most recently of all, provision has been made for more Church participation in the selection of episcopal leaders.

In making such changes the aim has been to adjust to changing realities and to equip the Church to discharge its mission in the changed environment. On the other hand, it is obvious that the changes have been gradual, involving an underlying continuity. It remains to evaluate the elements of change and continuity currently at work and the impact they may be having on the Church's contribution to national life.

One element of continuity made evident by the workings of synodical government is, obviously enough, a persistence of discrepant theological traditions. Indeed, it is possible that quasi-parliamentary forms of ecclesiastical self-government serve to aggravate existing partisan divisions. Certainly, in a situation where major changes have to be introduced on the basis of large majorities the existence of contrasting

and, to some extent, organised theological tendencies is a recipe for, at best, slow incremental change. Well organised minorities can stand in the way of change as they have done over such matters as Anglican-Methodist reunion and covenanting with other denominations. It is implicitly acknowledged that no one tendency can predominate and so the price of continuing Church cohesion may be a somewhat negative agreement to disagree. Such an interpretation offers limited hope for those who might see in the Anglican Church's own internal pluralism an invitation to effective dialogue between differing theological traditions. On the other hand, so long as unity is preserved the possibility of such dialogue always remains.

Some suggest that unity is preserved more by shared attachments to inherited institutional arrangement, including the anchorage provided by links with the State, than by a shared theology. Research into the attitudes of General Synod members may provide some support for this notion. Thus General Synod members, irrespective of theological position, share in a consensus concerning the general appropriateness of the Church's governmental arrangements and of its state links that contrasts markedly with continuing divisions over theological, doctrinal and ethical matters. Indeed, on such matters there is reason to suppose that many individuals on the Church's different 'wings' have more in common with members of other denominations than with fellow Anglicans of different theological backgrounds. Against this, however, it should be remembered that much of the heat that surrounded nineteenth century partisan conflict has now been removed. Recent liturgical changes have gone forward on the basis of a degree of agreement that once would have been almost inconceivable. It is also noteworthy that an active social concern now cuts across partisan divisions to a novel extent. On this and other matters there may be some blurring of the old lines of division. A blurring of dividing lines is also involved in the emergence of new sources of controversy tending to cut across the more traditional lines of cleavage. The traditional polarity, of course, was of the Catholic-Evangelical kind with 'Broad Church' (and 'liberal-modernists') occupying a 'centrist' position on the spectrum. That axis, relating to long established and differing understandings of religious authority, of course still has relevance. In recent times, however, new issues have surfaced on the Church's agenda liable to provoke responses on a somewhat different 'Conservative-Liberal/Radical' axis. Divisions over proposed new ecumenical ventures, the remarriage of divorcees, the ordination of women or over an ethical issue like abortion have some tendency to fall into this category. Not least, the recent controversy surrounding Bishop David Jenkins' doctrinal observations seems, at least partly, to be of this kind. Though appealing to different types of authority both traditional Catholics and conservative evangelicals could agree in their rejection of the Bishop's questioning attitude to time-honoured formulations of Christian understanding. The Bishop was saying nothing novel. He voiced attitudes to varying degrees shared by many Churchmen,

including many episcopal colleagues. He did, however, point to a division between those, appealing either to scripture or tradition, who hold fast to traditional formulations and those who maintain that the authority or credibility of Christian claims now depends on some modification of such formulations that take clearly into account post-'Enlightenment' changes in man's self-understanding.

The fact that particular individuals at different times find themselves on different sides of the 'Conservative'-'Radical' divide further complicates the situation. Groups and individuals in the Church are by no means all of a piece. For example, it is apparent that throughout the General Synod there has been something of a conservative reaction against the practical consequences of the law governing abortion—a law initially supported by a large slice of ecclesiastical opinion. It is a reaction involving individuals who, on such matters as women's ordination or remarrying divorcees, might be in the 'Radical' camp. Wrestling with the theological and ethical implications of rapid historical change does not always involve one single, coherent set of responses. Such uncertainty may guard against internal disunity more effectively than more systematically polarised responses.

The question of rapid historical change raises the broader issue of how the elements of continuity and change in Church life have combined to effect the institution's standing in the wider society. Institutional reforms came in response to a perceived need to equip the Church better for the task of ministering in a changed and, in particular, pluralistic society. It may be suggested, however, that for long (and perhaps until this day) many in the Church have failed adequately to grasp the full magnitude of the changes and their implications for the institution's life. Thus, for long, concentration on competition with other Christians' denominations perhaps tended to distract attention from the extent to which all Churches were having their bases eroded by long term secularising trends associated with the growth of a scientific world view and with sociological changes accompanying industrialisation. In particular it became apparent that the Church of England was especially affected by an absence of industrial working class support. The extent to which orthodox Christianity ever fully held the affections of all sectors of English society is a moot point. But the industrial revolution certainly exposed the established Church as an institution so deeply embedded in a traditional relatively static and hierarchically structured pattern of society that it was incapable of speedily adjusting to the demands of mission in fast changing economic social and political conditions. Through the last century, and spilling well over into the present one, it was not unjustly perceived by its adversaries as a significant and supportive feature of social arrangements characterised by privilege and inequality. Its characteristic territorial units were the products of pre-industrial society. Its clergy were drawn from the gentry or the professional classes. Its episcopal leaders tended to be associated with the more conservative portions of the nation's ruling classes. Its 'rank and file' were disproportionately con-

centrated in areas least affected by industrialisation and in the more prosperous social classes.

The above picture never constituted the whole story. The Evangelical movement threw up social reformers who, albeit from a paternalistic viewpoint, were concerned to ameliorate the evils of industrial society. The Catholic revival found its socially critical expressions. There was also the minority Christian Socialist movement with its roots going back to F. D. Maurice. Nevertheless, the overwhelming picture is of a Church bound up with one traditional, organic but persistent vision of English society.

At the heart of all this lay an abiding Church-State nexus which, in the new context, was more than ever characterised by a certain ambiguity. Thus the Church of England continued to see itself as the official custodian of Christian values deemed to be characteristic of the surrounding society whilst confronting other Christian denominations liable to question such a distinctive role. Equally, it claimed to have a special pastoral responsibility for the society at large whilst in practice tending to be linked to particular parts of that society and estranged from others. Not least, its links with the established order, and its consequent stress on the conservation of inherited values, militated against those prophetic and innovatory dimensions of religious experience necessary for the nurturing of a radical and coherent Christian critique of the surrounding society.

In practice the prevailing pattern of development has continued to be of a characteristically piecemeal and pragmatic kind, flowing from particular historical pressures rather than any obviously coherent theologically underpinned view of Church, State and society. For example, moves toward greater Church self-government have never involved any thorough-going theological evaluation of the establishment link. Rather, the Church has been content to accept Parliament as the model for its own synodical institutions. Equally, it could be suggested that, despite recent developments, the state, in the very last resort, remains the senior partner in the Church and State's co-operative relationship. Parliament retains ultimate powers of veto which were recently exercised in relation to General Synod proposals to alter time-honoured rituals associated with the election of bishops. A small group of Conservative MPs sufficed to reassert traditional understandings of the Church-State nexus. What is more, the Prime Minister still can play a more than nominal part in the appointment of bishops as one recent case suggests. Finally, it is obvious that the General Synod recruits preponderantly upper middle class members who, as things currently stand, are generally uncritical of existing arrangements.

Against all this, however, have to be set a number of possibly significant contemporary developments. Firstly, the very existence of the General Synod provides the Church with opportunities and even incentives to find its own distinctive and possibly critical voice. The 1983 debate on 'the Church and the Bomb' may be a pointer in this direction.

Secondly, changes in the Church's government have been accompanied by some changes in the nature or style of its episcopate. The demands of synodical government have perhaps accelerated an already present tendency to move away from a traditional 'princely' style of leadership and toward a more pastorally orientated and even collegial style. Sometimes this may entail preoccupation with internal pastoral or administrative concerns and to a certain disengagement from the public domain. But pastoral concern may also reach out to embrace a critical interest in such public issues as unemployment, housing or race relations having implications for society's general welfare.

Thirdly, the Church is proving to be by no means immune to the effects of the current breakdown of Britain's post-war political consensus. By virtue of its State links and its struggle for comprehensiveness the Anglican Church has found such periods of consensus particularly congenial. Not least, those pillars of post-war consensus, the welfare State and the mixed economy, were very much in keeping with the aspirations of Christian leaders reared in the shadow of such figures as William Temple and in the context of a politically 'progressive' ecumenical climate. The present breakdown of consensus has therefore tended to place an unusual degree of strain upon Church-government relationships. Equally, the Church's leadership has been unusually alienated from once traditional Conservative party allies. This is reflected in the General Synod where the still significant number of Conservative supporters are in the main 'wets' with a clear preference for consensus. Moreover, they sit alongside large numbers of Liberals and Social Democrats; that is, supporters of those parties dedicated to the reassertion of consensus. At the grassroots radicalisation even involves not insubstantial clerical support for the Labour Party. The net result is a general change of mood or climate whereby many Church leaders, over a significant range of issues, have felt constrained to define and articulate positions publicly critical of official priorities. This was true when Church leaders declined to turn the service to commemorate the dead of the Falklands war into a victory celebration. Recently it has obviously been true of episcopal remarks about the miners' strike.

As some radical commentators would stress such developments tend to represent specific reactions to particular issues rather than being the fruit of systematic corporate thinking about the underlying nature of Church-State relationships or the appropriate mode of Christian political engagement. Systematic thinking goes on but is not yet characteristic of the institution as a whole.

Rather, the Church's preferred form of political involvement has been of a rather more piecemeal kind. It has been by no means devoid of theological underpinning but this has not stemmed from one relatively unified body of thinking. Nevertheless, the accumulative effect of recent developments has been sufficient to incur the ire of those like Enoch Powell who see no legitimate role for the Church in the political domain and from those Conservatives tempted to see the Church as its 'natural'

ally.

The above developments are not of themselves sufficient to provoke any serious crisis in Church-State relationships. A plurality of Church decision making centres ranging from Lambeth Palace, through the General Synod's Boards to autonomous Church societies keep open lines of communication with opposite numbers of Whitehall. Public debates surface against the background of frequently close private relationships via which Church leaders seek to put their view. Conversely, there are instances of State reliance upon the Church's information or advice. Not least the Church of England's position in the Anglican Communion and in the international ecumenical movement makes it a useful supplementary source of overseas intelligence. The result is a degree of interlocking not easily disposed of and perhaps likely to foster caution in public dealings. Moreover, surveys suggest that grassroots lay Anglican opinion is generally to the right of official Church thinking and more inclined, amongst other things, to respond positively to Mrs. Thatcher's attempts to offer her own alternative brand of moral leadership. The medium term effect seems likely to be to limit the impact made on the public domain by official Church spokesmen.

Nevertheless, there are those who perceive possibly lasting and significant changes of climate. The possibility is seen of a more distinctive, assertive and effective Church contribution to the debating of public issues and even to the fixing of the nation's political agenda. A constructive response to this challenge would seem to depend partly on further development of existing patterns of ecumenical co-operation. It also appears likely to depend on a re-evaluation of the Church's position in society and the adoption of correspondingly fresh patterns of ministry and mission. Not least it may depend on developing the theological and institutional tools needed to draw significant numbers of 'rank and file' Church members into a sustained and informed encounter with the political realm. The encounter could provide major and potentially fruitful opportunities for disinterested service.

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[Kenneth Medhurst is Professor of Political Studies at The University of Stirling. Publications include *The Church and Labour in Colombia 1984.* Also the author is working with G. H. Moyser on a forthcoming book, *The Church and Politics in a Secular Age—the Case of the Church of England.*]

# JANE AUSTEN AND MARRIAGE

## by Park Honan

NO matter how much the world changes, romantic love seems to thrive in fiction and in life. We feel, despite Orwell's gloom in *1984*, that no force will suppress love. But as love is quirky and often problematic, we applaud formal engagements and even look with relief on unions in which lovers assume real responsibilities without wedding-rings. In Jane Austen's day, the engagement was very formal in concerning whole families, and though not legally binding, it did involve family honour in the gentry class and could not be easily broken. You did not say 'yes' experimentally, only to change your mind about your fiancé next week. In this light, it is surprising that Miss Jane Austen of Bath, who was wise and cautious about 'matrimonial affairs', became engaged on 2 December, 1802 to her young friend Harris Bigg-Wither, Esq., of Manydown.

Harris was 21; she was nearly 27. If we ask why she retired one night at Manydown Park as a woman likely to become 'Mrs. Harris Bigg-Wither' we soon note that we know almost nothing about this fascinating engagement. Jane Austen's biographers glide over it. Elizabeth Jenkins, in her charming *Jane Austen* (1938), mistakes the young man's name and calls him 'Harrison', though he was baptised 'Harris Wither' after his grandmother, a Harris. In my work in writing a new biography of Jane Austen, I have had access to materials which, I think, help us to see this engagement more clearly. I have used a rich collection of Austen-Leigh manuscripts, an invaluable MS. 'Family History' by Fanny C. Lefroy, scores of letters not included in the *Austen Papers* and other materials not previously assembled in this century. Naturally, I am interested in Jane Austen's novels as well as in new scraps of her letters, but I think it is true that she did not use fiction as a personal catharsis. She did not take up anyone wholly from 'real life' for fiction, nor does she explain her changing attitudes to marriage in any novel. Her comic art is objective. She was not 'disillusioned' in creating such a couple of unhappy partners as Mr. and Mrs. Bennet in *Pride and Prejudice*; they are funny, and she meant to entertain. We may feel that she had a sense of poetic justice. Her flawed couples deserve one another, as the Eltons or Mr. and Mrs. John Dashwood do. Lady Middleton is as exasperating as her hearty husband, and in *Mansfield Park* Sir Thomas Bertram seems as blind to his children's needs as is Lady Bertram, limp on her sofa with 'Pug'. Couples such as the Crofts, Gardiners, even the younger Musgroves and, to our surprise, Mr. Collins and his wife Charlotte Lucas, doubtless have been improved by matrimony. Maria Rushworth belittles her vows, in adultery, and seems tragic. For Jane Austen's heroines, on the other hand, marriage represents a beautiful possibility. Taking up the tradition of happy marriage as it comes to her in Richardson's *Sir Charles Grandison*, for example, she shows how Catherine Morland or Elizabeth Bennet *earn* their happy marriages at last, or how an Edmund Bertram or Captain Wentworth at last opens his eyes to a delicious, enduring Fanny or

Anne. If there is a dark uncertainty in the novels, so that we feel the Col. Brandons or the Churchills or even the Knightleys may not have smooth going, we are left on a last page with a vision of hope.

Adored by her sister Cassandra and their brothers, Jane Austen was hopeful in life. The clannish Austen loyalties and the love of a few female friends helped her happy, busy, coolly observant, brilliantly creative career. She was an expert dancer, flirtatious and forward enough at a ball to startle people. In an unpublished letter, her niece Anna says that Aunt Jane's moods and behaviour were far less consistent than those of Aunt Cassandra, and other evidence suggests that Jane Austen was diffident with strangers, an unusually private person, who at times 'flung out' boldly, violating decorum at a dance, to see how people would react or to 'make things happen'. Nobody will accuse her of being too proper with Mr. Lefroy's 'Irish' nephew, Tom Lefroy, for example, who arrived at Ashe one day weary of his studies, overworked, and ready to be entertained by a slim, pretty, red-cheeked, hazel-eyed young woman. You could make anything you wished of Tom who was quiet, bright, passive, handsome enough, and embarrassed by his Irish accent, and Jane Austen made a very minor scandal of him—dancing with him too often at three successive balls, teasing him, getting him to fall in love, comparing him with Tom Jones and telling her sister too brightly that she wouldn't care whether he proposed or left her. Mrs. Lefroy sent Tom off to London in a hurry—he had meant more to Jane Austen than young Powlett's kisses. She behaved more properly with Edward Bridges in Kent; after he proposed to her Jane Austen managed to persuade Lady Bridges that her son was not in danger. The catastrophe of Edward's capture by a poor rural clergyman's younger daughter was happily averted.

In 1801 at the age of 25 she loved the village of Steventon. Her mother loved the chalk hills less. But Jane Austen admired the crude neighbourhood in which hunters leapt over the ditches with sticks, and grocers' sons appeared at the Basingstoke assemblies. She was good at the satin stitch. She played the enemy's song of 'The Marseilles March' very well at the pianoforte in the chocolate-figured carpet room at the rectory and had entertained her family with stories about Elinor and Marianne, Elizabeth and Darcy, and 'Susan' and Henry Tilney. In draft, they were, perhaps, the greatest works in English since Milton or Shakespeare, and it says something that her family enjoyed them. The writer, the poet of the family was James. Of course, any Austen can write a story, as her brothers James and Henry had proved by writing moral tales for their Oxford *Loiterer* while seriously studying theology. (How lovely to have such brothers!) In 1801, Jane Austen's parents uprooted themselves from Hampshire to settle at Bath.

She ought to have liked Bath. It was not only genteel and elegant but secular and religious, Greek and Jewish (for anyone who understood John Wood the Elder's architectural insperiations); Mrs. Austen's relative the Duke of Chandos had made it glorious by first commissioning Wood the architect, and it was only a little tatty and cracked since the bank crashes

of the 90s; but, having set part of her 'Tilney' story there, Jane Austen disliked its white glare. Her feelings in 1801 involved her loss of status and friends and rural peace. At Steventon, where her brother Edward Austen became absentee owner of most of the land, her father was respected; at Bath, Mr. Austen was no one. Poverty depends on *place*. In the country, her father's modest income hardly mattered; at Bath, it did. At home she had been within reach of Madame Lefroy, the Biggs, and Martha Lloyd, whereas at Bath she had no friend better than Mrs. Chamberlayne. 'I cannot', wrote Jane Austen, 'continue to find people agreable;—I respect Mrs. Chamberlayne for doing her hair well, but cannot feel a more tender sentiment'. She had the fun of meeting an 'Adultress' (her relative) at a ball, and one summer when the Austens toured the seacoast towns, Jane Austen met a very appealing clergyman, rather like Mr. Edridge of the Engineers, as her sister later felt. When next heard of, he was dead. Cassandra later spoke of him frequently, because after the death of her fiancé, the Revd. Thomas Fowle, the loss of the seaside suitor had further united the two sisters. And yet Cassandra's loss of her fiancé, a former pupil of Mr. Austen's, whom she had known since her childhood, had been immeasurable.

When, in November 1802, the two sisters visited Manydown Park at the invitation of their good friends Catherine and Alethea Bigg, they may already have known of the death of the seaside suitor. Here at Manydown with its large parlour, kitchen, buttery, two cellars and malting-houses, kiln-house, and fine wainscotted upstairs chambers, one went back into old Hampshire. The house was built round a square court, the Cheyney Court, on one side of which was the room where Withers for 400 years as lords of the manor had settled the affairs of their tenants at Court Leet and Customary Court. Timber from Manydown Park went into the nave and roof of Winchester Cathedral. Over the oak mantelpiece in the Justice Room were the initials of John Wither and the date '1603'. John Wither's brother, George Wither of Bentworth, had married Mary Hunt, the mother of George Wither the poet, who was twice imprisoned before writing one of the loveliest lyrics in English—

> Shall I, wasting in despair,
> Die because a woman's fair?
> Or make pale my cheeks with care
> 'Cause another's rosy are?
> Be she fairer than the day,
> Or the flow'ry meads in May,
> If she be not so to me,
> What care I how fair she be?
>
> If she love me, this believe,
> I will die ere she shall grieve.

Few Wither holdings had been sold apart from Bighton which they had bought from Shakespeare's patron Henry Wriothesley the Third Earl of Southampton; or Chilton Folliat, sold in 1789. In that year, the widower Lovelace Bigg Wither had settled six daughters and two sons at Manydown House. He was a familial squat-faced man and a 'most useful magistrate' as Chairman of the Quarter Sessions, and Jane Austen wrote of him that 'his life is so useful, his character so respectable and worthy'. His cousin, Sir

William Blackstone, as author of the *Commentaries,* was the most famous legal writer of the 18th century, and it is fitting that Lovelace's eldest daughter Margaret married the Blackstone who was Vicar of Andover. Lovelace's daughter Elizabeth in 1802 was widowed in the third year of her marriage to the Revd. William Heathcote of Worting, and was now at Manydown with her infant son. His daughters Catherine and Alethea were, of course, among Jane Austen's closest, dearest friends.

As his elder son and namesake had died at Winchester, his only remaining son was his inheritor. Born at Chilton Folliat in Wiltshire on 18 May, 1781 and baptised 'Harris Wither' after Lovelace's mother Jane Harris, the eventual heiress of the Rector of Chiddingfold and Ash, this young man was a problem. Harris was about ten when Jane Austen first met him. He was huge for his age, and young ladies danced with him at Catherine and Alethea's parties. He was silent, rude, awkward, difficult with his loving father, badly inhibited by a cruel stutter, and a puzzle for his tutor Mr. Wallington. On 7 July, 1799 (when he was 18), his father sent a worried letter about his education to James Blackstone, and then Lovelace made him go to Worcester College, Oxford, from which Harris returned to the heavy books in his father's parlour. 'Ladies', Jane Austen wrote of Manydown, 'who read those enormous great stupid thick quarto volumes which one always sees in the breakfast parlour there must be acquainted with everything . . . Capt Pasley's book [on *Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire*] is too good for their Society'. As biographers of Jane Austen fail to discuss the width of her reading, perhaps, and neglect good evidence as to the forming of her talent and sentimentally evade their duties by calling her a 'Genius', so they do not really account for her alert eyes at Manydown. She knew Harris as the devoted brother of Catherine and Alethea, and could see he was an amiable, silent giant of 21. He 'was very plain in person, awkward, & even uncouth in manner', Jane's niece Caroline heard, 'nothing but his size to recommend him—he was a fine big man.' Breaking through his stutter, he was dictatorial and brash. Later, when he told the butler to make a punch of wines that had been served at dinner and everyone tasted the brew with a wry face, Harris rose and said, 'Gentlemen, my punch is like you. In your individual capacity you are all very good fellows, but in your corporate capacity you are very disagreeable'. His odd isolation was not unappealing, however, and when he blurted out his proposal to Jane Austen on December 2, she accepted him.

She knew, at this time, that his father had sold other properties to invest heavily in Hampshire. He had increased the Manydown estates in recent years to buy farms and lands worth £20,000 in Monk Sherborne, West Sherborne, Basing, Worting, Pamber, Up Nately, Wymering and Widley amounting to some 1,500 acres—all of which, with rich Manydown Park, would devolve upon Harris. (R. W. Chapman errs in thinking he had bought Tangier Park adjoining Manydown about three-quarters of a mile north on higher ground, but even that house, park, and farm of about 175 acres were to be bought by his grandson.) But there was trouble now between Lovelace and Harris; with tensions developing between a legalistic, busy

father and the rude, awkward son, the integrity as well as the comfort and peace of Manydown were endangered. Harris was soon to carry himself off to Wymering, and live apart from his father until his father's death. Catherine, Alethea, and the widowed Elizabeth *had* to live at Manydown, and they were Jane's dear friends. Apart from the tenderness one might have for a brother of one's friends was the matter of one's responsibility to Austens and Biggs. It was as a healer of families that Jane Austen had said 'yes' to Harris, as she knew, further, that when elderly Mr. Austen's income from clerical livings stopped at his death, Mrs. Austen, Cassandra and she herself might face degradation. Disliking Bath and yearning for Hampshire, she anticipated being a burden on her brothers; two of them (James and Henry) were, in fact, to recommend on Mr. Austen's death that the Austen ladies move between relatives for a part of every year of their remaining lives.

Had she been rash? Had she been selfish or wilful in saying 'yes'? Her sister Cassandra was present at Manydown on December 2. Just as it is unlikely that the sisters could have visited there had Harris hinted his matrimonial offer in advance, so it is inconceivable that Jane Austen would have accepted it without Cassandra's assent. 'The luck of one member of the family is luck to all', as she soon wrote in *The Watsons*. A good marriage diffuses its benefits, as Mary Lascelles reminds us. Poverty makes celibacy contemptible for a woman, and with Cassandra's approval there was no reason why Jane Austen might not help two families by marrying Harris.

She had thoughts such as these when she retired on Thursday night. We need not speculate on the thoughts that followed, since she talked to her sister-in-law Mary Austen twelve hours later; Anna, who heard what Mary Austen said, was to discuss the engagement many times with her daughter Fanny C. Lefroy, who, in her unpublished 'Family History', recorded what she heard. Jane Austen viewed Harris as 'the possessor of a large landed property' (as he soon would be), 'and his sisters were already her friends, he would take her from the Bath she disliked and restore her to the country she loved' and so she had not betrayed *herself*. And yet there was something horridly false in this reasoning: it had 'bewitched her imagination and her heart, aided by all the horrible eligibilities and the proprieties of the match, and the pleasure it would give all her family and his'.

There 'came', as Fanny states, and presumably before December 3, 'such a revulsion of feeling'. The cause in Jane Austen's mind seems to have involved her own idea of her bewitched 'imagination'. That is a key word in Fanny's report. Jane Austen, as we know, had imagined a good deal. We know that she had imagined Martha Lloyd would live with herself and her sister, and that her brother Frank would marry Martha Lloyd; we do not know, but it is implicit in her acceptance, that she imagined she would bring her parents to Manydown Park, settle Cassandra there as well, and become mistress inevitably of the estates and 1,500 other acres of Hampshire. She had some plan to redeem Harris and make him an acceptable husband. He was, at the moment, acceptable to almost no one. Her 'revulsion' seems to have involved her recognition that she had planned what everyone else

should do without very much attention to Harris's real needs or her own. She did not love him. On Friday, December 3 she retracted her consent, and then departed with her sister for James Austen's rectory at Steventon. 'But not feeling herself safe there from solicitation', says Fanny, 'and no doubt anxious to show that her decision was irrevocable, she would not remain but returned with her sister the following day to Bath, much to the sorrow of Mrs James Austen who thought the match a most desireable one.'

The Bigg-Withers did not take 'no' as her final answer. Looking over 'letters' about this event, Catherine Hubback concluded it was not settled in a trice. But 'when it was all settled eventually' Jane Austen was much 'vexed'. In her own eyes she had betrayed the trust of Catherine and Alethea and upset two families by giving her word only to break it. She had implied she could love Harris without loving him. She had in 'imagination' planned other people's lives without fully knowing her own mind. It is true that Lovelace Bigg-Wither seems to have behaved well, and that Catherine and Alethea soon invited her back to Manydown—but such trust only underlined her fault. Having returned kindness and hospitality with her grasping 'yes' and self-regarding 'no', she had time to feel miserable at Bath.

For his part, Harris soon proposed to Anne Howe Frith, the daughter of Beddington Bramley Frith of Carisbrooke, Lo.W., Lieutenant-Colonel in the North Hants Militia, and married her on 2 November, 1804—exactly twenty-three months after proposing to Jane. He took Anne to the Manor House, Wymering, where seven of their ten children were born. (Harris returned to the Park only after his father had died in 1813.) 'Harris Wither and his wife are still at Quidhampton and seem very happy', wrote Mrs. Lefroy late in 1804; 'I am to meet them at the Prices tomorrow. Everyone in the neighbourhood seems pleased with the bride.'

Jane Austen's reflections on herself seem to have been anything but happy, but there can be no doubt that she learned from her impulsive behaviour. 'Among so many friends', she wrote soon after Harris's sudden wedding, 'it will be well if I do not get into a scrape'. Her 'yes' on December 2 had been logical—but vain and wrong. She had subjected marriage to the scrutiny of commonsense, but neglected fully to scrutinise herself. And to be intuitive and observant about the self is also to be acutely sensitive to others, or to develop 'real sensibility', which is the capacity and will to sense accurately what other people are like and how *they* feel. The problem of human feeling lies at the heart of Jane Austen's mature views of language and of psychology. Commonly, she felt, we are deluded by the very word 'love', whereas there are undefined tracts of feeling between liking and esteem and fondness and loving. Mrs. Dashwood, who 'can feel no sentiment of approbation inferior to love', represents many of us. And yet those who are imaginative may make the most dreadful mistakes. The Harris Wither affair prepared Jane Austen to understand the mind of Emma Woodhouse—and, indeed, helped her with *Emma* in many ways. The 'imaginist' plans too much, deluded by pride, confidence, and the fertility of the creative mind. She takes things in rapidly without knowing herself or observing people accurately. Thus, with Frank Churchill's advances but not his

character or feelings in focus, Emma Woodhouse would sit 'drawing or working, forming a thousand schemes for the progress and close of their attachment, fancying interesting dialogues, and inventing elegant letters' and foreseeing 'the conclusion of every imaginary declaration' on his side. Deeply the character of Emma would draw upon Jane Austen's own view of herself in the years after her own brief 'engagement'. The glory and limitations of Emma would be in her conscientious fancies, her failures to observe, her belief that she knew what was best for others and could plan marriages and regulate people with the high-handedness of a goddess, or a creator of fiction. The difficulty of understanding people correctly is increased by our impatience with the everyday world. But, in fact, 'nobody ever feels or acts, suffers or enjoys, as one expects.' Thus the minutiae of the ordinary ought to be the field of our attention. Neither 'matrimonial affairs' nor the resulting marriages will be well understood by those who do not find the drama of the ordinary sufficiently enthralling. 'I will not torment myself with conjectures and suppositions', Jane Austen wrote wisely to Cassandra; 'facts shall satisfy me.' She dedicated herself to studying the most elusive and shifting of all facts, those of human character, and her ebullient nature responded to the comedies she saw in the ordinary events of social life. Her later heroines—Fanny Price and Anne Elliot—would be a good deal wiser than her earlier Elizabeths and Catherines, and all in all the Harris Wither affair proved to be advantageous for her. She finally permitted herself, it would seem, to laugh over the incident and perhaps to take pleasure in Harris's grateful regard for her. In 1803 she had come to her twenty-eighth year, after her recent humiliation in the wake of the events at Manydown Park. 'It is something', she wrote later on in *Persuasion*, a movingly retrospective and autumnal comedy, 'for a woman to be assured, in her eight and twentieth year, that she has not lost one charm of earlier youth.'

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[Park Honan's third article in the series, 'Samuel Johnson and Biography', will be published in the December issue.]

# GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENTS

## by John Elsom

MY first and, as it turned out, only interview with Peter Hall took place in the temporary offices of the National Theatre in Aquinas Street, months before the grand move. It was May, 1975. The birds were singing. Nicholas Tomalin, whose notes on the history of the National Theatre I inherited, had previously interviewed him; and later on, I wanted to talk to him again, but by that time the National Theatre had labelled me a 'member of the opposition' and were not being co-operative. All further contact between us had to be filtered through the Press Office; and so that was the only occasion when we sat opposite each other, divided by a desk, to discuss what was to become of the National Theatre.

It was a curious event, about which our memories differ, the main point of agreement being that it went on for too long. I hadn't particularly wanted to interview Hall at this time, for I was still writing the early history of the National Theatre movement; but I'd been advised that a preliminary meeting might be a good idea, just to establish an off-the-record contact. We were interrupted once or twice, and I offered to leave, but Hall indicated that I should stay. In his *Diaries,* he attributes the length of the interview to my droning on about my personal obsessions. My recollections, I must admit, are somewhat different. I would not dispute my capacity to bore the pants off St. Theresa when in good form; but on this occasion, I formed the impression that Hall was trying to distance himself from the Olivier regime and to persuade me that his appointment was a stroke of genius on the part of the National Theatre's Board, despite the bitter wrangles of previous years. The more he persuaded, the less I felt convinced—and so it dragged on.

Hall described himself as a 'sweeper', who loved to pass the football to others so that they can score the goals. He hated to sack people. He had not wanted to join the National Theatre as Olivier's second-in-command when invited to do so, for he did not relish getting under the old warrior's feet as the company marched towards the South Bank. Without exactly saying so, he implied that Olivier was something of an autocrat, while he would pursue a more liberal, 'open door' policy, to attract various sections of the theatre, popular and *avant-garde,* fringe and classics, to the still unfinished citadel which he described as 'the most exciting theatre complex in the world'.

It sounded fine, but there were snags. Did he mean *genres* or actual groups of people? If *genres,* then the 'open door' policy scarcely seemed to apply and Hall's views differed little in theory from that of Olivier's, who had also staged many kinds of plays under his management. If 'people', then the question arose as to whether directors and actors would be willingly magneted to the South Bank and what would happen to their existing companies, if they were. The National Theatre had

always been buttressed by the *Oresteia* argument, so dubbed because it was believed that there were certain masterpieces, of which Aeschylus's trilogy was a good example, which could not be tackled by ordinary companies with inadequate resources. The National Theatre was expected to add previously unscaled heights to the mountain range, not just clamber around the familiar foothills.

Hall agreed, but sensibly argued that a company with three stages and auditoriums to fill could not always be climbing the peaks. The more ambitious projects had to be surrounded by less demanding productions. Did this mean that the National Theatre would look towards the areas of modern European drama, or the easier classics, all those plays unseen in Britain which Tynan had listed? Well, up to a point, yes, and Hall was contemplating a German Expressionist Season, in conjunction perhaps with the National Film Theatre; but he was also looking for plays and productions closer to hand, such as those which were already popular with British audiences. The National Theatre would become a kind of shop-window.

Hall then went on to propose a theory which I had not heard argued before (except by some politicians) and which set the alarm bells ringing. Only a small percentage of those who worked in the theatre were genuinely talented and it was the National Theatre's duty to give these few the best possible conditions under which to work. Hall, as I understood him, was solemnly claiming the right—Irving Wardle in *The Times* much later described it as a *droit de seigneur*—to cream the talent off from the rest of the theatre system.

At this point, I may have protested. My memory is not crystal clear on the subject, but it is distinctly possible that I may have opened my mouth once or twice, letting forth an obsession or so, for even if it were true, as I doubted, that only the theatrical few were talented, there would be a plethora of opinions as to the composition of that happy few. Mists rose and eddied before my eyes, which cleared, leaving a Cassandra-like vision of the future—one where a British arts squad cheerfully stomped the boards on the South Bank while the whole new generation of civic reps, laboriously built up during the 1960s, struggled to stay in touch in the second or third theatrical divisions. I saw a vast gulf developing between the wealths of the National Theatre and the Royal Shakespeare Company, the two Hall theatres, and the rest of the system. There, as in some painting by Hieronymus Bosch, were the outstretched hands of the many who were artistically damned, clammering and cursing at the doors of 105, Piccadilly, where the friends of Hall sat ensconced on the Arts Council, their entreaties unheard, their imprecations shrugged aside, whether from the portly burghers of the reps (their new robes now in tatters) or the skinny beggars of the fringe, their wild eyes alert with frustrated idealism, their limbs skeletally creaking; while in the mid-ground, floating in that limbo previously reserved for bishops, smiled the in-boys and entrepreneurs, the commercial managements on both sides of the Atlantic, eager to do deals with the richest company around,

avid for the quick buck.

In other words, I saw, in a prophetic instant, a fairly accurate picture of what was to come, for the amounts spent on the National Theatre out of the total subsidy spent on British theatre quickly rose from a sixth to a quarter, to about a third of the whole, until even the Royal Shakespeare Company, the next in line and way ahead of the others, mildly expostulated about the differentials. Yes, of course, I knew that the new building would be particularly expensive to run. Yes, of course, I sympathised with Hall's problems with all the machinery that didn't work. Genuinely and completely I sympathised with Hall's dilemma, grappling with all the political pressures for instant success, inevitably to be compared unfavourably with Olivier's triumphs (for the past failures were quickly forgotten), alone, on a limb, with many hands trying to saw off the branch on which he was sitting.

Nevertheless, none of this could explain the fact that Hall was allowed to employ so many more full or part-time members of staff in relationship to the size of his audiences than any other theatre—1 staff to 3 customers was his ratio, as opposed to 1 to 16 at the Leicester Haymarket and 1 to 150 in some commercial theatres. Nor did this excuse Hall's general philosophy, which seemed to amount, as far as I could tell, to claiming the best of all possible worlds, as of right, the freedom to strike deals with commercial managements, the right to march across territories occupied by other companies, the seemingly endless claims for preferential treatment. Yes, of course, other managements were jealous. Yes, of course, there was much envy and malice and spite souring the atmosphere, which could only be explained, if not forgiven, by the widespread belief that Hall was breaking the many gentlemen's agreements that had brought the National Theatre tentatively into existence and which Olivier had zealously observed.

I may have said something to this effect at the time, but I do not think so for, to be honest, Hall's voice is so soft and reassuring that it invites immediate assent, whether one knows entirely what one is agreeing to or not. Much also depended on how Hall's philosophy operated in practice. Nobody could complain if he shopped around the theatre system, like any other management, and assembled a team of the best talents available, according to his lights. The question was whether he would use the privileged position, to which the state had called him, to the detriment of other managements or in co-operation with them, for sectional advantage or the common good. I remember writing an article for *The Listener* in Hall's support, in which I extended one of his images, to the effect that the National Theatre would become the heart of the theatre system, drawing in the impure blood of frustrated talent and sending it forth again, purified and oxygenated with money.

But scepticism will out and at this difficult period of the National Theatre's fortunes, with the new theatre not finished and Olivier not forgotten, anything less than wholehearted support was condemned as treachery. Hall's supporters felt themselves embattled. They reacted

badly to negative reviews, over-warmly to favourable ones. They tried to deflect criticism by casting doubt on its genuineness. Jonathan Miller was 'obsessed', while Michael Blakemore had been seen with the *Evening Standard* columnist, Gaio Servado, which made him 'a security risk'. A wealth of meaning can be invested in that word, 'with'. M/s Servado's articles themselves were sceptical but harmless. It was natural that my growing doubts, reflected in my *Listener* articles, would receive a similar treatment. I once remarked that the National Theatre should be scrupulous to the point of stuffiness in its relationship with the commercial theatre, which became transmuted through the National Theatre's jungle telegraph into the silly idea that I wanted the National Theatre to be 'stuffy'.

And so when I presented, for reasons explained in my previous *Contemporary Review* article (Vol. 245 No. 1424), a draft of *The History of the National Theatre,* which contained grass-roots criticism of the National Theatre, and upon which I was inviting their comments, the result was firstly silence—then furore. They threatened me with libel actions, for reasons unspecified, and when I pointed out that the book was only in a draft stage and had not been published, they asserted that passing around a book in manuscript is tantamount to publishing. But I hadn't done that.

It was a phase, an acrimonious and, in retrospect, childish phase which lasted until after the publication of the book, when questions had to be asked in the House of Lords before the National Theatre would stock it in their bookshop, and much later when questions were asked in the House of Commons about the size of Hall's salary (together with the other directors of national companies), and on, through the publication of Hall's amusing *Diaries.*

*The History of the National Theatre* was generally well-received and is now accepted as an accurate account; the causes of disagreement being clearly and (I hope) fairly outlined in the last chapter. What I most regret about it is its dogged tone and absence of jokes, for jokes at the time were decidedly risky. John Goodwin, the National Theatre press officer, phoned me up and politely congratulated me on writing a 'very good book', which didn't prevent the National Theatre from ringing around arts editors and producers of radio programmes to warn them against my book. The *Daily Express* phoned me up to ask if I wanted Hall's job, a ridiculous thought echoed by Richard Findlater, of all people, in *The Observer,* though somewhat less blatantly. Hall refused to appear with me in any discussions about the National Theatre, as did Christopher Morahan. Their aim seemed to be to present themselves (and Hall in particular) as a victim of a Fleet Street conspiracy, organised by me, although I had no influence on Fleet Street whatsoever.

Hall's *Diaries,* now in paperback, perpetuates the saga. The trouble lies in the format. The day by day account of what Hall was feeling at the time relieves him from the necessity of having either to answer the arguments levelled against him or to indicate whether his suspicions were

in fact correct. In my case, as of others, they were often wrong, and provably wrong; and yet he repeats them, returning to the errors which one might have supposed he would prefer to forget.

The recent history of the National Theatre turned out, as Nicholas Tomalin predicted, to be a microcosm of much else that is unhappy in our society, which is not to say that much has not been achieved, but that it has left a trail of good intentions frustrated in practice, of high hopes lost, of idealism forgotten and sometimes apparently betrayed. We survive nonetheless and there is much time left to put the record straight, if that is what we genuinely wish to do.

The December issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *PLO on the Way to Consolidation* by Zoran Pirolic, *The Future of the Falkland Islands* by C. D. Townsend, M.P., *Animal Rights: a Human Obligation* by Rebecca Hall and *Echoes from Durham* by R. B. P. Milburn.

# AFRICANS BUILD HIGHWAYS TOWARDS SURVIVAL

## by Thomas Land

AN immense construction project intended to create Africa's first comprehensive road transport infrastructure is starved of funds and running behind schedule. But its crucial second phase, which is to begin during this year of African disasters, may well restart the halting development process across the hungry continent.

The new tarmac is already eroding beneath the weight of the heavy lorries rumbling southwards from the Mediterranean ports with food supplies for the desperate Sahel. South of the Sahara desert, they wind their way across parched wastelands, often along precarious dirt tracks that have become the last source of hope for the destitute villagers.

Much of their cargo could not have reached the drought victims during the last big famine a decade ago when more than 250,000 Sahelians died of hunger while huge relief supplies donated for them piled up at the congested ports. This time, the transport bottlenecks may perhaps be alleviated by an expanding road network. It has been built or improved during the first phase of an immense, $40.5bn construction project intended to create Africa's first adequate, comprehensive road transport infrastructure. The road network comprising nine expressways linking together a system of minor routes is to end the physical isolation of all of Africa's major communities, connect its potential domestic markets with its manufacturing and agricultural centres and provide direct export outlets to Europe and Asia.

Africa's former colonial planners discouraged trade between their overseas possessions and built their highways strictly to serve their commerce between the inland raw material sources and the ports. To compete in the increasingly restrictive global export markets, independent Africa must now build the transport links essential for viable co-operative regional ventures; they would utilise the scarce capital and technological as well as raw material resources available collectively to groups of countries in order to generate capital investment for further development.

But that is for the longer-term future. This year, 34 African countries in the Sahel and elsewhere have been hit by drought with devastating effect on their economies, necessitating an estimated 3.3m tons of food aid. World Bank Director Shahid Javed Burki says 'development institutions now face one of the greatest challenges of the post-war era as they try to restart the African development process'.

Hence the immediate importance of the African road building projects. 'The construction industry is an important contributor to development,' the bank elaborates in a new study (*The Construction Industry, Issues & Strategies in Developing Countries*, The World Bank, Paris and Washington, unpriced). 'Construction work represents about one-half of gross capital formation in developing countries. Fostering domestic capability

in construction is thus an essential part of the overall development process . . .'

The African highway construction programme was launched by the United Nations General Assembly in 1977 as part of its policy to promote a new international economic order in the division of the global wealth between North and South. The UN Economic Commission for Africa is the lead agency co-ordinating the scheme.

The first implementation phase just ended included 1,091 individual projects costing $8.7bn, more than three-quarters of which has been raised and spent. The second phase ending in 1988 will comprise 1,322 projects at an estimated cost of $31.8bn. The money to be raised from many sources including the World Bank, various other development aid funds and banks and multilateral agencies as well as Western governments (including the European Community as a whole) which seek to assist Africa while promoting their own, recession-bound construction industries.

These are the major roads in the African transport master-plan: (1) the Trans-Sahara Highway linking the Mediterranean region with the Gulf of Guinea across the Sahel, (2) the Trans-African from Mombasa to Lagos, (3) the Trans-Sahelian from Dakar to Ndjamena, (4) the Trans-Coastal from Nouakchott to Lagos, (5) Ndjamena-Massawa, (6) Cairo-Nouakchott, (7) Cairo-Caborone, (8) Tripoli-Windhoek, and (9) Beira-Lobito.

Some of these roads are virtually complete while others exist only on the planners' maps. All of them make use of previously existing stretches of roads. Much of the Cairo-Nouakchott road, for example, is already in use as far as Rabat, connecting the Mediterranean ports of North Africa; eventually it will link them with the continent's other trading centres through the projected north-south expressways.

Proposals for the construction of a bridge or tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar—promoted by the Moroccan government and others outside the framework of the UN master-plan—would link the road networks of Africa and Europe. A further transport link is planned in the eastern Mediterranean region to join the African expressways with the West Asian road system and with the Trans-European North-South Motorway whose construction is advancing under the authority of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.

In Central and Southern Africa—affected for some years by savage drought, floods, military conflicts and other disasters—nine countries have decided to broaden their share in the continent's transport master-plan by co-ordinating crucial elements of their national development strategies. Some of the countries involved in the regional initiative are among the poorest in the world. Their 97 collaborative priority projects, which have attracted much international assistance, embrace transport, energy, public health and food production.

# CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

## by David Shipman

*THE Right Stuff* has no front title at all, but when its three hours plus running time is over there comes up on the screen the words 'Directed by Philip Kaufman', followed by 'Written for the screen by Philip Kaufman', just to make sure that the name has registered. True, Kaufman made little impression with his three previous movies (which include *The Great Northfield Minnesota* and *The Wanderers),* but he was given a $27 million budget with this one. Anyone who has seen those earlier pictures will not be surprised at the pretension of this one, which examines the twenty-year attempt of the Americans to conquer space before the Russians. The film disapproves of the reasons—at least at the beginning, when it spends much tiresome time establishing the Hawksian camaraderie of the test pilots in a lonely Fordian cafe near the airfield. Kaufman changes from half-hearted to full-blooded romantic by the end of the movie, and given the courage (or foolhardiness) of the astronauts this is a legitimate—and affecting—approach. Much of the footage of space flights, real and simulated, is thrilling, but the bemused, reflective and ironic tone of Tom Wolfe's book (Kaufman's source) has been lost. When Kaufman chooses to follow that, as in the first press conference of the first astronauts, revealing them to be not so much ordinary as mediocre, with John Glenn a publicity seeker, he is crassly satiric. The eventual combination (5% burlesque, 60% romanticism, 35% directorial ostentation) is not to be despised.

For, in the age of Indiana Jones and Darth Varder, a film for adults must be welcomed. Even better in that respect is *Under Fire,* which also takes old movie conventions (fearless foreign correspondents) in its stride to make some points about the modern US of A, in this case CIA involvement South of the Border. The journalistic triangle (Nick Nolte, Joanna Cassidy, Gene Hackman) have their Gable-Loy-Pidgeon connotations: escapes and pursuits are in the Hollywood tradition. However, they—the journalists—are not only fiercely critical of American government policy but they also find that they cannot maintain their somewhat cynical neutrality. As written by Ron Sheldon and Clayton Frohman, and directed by Roger Spottiswoode, the result may not be quite as exciting—or as polemic—as *Missing,* but it is one of the best films we have had in the interim.

Mexico stands in for Nicaragua, just as it doubles for Argentina in *The Honorary Consul,* which manages to have a very similar musical score. Again, here are the young, idealistic guerillas fighting against the established regime and the one who would like to keep his neutrality is a friend from college days, an Anglo-Paraguayan doctor, played in his usual narcissistic manner by Richard Gere. The press dissatisfaction with this movie centred on this casting, but the man is supposed to be a shell, devoid of principles, feelings, emotions; he's a man blown by the

winds. Gere doesn't provide an interesting centre, but Michael Caine does, in the title-role (and Bob Hoskins makes a more than creditable attempt at a cliché-role, the local police chief)—indeed, this may well be Caine's best screen work. Both men are burnt-out cases, to remind us that this is one of the better films made from one of Graham Greene's novels. It works well as a thriller; it poses the Greene dilemmas without pretension and plays down those elements in the novel which (I thought) came near to self-parody; and it offers his fascination with the odd, the out of the way, the unimportant exotic region, the strange and forgotten. John MacKenzie's direction is keen and uncluttered.

All these films lost money, despite favourable reviews for the first two. In the present climate we might be left only with boys' adventures like *Krull*, whose huge budget (another $27 million) was presumably sanctioned because of its resemblance to the *Star Wars* saga, not to mention other sword and sorcery epics. *Krull*, however, also failed to attract patrons to the box-office in sufficient quantity. Perhaps kids are getting fed-up with all-powerful inhuman villains, all with cohorts which are androids with space-guns; perhaps those that went to it found the prince (Ken Marshall) and princess (Lysette Anthony) parted by said beast without character; perhaps they have been spoiled by movies dependent on special effects—though these on parade here are quite the most spectacular and effective that I have ever seen. They are inevitably better than those pioneered by Ray Harryhausen, whose films had an often similar plot-line—a young hero on a quest, consulting a sage, accompanied by a giant creature, to finally vanquish the enemy in a vast building which collapses about them. Stanford Sherman's screenplay also borrows from the myths and legends of many lands, while Peter Yates's direction is loving towards both its strengths and weaknesses. The film's failure may mean a quick sale to television, when it should delight children for successive generations.

I'm not so sure that *The Man Who Loved Women* deserved its failure or its drubbing by the critics. It is certainly not a good film, though it is better than the thin, misogynist Francois Truffaut comedy from which it derives, as well as other of the over-indulgent, vulgar comedies also directed by Blake Edwards. For instance, it's more enjoyable than *10*, if only because it has Burt Reynolds instead of Dudley Moore—playing, as it happens, a similar role, a relentless philanderer. It also wastes Julie Andrews less heinously (she plays Reynolds's psychiatrist). If you think what a director adept at comedy might have done with this star teaming you may despair of this film; and it is, overall, as funny as a sick baby; but it was not the dead loss I had been led to expect.

You can add to this roster of failures *The Bounty*—at least in America, where television showings of the two previous films on the subject (1935 with Laughton and Gable, 1963 with Trevor Howard and Brando) doubtless proved to prospective patrons that they knew all about it. What they didn't know was that Captain Bligh and Mr. Christian were in love with each other—or so it was reported in the trade press when the film was

first announced. At that point David Lean was to direct, and as he worked on the project it grew into two movies and the budget escalated to $85 million—which was one reason he left it. Even at over $20 million, as the film eventually cost, the implication of a Bligh-Christian homosexual relationship might well have seriously damaged the film's chances of success: only vestiges of it remain in Robert Bolt's screenplay—and they are enough to make this reinterpretation of the mutiny an absorbing one for today's moviegoers. Bligh is shown to be the only sailor on board not to succumb to the dusky maidens of Tahiti and he resents the fact that Christian spends all his time with one; he seems immobilised by Christian's behaviour and he admits to his officers, when the ship sets sail, that he requires them to restore morale and discipline, and he can no longer do so. In effect, this means Christian, the only officer he finds reliable, but Christian chooses to behave pettishly and contemptuously, like a head prefect who knows that he has a hold over the head master. Accordingly, his conduct during the mutiny itself is both wild and childish, making this the most convincing of the three movie mutinies. The twin anti-climaxes—Bligh and the crew cast adrift, Christian and the mutineers—are also handled more sensibly than in the earlier versions, and the whole is handsomely directed by Roger Donaldson. Mel Gibson is well cast as Christian and Anthony Hopkins is outstanding as Bligh.

The affections in *Another Country* are of the same persuasion, though they are not seen to extend to more than hand-holding. Nevertheless, when Bennett (Rupert Everett) speaks of 'all those I've done it with' we know exactly what he means, since the prologue has established him as a surrogate Guy Burgess. The prologue also establishes him as one who betrayed his country for Communism, but during the main body of the film he has no political beliefs—or indeed, any interest in anything but himself and potential conquests. On the other hand, his best friend—or, perhaps, the student most tolerant of him—is a rabid left-winger and, apparently, the only hetero in the school (and he's well played by Colin Firth). The task for Julian Mitchell, who adapted from his own long-running play, is to strengthen their liaison so that Bennett's conversion to Communism becomes either evident or imminent by the last reel. He does this cleverly, even if much of the rest is predictable—as is the direction by Marek Kanievska. Beyond the midnight trysts, what a strange world is here depicted—that of the British public school in the '30s, where all is governed by an unholy alliance of religion and cricket, with allegiance to all matters military and Imperial. I came in at the end of it and can vouch for the accuracy, but what moviegoers of other nations make of it all I cannot imagine.

Like Bennett, the protagonist of *The Fourth Man* knows which sex he prefers and it isn't the usual one. He is an alcoholic writer, on a visit to Flushing to lecture. He allows himself to be seduced by Christine (Renee Soutendijk) and then stays around when he discovers that her boyfriend is a young man he had tried to pick up. He is delighted when

she agrees to go and fetch the young man, but during her absence—in a sequence of great tension—he discovers that she had been married not once before, but three times, and all the husbands had died violently. Either he or the boyfriend are to become the fourth husband, and obviously also to be summarily despatched, for both in dreams and reality he has been seeing premonitions of an evil nature. These interlocking portents, emphasising the writer's confession that he can no longer separate fact from fiction, are one reason why this is the most enjoyable thriller in a long while. The director is Paul Verhoeven and Gerard Soeteman's screenplay is based on a novel by Gerard Reve—which is also the name of the leading character, played by Jeroen Krabbé.

If it is a pleasure to see a movie set in the Netherlands, it is equally so to see a couple whose action takes place in Belgium. *L'Etoile du Nord* is based on Simenon's novel *Le Locataire,* which has been freely adapted, so that its young Turkish-Jewish protagonist has become a middle-aged French dreamer (Philippe Noiret). Forced to leave Egypt, he finds himself in Brussels, where he commits a poorly-motivated murder. Sylvie (Fanny Cottencon), his sole friend, helps him to hide out in the boarding house run by her mother (Simone Signoret), who on hearing his traveller's tales sets to dreaming herself. Since he cannot help talking about Egypt, and since others in the house have a particular interest in the murder (the victim was an Egyptian tycoon) it is only a time before two and two make four. This classic situation of mystery thrillers is directed by Pierre Granier-Deferre in exemplary fashion, and as a bonus there are the accomplished performances of Signoret and Noiret. The action of *Benvenuta* takes place in Ghent and Italy. A young screenwriter (Mathieu Carrière) interviews a reclusive novelist (Françoise Fabian) about one of her books, which he is adapting. At first she refuses to admit that the story is autobiographical and the truth of it never becomes clear as it takes precedence over the initial story, her relationship with the screenwriter: as it involves the passion of a young Belgian pianist (Fanny Ardent) for a middle-aged Italian magistrate (Vittorio Gassmann) it has its own fascinations, but they are strictly of a literary nature. One critic invoked Henry James, but this is a facile piece. As with the other films of André Delvaux the pleasures are undeniable, but so slight and so distant from life as I understand it that I may deny them myself in future.

Bertrand Tavernier, usually a more interesting director, offers a film which is equally a conceit with *Un Dimanche a la Campagne.* Tavernier's best films have been those adapted from literary sources and this is based on a story by Pierre Bost—who before his death had had a long writing partnership with Jean Aurenche, Tavernier's preferred screenwriter. Aurenche and Bost's credits include many literary adaptations, pretty period pieces, solidly entertaining. Too many of those films—as well as Renoir's wonderful *Partie de Campagne*—got in the way of my admiring *Un Dimanche à la Campagne* more than mildly.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## NIGERIA AND THE COMMUNITY

Dear Madam,

I am delighted to learn from you that readers have been asking for further information regarding Nigeria's policy towards the EEC during the Ironsi/Gowon regime, following my article 'Nigeria and Economic Community' (Vol. 245, No. 1424).

In fact, an agreement admitting Nigeria into the EEC was signed in Lagos on July 16, 1966, and it was to be valid until May 31, 1969 in the first instance. The validity of the agreement was subject, however, to ratification by member states (*African Research Bulletin,* June 15-July 15, 1966, p. 548). But the Gowon government decided to repudiate it in 1968, apparently because until then it had not been ratified by France who probably feared the advantages accruing to Nigeria *vis-à-vis* the smaller French-speaking African associated states. Thus, it would appear that Nigeria's final decision to dissociate herself from the EEC was influenced by a thorough reassessment of the situation fostered by France's attitude to her membership (*Daily Times,* Lagos, 5/10/68). I hope this additional information will be helpful.

Yours faithfully,

S. E. OROBATOR

University of Benin, Nigeria.

## TWO VIEWS ON THOMAS HARDY

Dear Madam,

In your review of *Required Writing* (*Contemporary Review,* Vol. 245, No. 1423), Philip Larkin may have been surprised to read of his 'controversial debate' with me: his tone suggested to me that his aim was not controversy but annihilation. But perhaps his reprinting of the review after so many years betrayed a fear that I might, in some remote retreat, still survive; worse, he may have felt alarm at the rise of a tide of opinion unlike his, but not so very unlike mine. Can Larkin, one wonders, have read the introduction to Dr. Rosemary Sumner's *Thomas Hardy: Psychological Novelist*? Or, since the tide has not ebbed even since the publication of *Required Writing,* has he encountered the section on Hardy in Dr. Gillian Beer's *Darwin's Plots,* where the author discusses Hardy's commitment to happiness?

Hardy made repeated efforts throughout his life to convey a point of view which many critics seek to misrepresent as despairing and defeatist, as asserting that no human effort can succeed against a malign Fate. The absurdity of supposing anyone would exert himself trying to prove that no exertion is ever effective has apparently not occurred to these people. The distinction I am trying to make is between those who think one can do nothing to alleviate human ills and those who think that one should try to

find something, however small, that might be done, and try to do it. I know where Hardy stood on this matter, and where I stand; and it is not difficult to know where Larkin stands—with his insistence on Hardy's 'always passive apprehension of suffering.'

Larkin insists on the sadness conveyed by much of Hardy's writing; rightly, of course. His accusation that I 'explicitly reject this' is an amusing invention. The question is whether this sadness derives from painful losses, misfortunes and misunderstandings about which nothing can be done, or from the realisation that much of the pain was unnecessary, that something *might have been done* about it all, that there are 'unfulfilled intentions', as Hardy called them, in the scheme of things, 'blessed hopes' and possibilities of which we ought perhaps to have been more 'aware', and of which we might then have taken advantage. The question is one that Hardy answers when he writes of 'the contrast of what is with what might be' and when he makes Eustacia realise that 'to have lost is less disturbing than to wonder if we may possibly have won'; but he repeatedly implies the same thing by his characteristic method of narration, keeping us aware not only of what happens but also of what might have happened, and precisely thus holding our sympathy and concern. It is a question that many critics, including Larkin, prefer to sidestep, for no very obscure reason.

Miss Wade's review (it seems to me: though obviously I am not unbiased) fails to do justice to Larkin's skill in misquotation. He misquotes me; not seriously, except that my phrases, now cluttered with Larkin's insertions, seem to support his assertion that Hardy fails to attract 'people who can write.' It is a small matter: but sad that such reviewers cannot be bothered to be accurate.

Yours faithfully,

Childe Okeford, Dorset ROY MORRELL

I am grateful to Roy Morrell for his stimulating comments. They serve to underline the ongoing debate on Thomas Hardy's attitude to those coincidental happenings which so often determine our destiny. When considering what positive steps Hardy's characters might have taken to combat Fate, it needs to be remembered that during the relevant period, 'Wessex' was one of the most backward areas in the kingdom. Even in the mid-thirties, primitive conditions and ways of thought lingered on in Dorset villages. In the early eighteen-hundreds, the protagonists would have had an extremely limited choice when deciding on a source of action.

In the Hardy spectacular staged during the Hardy Festival of 1968 at Dorchester, the pupils of Bryanston School reminded us that many of Hardy's renowned creations were mere teenagers: yet for years we have been complaining about their lack of mature judgement in moments of crisis.—*Editor.*

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## THE GREENHAM PEACE WOMEN

*On the Perimeter.* Caroline Blackwood at Greenham Common. Heinemann. £5.95.

It is impossible to imagine a more vivid account of the Greenham Peace Women than that supplied by Lady Caroline Blackwood after intensive study on the spot. The women had been described to her in advance as 'belligerent harpies,' 'a bunch of smelly lesbians,' as 'rag-tag and bobtail,' but from the moment she arrived on the scene she was disarmed and one part of her critical faculties suspended. Her compassion was overwhelmingly aroused. 'I found that nothing had prepared me for the desolation of the camps the women inhabited. At first sight, the camps of the Greenham women looked like derelict piles of refuse that had been allowed to collect on the side of the road. The "benders" they inhabited were like crazy little igloos made of polythene.' As tents and caravans had been forbidden by the local council, 'they had erected these small and eccentric dwellings by draping a sheet of plastic over bending boughs which they had pegged into the mud.' Some of the benders were not more than two feet off the ground and had to be entered on all-fours. 'It was astonishing to see a grey-haired woman going into her bender with the scuttling movements of a rabbit vanishing into its burrow.' From then on, the story is one of unrelieved discomfort and extreme self-sacrifice. None of this one need question for a moment.

When I myself visited one of the camps it was moderately warm and fairly dry. It did not take much imagination to guess what conditions would be like when the weather was really nasty. Lady Caroline abstains from passing explicit value judgements. Her sympathies, however, whatever they may have been before her visits, are unrestrainedly in favour of the women and their anti-nuclear cause. She recognises the possibility that the 'great Powers' might defeat the protest, but she adds the defiant afterthought: 'The glorious victory could only be pyrrhic.' The women, with one exception, are presented as noble characters. The exception is provided by the lesbians, about whom Lady Caroline is unexpectedly sharp. She considers that they have done the anti-nuclear cause no good at all by their provocative gestures and parade, in season and out, of their personal tendencies.

The other characters in Lady Caroline's story are presented in a most unattractive light. The soldiers who, on one occasion, drove past with bare bottoms, show their contempt for the women, the police, the Americans, and the local inhabitants. In one or two cases, the latter revealed a sneaking sympathy but, on the whole, they and everyone other than the women, appear as ludicrous, at best. Frequently, as coarse and unfeeling. She quotes a British ex-magistrate who 'looked at all the hordes of police with a shudder.' She has been described as being sent to gaol many times since she had become a Greenham woman. 'I wonder,' she said, 'if this country can continue to have nuclear weapons without turning into a police state. More people ought to ask that. Who cares whether it's wrong to be lesbian and all that trivial, frivolous nonsense? All that's always only used to camouflage the issues that really matter.'

This must be the same lady who escorted me round, who afterwards had lunch with me and whom I later visited when she was once again in prison.

She is a deeply impressive person, a former nurse, happily married, with five grown-up children and an admirable family life. A strong Catholic. But neither from her then nor from any of the other women did I extract any reasoned argument for the course they were pursuing. I am not suggesting that this lady or some of the others would have been incapable of sustaining such an argument, but it is part of the peculiar strength of the Greenham camps that they do not have any 'leaders.' There is an extraordinary solidarity, even more feminist than that of the Ulster Peace Women, with whom I could not help comparing them in my mind. Whether deliberately or otherwise, a united front is preserved by not emitting statements that could prove divisive. The problem of arguing with them becomes, therefore, almost impossible.

I am sure that anyone inclined to sympathise with the Greenham women will be drawn further in that direction by Caroline Blackwood's eloquent portrayal. Those who feel no such sympathy will be fortified in the belief that it is a purely emotional demonstration. But the sacrifice is real enough. Caroline Blackwood does well to give us such a telling glimpse of what it signifies.

FRANK LONGFORD

## THE GOOD IN SIR ROGER CASEMENT

*Casement. The Flawed Hero.* Roger Sawyer. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £12.50.

The author of this book of some 200 pages about Roger David Casement is a Life Member of the Anti-Slavery Society. Although not exactly an attempt to rehabilitate Casement for British readers, the subtitle does indicate the standpoint of the author, who is concerned much more to portray the good his subject did than the faults in his character which led to his execution as a traitor to the British Crown in 1916.

Casement was certainly a complex character, and the book opens with an attempt to explain this by a study of his Irish antecedents. Although these were bizarre enough, a curious combination of 'Elack Protestant' and Roman Catholic, the man himself seems even more so. The book continues with a thorough exploration of his career as a consul in British Government service, in the course of which he did a great deal to expose dubious goings-on in the Congo Free State in West Africa and in the Putumayo region of South America. Unfortunately, while he was doing this as a servant of the United Kingdom Government, a Government which then spoke for the whole of Great Britain and Ireland, he was indulging in some pretty dubious goings-on himself.

Homosexual behaviour nowadays has almost been morally sanitised by permissive legislation and public tolerance. In those days it was a heinous crime. Casement, according to his diaries, which this author shows conclusively *not* to have been forged, indulged his proclivities almost unceasingly. He was a very bad man by the standards of the day, yet the most censorious of us would now admit that, notwithstanding this, he did some good. Perhaps the urges, in part sexual, which led him to explore widely and to insist that an important part of the duty of a Consul was to travel, were precisely those which, at the same time, enabled him to indulge his vices and to expose man's inhumanity to man in these then remote regions. Perhaps we could not have had the one without the other. Travel, after all, provides many opportunities for sexual indulgence.

But Casement is more infamous, or famous, depending on your point of view, for his abortive attempt to intervene in the Irish Rising of 1916. Soon

after the outbreak of the 1914 war, he joined the Germans and tried, in another sense, to seduce Irish soldiers captured by the Germans whilst fighting for England from their allegiance to the British Crown. As the author recounts, many of them, truer to their salt than he, told him where to go in no uncertain terms.

In April 1916, Casement left for Ireland in a German submarine, but was captured and brought to England for trial. Sentenced to death for high treason, it is often said that he would have been reprieved but for the diaries which proved him to have actively indulged his homosexual inclinations over a long period. The author does not dissent from this view, but it remains an arguable point.

The book is painstakingly written, and based on much research. It does not, however, make for easy reading, and there are a number of non-sentences, that is to say, sentences divided by a comma instead of a full stop, for example at pages 57, 71 and 84. The author's sources as given in the notes at the back of the book are not always dated, and they are sometimes difficult to find in the bibliography. It is a book that will be found useful by historians of the Consular service and of the diplomatic service generally, as well as by historians of Ireland and of slavery. Its faults should not blind the reader to its merits.

GEORGE CHOWDHARAY-BEST

## HISTORY OF THE CINEMA

*The Story of Cinema, Volume Two.* David Shipman. Hodder & Stoughton. £17.95.

Until the Second World War, film-makers, by and large, stayed in their own countries. There were, of course, exceptions, but the French made films in France, the Italians in Italy and so forth. With the development of international travel, and increasing political pressure on film-makers, coupled with either blacklisting or exile, the cinema has become much more cosmopolitan since the making of *Citizen Kane*, with which this second and concluding part of David Shipman's mammoth history opens. Fittingly, the book ends with an analysis of films by directors from Turkey (Gurney) and Pakistan (Dehlavi), both exiled.

This intercontinental travel has produced some problems for Mr. Shipman; traditional boundaries have been lowered and particularly French directors have tended to film in America. One must flit from chapter to chapter to gain a full assessment of a director's work. But the title is correct. It is the story of Cinema. Every country's output is considered, in chapters entitled as 'Kane and other Citizens,' 'The British at War' and 'The Movie Brats' to show that things come full circle back to Orson Welles.

It is unsurprising that Mr. Shipman has favourites (Capra), dislikes (Randolph Scott), strengths (Japanese and French cinema) and weaknesses (no real mention of women film directors, no Lupino, Kaplan, Weill, etc.). Nevertheless, his has been a massive and successful undertaking. If, at the end, there is a falling off in viewing—no mention of Boetticher; Bresson and Franju's later films go unremarked; there is nothing of the phenomenal popularity of Eastwood's films, it is only to be expected. Mr. Shipman will have caught up with them when the second edition comes about.

Mr. Shipman is a trenchant writer and his likes and dislikes are forcibly argued. It is a book with which to disagree violently and still admire. The

sheer volume of entries and research make it a book to be dipped into repeatedly rather than, as is the temptation, to be read at one sitting. To read it at a stretch would be like seeing the uncut version of *Greed*. Evelyn Waugh once wrote of a hotel in Malta that, whilst it had certain limitations, it was the best hotel on the island, adding, 'further comparisons seem merely to confuse the issue.'

The same can be said of 'The Story of Cinema.' It is the best book on the market.

JAMES MORTON

## A RADICAL FAMILY

*The Benn Inheritance: the Story of a Radical Family.* Sydney Higgins. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £12.95.

The heritage of Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Member of Parliament for Chesterfield and often the bogey man of the *Daily Express* and the *Sun*, is that of four generations of politically active men and women whose ideas and ideals have all concerned the betterment of men's lot and particularly their right to proper parliamentary representation. 'Tony', as the media have come to call him, describes himself as 'a socialist whose political commitment owes much more to the teaching of Jesus than the writing of Marx'. The statement is less sanctimonious than it sounds, for he is only describing the two interwoven strands that have carried the beliefs of his forbears as well as his own for the past hundred years. But their tradition in British politics stretches farther back: the legacy of Cromwell and even the Levellers has its echoes here, for it is in the direct line of nonconformity and dissent in religion and of independent radicalism in politics. There is always that element in Tony Benn's thinking which forces to the surface the whole question of what is ultimately meant (and still more intended) by left-wing political philosophy. Is it, for instance, to remain a vague general tendency to approve the principle of equality? Or is its partner, 'distributive justice', to be put into practice where possible, as its logical outcome in action? This book does not directly address such questions; for the author's intention is to show Benn in action in the arena and to show some similar situations in which some of his forbears, particularly his father, found themselves. In this Mr. Higgins succeeds admirably.

Many of Tony Benn's most celebrated causes such as abolishing the House of Lords and increasing the flexibility of parliamentary democracy by introducing referenda (as in the case of the proposed joining of the Common Market) were earnestly advocated when his father was first elected to the House of Commons in the Liberal 'landslide' government of 1906. By accepting, after long and distinguished service in peace and war, a hereditary peerage in 1940, Viscount Stansgate saw clearly that inheriting the title might in itself create problems for Anthony, should his parliamentary career become as successful as seemed likely. Stansgate's eldest son, Michael, a fighter pilot in the war, had tragically been killed as the result of faulty servicing of his plane. The reasons why Anthony renounced the title and the story of its political repercussions is extremely well told by Mr. Higgins. Briefly, whilst already sitting in the House of Commons as M.P. for Bristol, Benn declared his intention of retaining the seat to which he had been elected. The Bristol electors would otherwise, he maintained, be denied their free choice of Member, should he be forced out of the Commons and into the Lords. The initial skirmishes were dramatic and some of them absurd, as when he was

threatened with being forcibly denied entry to the Commons. His claim to renounce the title had to be tested against a judgement given as long ago as 1626, by Justice Dodderidge. The learned judge had pronounced that the peerage was 'an incorporeal hereditament affixed to the blood and annexed to the posterity'.

From so evident an absurdity Benn fought a case which, besides gaining him personal victory, had other far-reaching political repercussions. Whilst not achieving the abolition or even reform of the House of Lords, the Peerage Act of 1958 affirmed inalienable democratic rights on two levels: the personal level of permitting the renunciation of a hereditary position in society and the community level of ensuring the right of citizens to elect their chosen representative. Mr. Benn has, since that date, attacked privilege wherever he found it and has advocated the politics of verbal confrontation as a democratic process in situations as uncomfortable for his own Labour government as for that of the Conservative Party. His consistent refusal to be muzzled has sometimes overshadowed the distinguished work he did in both the Wilson and the Callaghan Cabinets, as Postmaster General, as Minister for Technology and as Secretary of State for Energy. His second success in amending the constitution was to establish the referendum, a formerly unused process in parliamentary democracy, for and against Britain's entry to the Common Market. Consultation is henceforth extended beyond voting solely through elected parliamentary representatives. Perhaps Mr. Benn's most substantial achievement is to have alerted the Labour Party to its 'chronic failure to be anything other than an incorporated, ameliorative factor in a declining capitalism', and thus to keep alive the spirit of socialism. Mr. Higgins shows that Benn has helped to ensure that socialism is seen 'not only as a collection of economic theories but also a way of organising society to provide for "the deeper needs of humanity".'

The author has told an excellent story in recounting the events in the lives of Mr. Benn's father, Viscount Stansgate, and his family; and he has succeeded in bringing vividly to life the political scenes of the early twentieth century. Long before his removal to the Lords in 1940, Wedgwood Benn had fought the cause of Liberalism in the Commons and had loyally supported Asquith up to the point of the latter's co-leadership with Lloyd George. This he could not accept and, whilst affirming the principle of a wholly self-sufficient Liberal Party, he approved only of Lloyd George's provision for the Old Age Pension. Under Ramsay Macdonald's premiership, Benn never ceased to believe that the Labour Party was implementing many Liberal measures. He complained, in an article in the *Contemporary Review* of October 1924 (a reference not included in the book's index) that the Labour Opposition during the Coalition had 'moved official declarations in favour of the complete abolition for the inquiry into the means of the old age pensioner, but when Mr. Snowden had the change to make, he found himself unable to do more than raise the money limit of disqualification . . . by no means a redemption of the pledge'. ('Nine Months of Labour Government'.)

Together with his publisher brother, Ernest Benn, he was a staunch upholder of Free Trade: whereas Wedgwood Benn took the left-wing view of Liberalism to the point where Snowden could not understand why he did not respond to invitations to join the Socialists, his brother went so far along the individualist road that he founded the Society of Individualists which was more like the Primrose League than any Liberal institution had any right to be. The theoretical difference between the two brothers, both serving the cause

of liberty in their opposite ways, highlights the libertarian crux that is inescapable, as was amply shown by Deryck Abel in his biographical account, *Ernest Benn, Counsel for Liberty* (a source not mentioned in this book's list of references to Ernest). Originally in the same Radical Group formed in 1924 by his brother, Ernest helped to campaign for an independent Liberal Party in substantial ways during the Coalition, both being anxious to prevent Lloyd George from formally linking Liberals with Conservatives in the House. Still loyal to Asquith as leader, Wedgwood Benn expressed grave doubts about the latter's elevation to the peerage and its value to the Liberal Party. After the Convention on January 30th, 1925, where Asquith and Lloyd George solemnly first appeared as joint leaders, Wedgwood Benn noted in his diary for that day, 'Mr. A. still lives among the Foxes and the Pitts, and said really nothing that could touch the working man . . . a leaf has been turned in the history of the Liberal Party: the influence of the Old Man will now definitely diminish, for all the work must be done in the Commons, and the decisions taken there'.

If Mr. Benn's present political beliefs seem to some to be dangerously destructive, their basis is recognisably similar to that of his father's hopes and fears for the plight of the ordinary man. There still remains a detailed study to be made of the career and achievements of Viscount Stansgate. But Mr. Higgins has made an excellent start.

BETTY ABEL

## BARBARA PYM NOVELIST AND DIARIST

*A Very Private Eye: An Autobiography in Letters and Diaries.* Barbara Pym. Macmillan. £12.95.

This book, compiled after Barbara Pym's death by her sister and a colleague and friend, is a selection from diaries, notebooks and letters written over almost fifty years. Hilary Pym and Hazel Holt have made their choice so as to tell a continuous story from her Oxford years in the early thirties, through the war when she joined the WRNS, to the fifties when she was a published though not yet fully appreciated novelist. Amidst the acclamations of critics in the late seventies, Barbara Pym died of cancer, having suffered a period of literary neglect throughout the sixties and early seventies. Her posthumous fame, establishing her as a highly individual novelist with her own rather idiosyncratic view of life, makes the present volume doubly welcome. Much of her experience was transmuted into material for the novels, and her notes and jottings on scenes and character are recorded in its pages.

Two of Barbara Pym's earliest literary admirers and subsequently influential friends were Lord David Cecil and Philip Larkin. Larkin sustained her through the traumas of failure and congratulated her in success in a way that kept her spirits high, even through her last painful months. She, in her turn, found his poems a source of strength and felt his genius early on in his rise to eminence in the literary world. Lord David Cecil regarded her 'unpretentious, subtle, accomplished novels' as 'for me the finest examples of high comedy to have appeared in England during the past seventy-five years'. Philip Larkin wrote, 'Underrated: the six novels of Barbara Pym published between 1950 and 1961 which give an unrivalled picture of a small section of middle-class post-war England'. Her rediscovery was prepared when in 1977 *Quartet in Autumn* was published, along with reprints of others of her books.

Hilarious accounts in the diaries and letters of various unsuitable love affairs at Oxford (notably with one dastardly Henry who required her to read to him *Samson Agonistes* in bed and Spence's *Anecdotes* in the bath, subsequently showing his ingratitude by being in a thoroughly bad temper) pave the way for an even more disastrous passion for C. Gordon Glover, a writer and broadcaster with whose wife and family she shared a house in Bristol in the early war years. Complications ensue of a thoroughly Barbara Pym kind, for her own affair with Glover was ending when she joined his estranged wife: they listened eagerly together to a broadcast of his radio play, *Farewell, Helen,* in which the story of his affair with Barbara was recognisably told. Unembittered, she continued to be a good friend to both Glover and his wife. Throughout the letters and diaries there shines a generous good nature which, if one had not read the Angela Thirkell-like novels with their malicious exposé of middle-class values, might appear to be the virtue of a simple soul. In a sense, she is avenged in this delightful volume.

BETTY ABEL

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Family Portrait wtih Fidel.** (Jonathan Cape. £12.95, paperback £5.95). This remarkable account by Carlos Franqui of his close ties with Fidel Castro was first published in Spanish in 1980. It has now been very usefully translated into English by Alfred MacAdam. Franqui is basically a Cuban journalist. He played a prominent part in the revolution overthrowing the Batista regime, and has published his *Diary of the Cuban Revolution.* This later volume follows after the revolution, from 1959 to the Moscow sugar agreement in January 1964. During most of this time Carlos Franqui was Editor of *Revolucion,* the daily newspaper, which, while inevitably loyal to the revolution, could be remarkably independent at times. This was natural to Franqui who acted with great courage in frequently expressing highly controversial views upon current events and made enemies among Castro's inner circle. Nonetheless, as this intriguing book shows, his relations with Castro himself remained, if occasionally stormy, remarkably good. One of the most interesting passages relates to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author has no doubt that Krushchev engendered a missile base in Cuba to balance the American missile bases aimed at the Soviet Union, and to use such a Cuban base as a bargaining counter to reduce the American bases. To do this he persuaded Castro that America intended to invade Cuba and to ask Russia for the base as a defence. This was the impression he gained from a meeting with Krushchev subsequently. This is a volume which will be valuable when the history of Cuba during these years comes to be written.

**The Onslaught** (Sidgwick and Jackson. £13.95). This is a remarkable publication, containing 150 colour photographs of the German advance to Stalingrad. They were taken by two amateur photographers and one professional. The former were two clergymen, one an army chaplain and the other serving in the ranks of the Sixth Army. They provide most of the photographs; the balance come from a PK-reporter attached to the Sixth Army, and directed to film the campaign. The colour and sharpness

are excellent. The German invasion started on the morning of June 22, 1941. The initial advance was swift, and then, particularly during the appalling winter conditions that followed, it slowed down. The Russian defence steadily improved and eventually the Russians triumphed at Stalingrad and the Sixth Army finally capitulated at the end of January, 1943. The suffering on both sides was horrifying, indeed, hardly believable. Except in a few photographs, this side of the fighting is not shown. In his Foreword, Max Hastings points out that they 'provide fascinating glimpses of the face of the German army at war. . . . Because they cover only the early stages of the campaign, they suggest the sunshine naïvety that imbued so many of Hitler's men, flushed with victory, in those first months in Russia. Disenchantment, despair and final disaster lay ahead.' Some indication of this is given in the pictures of Stalingrad under siege. An historical essay has been included by Heinrich, Graf von Einsiedel, translated by Arnold J. Pomerans. The photographs have short explanatory notes.

**A Guide for Readers** (Penguin Books. £2.95). This 'new Pelican guide to English Literature' is edited by Boris Ford. It is intended 'for general readers of fiction and poetry; and for general readers who are also specialist teachers and students of literature'. The volume is divided into eight periods, each with a separate compiler, starting with medieval literature and ending with 'The Present', which is after T. S. Eliot. The general scheme is to divide each period into 'two major sections'. The first is a bibliography, 'related to the social and intellectual setting of the period, and then to the literature itself. The second includes biographical and bibliographical information about individual authors', including some significant secondary writers. The purpose is to keep the contents up to date by revisions, regularly. Within its scope this is a very useful volume.

**Great Tales of Detection** (Dent. £2.50). This selection of nineteen detective stories made by Dorothy Sayers was first published in 1936, reprinted in 1976 and now reissued in the Everyman Classics Series. In her Introduction, Dorothy Sayers defines detective stories as 'those stories of crime and detection in which the interest lies in the setting of a problem and its solution by logical means,' in short, a whodunnit. She discusses the emergence of the detective short story, with 'the most important principle . . . which we know as the Fair-Play Rule,' over about a century. Her choice of authors is: Edgar Allen Poe, Wilkie Collins, Robert Louis Stevenson, G. K. Chesterton, E. C. Bentley, Ernest Bramah, Edgar Jepson and Robert Eustace, Richard Austin Freeman, Thomas Burke, Ronald Knox, Agatha Christie, Anthony Berkeley, Freeman Wills Croft, John Rhode, herself, Henry Wade, Milward Kennedy, Henry Christopher Bailey and C. Daly King. It is an interesting choice in the light of the story's development. It is a pity, however, that the Introduction has not been brought up to date.

**Kirsteen** (Dent. £2.95). Margaret Oliphant, the Scottish writer, 1828-1897, wrote this 'Story of a Scotch Family Seventy Years Ago' in 1890. It is one of her best works, and its revival is welcome. Perhaps now she will become better known again. Merryn Williams has contributed an Introduction about Margaret Oliphant and her work. In spite of its blemishes, he describes *Kirsteen* as 'an impressive, indeed, a magnificent novel.'

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# Contemporary Review

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## SOME ECHOES FROM DURHAM

### by The Very Rev. R. L. P. Milburn

THE commotions which attended the enthronement of Dr. David Jenkins as Bishop of Durham suggest that the Church of England is passing through one of its periodic spasms of controversial self-examination. 'Where', some may ask, 'have we all got to?' The first point in the answer might well be that theologians of the newer sort take as their cardinal principle a deep reverence for the findings of natural science matched by robust scorn for Church tradition and its accepted formulae.

As early as the second century A.D. the writer known as Clement of Rome laid down the principle 'Let us put aside vain and empty imaginings and settle for the glorious and venerable rule of our tradition.' What Clement, as others after him, means by 'tradition' is a deposit of truth manifested by God to the Biblical writers and then distilled and passed down by 'apostles and prophets', that is to say by men whose outstanding spiritual, and in some cases intellectual, quality enables them to distinguish essential from partial truth and from error. For the assistance of the faithful and the eradication of false ideas this deposit of truth was compressed into creeds; some, like the Apostles' Creed, to be used in connexion with baptism, others, rather more technical in tone, to be applied in testing the fitness of the clergy. Pre-eminent among these stands the Nicene Creed, originally a formula in use at Jerusalem but adopted as a standard expression of revealed truth by successive Church councils in the fourth century. Certain details of language and imagery might be expected to vary in emphasis since

> Last year's words belong to last year's language
> And next year's words await another voice

but the central core of the message would, it was supposed, remain unshaken for all time. What has upset this calculation is the growth of scientific discovery, amassing a vast array of detailed knowledge in the fields of history as well as in those of nature. No longer, therefore, can history be regarded as 'the near ally of poetry and a kind of epic freed from the shackles of metre.' History has come, in J. B. Bury's words, to be 'enthroned and ensphered among the sciences', and it is then possible to detect, in the vivid compressions of the Gospels and the Creeds

derived from them, modes of expression which are not, as Bury thought they ought to be, 'critical, colourless and new'. Where attempts are made at relating the eternal to that which is hammered out in time they are likely to bear about them an element which may be called shimmering and elusive. This leads the Bishop of Durham to note austerely 'Myths contain no vestige of science and reflect history, if at all, in a very oblique and highly-coloured way'. What therefore, seems left at this time for the man in the street to contemplate in the Bible, Creeds or any official exposition of faith is no compact deposit of revealed truth but a *mélange* of history, legend, outdated metaphysics and ethical precepts of varying worth between which he is expected to make a personal choice. Along with this responsibility goes a diffused sense of the unyielding vastness of the universe so that Bertrand Russell's picture of mankind as so many flecks of spume or minute traces of flotsam tossed about at random on the waves of time's immensity takes on a compelling power.

The Bishop naturally avoids this conclusion but only at the cost of introducing novel factors, value-judgements which lie beyond the scientist's ability to weigh, measure and inform. He invokes what he describes as 'fundamental intuitions', the chief being that God is active in revealing himself and his purpose in the faint outlines of the Bible record and particularly in the 'decisive focus' presented by Jesus of Nazareth. How 'fundamental intuitions' are to be distinguished from what the Bishop calls 'unifying fantasies which man constructs for himself' is not apparent nor it is obvious how the outline is to be disentangled from the myth-ridden details other than by a process that resembles the gradual dismemberment of an onion.

The Bishop grants that even his strictly demythologised form of Christianity 'takes a lot of believing' but is a faith to be grasped if allowance is to be made for the totality of experience. And here the Bishop's method of reckoning evidence must surely be accounted right. For there are many matters of absorbing interest to human beings which pass outside the bounds of scientific demonstration. Bishop Butler's distinction between reason and revelation may command a certain respect even during periods when science is triumphant. Butler's point is that the order and reliability of the world, its strict obedience to unshakeable laws, suggests the hand of the mighty Architect of the Universe whose works may be subjected to the keenest logical scrutiny. Other matters, however, observable enough and helpful in declaring the character of reality, run entirely beyond the scientist's scope. The obvious example which forces itself in here is the awareness of beauty or beautiful things. For beauty serves no useful purpose in the struggle for existence nor does it minister at all to the gradual growing-up, or evolution, of the human race. Robert Bridges may be thought to supply the appropriate motto:

> This much we know that, as wonder to intellect,
> So for the soul desire of beauty is mover and spring.

At any rate the cry of faith resounds down the ages that in a view of distant hills, in the sunlight on a rain-drenched roof, in some haunting

phrase of music, the vigour of God may be felt bursting through to reach our mortal consciousness. In other words, the things of this world, when graced with beauty, serve to reflect—as Platonists would say—that true reality beyond the restless flow of time and change wherein the human spirit finds its natural home. Even the vast size of the Universe loses part of its terrors when compared with the human mind which contemplates and in some measure comprehends its marvels:

> I come from nothing, but from where
> Come the undying thoughts I bear?

When dealing with the fact, or manifest appearance, of beauty the scientific expert may give a number of valuable hints on the character and technique of the artist or the historical details of the composition. But, if challenged to prove that the Mona Lisa is a better painting than the girl on top of the chocolate-box, he will be unable to do more than mouth a few meaningless expressions such as 'significant form'. The criterion here will be not the scientist's measuring-rod but the intuitive judgement of the onlookers, preferably a mixture of experts with reasonably educated but in no way remarkable members of the public, who are prepared to open the eye and thus detect the particular impress of the Word of God as it appears outspoken in beauty throughout the world. Nor can this awareness entirely overlook the special variety of beauty displayed in human conscience and character when considerations of prudence yield to inspired impulses of sacrificial service and the comeliness of beauty is displayed not so much in the rainbow's arch or the wind-blown acanthus as in the cross of Golgotha.

Objects of beauty, then, and certain impulses of the human heart claim to authenticate themselves without assistance from the scientific method. The Bishop and his critics will presumably be at one thus far: the moment of divergence occurs when real (or supposed) events of history provide the material concerning which a value-judgement has to be offered. Stress on the order and regularity of the universe may here have to contend with an instinctive sense of what is appropriate and to be expected. The Bishop is concerned for truth over against fanciful superstition, his opponents are anxious to guard truth in its richness and variety against the simplified viewpoint of secular liberalism. The two matters stated to be particularly at issue are the Virgin Birth—more properly the virginal conception—of Christ and, secondly, the clear and tangible nature of Christ's appearances to the apostles and others which marked his resurrection after an infamous death.

The manner in which teaching about the Virgin Birth enters the field of history, and thus falls within the range of scientific criticism, is not disputed. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, was condemned to be sent to Rome and torn to pieces by wild beasts in the amphitheatre, the date of his martyrdom being 108 A.D. or closely thereabouts. While on his journey to Rome, he found time to write half a dozen letters, most of them addressed to the churches in the cities of Asia Minor through which he passed. They are letters of exhortation urging unity and charity and resolution in upholding sound doctrine against the speculations of heretics

on the fringe of the Church. Ignatius' letter to the Ephesians contains the passage 'The virginity of Mary and her giving birth were hidden from the prince of this world as was also the death of the Lord: three mysteries of a cry, which were wrought in the stillness of God'. Next, when addressing the churchmen of Smyrna, he praises God for the firmness of the faith which makes them 'fully persuaded as touching our Lord, that he is in truth of the family of David according to the flesh, God's son by the will and power of God, truly born of a virgin'. The Virgin Birth of Christ may thus be seen to have found its way, by the beginning of the second century, into the norm of Church teaching, and there it remained throughout the period of the Councils and official creed-making, so that when, Sunday by Sunday, the Nicene Creed is recited in Durham Cathedral or any other place of worship, belief is expressed in Jesus Christ who 'was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary'. There are no ambiguities about this statement, which is amplified in the Proper Preface for Christmas Day into the words 'who, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, was made very man of the substance of the Virgin Mary his mother'. It remains, then, to enquire what the New Testament evidence may be for such a statement, since, in the early ages of the Church, no doctrine of any importance could be established unless it was buttressed by the clear evidence of Scripture.

The earliest Gospel, that of St. Mark, written about the year 68 A.D., contains no reference to the birth of Christ. This Gospel is constructed in such a way as to illustrate the gradual unveiling of the secret that Jesus is to be identified with the Lord's Anointed and the first episode of the drama is the witness of the Holy Spirit to Christ's identity during his baptism by John. Nothing is taken further back than that point. The detail concerning the circumstances of Christ's birth occurs in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, which made use of Mark with additional material derived from elsewhere, and which assumed their present form by about 80 A.D. Luke's aim is set out plainly in his opening words: it is to relate in narrative form the substance of the earliest teaching of those who had been eyewitnesses of the events recorded. He claims to write exactly and in order and, though there may be an element of convention in such protestations of accuracy, his claim to adopt a high view of the historian's task is very reasonably justified by the manner in which he composed his Acts of the Apostles. Here Luke exercises much care in the use of reliable sources so that there is nothing ridiculous in the view, now regarded as old-fashioned, that he derived the material concerning Christ's birth, at first or second hand, from Mary herself who 'had kept all these things in her heart.'

The birth-narrative of St. Matthew's Gospel is totally independent of Luke. It is slighter, Hebraic in tone and finds support in a proof-text drawn from the prophet Isaiah and used nowhere else in the early Christian writings. The conception of Jesus 'by means of the Holy Spirit' is clearly maintained but, as in the case of Luke, the author is content to state the fact without indulging in the physical speculations which

later commentators have essayed with uniform infelicity. Two questions remain to be answered in view of this repeated declaration that Joseph was not the father of Jesus. If Joseph is ruled out, who was the human father and why is there no reference to him in the Gospel narrative or anywhere else? Alternatively, if Joseph really was the father, can it be thought likely that both Matthew and Luke would start off their Gospel with a direct, and, to some, obvious, falsehood concerning Christ's paternity?

The Bishop of Durham dismisses these and all such sections of the Gospel narrative as so much picturesque fantasy. He is reported as saying that God was perfectly capable of arranging a virgin birth for Christ if such had been his desire but that there is no reason to suppose that God embarked on a course so unnecessary and out of character with his ordered universe. At this point the word 'symbolism' is often invoked, but the birth-stories in Matthew and Luke are not symbolic in the full sense. Symbolic statements sum up realities which go beyond the limits of human language and imagination; so that the description of Christ 'sitting at the right hand of God' is pure symbolism while the birth-stories, as indeed the accounts of the Resurrection, may be symbolic in form but claim to rest on a foundation of meaningful historic fact. Those who describe them as 'symbolic' really mean that another imagined sequence of events should take the place of the Gospel story.

'What wonderful things are facts' remarked the historian Ranke, 'the least of them are greater than the sublimest speculations'; but facts can be manipulated easily enough by the process of selection and stress. For this reason Aldous Huxley allows himself the outburst 'Facts are like ventriloquists' dummies. Sitting on a wise man's knee they may be made to utter words of wisdom: elsewhere they say nothing or talk nonsense'. Much depends on the angle of vision and the ability to sift wheat from chaff. Moreover, omission can distort a picture just as gravely as does the insertion of embroidered material, and to reduce significant history to its lowest common factors secures a result that is totally inadequate. The Gospel-writers for their part were composing not academic treatises so much as handbooks for mission-preachers obliged to compress truth within manageable compass and ensure its appeal in relation to hearers both cultivated and unlettered. Footnotes, appendices and long explanations being thus ruled out, the overall message was necessarily incorporated in the text. The Jewish Talmud contains a reminder that events may on occasion need to be interpreted by persons whose work resembles the hammer-blows which awaken the sparks slumbering in a rock: similarly, the art of the Gospel-writers bears some relation to impressionist painting where photographic fact and delicate commentary are inextricably intertwined.

On strictly logical grounds the doctrine of the Virgin Birth can neither be proved nor disproved, since the evidence either way is insufficient. Two out of the four Gospels declare it independently and clearly, but in sections which smack of poetical summary rather than scientific detach-

ment. Elsewhere in the New Testament, whether through reticence or ignorance, discussion of the matter is not found, yet the doctrine is widespread by about the end of the first century. Reaction to this state of affairs may be expected to run along one of three lines. Some will dismiss the whole question of the Virgin Birth as so much ecclesiastical twaddle, outdated and futile. Others, more sympathetic to the Christian tradition, will accept it, without bothering too carefully about the relation of fact to feeling, as a suitable manner of demonstrating that there were entirely exceptional elements in the person of Christ. Others, again, will receive it willingly on two grounds, first as having some fair support in history and, secondly, because unique circumstances are inevitable if the person of Christ is to be regarded as the meeting-point between God and man, the divine Word vindicating his claim, in the only possible manner, to be a God of love. When, they will add, the Immortal seeks to put on mortality, some of the accompanying detail is likely to present unusual and mysterious features.

Decision on all such points will, however, be made not on the basis of intellectual power—though breadth of vision may serve to exclude the harsher dogmatisms at either extreme—but through what Cardinal Newman calls the 'illative sense' in man. Newman meant by this 'illative sense' the instinctive choice or viewpoint which decides anyone's approach to reality, the faculty of judging by processes outside the limits of strict logic.

> Ah, what a dusty answer gets the soul
> When hot for certainties in this our life,

and the affirmations are likely to be made in accordance with mood, claimed perhaps as insight, rather than on the grounds of persistent enquiry into an overwhelming mass of contradictory facts. In any case, no one individual has time to cultivate omniscience; his judgement will be guided by his 'illative sense', his faith or point of view which, as St. Paul indicated, causes some to be vessels of honour and some to be vessels of wrath.

The question of Christ's appearances after death is more closely bound up with history than is the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. The Roman historian Tacitus assigns to the latter part of Tiberius' reign, 30 A.D. or a little later, the execution of Christ at the hands of Pontius Pilate. He notes that the 'pernicious superstition' of Christianity was thereby checked but quickly broke out again and spread far and wide, reaching Rome before long. Such is the witness of the pagan world to the Crucifixion and the vigorous activity which arose thereafter; and the question arises: What caused so dramatic a reversal of fortune? It is all very well to murmur 'The disciples had a feeling that Jesus still remained with them', but something of a remarkable nature was required to convert a disillusioned band of Galilean peasants and *petit bourgeois* 'who all left him and fled' into a confident group of churchmen who 'took their food with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God and having favour with all the people'. It is instructive to compare the fortunes of those early Christians with the fate of other contemporary enthusiasts. Two such

companies are mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles and receive fuller treatment at the hands of the Jewish historian Josephus. Both Theudas and Judas of Gamala claimed the title of Lord's Anointed or something similar and attracted several hundred adherents, but in each case the leader, coming up against the might of the Temple authorities and the Roman army, 'perished and all, as many as obeyed him, were dispersed and came to naught'. All such pathetic little efforts at discovering anew the secret of life soon disappeared from the fading page of history, and it must remain a problem why the Christians who also 'were dispersed and came to naught' were established, within a few years, as an eager, widespread and even quite influential body of men. Fortunately there exist historical records which hint at the answer, the earliest in time among these being St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians. This letter, accepted by all critics as undoubtedly genuine, was composed by St. Paul while he was at Ephesus between 52 and 55 A.D. so that when Paul talks about appearances of the risen Christ he is not retailing some far-off imaginings drawn from the rhythmic pattern of the seasons but refers to a 'piece of good news' falling within the recollection of persons still in their early middle age. Paul makes no attempt to analyse or explain the appearances beyond claiming that they were unique and powerful in their effect. He mentions five examples drawn from an official list: three have parallels in the Gospel record, one, not included elsewhere, notes an appearance to upwards of five hundred people many of whom are still alive and thus available for questioning. So convinced is Paul that these appearances occurred that he makes them the basis of his preaching and the only sure ground of hope. In so doing he transforms the cross, the precise equivalent of the hangman's noose, into an emblem of triumph.

The Gospel-writers also make these appearances of the risen Christ the culmination of their message. Details conflict, and interpretation weaves its way into narrative as when Luke, determined that his readers shall not imagine that the vision was of some insubstantial ghost, causes Christ to eat a piece of boiled fish. Matthew, foreshadowing the unchastened methods of the apocryphal gospels, speaks of an earthquake, that being his way of indicating that the resurrection of Christ shattered and transformed all previous expectations concerning the relationship between God and man. The four Gospels unite in maintaining that, after the Resurrection, Christ's tomb was empty. It is perfectly possible to dismiss this information as 'symbolism', but awkward questions of a historical nature persist. Setting aside the ludicrous suggestions that the whereabouts of the tomb were forgotten or that somebody abstracted the corpse, we are faced with the difficulty of what happened to the body. Had it remained in the tomb it must surely have received the customary tokens of affectionate regard. If Mary Magdalene and her companions felt obliged to 'bring spices on the third day' others would have continued the pious practice in more settled and triumphant times. A more important question runs along these lines: The earliest Christians

had a number of enemies and all that any of these needed to do, in order to show the absurdity of talk about Christ's resurrection from an empty tomb, was to produce the body or point out where it lay. But no such exposure was found possible and the theme of the earliest Christian preaching, as reported in the Acts of the Apostles, runs: 'This Jesus did God raise up, whereof we are witnesses'.

Here again there are three possible attitudes, no doubt with variations, which can be taken up in face of the accounts of, or references to, the post-resurrection appearances of Christ. One such is resolute and total disbelief in fantastic story-telling. The second class of persons will feel that, behind the shimmer of legend, some truth lies hid and that, in any case, the vitality, even the existence, of the early Church demands to be accounted for by some impressive happening. Thirdly there will be those who maintain that, while the Gospel writers tell their story, as all men must, in language coloured by the conventions and thought-forms of their own day, the narrative is in substance true. The unique fact, they might add, of the Word made flesh allows, if it does not actually demand, unique circumstances which do not so much contradict as transcend the rigid formulae of natural science.

But, how, it may be asked, do Tom, Dick and Harry decide for themselves momentous questions on which the experts argue inconclusively for a lifetime? On what lines, and under what influences, will their 'illative sense' of judgement be formed? The advice offered by the Bishop of Durham is that they should 'follow the way of authentic involvement with serial reality'. Should any of his hearers ask for something further by way of explanation, they will learn that 'Christian truth must be essentially experiential and experimental, and always as much a hope as a possession'. The Bishop has the resources within himself for judging his experiences and conducting his experiments but not everyone will share this capacity. Most people will probably realise that never again will anyone be authoritatively told 'Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholick faith', and they will be perfectly content to let the trumpetings of 'Athanasius' slide into limbo. Nevertheless, they might hope for some distillation of the Christian message, some outlines of a simple but factual creed to which they could refer their own doubts and their children's questionings. And Mme. de Sévigné's words 'Thicken my religion a bit: it evaporates entirely when you start refining it' might perchance be attached as a postscript to their plea.

The Bishop of course has his answer: 'We need to be trapped in no mythology, no theory and no fragmentation of absurdity. We have rather the opportunity of hopeful openness in the fearless development of science and in the loving development of personalness'. This fine confidence in the free man's duty to follow the physicists and behave decently, as a summary of the Christian faith, becomes on feebler lips a confession of ignorance and vague inadequacy. It offers no very robust answer to the agelong cry 'O, where shall wisdom be found?'

# THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

## by C. D. Townsend, MP

ON 2nd April 1982 a delighted President Galtieri was informed by his military commanders that the Falkland Islands had been successfully invaded and captured by the Argentine forces with minimum loss of life. This military action brought to a head a long-running dispute which had embittered relations between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic since the Second World War. It also led to the early and welcome downfall of Galtieri's unpopular and unsuccessful military regime. Today, Argentina has one of the most liberal civilian governments in Latin America and a President who is determined to demonstrate that his new Radical regime is not only a reaction against the previous one, but one that holds very different and separate values. Yet, over two years after the guns stopped firing in the South Atlantic, the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic remain poles apart, without any official diplomatic or commercial links.

I was a member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the last Parliament and made the long tedious journey down to the Falkland Islands with that Committee in 1983. On our return we reported to the House of Commons in these words:

> Your Committee do not believe that present policy, however necessary it may be in the short term, offers a stable future for the Islands. Not only are its material and political costs burdensome, but the policy itself is reactive and inflexible and carries with it unfortunate implications for the wider conduct of foreign policy both now and for the future.

That considered view of an all-party committee, with a Conservative majority and under the Chairmanship of Sir Anthony Kershaw, would be widely shared in the present House of Commons, for the passage of time has highlighted the shortcomings of a 'Fortress Falklands' policy. Although following the brilliant and bold recapture of the Falklands Britain was in a position of great military and moral strength, today, and particularly at the United Nations, Britain is seen to be on the defensive.

I admit to being a great admirer of Sir Anthony Parsons, our former Ambassador at the United Nations. He was recently reported as saying:

> I think the international community will be waiting to see how much willingness we are showing to improve the situation. I do not think that means people are necessarily expecting us to make concessions which we would regard as being against our principles and interests. I think that what the international community, which is sympathetic to us, would like to see, would be progress towards normalisation of our relations with Argentina.

In December 1983 a number of interested people got together to set up the South Atlantic Council, which seeks to carry through many of the ideas set out in the report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the last Parliament. The aims of the Council are to secure long-term, peaceful solutions to the problems of the South Atlantic, to establish good relations between the British Government and the new democratic government in the Argentine, and to safeguard the security and British way of life of the Islanders. I am fortunate to be the first Chairman of the

South Atlantic Council and we have as our members as well as politicians (the majority of whom are Conservative) businessmen, academics, former diplomats and senior churchmen. Dr. Alaine Low is our full time co-ordinator and researcher. On two occasions we have had talks at the Centre for International Development, University of Maryland, with members of the Argentine Council for International Relations. On the most recent occasion, in April 1984, we welcomed two distinguished Argentine congressmen to our deliberations, Dr. Jorge Connolly, Vice-Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, House of Representatives, and Dr. Jorge Vanossi, Chairman, Constitutional Affairs Committee, House of Representatives. These talks were certainly not negotiations. We discussed the issues that divided our two countries and what sensible suggestions we could put to our respective governments to improve matters.

I visited Buenos Aires from 25th June to 1st July this year. I was the Conservative member of an all party parliamentary delegation which included George Foulkes, M.P., (a Labour spokesman on Europe) and Lord Kennet (Foreign Affairs spokesman for the SDP in the Lords). We went under the auspices of the South Atlantic Council and following an invitation from the Argentine Senate Commission for Inter Parliamentary Relations. The highlight of our stay in Buenos Aires was a long session with twelve senators and deputies at their invitation, including the chairmen of the five most relevant congressional committees. During this meeting in the Senate, which lasted well over two hours, I put forward for consideration the three clear stages I personally see ahead. First, we must restore diplomatic and commercial links with Argentina. That would be in Britain's interests and is government policy. It would be in the interests of the Falkland Islanders, as it would reduce tension and thus assist the development programme which has been making uncertain progress. It would also be in the interests of President Alfonsin, who clearly wants to scale down the armed forces of his country and give them reduced influence in the future.

When that stage has been reached we shall need a new communications agreement between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine, as was called for by Lord Shackleton in his two economic reports. The Select Committee Report previously mentioned stated:

> The present situation poses other problems for the population of the Falkland Islands themselves; they are cut off from air links with the South American mainland, deprived of the local educational, health and communications services previously available to them, and dependent for all these and for the continuation of their normal economic activities, on an expensive, complex and time-consuming life-line over 8,000 miles of ocean to the United Kingdom.

Finally, although probably not until the 1990s there will have to be moves towards fruitful negotiations between Britain, the Falkland Islands and Argentina so that permanent solutions to the problems of the region can be found. I did not expect to find these three stages to be thought desirable by our hosts and they were not! One congressman promptly left our meeting, which was held behind closed and guarded doors, and told the waiting pressmen that I was an 'insolent gringo'!

During our six days in Buenos Aires we also met privately a number

of other senators and deputies, their advisers, people from the media (including those from Britain), universities, trade unions, the defence establishment and the British Chamber of Commerce (which was very British and very short of commerce!). Included among these were some members of the Radical Party very close to the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry. We were encouraged to be told that the channels of communication via the Swiss and Brazilian Embassies were open and in use. Inevitably we looked to the immediate and practical steps forward and our hosts looked towards the distant scene.

On our return to London, Sir Anthony Kershaw kindly invited us to write a memorandum for the present Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. We gave our impressions in these words:

> Argentina adheres to a doctrine of sovereignty incompatible with that prevailing in Europe and elsewhere: There is a general conviction that the occupation of the Falklands for about ten years before 1833 by the Republic of the River Plate establishes that the Islands are now under Argentine sovereignty. Argentine intellectual processes and indeed the Argentine way of life are stagnant; not surprisingly, since the country is far from everywhere and on the way to nowhere. Myths flourish and resentments fester unventilated by normal international contacts. The absence of diplomatic relations and the embargo on trade in general and books, video, etc, in particular, means that these myths and resentments grow especially rank in regard to Britain. Nor does military defeat make for calm judgement... But not all Argentinians accept the national mythology... We found a strong desire to end the mutual isolation and restore diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations. But the national mythology makes it difficult for Argentina to negotiate anything unless sovereignty is also on the agenda.

Lady Young, the responsible Foreign Office Minister, agreed to see us at the Foreign Office shortly after we got back to London and we put to her some immediate steps we thought could be taken. We would like to see Britain lifting the requirement for Argentinians, who seek to visit Britain, to obtain visas. At present Britain operates a far more liberal policy than the Argentine and lifting the requirement would cost us nothing (hopefully there might be a small financial saving) and it would be seen as a sign of good will.

Once again, we raised the humanitarian subject of a visit to the war graves in the Falkland Islands by the Argentine bereaved under proper Red Cross control (so that it could not be turned into a propaganda stunt). However, there is evidence that the Argentine government has been making difficulties over such a visit, presumably considering that the relatives should not need permission to visit what is, in their eyes, Argentine soil. We have asked the churches to seek a way forward.

A fisheries conservation regime is an obvious thought, for the increasing over-fishing cannot be allowed to continue, whether or not Argentinian boats are among those allowed to fish what have been traditional fishing grounds for some of them. The lifting of all financial and trade restrictions (especially on books), a major exchange of students and all forms of cultural and sporting activities are other possible moves.

A former President of the Argentine, whom we had called on at his home in Buenos Aires, put to us an idea he claimed he had been urging on President Alfonsin. There should be two simultaneous unilateral

declarations, without negotiations and without any attached strings. The Argentine would formally declare all hostilities terminated and Britain would at the same moment remove the 150 mile protection zone around the Islands. These two events would be organised behind the scenes by the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires. In themselves, these declarations could not be described as difficult for the respective governments. Hostilities on land have been officially declared to be at an end and have not taken place in the air or on the sea since the recapture of Port Stanley. During a recent visit to Venezuela, Dr. Caputo, their Foreign Minister, stated:

> 'We commit ourselves formally before the international community not to use force except of a dissuasive or defensive character'.

There is little point in Britain claiming to have a protection zone if there are no hostilities taking place or forecast.

With regard to long-term solutions four main possibilities were discussed during our visit to the Argentine, sometimes at our suggestion, sometimes at theirs.

*United Nations Trusteeship:* (under Articles 75-81 of the UN Charter).

We found this suggestion unfamiliar at first but it was greeted with fair enthusiasm by some Peronist (opposition) congressmen. We had in mind not just one Trust Power, but a group of perhaps five acceptable countries (Austria, Canada, Finland, Peru and Zambia for example) who would supervise an elected Islands Council.

*Joint Sovereignty*

I find this most unattractive but it was favourably received in the Argentine (one experienced statesman even suggested alternating sovereignty, which would be a nightmare!). Argentina already has some experience of the problems for the island of Martin Garcia in the Plate Estuary has been under joint Argentine and Uruguayan sovereignty since 1974. We fear the idea might be a bad precedent for the countries in South and Central America, such as Guiana and Belize, which are resisting unjustified territorial claims from their neighbours.

*An Autonomous Region* (within Argentina).

This seems to be a much more sensible suggestion and we had discussed it in great detail at our two conferences in Maryland. When Argentina talks about 'sovereignty' it means the *principle* of sovereignty and the recognition of Argentine rights by the rest of the world. It has almost no interest in the Islands for themselves. (They do not think there is gold in the hills behind Port San Carlos and they have no wish to get involved when two kelpers have a fight at Goose Green on pay night!) They seek the symbolic assumption of sovereignty and would be content for the British way of life to continue. (The fascinating example of the Aland Islands in the Baltic is worth a mention in this context). It was repeatedly emphasised to us that rights of the 'ethnic minorities' in Argentina, mainly English, Welsh and German, had been guaranteed for generations and that this had never been in dispute between our two countries.

*Leaseback*

This is a popular suggestion in the Argentine but it has been rejected by the Islanders' representatives in the past. It has been described as the most 'elegant' solution as it combines the principles of British administration with the instant introduction of the principle of notional Argentine sovereignty. Would a lease that covered, say, two or three generations be really such an awful idea for the Islanders, many of whom have privately expressed their fears that 'Fortress Falklands' could not be sustained indefinitely?

Our brief and rushed visit was perhaps the first small gesture of reconciliation since Britain's recapture of Port Stanley. What was achieved? Dr. Caputo praised our visit when asked for a comment during a TV interview and the Foreign Office back in London appeared to find it helpful. At least we were able to restore relations with the Argentine Congress and try and explain to them how the dispute was seen by the political parties at Westminster. At least we were able to hit out at the myths that abound. Over and over again we had to tell them we are not, and have no intention of, importing nuclear weapons into the region and that the Islands are not, and cannot be, a NATO base. In general our visit was welcomed and opinion-formers were well aware of the need to get relations with Britain back onto a more realistic basis.

To those who still wonder why, having won the war, we should ever again discuss sovereignty with the Argentine, I would ask them to once again have a look at a globe. Whatever else may be in support of the status quo it is not geography. On 2nd July the *Financial Times* marked our return with a powerful and, in my mind, unanswerable editorial.

At the end of July Britain and Argentina negotiated face to face in Berne. It appears the ground had been meticulously prepared beforehand and a document exchanged which set out exactly how the touchy issue of sovereignty was to be played by both sides. Unexpectedly the talks broke down within twenty-four hours, possibly due to nervousness on behalf of the Argentine government which was facing concessions over the Beagle Channel dispute at the same time. Certainly, it was not in Britain's interest that the talks should have broken down so quickly. There was no prospect of a resumption before the issue was debated and polarised in the United Nations General Assembly. The need is now for renewed contacts. Britain would be living up to its finest traditions if the search for a lasting peace is pursued with vigour and imagination.

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[Cyril D. Townsend is Conservative Member of Parliament for Bexleyheath.]

# THE BOMB AND THE WORD

## by Paul Rose

ONE figure seemed to dominate the Conference season—the President of the Mineworkers' Union, Arthur Scargill, whether as hero or ogre —and then in one horrific blast, the IRA demonstrated the real meaning of violence and conflict in a world where the gun and the bomb make the stones and truncheons seem like the weapons of naïve children. As the atrocity at Brighton hit the public, Arthur Scargill was momentarily pushed into relative oblivion, albeit not for long. A day after Norman Tebbit's standing ovation, the Minister with the appearance of an heir apparent was being patiently extricated from the rubble of Brighton's most prestigious hotel.

The whole perspective and analysis of the Party Conferences was momentarily blown into fragments. The Irish dimension which has periodically blighted Parliamentary politics for a century forced itself into focus with a disregard for human life that most of us find beyond our comprehension.

If the Falklands factor was followed by the Scargill bonus for a Prime Minister whose dismal economic record is offset by her resolute approach, the explosion at Brighton was to reinforce the image which, only a day before, was appearing tarnished. Violence and terrorism are not only immoral weapons. In this context, they are self-defeating and show a deep lack of understanding of the British psyche.

What William Joyce's mocking propaganda and Hitler's bombs produced as a response in World War II was the united determination of Britain to stand up. Miner and aristocrat, Bevin and Churchill, Attlee and Eden stood side by side. Only a disaffected few would rejoice in the Brighton bombing, for it threatens the whole fabric of a society in which leaders and led could mingle, be shaken warmly by the hand or harangued by protesters without the need for a posse of security men or bullet-proof glass to insulate them.

The world outside is fast destroying these traditional attributes of our cosy gatherings, whether at Blackpool, Brighton or Buxton. For it is only because of outside support that the IRA can create such havoc, while the true representative of the Northern Ireland minority, John Hume, has no one's ear other than that of minorities within the major parties. It is a tragedy that, even in 1984, twenty years after I personally became involved in the Northern Ireland problem in my election campaign, the voice of the moderates is ignored so that a spurious authenticity is given to the bombers and gunmen.

Only a week earlier, at Blackpool, a Party with a death wish had, on its first day, passed such outlandish resolutions and hailed Arthur Scargill as the second coming that even a brilliant, albeit coded speech by Neil Kinnock could not undo the damage already manifesting itself in the polls. Readers would, however, be naïve if they failed to understand that the death wish is not as it seems. To the supporters of a myriad of tendencies, of which

Militant is only one, the object is not to see a Labour Government elected. It is to 'smash capitalism'; 'fight Thatcherism'; 'destroy the system'. To others, the genuine belief that only the media fog prevents an immediate response to their full-blooded Socialist message encourages them to press for measures that entirely miss the real aspirations of workers in Britain. Self-delusion is the staff of Party Conferences.

The aspiration to own one's home is a key example. The aspiration to enjoy middle-class standards of comfort, leisure activity and consumerism characterises the majority of car workers or shop assistants and is more tangible than heady notions set out in *Labour Herald* or *Militant* for a revolutionary change. Even those on the picket lines would find the language of Lenin and Trotsky as distant in time and space as it is from the state of Britain sixty-five years after the Russian Revolution; and yet it is these Messianic slogans and romantic illusions that increasingly motivated the dwindling but more fervent faithful at Blackpool this year. Nevertheless, rotting inner cities and growing unemployment give them some credibility that they lacked before.

Attacks on judges and police are no substitute for well thought out policies. There is no doubt that, by the nature of their background, judges are likely to be Conservative inclined, albeit modified by a genuine attempt to be fair and an obvious belief in the rule of law. He who seeks to change laws cannot be selective in obedience, was Kinnock's message, lost in the adulation of those actually appearing to fight Thatcher in the courts and on the picket lines.

True, blue uniforms do not imbue their wearers with angelic qualities, but neither do pit helmets and coal-stained faces. Both groups of men risk life and limb daily for our comfort. The former have a strong sense of community and the latter a somewhat remote subculture imposed by the nature of their position. Both have commanded respect in our society and the violence on each side has been minimal, given the bitterness of the dispute.

Intimidation on one side can be defended no more than breaches of civil liberty on the other, but to condemn all police is to politicise the police as much as the Government has done. True, again, the police and the judiciary serve the State but, whatever the inadequacies and unfairness of our democratic state (and it may be argued that democracy can be a bad form of government), few of us would wish to live under any other.

Our task is to improve the accountability of that democracy—and all the Party Conferences paid lip service to this. It seemed to me that the Liberal Party, above all, with its emphasis on community policies, decentralisation and electoral reform came nearest to it. However, for David Steel to veto his Party's vote on Cruise, whether for the sake of the Alliance, for votes or for his own conscience, did not appear consistent. There, at Bournemouth, a new figure appeared on the political horizon in the shape of Paddy Ashdown of the open-necked shirt, macho past and pacific pronouncements. For me, personally, he was the man of the Conference season. David Steel's position is being slowly eroded and he will have to

live up to his name!

The SDP had become more soggy and centralised, although it just about condemned plastic bullets in Northern Ireland and had constructive plans to lessen unemployment and smooth industrial conflict. It is looking too much like a centre party with a Tawneyite left attracting disaffected Labour moderates. Its initial radicalism seems tarnished. David Owen, like Ian Botham, is a great swashbuckling all-rounder, but a captain should mobilise and place his team, motivate supporters into activity and bring out the best in them. He could learn from Mike Brearley. No one can fault his personal performance, but as any cricket enthusiast knows, that may detract from his captainship.

Certainly, Bill Rodgers should have been more sensitive to the natural organic growth on the ground of Alliance co-operation rather than sticking to the rigid formulae of central offices. Of course, he had to defend the SDP's sense of separate identity, but Liberals are often over-sensitive in the failure to understand why the SDP did not just come *en bloc* to them. Both will have to see that the Alliance is greater than the sum of the two parties. A new radical approach will be needed to recapture the spirit of Crosby and Croydon. Nevertheless, nothing catastrophic happened at the SDP and Liberal Conferences and in all their image was constructive and sober. Perhaps a realisation that the balance of power in the land is within reach made for greater reservation? At the same time, on Cruise, secondary picketing and the acceptance of the European Conversion as overriding National law, the Liberals look more radical than the SDP, if perhaps less egalitarian than the original 'Limehouse' group.

Sadly, this coming of age seems aeons ago after the fervour of the Blackpool bother boys and the bomb at Brighton. Out of the ruins stepped an ice-cool Mrs. Thatcher as the embodiment of Britain's unflappability—of the Bulldog breed and defiance in the name of democracy. The IRA did for her what Galtieri did at the height of her unpopularity and what Arthur Scargill seemed to be doing in his charismatic way only a week before. Their belief in their rectitude and courses are something they have in common. Their stubbornness is only outdone by Mr. Macgregor's.

However, even before the bomb, cracks were appearing in the Conservative Party and even the Established Church was hurling sermons at the Government in the tradition of Elijah and Isaiah rather than the Conservative Party at Prayer. Even the Chief Rabbi was bound to agree that spiritual leaders should have the right to speak out on moral issues and one waited with bated breath for the Pope to announce Solidarity's contribution to the striking miners' funds. If men of the cloth—men of peace and reconciliation —were genuinely concerned at the rift in our society, so was leading wet, Peter Walker, speaking without the restraint of the platform at a fringe meeting of the Tory Reform Group.

Meanwhile, young Tories showed their respect for law and order by criminal damage to a submarine—albeit a model one—launched at Brighton by CND in an almost unnoticed protest at Tory defence policy. Labour had gone unilateralist and even Dennis Healey did not blink an eyelid.

When it happened at Scarborough, the whole nation shook as Gaitskell vowed to fight, fight and fight again. The Party he loved was almost unrecognisable. The Party Lord Alec Douglas-Home loved had become somewhat more classless. Working miners and their wives were wheeled on to condemn obscene and violent intimidation and the working miner competed well with the police for the plaudits of the Conference.

The cries of anguish from the stranded Northern Tories reflecting the dereliction and unemployment figures showed a compassionate side to Toryism and Mrs. Thatcher was not going to be caught out by accusations of not caring. Michael Heseltine lacked his manic lustre in the defence debate that one had come to expect and while only the most faithful could follow Geoffrey Howe, who had a more optimistic note, they duly received their standing ovations. Norman Tebbit's was greater than all, but here was a new Norman, even joking and smiling—the 'semi-house-trained polecat' was really a pet after all. Not even his most hardened opponents could have watched him twenty-four hours later gently eased out of the rubble of the Grand Hotel in pain and injured without sympathy. At times like that, our common humanity transcends personal and political dislikes. No one would deny the dignity and fortitude of the victims—Lord Gowrie picking up deckchairs to seat the shocked and provide makeshift stretchers. Can we not extend this to the dying children in Ethiopia and the wretched unemployed without hope in Tyneside or Liverpool? It is not enough for Leon Brittan to crack down on the other killers, the heroin dealers, for the big fish will not expose themselves. It is not enough for Nigel Lawson to explain the niceties of public spending policy. A small but growing section of Conservative opinion was beginning to see that the social evil of unemployment was different in kind from the monetary 'evil' of too much public spending.

In selling off the nation's assets—privatisation is the 'in' word—it was ironic to hear of the spread of wealth and ownership, for it will be the Racals of this world or GEC which will benefit most. Nevertheless, I confess to being a prospective purchaser of £500 in British Telecom and these are exciting times for the more fortunate among us. The young Tory who spoke of public and private sector working together was heckled and is clearly a future candidate for the SDP. Privatisation has become the Conservative Party's clause 4 and the ghost of Adam Smith has upstaged the old man whose grave is an objective for pilgrimages to Highgate Cemetery. The law of the market place prevails. The social market economy, workers' participation and shareholding are eating away at the fabric of Morrisonian nationalisation in the SDP. Even prisons can be privatised, as in the USA, in the eyes of some Conservatives. The Tory party was as ideological as Labour under Harold Wilson was pragmatic.

But where does this leave the Hattersleys, Shores and Silkins on the one hand or the Pyms, Gilmours and Heaths on the other? For there is no sign of an exodus into the world of Roy Jenkins and David Owen. It will take Peter Walker half a decade of arduous labour to bring the Tories home. I fear Neil Kinnock and his attractive wife, with all the wit and words at

their command, will not be able to stave off the increasing stranglehold in the constituencies upon a party whose base is shrinking.

Unless the two Davids get their act together, rekindle radicalism and show that they not only care but they have the answers, the great divide will remain, as will the politics of Mrs. Thatcher. It is not enough even to have credible imaginative policies. People have to believe they really can win—and not just in by-elections.

It is incredible how soon the politicians have got back to business as usual. So, what of the future, after the four 1984 party political Conferences, now that Parliament is in session again after the long summer recess? I see Labour contracting and more purist and the rift between rank and file and leadership widening; the Iron Lady able to be a little more pragmatic in her hour of strength, and the Alliance, with all its tensions, clawing its way into town halls and by-election seats painstakingly but as surely as Labour's decline on present form is inevitable. The bomb has temporarily ossified the Tory Party. One cannot stage a palace coup where the IRA failed a grand assassination.

I am concerned about the future of civil liberties. It is time that we balanced personal liberty with professionalism in security. I personally have taken a weapon on board a plane, left an airport without checking out and walked into 10 Downing Street with a large barrister's bag and no one stopped me, because in each case I looked the part. I did it to prove a point, but I suppose in a democracy there is no ultimate security and in a dictatorship no one is secure.

Of one thing I am sure; the President of the Irish Republic, Dr. Garret FitzGerald's, moving speech should unite the British and Irish in combating the gun and the bomb as a means of conveying hope to the minority in Ulster and may ultimately have done some good in bringing out our common humanity. I fear, nonetheless, that the current move will result in a further erosion of accepted civil liberties and greater police powers in the wrong areas. Professionalism is one thing; politicisation is another.

# MALTA AT THE HALF-WAY STAGE

## by Christopher Jones

WHEN Malta became independent in 1964, the Nationalist Party, at that time already in power, guided the country from the emerging state of colonialism to the years of self-rule, a process which was to last right up to 1971. Since then, Malta has had three successive years of Labour Government, which has already lasted 13 years and which is due to end in 1987.

As often occurs in countries the world over, when a party dominates for a period of government and there is a change, the impact is always the same. It brings forward a complete change in political thought and rule. In Malta's case the effect has been remarkable, and the political concepts which for a time were based on a moderate and democratic form of government have now made way for a government which is bent on professing an ultra-socialist doctrine.

Unfortunately, the third Socialist term of office has been accompanied by an open conflict, since the results of the last general elections have been openly contested on the grounds that there was a case of jerrymandering in the distribution of districts. This has had the effect of producing an enigma in that, while the Nationalists obtained the largest number of votes—that is, 51% of the electorate—the Labour Party, on the other hand, has been able to obtain the larger number of Parliamentary seats, which has made possible the formation of a government. Bickering over this question has become the major problem in Malta, the Malta Labour Party contending that they represent the country legally, whilst the Nationalists opine that they have been unjustifiably robbed of being in power. Naturally, this ill-feeling is at the crux of all the 'malaise' that permeates throughout the country, where there is now a sense of deep frustration on the part of the majority of the islanders.

Meanwhile, the Malta Labour Party, strengthened by its third term of office, has proceeded to govern the country on the basis of its election manifesto, adopting a policy which today indicates clearly that the present government is embarking on a long-term policy on the foundation of a Socialist state in all its forms. Unlike previous labour governments, in its third term, the present administration is now bent on controlling every aspect of Maltese life—from the cradle to the grave.

In the field of foreign policy, whilst the avowed declaration of the present government is that of strict neutralism and adherence to non-alignment and the Third World, its entire foreign policy leans wholly on the Eastern bloc countries. Then, in foreign affairs, rather than adopting a policy of conciliation, it has, as in the case of the Conference for European Security, adopted an intransigent attitude when, at the Madrid Meeting, Malta refused to sign the end-of-the-conference communique, before a clause was included on the need for the preservation of peace in the Mediterranean against the threat by the two super naval powers.

Again, whilst Malta is a member of the United Nations and its various agencies, enjoys association membership of the European Common Market and is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, in its efforts for assistance and reciprocal and technical and cultural aid it leans almost solely on Eastern bloc countries. Agreements, have in fact, been signed mostly with such countries as Russia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, in Europe, with North Korea and China in Asia and in a number of North, Central and West African countries.

Evidently, when all British connections with Malta were severed along with NATO and when Malta was assured an intake of £M31 annually through British and NATO presence as well as other consequent invisible assets, the country was faced with a heavy financial burden and Malta had to seek opportunities elsewhere for financial assistance and technical aid in order to make possible the purchase of valuable commodities and raw materials, particularly oil supplies. The strange role of Malta's relations with foreign countries cannot be expressed more clearly when it transpires that, while Malta enjoyed special relations with Libya—who immediately after the British withdrawal rushed in to help—(and acquired in the process the entire air control from Malta right up to Chad!) and granted Malta special easy facilities for its oil supplies, this did not deter Libya from taking special measures with the deployment of naval forces to prevent Malta from prospecting for oil within Maltese territorial waters. The matter is still listed for eventual hearing before the International Courts of Justice at The Hague.

In the changing atmosphere of Malta's economy, which is now based on tourism and industrial growth, as well as the development of an efficient tanker and ship repair yard, the country hopes to build its future. It has to be recalled that it has taken many years of publicity to change Malta's former image as a fortress island into one which can afford ideal tourists' advantages. On the other hand, the development of industries is an uphill fight because the island has no raw materials and this restricts the nature of its industries which are suitable for the less established world markets, such as in the African continent.

The world over, tourism has become one of the prime means of helping the economies of many a nation. However, it has its drawbacks, because this is a sphere which tends to suffer from the fickleness of tourists who seem to like to move from place to place according to the popularity of the day. Fortunately, Malta has all the attributes to attract tourists, the sun throughout the year, perfect, crystal-like seas, an hospitable people and an historical past, ranging from prehistory to the 16th and 17th centuries, with remains and relics which satisfy the tastes of the historically-minded. Besides these basic requirements, one has to have an adequate and efficient hotel service to suit all purses, good catering in restaurants, a variety of food, regular communication with the outside world and plenty of night life and theatre entertainment. Much has been done in Malta in this sector to attract tourists. However, arrangements in many cases fall short of foreign standards. For instance, there has been too much emphasis on

attracting British visitors, when all over Europe there is a vast potential of tourists from Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux countries.

Industrially, since the British rundown in 1958, Malta has made some remarkable progress, first through pilot industrial centres and then by the extension of prebuilt factories spread all over the island. However, our industries have to rely to a large extent on foreign capital and market expertise and, as such, many of our industries are joint ventures. Although Maltese exports have made a good start, the difficulty of market penetration, coupled with world recession, inflation and the energy crisis, have contributed to a slow growth in exports.

Along with tourism and manufacturing industries, Malta had hoped to develop its potentialities as a leading Mediterranean shipyard capable of repairing the largest tankers and all forms of merchant shipping. This view was based on the fact that throughout its history Malta was always an important shipping centre and through its British connections Malta had become one of the most important naval repair centres in the Mediterranean.

After conversion from naval to civil repair, the shipyard was administered first by Bailey's of Wales and then by Swan Hunter. Finally, it was passed on to the Malta Government and is today managed by the workers themselves, who are ultimately responsible to Government. The aim of the civil yard was to service the largest tankers that ply between the Mediterranean and Middle East. A new China dock was built by the Chinese for this purpose and later, through help from Gulf and Saudi Arabian states, a ship repair yard was also constructed. Unfortunately, the recent energy crisis has had a crippling effect on the tanker repair trade, not to mention the highly competitive nature of the more established shipyards in the Mediterranean such as Genoa, Palermo, Tunisia, Athens and Lisbon.

Many other problems have come to light during the past years and, of these, one of the most serious has been rising unemployment, which reflects conditions abroad. However, this is not entirely due to outside conditions. It is felt that better planning, less state interference, more private enterprise and a more conciliatory atmosphere in the local political scene would have avoided the constant increase in the numbers out of work.

Official figures for employment quote the number to be just over 10,000, but economic experts are inclined to believe that the figure is, in reality, twice that amount. However, even then, when one considers that Malta's population reaches just over 325,000, the official figures show that 1 in 32 of the total population is out of work. In a bid to stem the unemployment problem, the Maltese have been encouraged to work abroad in nearby Libya, while, over the years, Government has attempted to cushion the unemployment growth by launching small bodies of auxiliary and semi-military corps, which are engaged on various works throughout the island.

Towering over the delicate internal situation which Malta is now facing are the deep divisions in a country where it is practically impossible for people to discuss matters of universal concern, either through conversation, the media, TV or in public debate. Relations are so strained that the Opposition has found it difficult to fulfil its proper role. The prevailing

antipathetic atmosphere makes any form of constructive criticism virtually impossible. There is now in existence a tight control on the part of Government in all sections of civil, political and commercial life. In trade and commerce, free enterprise is restricted. The system of quota allocations is paramount, and Government has a hand in commerce by adopting a policy of bulk buying, something which in itself tends to stifle commercial and trade initiative on the part of the entrepreneur.

Now, the latest question to foster dissent among large sections of the public is Government's decision to make all privately-run (mostly Church) schools free. This question has again torn the country in two, to the point of actual physical violence and has brought the Government into head-on collision with the local Church authorities, the Vatican and those members of the population who prefer to send their children to privately-owned schools, the majority of which are Church-run. This matter has dragged on for a number of years and has now come to a head, Government having amended the Education Act in order to implement its decision to make privately-run schools free. Under the new Act, the authorities have the power to take over private schools that do not comply with government orders, all schools being subject to a permit which lays down certain conditions which have to be complied with before permission to operate is approved. The public's reaction to this new development has been to rally around the private schools with massive protest rallies, marches and meetings. So far, that is one side of the political picture in Malta today. But what of the other side, as reflected by the Opposition Party?

Since losing the elections of 1971, 1976 and 1981, the Nationalist Party has undergone a considerable overhaul. There have been changes not only in leadership, where Dr. Eddie Fenech Adami has taken over from the late Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier, but above all in its policies, structure, administration, public image and its preparedness for a sudden general election—even before the expiry date of the present government. The Party now has a most up-to-date headquarters in the central part of the country and is equipped with an independent press which publishes a daily newspaper in Maltese and two weeklies, one in Maltese and the other in English. The expert diplomatic handling by its former leader, Dr. G. Borg Olivier, has been replaced by the painstaking, determined and flawless leadership of Dr. E. Fenech Adami, whose dedication to the interests of the nation has won him the respect, admiration and affection of the people, as confirmed by the crowds that flock to his mass meetings.

Faced with insurmountable obstacles, which have prevented the Nationalist Party from reaching the public due to the lack of an impartial local television and radio network, the party has adopted the weapon of boycott in advertising, which had such an effect that it brought the network to a financial crisis. Also, abstention from attendance in Parliament has been resorted to, and this has resulted in making business in the House of Representatives a one-sided affair.

Next, in order to reach the man-in-the-street, the Nationalist Party has gone to the open squares with mass rallies and meetings throughout Malta.

The purpose of these 'direct' contacts has been to inform the people of what is taking place in their country, to explain policies, rebut allegations, to educate the masses and finally to give a true picture of the political scene which, so far, has been so much distorted.

Another area of contention is the Labour Party's claim that the Law Courts are a centre of intrigue. The majority of practising lawyers either belong to the Nationalists or at least sympathise with the party. There have been complaints against decisions taken in court on the grounds of political bias. These assertions are, of course, quite unfounded.

Over the years, one of the unresolved problems for Government has been the 'impasse' ever since the medical profession went on strike over new measures which the authorities introduced concerning the employment of doctors entering the service on graduation. Government responded by locking out doctors who served at the General Hospital, as well as performing private practice. In turn, the doctors affected left the country and sought work elsewhere. That was a major setback for the medical service in Malta and, faced with the loss of some of Malta's finest doctors, the authorities were obliged to shop abroad, recruiting members of the medical profession from Iron Curtain countries and from the African and Asian continents. Private hospitals, particularly the well-known Blue Sisters Hospital, were closed down, and Government retained only one general hospital. The overall effect of these measures has been to create overcrowding in the one hospital, with foreign doctors, who do not speak English, having to deal with patients who, in the majority of cases, only speak Maltese. From the financial point of view, recourse to foreign doctors has brought about a further burden on the exchequer, as foreign doctors have to be paid at higher wages, besides being given additional allowances.

There can be no doubt that Malta is, at present, passing through one of the most acute and delicate periods of its history. The Labour Party intends to run its full term of office, due to expire in 1987. The only ray of hope on the horizon appears to be the MLP's reaction to the N.P.'s proposal for the appointment of a Parliamentary Select Committee to revise the present electoral laws and sections of the Malta constitution. However, unfortunately even here there seems to be a 'fly-in-the-ointment,' because the present Government is only prepared to accede to these requests for revision if the Opposition Party ends boycotting Parliament and attends the House of Representatives. The question of Constitutional changes, therefore, appears to strike an ominous note, as Government proposes to widen still further the powers of the President—until now more symbolical than anything else. This new development is being interpreted in some quarters, now that the Prime Minister has appointed a deputy Prime Minister to succeed him when he retires, that in effect the Constitutional changes in the role of the President will serve to strengthen still further the latter's role, and could well mean that the Prime Minister would then take over the Presidency. In that case, the position will become even more difficult for the Nationalist Party in their bid to return to power.

# DR. JOHNSON AND BIOGRAPHY

## by Park Honan

THE bicentenary of Johnson's death was marked last summer (19 July-14 September) by a vibrant, fine display at the Arts Council in London featuring four Johnson portraits by Sir Joshua Reynolds. One of them shows the thick-lipped, nearsighted Johnson poring over a crumpled book as if he might eat it. But I kept returning to the moving and interesting plaster cast of Johnson's bust and death-mask by James Hoskins and William Cumberland Cruikshank Johnson has an enormous splayed nose, almost as wide as it is long, above a wide mouth. The pits of the operation that he had for scrofula are seen in the right side of Johnson's neck. He was, of course, almost deaf in the right ear, and nearly blind in one eye. His head pushes out ahead of the torso, which, even at his death at 75, is young-looking, muscular, strong, with large slanting breast-bones—the torso and bust of a critic who had immense energy and mental force.

The exhibition's catalogue, *Samuel Johnson 1709-84,* has black-and-white illustrations of the portraits, a vigorous introduction by Kai Kin Yung, and three essays varying from the routine and chatty to the scholarly. John Wain chats about Johnson's mind, W. W. Robson writes very sensitively and with a relish for verbal music on Johnson the poet, and David Fleeman is erudite on the *Dictionary.* William Rees-Mogg's preface is written in the barker style, with a hint of Mohammed Ali punching the air just before getting into the ring. Johnson is 'our greatest literary moralist' and 'the greatest conversationalist in British history' and 'Britain's greatest literary critic'—and to top all of that, in an awesome tribute to the BBC: 'Without Samuel Johnson, Robin Day would not exist.'

After Mr. Rees-Mogg, I would hesitate to add a claim that Samuel Johnson was 'the greatest' of anything else. Johnson was a modest man, with a just sense of his distinction as a critic and lexicographer. He wanted to be called *Mr.* Johnson, and despite his belief in 'subordination' in society, he let some of the needy live in his own house and seems to have talked on equal terms with the London poor. After all, he had walked the streets all night with the poet Richard Savage when they could not afford lodging. But I think that the Arts Council's essays do no real justice to Johnson the biographer, and that although he is not 'the greatest' in that line, his *Lives of the English Poets* is unique and very readable. Boswell said of the short pieces and major biographies comprising the *Lives* that they are altogether 'the richest, most beautiful, and indeed most perfect production of Johnson's pen.'

What turned Johnson into a biographer? He had begun life as a frail ugly duckling but had become physically strong, proud and swaggering as a lad at Lichfield. He was jealous of a younger brother and alternately devoted to and half-ashamed of his father Michael Johnson, who scraped

a poor living as a bookseller, though Johnson later exaggerated the family's poverty. Mrs. Johnson, who was forty at Samuel's birth, was a bustling and rather insensitive woman who by turns indulged and lightly denied her bright son, lecturing and beating him as she hoped to make him self-sufficient and feared his hulking laziness and quick, easy tongue. One doubts that he was beaten hard. 'I did not respect my own mother', he later told Mrs. Thrale, 'and one day when in anger she called me a puppy, I asked her if she knew what they called a puppy's mother.' Another boy would have been thrashed for *that*—and there are other signs he was indulged. At Pembroke College, Oxford, he was to study for thirteen months on a legacy his mother could ill afford to give him, after taking over 100 volumes from his poor father's bookshop before he left.

The father 'was a foolish old man', as Johnson later said of him, 'that is to say was foolish in talking of his children'. Samuel had loathed his father's caresses, Mrs. Thrale records, 'because he knew they were sure to precede some unpleasing display of his early abilities'. The bookseller was 52 when Samuel was born: Michael Johnson was a large, gaunt, devout and conscientious man, 'prone to melancholy' and rather henpecked; it is not surprising that he took almost excessive pleasure in his son's brilliance.

Johnson's psychological problems, including the pressures that made him a confident and forceful biographer, were forming during his early years at Lichfield. He did not suffer from a lack of love, but from an excess of clumsily directed parental concern and affection. As an ugly child, acute and quick, he must have viewed himself as less desirable than his brother; and then Mrs. Johnson's hectoring, anxious concern and Mr. Johnson's 'foolish' doting pride in Samuel's wit and rapid learning tied him too closely to his parents. W. Jackson Bate in his *Samuel Johnson* (1978), a close and thoughtful biography, finds Johnson the victim of a deep psychological identification with his father. To Johnson, the aging man seemed ineffectual, feeble and helpless—as his poor business went to ruins and the father who had been elected Sheriff of Lichfield in the year of his son's birth (1709) now settled into deep melancholy. Whether Mrs. Johnson became more strident as her husband faded, we do not know, but life can hardly have been easy in the household.

In poems he wrote at school, in 'Festina Lente' and other exercises, Johnson oddly shows off a polished talent. The poems have the look of mature work, and seem older and wiser than their author probably was. Johnson offers moral reminders that strong feeling is deadly, and shows off an extricating violence:

> Orestes plung'd his vengeful dart
> Into his supplicating mother's heart.

Reason calms the 'ruffled soul', and may keep one from moving down steep cliffs precipitately,

> Urg'd headlong on by hatred or by love.

All boys enjoy gore, and these lines may have nothing to do with his

parents. What is certain is that he felt oppressed by a 'foolish' Michael, and a Sarah Johnson he could not 'respect', and that, in manhood, he would have chances to review life as a biographer. Although every biographer tries to recreate a factual past not his own, one may in biography have a chance to gain insight into one's formative years. One may judge one's parents, or implicitly control them in retrospect by reviewing a different but similar psychological past; one may in writing a 'Life' have an opportunity to judge forces that bewildered one in earlier years, or that one was never able to elude or control or protect oneself from. One recreates factual versions of childhood, youth, and early manhood, and now with judiciously authoritative correction and comment. I would go further in saying this. Unless the biographer *does* strongly identify with the person he or she writes about, to the extent of finding reminiscent echoes in that different past, the biography is likely to be what Johnson called a 'barren and useless' account, false to elusive human emotions. What is always required in biography is a penetrating power, but one needs to penetrate with more than the intellect. We cannot understand anyone without loving the person, as Wordsworth would say; and perhaps we need love or hatred to depict a life interestingly, faithfully and as fully as possible. In our century with its legacy of scientific positivism we are less likely than eighteenth-century people to value the commitment, feeling, and subjectivity that made Johnson and Boswell excellent biographers. The biographer is nothing if he is always at the mercy of his feelings; he must be a critic, supplied by what he has felt so that he will be capable of insight and of animating past 'facts'.

Johnson felt the pressures of despair most acutely in the five-year period after he left Pembroke College. He plunged into acute depression and lived in a condition of breakdown, anxiety, and lassitude, so that rational analysis only convinced him he was losing his mind. He 'strongly entertained thoughts of Suicide', John Taylor later remarked of him, and Boswell only with much difficulty learned anything about this long interval. Johnson typically would walk from Lichfield to Birmingham and back, thirty-two miles, to try to master himself. I have walked part of the distance on streets of north Birmingham less pleasant than his fields, but not with anything like Johnson's frightful state of mind (I hope), and it seems to me that his long, compulsive walks have to do with his need for external obstacles. He was a man who required years of poverty and struggle, enormous tasks, long challenges and outward difficulties to retain inward composure. As for his anguished prayers, which it is fashionable now to pity, I suspect that they had beneficial psychological effects for him. His deep Christian faith allowed for the sin of despair since its premise was that we are all sinful all of the time. As a rational faith it helped him to objectify his sufferings confessionally, to remind himself of ideas which were morally fortifying and applicable to his state of being, and of course it promised hope through grace. He did emerge from five difficult years, at the age of 25, to marry a widow

then in her forties, Mrs. Elizabeth Jervis Porter or his 'Tetty'. Lucy Porter says that Johnson was then 'lean and lank, so that his immense structure of bones was hideously striking to the eye, and the scars of scrophula were deeply visible'; he wore his stiff hair parted behind and had 'convulsive starts and odd gesticulations, which tended to excite at once surprise and ridicule'. Tetty however was impressed by him sufficiently to say, 'This is the most sensible man I ever saw in my life.'

He began seventeen years of marriage, as a schoolteacher with three pupils. With one of them, David Garrick, the future actor-manager, he left in 1737 for London where he arrived with twopence halfpenny and perhaps a letter of credit in his pocket. However shabby his days were, they were redeemed by the gaiety and intellectual interest of a cultural capital. 'The happiness of London is not to be conceived but by those who have lived in it', he said thirty years yater. His years as a Grub Street writer brought him in contact with the underworld, the poor, and nearly all professions; his inspired hackwork for Edward Cave's *Gentleman's Magazine* forced him to write on medicine, agriculture, chemistry, politics, city life and travel, while he turned out thirteen biographies or biographical sketches and then half a million words of the journal's *Parliamentary Debates.* For these, often writing at a rate of 1,800 words an hour, he imagined himself into the minds of politicians and developed the tactics that made him a fine biographer. His 'Life of Savage' (1744) shows what he had learned. He accepted his friend Richard Savage's claim of being the illegitimate son of the Countess of Macclesfield, but tried to tell the truth about his friend's shiftless, violent, plucky, sponging, and luckless career. Evil is located in a mother's barbarity, and we feel sympathy for Savage as he stands in the dark before her door hoping to see the parent who rejected him. But 'he could neither soften her heart, nor open her hand, and was reduced to the utmost miseries of want, while he was endeavouring to awaken the affection of a mother. He was therefore obliged to seek some other means of support; and, having no profession, became by necessity an author.' One feels there is hardly a better plot-line in a Dickens novel. Channeling his emotions into Savage's story, the narrator holds the ingredients through a strong controlling framework of general comment on life. Johnson is a lofty chorus, but is never so remote as to suppose that his task is not to illuminate the reader's life. His practice accords very well with his theory in the 60th *Rambler* essay where he says that a biographer's business is to 'display the minute details of daily life' so that they seem meaningful 'to every diversity of condition', and the theory, I think, explains why 'The Life of Savage' seems fresh and moving. The tactics are excellent in persuading us that nothing recounted is untruthful or improbable and that the narrator with his phrases such as, 'it is very reasonable to conjecture' or 'nor is it to be doubted', is rational and moderate. The prose is not excessively balanced, and after pitiable details of frightful turmoil and murder and self-indulgence and ruin, we have stately and wise paragraphs in which Johnson extracts lessons from what we have beheld.

His sympathy for the individual case makes his morality appealing. Having known a few of his friend's temptations, he is never in a flutter over Savage's wine-drinking or prostitutes. When near the end of his life in 1777, at the age of sixty-eight, Johnson came to write the *Lives of the English Poets*, he knew every level of London society from its depths to its upper levels of wealthy actor-managers and investors, Tory and Whig politicians and aristocratic ladies. Few men with scholarly aims, interested in the etymologies and multiple meanings of words, were ever so worldly and fascinated by daily life in a city as Johnson. It seems just as well that he thought of the *Lives* as a 'little' task. The proposal relaxed him, so much so that he badly cheated himself by asking only a small fee for his writing. The Martin brothers' Apollo Press in Edinburgh had launched an enormous edition of the English poets, to the alarm of London booksellers who felt that the Scots were invading their special field. To counter the audacity of the Martins, a group of London publishers decided to produce their own elegant edition of the poets; they limited their scope to forty-seven writers dating back to about 1660 and asked Johnson, a famous man, to write a concise account of each author and name his price. He asked for a modest 100 guineas, swelled the list to fifty-two poets, and gave them 370,000 words.

No publisher in our time has really known what to do with the *Lives*. They ought to be available in paperback; they must be read as a series—and yet who has ever heard of Johnson's Thomas Yalden or David Mallet or Gilbert West, or knows what to do with 370,000 words? The Yale edition (costly) is coming to the *Lives*, and meanwhile we have Penguin's *Selected Writings* of Johnson with the whole of 'Savage' and 'Gray' and a few extracts mainly from 'Milton' and 'Pope.' Some day, Penguins and Dent will perhaps learn not to print extracts, as Penguins for its sins have done even for Ginsberg's poem 'Howl'. The *Lives* present a difficulty because they are of varying length; some are so short that Johnson was able to write four or five of them in one week in April 1780, but those of Cowley, Milton, Dryden and Pope are major biographies. It is a delicious and rewarding experience to read straight through the lives and to adjust to brevity and expansion. Written in the century of Pope and Haydn, each of the *Lives* is a delightful variation on a standard pattern —which includes an account of a man's life, comments on his character and then a succinct review of his works with the author in focus. Suffusing this pattern are the wisest comments on life that I have seen in any work in English since Shakespeare. I know of no biography more enthralling than Johnson's *Lives*, unless it is Boswell's *Life of Johnson*.

Perhaps the first thing one notices is that there are no dullnesses except for Johnson's few extracts from pedants. Like Pope he hates tedium, and the gratuitousness of the floating detail: he had said that we are no wiser about Addison when told of the 'irregularity of his pulse'. How does the biographer avoid tedium, then? First, it would seem, by establishing his presence, his seriousness and commitment and unflappable interest in the moral character of men. Johnson appears in universal statements

which he uses as a touchstone for judging the worth of men. His second way of being interesting is by not according blame and credit in any simple manner for behaviour, but by judging in a kind of dialectic of moral inquiry. One is fascinated to see how this will work out, as in his 'Dryden'. Dryden attacked his predecessors vengefully, and that was a fault despite his placable nature and warm friendships. But he cannot *quite* be judged as other men for he was lively, vigorous, intelligent and achieving. Thus if he was censorious he must be credited for excellence; he had an authoritative right: 'he who excels has a right to teach, and he whose judgement is incontestable may, without usurpation, examine and decide.' Dryden is a genial man whose arrogance is a bad fault, though an index of high attainment. Johnson in his critical section looks for the man in the poems and finds in the poet an unusually comprehensive mind goaded by bold, large aims: 'His compositions are the effects of a vigorous genius operating on large materials' and even treading 'on the brink of meaning'. We are left with a vision of Dryden's daring mind.

Since he believes that literature is emotive and that unless a work moves us its brilliance fails, he can be harsh on the 'the metaphysical poets'—which he grouped and named for the first time—in 'Cowley'. They never succeeded in 'moving the affections' it seems; but what bothers him particularly about Donne and Cowley is that they splinter life, they dissect just as a sun-beam is shattered by a prism. Here Johnson expresses one of the strongest impulses of his own nature or his need for wholeness and integration. It is typically a demand of the later eighteenth century when the compartmentalisation of knowledge had begun. Life, he believed, is impoverished if feelings tell us one thing and our intellect continually dictates something else; he would not have agreed with T. S. Eliot that the 'dissociation of sensibility' began after John Donne. It is seen virulently in Donne himself. Johnson implies that the main effort of modern writing and thinking must be to find those ideas and resources that unite feeling with intellect, yet he is willing to give Donne and Cowley the credit of 'surprise' and 'elegance' due them.

He is much more virulently prejudiced in the 'Life of Swift' since Swift's politics, gloom, Irishness, and misanthropy all grated on Johnson. When really hostile to a writer he tended to avoid research and accept the worst reports he knew. Swift becomes an unstable eccentric, so zany and obsessive that he took up jogging: 'He thought exercise of great necessity, and used to run up and down a hill every two hours.' (There was a tradition that at Letcombe he ran up a hill every day before breakfast.) This dreadful jogger absolutely failed to read books at all, then devoured them eight hours a day for seven years before writing his 'wild' *Tale of a Tub.* His *Gulliver's Travels* befuddled its critics. ('When once you have thought of big men and little men it is very easy to do the rest', Johnson calmly said.) But Johnson's hostility seems to be the price he must pay for being candid, and Swift gathers importance from

the assaults on him. Johnson pours them on: 'He is querulous and fastidious, arrogant and malignant; he scarcely speaks of himself but with indignant lamentations, or of others but with insolent superiority when he is gay, and with angry contempt when he is gloomy.' The importance and interest of Swift are never denied. No modern admirer of Swift can resent Johnson's essay. And I think this is because 'Swift' displays the energy, caring, authority, and passion of Johnson's whole commitment to life. We need not like every classic, but we ought to express what we feel and think with absolutely fidelity in what we write. 'Swift' moreover ought to be read alongside the balanced, intuitive 'Life of Pope', the finest of the *Lives* in which Johnson unconsciously pays tribute to himself. 'Pope had likewise genius', he writes, 'a mind active, ambitious, and adventurous, always investigating, always aspiring; in its widest searches still longing to go forward, in its highest flights still wishing to be higher, always imagining something greater than it knows, always endeavouring more than it can do.'

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['Dr. Johnson and Biography' is the last in the series of three articles on celebrated writers by Park Honan. 'The Young Matthew Arnold' was published in the October issue (No. 1425, Vol. 245) and 'Jane Austen and Marriage' in November (No. 1426, Vol. 245).]

The January 1985 issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *New Zealand's New Government* by Keith Suter, *The Haunting Spectre of the Horn of Africa* by J. B. Wood, *Japan's Village People* by Anthony Head and *In Defence of Surrogate Motherhood* by Hugh V. McLachlan.

# PLO ON THE WAY OF CONSOLIDATION

## by Zoran Pirolic

WHEN the leader of the PLA, Yasser Arafat, was besieged by Fatah rebel forces and Syrian troops in the town of Tripoli, northern Lebanon, late in 1983 there were no obituaries being written for the Palestinian leader. The legendary Abu Amer seemed to be fighting one of his last battles, deserted by one and all save a handful of his closest associates and two or three thousand loyal fedaheen.

Today, over a half year after the deplorable fighting in refugee camps Nahr el Bare and Al Baddawi on the approaches to Tripoli, the situation in the ranks of the Palestinians has greatly changed. Instead of discord, disunity and the possible emergence of two parallel and mutually irreconcilable organisations, the PLO is well on the way to internal consolidation. No one really seriously questions Arafat's leadership any more save for the Fatah rebels and the members of some miniature Palestine groupings. Despite demands for collective action in the PLO and Al Fatah, despite more or less open criticism of his unannounced meeting with Egyptian President, Mubarek, which shocked many Palestinians, Arafat has remained one of the symbols uniting Palestinians of various different political and ideological options. The Palestinian leader also has to his credit the recently signed agreements between Al Fatah and the representatives of four Palestinian organisations, defining future trends of political and organisational changes in the PLO. These are at the same time agreements which have opened wide the doors to an exceptionally important session of the Palestinian National Council (parliament in exile) at which the political platform of the PLO's future activities will be determined.

The essence of the dispute between hard-liners in Al Fatah and the PLO, and the mainstream of the Palestinian movement headed by Arafat are the roads and forms of action of the revolutionary Palestine organisation under the new conditions created by the Palestine-Israeli war in 1982. The dispute flared up after the Palestinians evacuated Beirut and was further compounded by the interference of outside Arab factors which felt this was a chance to use the PLO for their own interests and so substantially strengthen their position in the ever more complex Mid-eastern situation.

Even before the anti-Arafat front was created within Al Fatah, five Palestinian groups met early last year in Tripoli (Libya) to determine their action course against the 'American-Zionist' offensive in the Middle East. The People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) headed by Georges Habash, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) of Nayef Hawatme, the Palestinian People's Front and Samir Gaushe, also the general command of Ahmet Djibril and Al Saik Isam Kadi rejected Reagan's Mid-eastern plan as completely unacceptable and opposed any kind of joint Palestinian-Jordanian initiative. This

alliance was definitely in favour of military action as the only possible way to create an independent Palestinian state ('what has been taken by force, can only be restored by force'). The Tripoli communique rejected any kind of talks with Israel, including contacts with progressive Israeli figures, even those belonging to the movement 'Peace—Now'.

The political, and later military, strife within Al Fatah, by far the largest grouping of the PLO, caused further ferment within the Palestine movement. When the Fatah mutineers tried to settle their differences with Arafat by force of arms and with abundant aid from their Arab friends, the coalition of Tripoli began to fall apart, for Habash and Hawatme, unlike the others, could not agree to differences within the movement being settled by force of arms. In Aden the DFLP and the PFLP, together with the Palestine Liberation Front of Talat Jakub and the Palestine Communist Party set up the Palestinian Democratic Alliance in April this year, expressing readiness to make contact with Al Fatah and Arafat.

Arafat's implacable opponents Abu Musa and Abu Salah with the dissident Al Fatah organisations, DFLP—general command, Al Saik and the Palestinian National Front founded the so-called 'Palestinian National Alliance' in Damascus, which immediately declared itself definitely opposed to Arafat's policy and his rapprochement with Jordan and Egypt.

What did Abu Musa and his likeminded allies in the uncohesive 'Palestinian National Alliance' consider so unacceptable in Arafat's actions?

First of all, they consider that the dispersion of Palestinian fighters in nine Arab states, thousands of miles away from Israeli territory, virtually means that the PLO has renounced attaining its aims by force of arms.

The radical leaders of this alliance consider the Arab peace plan of Fes unacceptable because of point 7 of the agreement which has been taken to imply the recognition of Israel. The Fatah dissidents consider that Arafat is especially to blame for never having categorically dissociated himself from Reagan's plan and its implications. This is also the source of basic differences over the planned confederation with Jordan, which the mutineers consider part of the realisation of President Reagan's plan for Palestinian autonomy.

These differences are largely due to the fundamental disagreement over the PLO's activities as a revolutionary organisation of the Palestinian people. The radical views of the Fatah rebels and their likeminded supporters in the Palestinian movement, shrouded in revolutionary romanticism, reject any political action as completely inadequate and basically defeatist, so what they want is an armed struggle following the well known watchword 'throw Israel into the Sea!' Even if one were to abstract the present realities in the Middle East and international relations, in general it is hard to see how this battle against Israel could be fought on Syrian territory, or from the Bekaa valley in Lebanon likewise controlled by Syrian troops, for Damascus did not and does not

permit any Palestinian action from its territory against targets in Israel.

Yasser Arafat having withdrawn from Tripoli, engaged in dynamic international activities under the newly created conditions, striving to consolidate the PLO. These activities were intended to achieve several things. The PLO continued activities aimed at consolidating existing and building new bridges with the Arab countries, striving to create conditions for the implementation of the Fes Plan and strengthen its positions in international relations by cooperating with the Islamic, socialist and non-aligned countries.

Rejecting the radical demands of the Fatah rebels which would definitely have isolated the Palestine revolution, the PLO was faced with a number of alternatives on which the leadership of the organisation declared itself through action aimed at closing the ranks of the Palestinians.

Although the door was left open to continuing talks with Jordan on the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation in accord with the resolution of the 16th session of the Palestine National Council, the Hashemite sovereign was clearly given to understand that setting up an independent Palestinian state was *conditio sine qua non* of their future relations.

Some of the so-called 'moderate Arab countries' had the idea of setting up a provisional Palestinian government in exile. Although this idea seemed sometimes to enjoy support among certain PLO leaders, it would appear that such rumours were bruited rather for tactical reasons than out of any conviction that setting up such a government would do anything to bring a just solution nearer to reality. The more realistic and sober figures in the PLO pointed to the inglorious fate of the Palestinian government in exile after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, and whose short and barren existence ended in Cairo. According to these views the present PLO Executive Committee, to be slightly modified after the talks in Aden, has all the prerogatives of a government and at present there is no reason whatever for the Palestinians to declare it an actual government.

Even more convincing is the Palestinians' contention that for the present it would be most unwise to use their trump card—recognition of Israel. This would be far too high a price to pay, for one luncheon with American secretary of state George Shultz—the head of the Palestinian diplomacy, Farouk Kaddoum observed ironically. Furthermore the attitude of official Tel Aviv (as well as of the opposition) is so negative and so extreme in relationship to the PLO, that the Palestinians really have no reason to meet the Jewish state half-way. Unilateral recognition of Israel would mean that the PLO had renounced any legitimate claims on the greater part of the territory now and earlier inhabited by Palestinian Arabs, while they would obtain nothing in return from Israel for having recognised it.

The Palestinian revolutionary movement, however, fully supported the idea of convening an international conference on the Middle East,

to be attended by all the parties involved, and the PLO. The realities of overall international trends, including relations in the Middle East, open up dim prospects of this initiative being put into practice. Both Washington and Tel Aviv are against the convention of such a conference, so that the Arabs and Palestinians are perfectly justified in their claims that the USA and Israel are mainly to blame for obstructing the peace process in the Middle East. Of course this too will do little to speed up such a procedure. Reagan's plan remains the hub of America's now modest efforts to set the solution of the Mid-eastern crisis in motion. After the debacle of American policy in Lebanon, the architects of American foreign political initiatives in the Middle East appeared unwilling during election year to take any steps in this region, especially if they were hazardous.

The American elections were of course not the main reason for the Palestinians to speed up efforts to close their ranks and decide on a useful campaign which would be verified by the Palestinian National Council and signed by the leaders of major PLO groupings. A more important element is certainly Israel's activity on the occupied West Bank and in Gaza, striving to change the region's ethnic character by extensive resettlement.

A *fait accompli* on occupied territory would rob the Palestinians of their last chance and possibly once and for all destroy any prospects of their setting up their own independent state. Unlike earlier stages in the Palestinian revolution, time is not on the side of the Palestinians now and Arafat is well aware that it should not be wasted over mutual disputes, squabbles and recriminations.

Arafat's military commander Abu Jyad has defined present PLO action trends in the Middle East as follows:

1. Uniting all Palestinian potentials at military, political informative and other levels;
2. Preserving the Palestinians' Independent decision-making;
3. Striving to set up an Arab front for Palestinian armed action;
4. Rejection of Reagan's plan;
5. Deploying military activities on occupied territories.

Signing the agreement with the 'Palestine Democratic Alliance' has paved the way for strengthening PLO unity and convening the long awaited session of the Palestinian National Council. At the same time the consolidation continues of numerous Palestinian political, economic, cultural and informative institutions which have been re-established in other Arab countries after they had to leave Lebanon. It is hard to expect that these numerous and scattered institutions of the Palestinian revolution will be restored to the same level and strength as in Lebanon; however, it is important that they have been preserved and are continuing to operate. Political activities likewise continue in refugee camps throughout the Arab world.

Restoring normal relations with Damascus will be a touchy task, but without this there can be no consolidation in Al Fatah and among the

broader Palestinian ranks. Today, Syria holds a key position on the Arab resistance front against Israel and its role in overall Mid-eastern developments cannot be by-passed, especially after recent events in Lebanon which further strengthened Syria's positions. Aware of the strategic importance of alliance with Syria, Arafat would like to resume relations with that country, while clinging to his hard-won right to independent decision-making and independent PLO action. Extending the hand of conciliation to Syrian leaders after a protracted period of great coolness is part of the conditions for making his peace with Habash and Hawatme.

Rapprochement between the PLO and Egypt will certainly take longer than originally expected and will depend on how quickly Cairo joins the Arab ranks.

The peaceful solution of the Iraq-Iran war is of special importance to the PLO, first because of obtaining both these countries' support in the Palestinians' struggle, and second as this would remove a heavy burden from overall relations in the Arab and Islamic world; bringing attention and activities back to the problem of Palestine, the key issue in the Middle East.

The Palestinians' agreement in Aden represents the reassertion of the PLO's united view that this organisation is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people's rights, entitled independently to decide on fateful issues for that people's future. These are the trump cards while the PLO holds, pending the session of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers, and it is convinced that this is a turning-point which requires all Palestinian potentials to rally, and active support from the Arab and other friendly countries. It now remains to be seen in what measure the deadlock in resolving the Mid-eastern crisis can be broken, considering the variegated mosaic of events in that region and the uncertain trend in relations between the two superpowers. However, even under highly unfavourable conditions, and beset by fierce pressures from various quarters, the PLO has asserted itself as an unusually viable and dynamic revolutionary organisation, reborn miraculously, like a phoenix, from the ashes of Beirut, Tripoli and many other battle fields of the revolution. Sooner or later the legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the only authentic representative of the Palestinian people will have to be recognised even by these denouncing it today most fiercely and without any substantial arguments.

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[Zoran Pirolic is foreign political editor of Radio Sarajevo.]

# ANIMAL RIGHTS—A HUMAN OBLIGATION?

## by Rebecca Hall

MAN has always had an ambivalent attitude towards the creatures with whom he shares this earth. Primitive man hunted, but respected them, understood their dignity and recognised their strengths against his many weaknesses. We humans cannot measure up to them in all their variety, stamina, strength, stoicism, self-sufficiency, good parenthood and much more.

But instead of maintaining this symbiotic sense and evolving into a reverence for life, man has allowed civilisation to corrupt his awareness. The power of his cunning not only rushed to his head, but has been enthroned there and reigns supreme.

Throughout recorded history, the voices of noble souls have spoken out for the animal creation; the importance of living in harmony with all life forms. Hippocrates talked of 'One common flow/One common breathing/All things in sympathy,' whereas R. D. Laing has, quite rightly, I feel, talked of 'the disarray of personal worlds of experience, whose repression, denial, splitting, projection and general desecration and profanation our civilisation is based upon.'

We are out of touch with our inner selves for the most part and, thus alienated, do not relate to the natural world. Because of this state of non-integration, we project our negativity onto whoever and whatever we can find and animals, being in a relatively weak position, bear the brunt of so much of our aggression and our anger which, in fact, is anger with ourselves.

Pope proclaimed the Oneness of all things: 'One stupendous Whole whose body nature is' and, as a part of that body, we are contributing towards disease rather than health in our treatment of the animal world.

Ever since Descartes said, 'I think, therefore I am, I am therefore I think' and promulgated the theory of animal as machine—he believed that the cries of pain issuing from an unanaesthetised animal were merely a 'mechanical response'—the deadly grip of animal experimentation has taken an ever faster hold upon the collective consciousness. In research, animals have become the receptacle for all our fears of sickness and death, despite the fact that animal experimentation leads us away from the true causes of disease and presents us with cures that do not really cure. In inflicting suffering upon millions upon millions of animals every year in the name of science, we then excuse ourselves and pretend they do not feel and know as we do, 'as if we could take/obedience for assent/silence for unsuffering', as Maureen Duffy spells out in her heartrending poem, 'Lemonchic' about the first Russian dog put into space.

And so it is that not only such specious motives as 'for the good of mankind' are put forward for the infliction of suffering, but curiosity, pure and simple, is not hidden, for does not man, the questing hero, have

an absolute right to use any means towards his end—the pursuit of 'knowledge'? So says materialistic philosophy.

Many have spoken out about the terrifying danger in the separation of science and a sense of morality. Microbiologist, Dr. Catherine Roberts, made this clear in her book, *The Scientific Conscience:* 'I would say the time has come to die when a dying person, young or old, can be kept alive only by means which have arisen out of scientific violation of both human and animal creatures.'

Proof of the secure foundation for such unease is everywhere to be found. Last year, a letter written by a doctor out of sympathy with vivisection, to the *British Medical Journal,* pointed out that of a group of Canadian neurosurgeons who had taken a year's sabbatical, those who had involved themselves in experimentation on animals and had learned to harden themselves against their victims' suffering, took quite some time to regain empathy with their patients' suffering when they returned to doctoring.

Dr. Donald Whittal who wrote, *People and Animals,* a splendid indictment of animal experimentation, describes the ugly process of brutalisation, not only in the reporting of a surgeon who, having transplanted canine and primate heads, wishes to try his skills on a human subject—but apparently, we are not yet 'ready' for this—but in pointing out that sophisticated torture methods have evolved from experiments on animals. These are often administered by doctors—members of the healing profession—on hapless political prisoners in the hundreds of dark corners we choose to put from our minds throughout the world. Danny Abse's poem, written on attending his first brain surgery, still echoes: 'From the table came the cry, "Leave my soul alone".'

It is this same sense of discomfort which hinders the progress towards better treatment of animals. As good men do nothing, day after day, and year after year, evil proliferates, for as Dr. Whittal points out, people find no limits to the brutal acts they perform while they can carry on uncensured and unpunished.

And so, while the basically decent majority remain silent, those who have no means of breaking the silence must remain caged and tormented; deprived of their young; neglected; starved; driven from their habitats; parted, heart still beating from their beautiful warm furry skins; trapped; shot; put on humiliating show; trained to kill their fellow creatures or carry their 'masters' (and 'mistresses' too) upon their backs to a kill. In the heat of the chase, the sense of the freedom and community of the herd in the wild, the joy of beating hoof upon good earth against the wilful speed of the wind is ignorant of the equine slave markets where men pay more for corpses than warm bodies, nudging faces, tossing manes. It is ignorant of the blood trail cast around the world where the price of horse flesh mixed with garlic, dainty on pizzas, sliced into sandwiches, feeding mouths which are not hungry, is so high in wounding and agony.

Frozen to keep, horsemeat, exported to France, Belgium, the Nether-

lands, Italy, earned Britain £10,401,264 in 1982. The friendly ponies who roam Dartmoor, the New Forest, The Black Mountains, are not free to die in the open, their carcasses allowed back to the earth. Their end will be in some overfed Western stomach, or chopped into pieces in a can for other creatures to consume at a later date. Their journeys from Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia, to Italy by boat; the old and weary ones packed into trains and lorries, where eyes get knocked out, where the old fall and get trampled by their helpless, frightened companions, where thirsty and unfed, their large wounds are left untended. They are simply part of a system, a process, the religion of civilised man—it is called economics, and its mother is greed.

In the last ten years horse slaughter has risen 2,000 per cent in the USA—about 17,000,000 lbs. are exported annually to Canada, France, Belgium and Japan. Australian horses, snatched from the wild, are forced to travel vast distances for days in temperatures of up to 115°, with little or no water before they face callous abuse in the markets. China, which rounded up its dogs for mass electrocution, sends its horses to Japan to factory farm fattening ranches where they will mostly meet Death—that thing which humans meet with far less equanimity than animals—by primitive poleaxe smashing the skull.

How many, aware of such facts, remember the horse as a courageous forced companion in many wars? Leonardo da Vinci, lover of Nature, wrote of the eating of oxen: 'The masters of the estates will eat their own labourers'. How many men and women are eating their friends?

He also stated, provocatively: 'He who does not value life does not deserve it.' Perhaps guilt itself still prevents us from facing such a possibility today, just as overwhelmed by our own negative characteristics, we rarely face the truth about our real selves and, burying the pain, continue in anger.

We may bury our pain and shut away the pain of other animals in places where certain humans are left to do the dirty work for us—slaughterhouses, not for the squeamish where, in the words of one man who has seen several, 'bloody, slippery floors, sharp knives and bad smells', constitute the working conditions for men on piecework where humane handling will count for less than a fatter wage packet: 'I have seen the most terrible atrocities in some abattoirs where sheep are never stunned, because the electric tongs are never used,' he said. All in a line, hanging by one hind leg from the bleeding rail; their throats will be cut, slashed open so they will look a better colour when they are dead, skinned and hacked to pieces for dainty eating. (The abattoir where this was observed kills 2,500 sheep a week and has been doing so for years.)

Yet how many will sacrifice the dubious pleasures of grilled lamb chops or mutton stews in sanitised supermarket cellophane in which the blood, if it drips, is so easily washed away?

Or is it? Does the consumer, who suddenly realises, want to wash his or her hands like Lady Macbeth in torment or like the former huntmaster, Captain Robert Churchward who, in his public confession in a

national newspaper, poured out his remorse and told how he wanted to repay the animals for his years of hunting.

His wife, on being 'blooded' into deer-stalking, went 'into dinner at a smart hotel with her face set hard in a mask of blood.' On seeing this, the distinguished guests congratulated her.

We congratulate the blooded continually: We give prizes and acclaim to animal experimenters, congratulate those who grow rich on the profits of factory farming and subsidise their work; we praise the industrial and financial acumen of multi-national pharmaceutical and chemical company directors—one-third of all disease is now considered to be iatrogenic, that is, drug induced—we televise anglers and gloat over the 'big fish' caught—is there some hidden power complex in this?—we call the mass annual slaughter of game birds 'glorious'; we allow sadistic film directors who kill and torment creatures for a piece of celluloid to remain in a limelight denied more sensitive mortals.

We live in a world where the compassionate are all too often crushed along with the victims they endeavour to protect. Should the above list appear outrageous or incredible, a few facts will steady the dizziness.

Immense kudos is to be gained in the area of spare part surgery, yet the suffering upon which heart transplants, for example, grew, is too horrible for the feeling to contemplate. Countless 'disposable' animals were subjected to the procedure before the first human recipient was given his secondhand heart. There is an horrific story that Christiaan Barnard's team experienced the terrible scream of a living baboon as its heart was torn from it. (Barnard, having put an animal heart into a human, then decided to store human hearts in live baboons.)

Dr. Pappworth, author of *Human Guinea Pigs* stated: 'All transplant surgery is a confession of failure, of unsuccessful early diagnosis and treatment. Would it not be wiser to spend the energy and money involved in research into the early diagnosis, prevention and better treatment of disease?'

Medical research covers a multitude of evils, yet instead of looking at causes, through fear and laziness, we are prepared to send ever more victims to the scalpel, the hypodermic needle, the force-feeding tube; to a slow and painful death in a vain search for the magic bullet to cure the ills we have all too often brought upon ourselves by indulgent life-styles and negative or aggressive thought patterns.

In an in-depth investigation into cancer in the USA by journalists Robert Houston and Gary Null in 1978/9, the research fraud of the cancer industry kept alive by vested interests, was revealed: 'A solution to cancer would mean the termination of research programmes, the obsolescence of skills, the end of dreams of personal glory... The truth eventually must be confronted that the real enemy is not cancer—a natural phenomenon—but the cancer establishment itself, which consistently moves to destroy whatever is hopeful against the disease and to enlarge its predatory position as a parasite on human suffering.'

The facts to back up these conclusions are in print to be read. Natural

cures for cancer are scorned, a search for the real causes avoided, pioneering voices are isolated and kept out in the cold, without the comforts of the establishment's favours.

When Ceibar-Geigy did not stop at animal testing for its potentially carcinogenic pesticide Galecron, but tried its effects on a field containing a small group of unprotected Egyptian children, no voices were raised in protest and if they were, they were soon smothered.

Power corrupts. But inner corruption often goes unnoticed.

Novelist and poet Maureen Duffy has cleverly explained the hidden psychological links between hunting and sexual pursuit and backs up her argument with examples from popular literature. She states that it would be 'a simple desire not to face facts to pretend that it wasn't so as such songs were sung in the taverns by the very participants.'

Animals may indeed feel pain and we can identify with the hunted hare,—but what about fish? Living in an alien environment, they are denied all feeling and called 'cold blooded' yet there is now evidence to show that fish do have in their bodies something known as 'substance P' which is associated with the transmission of pain in the nervous system of mammals and the mouths of fish are well endowed with sensory organs and free nerve endings. Yet they seem to be unworthy of concern.

Perhaps this is because we instinctively sense—and the facts about the brain demonstrate—that animals have a very similar emotional make-up to our own. The experiencing, limbic seat of the emotions levels are the same as ours, yet we differentiate because they cannot verbalise the experience. This brain apparatus goes back about 200,000,000 years, yet we deny them their affinity with us.

We have no real grounds for differentiating, yet tomorrow, millions more calves will be torn from their lowing mothers so that their milk can be taken to fill the milk lakes, build the butter mountains and thicken the arteries of insatiable man; while badgers will be murdered because they are conveniently blamed for giving them tuberculosis. (There is no real evidence for this theory.)

They are not really different, yet hundreds of thousands of domestic pets, their friendship betrayed, will be beaten, neglected or abandoned to meet their end with the drug which blots the world out for ever or they will be snatched from their hounded street life and filed into the darker death chambers of science.

It is fashionable to say we will 'conserve' the rare and interesting ones of their species, as if we were generous; yet they will become living museum pieces and be made to pay for their existence. The right to live does not apply.

Their liberators will be put in prison if they are caught and those who express feelings on these issues will be called 'sentimental' or 'anthropomorphic' or 'emotional' as if there were humans without emotions, be they overt or repressed.

William Blake warned us in *Auguries of Innocence* that, 'A Robin redbreast in a cage/puts all heaven in a rage' and that 'A dog starved

at his master's gate/predicts the ruin of the state.'

Here we have a profound truth which has fallen upon deaf ears. As we eat up the earth as if Nature herself were to be allowed no more room; as we hurtle towards the crisis which threatens the destruction of all life, we might remember the battery hen living out her short life in a cage too small to spread her wings. We might remember how our anthropocentricity always puts human convenience above any consideration for responsibility towards animal companions. Or we might even entertain the thoughts of a Red Indian:

> When the earth is sick
> The animals will begin to disappear
> When that happens the Warriors of the Rainbow
> Will come to save them.

But there is no mention of those who created the sickness, nor of their being saved.

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[Rebecca Hall is a prominent campaigner for animal rights. She is author of *Animals Are Equal* (1980) and *Voiceless Victims* (1984, Wildwood House).]

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The following information, received from *Eurofocus* 37/83, may be of interest.—*Editor.*

Louise Herklotz, a German Socialist MEP, has called for tougher controls on the use of animals for scientific experiments in Europe. She admits that the use of vertebrate animals is 'indispensable' to progress in medicine, but says that animals are often used even when reliable alternative methods are available. She is also critical of scientists who work without the use of anaesthetics, particularly when the results of the experiment concerned would not be affected by their use.

Louise Herklotz also states that the suffering inflicted on animals during their transportation, their incarceration at experimental centres and on the operating table justifies intervention at European level.

The Council of Europe has already launched an initiative to establish a European Convention on the protection of vertebrate animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes. Now, Louise Herklotz recommends that the European Commission should follow suit and draw up proposals for a European Directive to harmonise existing legislation and ensure 'the highest possible degree of protection for animals'.

# THE DRAWINGS OF HENRI MATISSE

## by Philip Vann

IN his exquisite pen and ink drawing of 1935, 'Reclining Nude in the Studio', one of a series of large drawings depicting the female nude, naked except for a necklace of flowers, against a decorative background, Matisse the artist appears in the lower right hand corner in the form of his thumb and forefinger wielding a pen over a drawing-in-progress. The nude does not simply recline—she relaxes utterly, arching herself back onto the flowered coverlet with true pleasure and an almost feline abandon to the senses. As we regard this scene of *luxe, calme et volupté*, we are aware of that little black nib forming lines and curves and arabesques, describing the scene. Although the black pen, like the bearded, spectacled face of the artist in another drawing of the necklaced nude, ('Artist and Model Reflected in a Mirror' 1937), may at first suggest that Matisse was a voyeur, an intrusive phallus, a masculine dissecting intellect and his models mere objects, further observation shows otherwise. The passiveness of Matisse's models is a wise one. Portrayed in a state of abandon, they convince the spectator that they are so, since the intelligent, disciplined artist is also in a state of abandon—to the act of portrayal.

The sublime femininity which Matisse elucidates in his drawings of reclining, stretching, resting and sleeping women is subjective to both him and his models. The women do not pose or appear coquettish or falsely demure. The celebrated *calme* which manifests itself in drawings such as 'Study for Pink Nude' (1935) and the terribly tender 'Woman Sleeping at the Corner of the Table' (1939), is that of an artist growing and identifying in a spiritually sensuous way with what he sees.

The intimate, interior world which Matisse inhabited—psychologically, artistically (and literally in the case of his Parisian and Nice studios, richly furnished as they were with exotica and Orientalia), does not transfer easily to the cavernous impersonality of the Hayward Gallery. This difficulty has been partly overcome by sensitive hanging on dove-grey and cream screens. In 1968 the Hayward opened to an exhibition of Matisse's paintings. The present exhibition, containing 159 drawings and 69 sculptures, is accompanied by two illustrated catalogues. John Elderfield's text on the drawings brilliantly illuminates their complex nuances of light and shade.

Matisse is perhaps best known as the Fauvist master of luminous colour and immediate, reflective sensation. Initially, it is somewhat puzzling to view this large exhibition of works without colour (excepting black, white, blue and bronze). It is as though we are being greeted by Matisse only in the colourless afternoon; he painted in the mornings, drew in the afternoon. In 1941, at the age of 71, Matisse spoke of 'the eternal conflict of drawing and colour in the same individual'. But conflict between the demands of different media could be mutually re-

warding. Speaking of his great innovations in paper-cutting, he said, 'Cutting into colour reminds me of a sculptor's carving into stone.'

His pure line drawings, which he considered his most direct and spontaneous expressions of feeling, were usually preceded by charcoal studies in which character and atmosphere could be explored in a sub-painterly fashion. The final drawings, spontaneous partly through the discipline of the preliminary study, are economic, charged with light, and like their subject. Their draughtsmanship is completely at odds with the precise pedantic likenesses encouraged by late nineteenth century art academicism, against which Matise so continuously and consciously rebelled.

At his most lively, Matisse captures to the quick that fleetingness, those sleights and subtle shifts of body and head, embodied signs of a person's character, which some great Chinese and Japanese calligraphic painters in black ink have also evoked. Here, every line contributes towards not only a physical but simultaneously a spiritual portrait. How clearly this is seen in Matisse's 'serial drawings' of the same person observed in barely altered attitudes. The nine pure line drawings of his granddaughter, Jacqueline Matisse, preceded by a powerfully concentrated charcoal study in mood and character, show the youthful, full-lipped girl, head full on, tilted at different angles, cupped in hand and in half surprised profile. *En masse,* these pure drawings suggest what it was like to be with Jackie in Vence in 1947. Today in the Hayward, we are absorbed with her sure, delicate presence. The artist is the medium.

There are many examples of tonally-varied, decoratively-rich drawing here whose technique of charcoal smudging adds to an atmosphere of graceful yearning—a young woman plays a violin at the open window in a drawing of 1924; and ink drawings too where the poetry emerges through the sparseness of line, in the absences between the fluid, spontaneous lineaments.

'Head of a Young Sailor' (1906), modelled on Matisse's son Pierre, is a study in profound thought and self-containment. The generous, rounded features of the handsome boy exhale the spirit of some dreamy, impassive quest. That Matisse imbibed what he needed from contemporary art developments is demonstrated by the somewhat abstract composition of 'Still-life with Oriental Bowl' (1915). The rather diagrammatic pineapple, drawn in pencil, exudes for me the tempting succulence of the vibrant gold and green *l'ananas* of his paintings.

The series of pencil drawings of the model Antoinette wearing the extravagant plumed hat (all dating from 1919) is exotic and classical in its conception. Profoundly influenced by artists such as Michelangelo, Delacroix, Cezanne and Renoir, Matisse had a wealth of resources to draw upon and to enrich his natural talents and the expression of his perceptions. The infinitely varied, intolerably poignant depictions of Antoinette adorned by that mass of feathery delicacy, the quintessence of her sensuousness, show perhaps both Matisse and the western tradition of fine draughtsmanship at its best.

In a portrait of about 50 pure lines, from 1942, the poet Louis Aragon

stands before us, conjured up like a spirit from the nothing of white paper, charmingly friendly, engaging in intense thought and conversation. It was in this year, following a serious operation, that Matisse experienced a 'floraison' in his line drawing and also began making pictures with paper cut-outs. The dancers, swimmers, acrobats and blue nudes exercising against dazzling white backgrounds represent a late marriage of Matisse's skill as draughtsman, painter and sculptor and the true imaginative vitality of the now invalid artist.

Matisse was supremely interested in the human figure, and the human face. In 1908 he wrote, 'I penetrate amid the lines of the face those which suggest the deep gravity which persists in every human being.' 'The lines of the face', pure in ink, thick and shaded in charcoal, finely pencilled, sculpted in coloured paper; the contours of the body in sleep, quiet ecstasy and dance; multitudinous features of mysteriously content, secluded women and men—all become Matisse's own in the act of drawing.

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The exhibition is at the Hayward Gallery, London until 6th January 1985 and at The Museum of Modern Art, New York 27th February–14th May 1985.

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[Philip Vann was assistant organiser of the recent exhibition of Naive Art at The Royal Festival Hall and part author of the catalogue. He is at present preparing a series of exhibitions, and a series of profiles of British naive artists.]

# QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

## by David Fingleton

VERDI. *Il Trovatore.* Chorus and Orchestra of the Accademia di Santa Cecilia, Rome/Carlo Maria Giulini. (3 Records) Deutsche Grammophon 413 355-1.
VERDI. *Macbeth.* Chorus and Orchestra of the Deutsche Oper, Berlin/Giuseppe Sinopoli. (3 Records) Philips 412 133-1.
RICHARD STRAUSS. *Der Rosenkavalier.* Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/Herbert von Karajan. (4 Records) Deutsche Grammophon 413 163-1.
MOZART. *Die Zauberflöte.* Leipzig Radio Chorus and Dresden Staatskapelle Orchestra/Sir Colin Davis. (3 Records) Philips 411 459-1.

ONE of the chief pleasures of my early opera-going days at Covent Garden was to hear the works of Verdi conducted by Carlo Maria Giulini. His readings, for example, of *Don Carlos* and *La Traviata* will remain indelibly in my memory. Some years ago now Giulini decided to withdraw from the opera house because he no longer found conditions there conducive to obtaining the standards he sets, and with one exception that is how it has remained. The exception came two years ago when he agreed to conduct a new production of Verdi's final great opera, *Falstaff,* first in Los Angeles, then at Covent Garden, and finally in Florence, and subsequently to record it with the same cast. Having attended the first night at the Garden and subsequently listened to the recording, I had to admit to a certain disappointment with the results. Somehow the old Italianate, passionate, but always totally musical, Giulini had faded and something equally musical, but more academic, and cool had taken his place. Moreover, so far as *Falstaff* was concerned, he seemed no longer to enjoy humour, again a quality which I had relished in earlier days in his performances and recordings of operas by Mozart. Nor, good though it undeniably was, did his recording of *Rigoletto* with Piero Cappuccilli, Placido Domingo and Ileana Cotrubas, backed up by the Vienna Philharmonic and Vienna State Opera Chorus, issued in 1980, seem altogether to have the old Giulini flair and dramatic sweep.

Now, most happily, the balance is comprehensively redressed with a recording of *Il Trovatore* which not only once again reveals Giulini as the consummate master of Verdi's music that he is, but is of such unmitigated quality that it is, and will remain, one of the jewels of my record collection. For a start that old adage about all you need for Trovatore is the four greatest singers in the world is shown to be demonstrably false. Here what we have are four fine singers in the leading roles, of whom only one, Placido Domingo, might be said to have cast himself. The other three are a highly exciting, but still developing English soprano, one of the finest German mezzo-sopranos, known chiefly for her work in the German repertory, and what can be fairly described as a 'stock' Italian baritone. But thanks to Giulini, and thanks too no doubt to the patient preparation and coaching of his faithful 'maestro sostituto', Roberto Benaglio, from La Scala, Milan, his assistant for many years now, this disparate quartet has been welded into a cohesive, utterly committed team who must have surprised even themselves and their conductor by the sheer magnificence of their results.

While one old adage may have bitten the dust, another, about there being no bad orchestras, only bad conductors, is triumphantly vindicated. For *Il Trovatore* Giulini chose to use not one of the great orchestras of the world, not even a highly experienced opera house 'pit' orchestra, but instead returned to his roots and had Deutsche Grammophon sign up the Orchestra of the Accademia di Santa Cecilia in Rome with whom, when it was known as the Augusteo Orchestra, he had begun his own musical career as twelfth viola and had played under some of the finest Italian conductors in the days before the last war. The Santa Cecilia Orchestra were well known for their operatic recordings during the 1950s and 60s, but in recent years have stuck to the concert repertoire, and this recording marks their first excursion into the operatic field for almost twenty years. One gathers, and can well believe, that Giulini's initial rehearsal period with them was rigorous, even fraught; but the results are what count, and the Santa Cecilia play on this recording as to the manner born, not merely with immense sensitivity and polish, but with a feeling for Verdi that argues for complete comprehension of this marvellous score.

Marvellous score it indeed is, particularly when given with such scrupulous regard for that Verdi actually wrote. Giulini and Benaglio went back to the composer's autograph and made a detailed study of what additional handwritten markings the composer had added to it. There are thus times, such as in the orchestral prelude to the opera and in Manrico's immortal cabaletta *'Di quella pira'*, when the music may initially strike you as surprisingly slow; but play it a second time and it will sound precisely right. Time and again one notices with delight how utterly correct and Verdian the music sounds. It loses nothing in drama, power or passion, and, in the two great choruses, nothing either in sheer Italian guts, but it also has an integrity and a lack of conductor's affectation or self-expression that make the entire performance immensely rewarding musically.

It is not surprising that the entire cast, as well as the Santa Cecilia Chorus, respond to this honesty of approach so as to give of their best. We know Domingo's Troubadour from other recordings, and know how splendidly sung and how fine a characterisation it is. I can only say that here it is even better, sung with power, artistry, drama and immense musicality so that one hangs on to his every note. *'Di quella pira'* is no mere tenor show-piece, but an integral part of the drama that is unfolding, and none the less thrilling for that. Many agents' and other sopranos' eyebrows must have risen around the world when it was learned that Giulini had selected the very promising young English soprano Rosalind Plowright as his Leonora. Certainly, having heard and been impressed by a number of performances in this country's opera-houses and concert halls, I was not prepared for the sheer power and maturity of this interpretation. The middle of the voice as well as the top notes are magnificent and every aria and recitative is tackled with scrupulous regard for both words and music. This is a beautifully sung,

deeply felt interpretation of which Miss Plowright can be justly proud: those hours with Giulini and Benaglio have yielded dividends.

The other surprise choice of this recording was of Brigitte Fassbaender as Azucena. I doubt that the German mezzo would want to sing the role in the opera house, and if she did I doubt that it would come over as effectively as on records, but here her performance is superb. No demented or hysterical gypsy playing to the gallery this, but a carefully worked-out characterisation in which every word tells in a performance that sends, as it should, shivers down the spine. The Luna is Giorgio Zancanaro. Having heard him sing Escamillo in *Carmen* the week before I received these records, I confess I was not looking forward to his contribution. But I was wrong; again this is a thoroughly worked-out, fully considered performance, and again one that is admirably sung. Hear him in 'Il balen' to appreciate both the quality of Zancanaro's singing and the unerring sensitivity of Giulini's accompaniment. As well as bringing together this marvellous team for *Il Trovatore,* Deutsche Grammophon and their producer, Gunther Breest, have supplied an immaculately balanced, gloriously clear and full-bodied recording which is a pleasure to listen to throughout. I do not apologise for extolling this issue of *Il Trovatore* at such length: it is without question one of the great recordings of the past decade and one that no opera-lover should fail to have in his collection.

A new Italian conductor on the scene who is also making his mark in performances and recordings of Verdi's operas is Giuseppe Sinopoli, who this season has become the new Principal Conductor of the Philharmonia Orchestra. Last year he conducted Puccini's *Manon Lescaut* at Covent Garden and also Verdi's *Macbeth* at the Deutsche Oper in West Berlin, and this he has now recorded for Philips. It certainly has considerable merits and makes for exciting, often impressive listening. But whereas when Giulini makes one sit up and take note at certain points in the score, and, having done so, leaves one feeling he is in accord with the composer and thus right, Sinopoli leaves me by no means so sure. Naturally enough he employs Verdi's later version of *Macbeth,* that prepared for Paris in 1865. But the opera was still a work from the conclusion of the composer's 'galley years' in 1847, and therefore remains an early opera. There are times however when Sinopoli so pulls the tempi around that he seems to be trying to make something else of it altogether. But the excitement is certainly there and the cast is splendid. The great Italian baritone Renato Bruson is surely one of the finest operatic Macbeths of our day, and his Lady in the less known Italian soprano, Mara Zampieri, who has impressed recently as Tosca at Covent Garden. Whether she is an ideal Lady Macbeth is a matter of whether your taste is for a mezzo or lyric soprano in the role. She is possibly at her least convincing in the great Banquet Scene, but is mightily impressive when sleep-walking. The other principal roles are taken by Neil Shicoff as a mellifluous Macduff and Robert Lloyd, a resonant Banquo. The orchestra and chorus of the Deutsche Oper are

in fine, eager form and Philips have supplied a spacious and well-balanced recording. If you already have the Abbado or Muti version don't worry; if not, try this newcomer against them.

No newcomer is Herbert von Karajan, now 75 and frail, but still performing and recording as busily as ever. Karajan of course recorded Richard Strauss's *Der Rosenkavalier* back at the end of the 1950s with the Philharmonia Orchestra in London, and, with Schwarzkopf as the Marschallin; what a fine recording it is. But no doubt he wanted a second try, as so often he does, and this time with the forces of his Salzburg Festival. Thus we have this beautiful new production with the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra, and Karajan drawing exquisite playing from them as well as demonstrating immense affection for the score. But, as so often seems the case, it is the sheer beauty of the orchestral sound upon which von Karajan seems anxious to focus the microphones' and thus our attention. It is not that the cast—save in one principal role —are weak; simply that they frequently seem to take second place to what is happening in the pit. If that is not something you desperately mind, then this is, in all but one respect, a very fine performance indeed, gorgeously played, gorgeously sung and gorgeously recorded. Anna Tomowa-Sintow is a sumptuously voiced, sensitively sung Marschallin, Anges Baltsa a splendidly positive Octavian, whom we shall be seeing this month in the new production at Covent Garden, and Kurt Moll a gloriously musical, blessedly unexaggerated Baron Ochs. The let-down is the Sophie, taken by a young American soprano, Janet Perry, whose thin breathy tone and lack of positive characterisation do not make her a joy to listen to. A pity, for otherwise this would undoubtedly be the *Rosenkavalier* to have, blessed as it is with one of Deutsche Grammophon's finest digital recordings.

Finally we have a new recording of Mozart's *Die Zauberflöte* from Philips in which our own Sir Colin Davis has travelled to Dresden to conduct the magnificent Staatskapelle Orchestra. A top-flight, at times highly exciting, cast has been assembled, Sir Colin conducts with his customary affection for the work and understanding of his singers and the orchestra, with whom he has already recorded some late Mozart symphonies most successfully for Philips, respond with warmth and superb polish. Amongst the cast Margaret Price and Peter Schreier are almost unequalled today as Pamino and Tamino, Kurt Moll is a glorious Sarastro, Luciana Serra a thrilling Queen of the Night, and there are strong Ladies, and real Boys. Moreover the young Danish baritone, Mikael Melbye, makes an auspicious debut as Papageno. But—and sadly there is so often a but—Philips engaged the Dresden Staatsoper's Joachim Herz to 'produce' Schikaneder's dialogue in full, and Herz decided to use actors for it. We thus have different voices in a different acoustic—except for Melbye's Papageno— which not only holds up the action, but also induces a deep sense of irritation in the listener. Surely even imperfect German accents from a few of the cast would have been preferable to this laborious, 'hammy' exercise.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## KENNETH CLARK—THE MAN

*Kenneth Clark—A Biography.* Meryle Secrest. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.95.

Kenneth Clark was arguably the most successful man of his generation. Only Lord Home attained a higher pinnacle, and that briefly. Kenneth Clark was Director of the National Gallery by the time he was 30. Soon afterwards he became Surveyor of the King's Pictures and was from then on an intimate friend of royalty. At the age of 64, he began to work on the great television series 'Civilisation,' which made him a world figure. In between, he had picked up a life peerage, the Order of Merit, the Chairmanship of the Arts Council and of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, along with other distinctions.

He exhibited from his boyhood an extraordinary power to respond to and interpret great pictures. He had a phenomenal visual memory. His life's objective was to enable the masses of the people to understand and enjoy the noblest works of art. In this he brilliantly succeeded.

But he emerges from this compelling book as a flawed hero. Meryle Secrest received active co-operation from him and from many others, including some of his numerous lady friends. She does not hesitate to bring out the painful fact that, from his early thirties, he needed feminine admiration outside marriage. It is not always clear how far he 'went' on these occasions. The impression is left that even President Kennedy or Wilfred Scawen Blunt hardly excelled him as an amorist.

His wife, a very attractive woman when I knew her slightly, remained devoted to him and he to her. But she became, as described in detail here, a complete alcoholic, falling to the ground at one embassy party after another. Readers will judge for themselves how far his unfaithfulness brought about this tragic outcome.

Kenneth Clark inherited enormous riches which may, or may not, have been a blessing. He and his wife entertained before the war on a princely scale. Meryle Secrest makes the shrewd comment 'the Clarks were too grand for their own good.' There were many who wished them nothing but ill, who would be delighted to see them toppled from their dazzling eminence. A story went the rounds in London about Jane Clark. 'I simply must get another tiara. I have worn mine to Buckingham Palace so much that it is getting worn out.' But the poor young woman was desperately trying to live up to 'K', and 'K' had to succeed at all costs, socially and otherwise.

Grandeur continued to the end, but in the later years it was mixed with much misery. 'K' would seem to have obtained little satisfaction from his phenomenal worldly success. He was loved by many, inside his family and outside of it, but he was all too well aware that he had failed in marriage. When Jane Clark died, there were a number of ladies who expected to succeed her. Instead of that, he married a French woman of distinction. There were 'shock waves of anger and outrage on several fronts.'

A week before he died, Kenneth Clark was received into the Church of Rome. Some of his old friends were surprised and horrified. But Lady Clark, herself a Catholic, explained that her late husband's religious commitment was of long standing. It emerges from this book that he had for a considerable time

felt a divine presence behind the greatest art. To one reviewer at least his final step seems completely natural.

FRANK LONGFORD

## ASEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

*ASEAN Economic Co-operation and the New International Economic Order.* B. A. R. Mokhzani, Khong Kim Hoong and R. J. G. Wells (Editors). Malaysian Economic Association, Kuala Lumpur.

This book provides a collection of papers, from authors associated with the ASEAN region, related to two major areas, ASEAN and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and ASEAN Co-operation over the period 1978-1983.

The fourteen papers cover a diversity of topics and countries, yet lying behind these differences is the growing need to reduce uncertainty and to overcome many of the difficulties faced by poorer developing countries in the problems they face such as higher energy prices, the slow growth in world trade, growing protectionism in developed countries and political instabilities in various parts of the world.

One of the most important aspects of the declaration of the NIEO was not only its timing, but its emphasis for third and fourth world countries to seek a greater influence over the decision-making processes in the international economy and for a redistribution of political and economic power which can be concomitant with a redistribution of income.

It may or may not have been the 'success' of the OPEC petroleum cartel which demonstrated the short-run effectiveness of 'commodity power,' but there has been growing concern by less developed countries as to the current international trading and payment systems which are often seen as mechanisms perpetuating and, in some instances, exacerbating international inequalities. Moreover, there is mounting dissatisfaction on the part of the developing countries with the commodity composition of their international trade, the discriminating protectionism pursued by developed countries and the general dissatisfaction with the operation of international markets. NIEO has, therefore, three salient themes, firstly, the reorganisation of commodity trade through an integrated programme for commodities, secondly, a reduction in protectionism undertaken by developed countries, especially in areas of third and fourth world countries' exports and thirdly, to refashion the patterns of relationships between multinational corporations and host countries, particularly in the light of their relationships to the distribution of income.

The fourteen papers cannot hope to cover all these areas comprehensively, yet they endeavour to give a cross-section of current research being undertaken in the above-mentioned topics.

In the opening papers of this book, emphasis is placed on a discussion of the need for ASEAN countries to overcome domestic price instability themselves, since the NIEO is still only a declaration. ASEAN, it is also suggested, needs to make more contact with groups such as the EEC, Japan and the USA, but at the same time should push forward collectively in its R and D, and should establish an ASEAN institution to provide facilities for screening, organising, storing and providing information to enhance the bargaining strength of members as buyers in technology markets.

The latter papers discuss the prospect for ASEAN economic co-operation, particularly until the doctrines of NIEO become an actuality. The need for industrial co-operation, especially for regional industrialisation of projects

based on the argument of scale, is propounded, together with ideas for the modernisation of ASEAN small industries, joint finance and the establishment of an economic planning co-ordinating group.

The remaining papers look at the independence that exists between formal and informal sectors, the case of aiding private industry and the overall need for governments to step in to promote exports, widen markets internationally and/or regionally, to provide adequate and economic transport and to take counter measures to safeguard the outpricing of ASEAN products in the world market.

Overall, this is a most interesting group of papers which are very readable and contain much interesting and, arguably, pioneering work in the area of co-operation and discussion of ASEAN problems into the eighties.

MARK COOK

## ELEVEN PRIME MINISTERS

*Eleven at No. 10: a personal view of Prime Ministers 1931-1984.* Frank Longford. Harrap. £9.95.

A survey of eleven Prime Ministers in less than 190 pages, even if confessedly 'a personal view', cannot but be a succession of snapshots, with a few pieces of reminiscence thrown in for flavouring. The good Earl is too well-known a figure as penal reformer, Christian and fighter for liberal causes for there to be many surprises here. He calls himself 'a renegade Conservative', but whatever his Irish landed origins, Eton schooling and comfortable lifestyle, he held office only in Labour Governments, and claims, indeed, to have been, as Sir William Beveridge's aide in the war, one of the real authors of the Welfare State, or at least of the Beveridge Report. He fought only one parliamentary election and lost at Oxford in 1945—his peerage as (then) Lord Pakenham might seem to some to have been easily earned.

Of the eleven individuals etched here, Attlee is his special favourite and this is easily the best (perhaps because the most affectionate?) portrait in the book. But there is, too, an obvious warmth in his sketch of Lord Home, the gentleman responding to gentleman in politics. He also describes himself as an eccentric, and this is certainly an eccentric view of No. 10. To all his portraits he brings a firm 'I am determined to be fair' attitude that can be both patronising and irritating. Where there was no rapport, he will praise, but it is such forced and faint praise that it is positively chilling, as with Churchill, Heath and Wilson—although he does throw some light on Wilson's own isolation, as he climbed the greasy pole, in noting his distance in the post-1945 years from the 'Hampstead Set.' There is no rapport, and, as a result, little understanding, in the few pages on James Callaghan or Margaret Thatcher. There is unusual bitterness (and some inaccuracy) in his references to Ulster in 1968-69 (the British troops did not go in to 'protect the Catholics'); and there is, in the references to Suez in 1956 (which is seen exclusively as a piece of wicked collusion between Britain, France and Israel) no awareness of the rights of Britain and France to intervene in terms of international law, and no realisation that part of the explanation of Anthony Eden's nervous and physical tension in these years was that he had been aware from 1954 (when Britain finally lost all its military capacity for sanctions in the Canal Zone) of the weakness of Britain's position, and that he had put a trust in Neguib and Nasser that he knew, and that all his advisers confirmed, was a gamble.

In fact, what is missing from this book is a real understanding of the nature

of political power. As the poet in the Western Desert put it, 'The dregs are bitter at the bottom of the cup.' This is a pleasantly anecdotal 'I was there,' but it remains, in all its cosiness and Christian charity, and despite the author's sixty years in politics, a very innocent view of what goes on behind the door at No. 10.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## VITA SACKVILLE-WEST AND VIRGINIA WOOLF

*The Letters of Vita Sackville-West to Virginia Woolf.* Edited by Louise DeSalvo and Mitchell A. Leaska. Hutchinson. £12.95.

Over the past decade or so, a rose-coloured castle has been reconstructed by devoted hands: Nigel Nicolson's *Portrait of a Marriage* and Victoria Glendinning's biography of Vita Sackville-West, together with the *Letters* and the *Diaries* of Virginia Woolf. Vita's diaries have not yet appeared. Nigel Nicolson (Vita's son) has now invited two American experts on Virginia Woolf studies to edit his mother's surviving letters to Virginia Woolf. These cover the period 1923-1941. The majority of them are preserved in the Berg Collection, New York, with a remaining 18 at the University of Sussex. The letters for the years 1930 and 1931 are lost. Apparently, dating was difficult, but the editors have made an incisive job of it. They have also, rightly, interpolated 175 extracts from nearly 400 surviving letters of Virginia Woolf to Vita Sackville-West.

Dr. Leaska has contributed a fine, bravura Introduction, with many a plangent phrase—'So that as there was passion and promise in the beginning, in the end there would be compassion and compromise.' His approach towards the tensions of the relationship between the two women leans more towards the psycho-analytical than most English editors would have attempted, and the effect is unorthodox. Perhaps this is no bad thing, and amounts to a breath of different air in the courtyards of the castle. After wincing, Virginia Woolf, especially, would have appreciated the truth of many of the editorial insights. Dr. Leaska emphasises the infantile part of Virginia's need of Vita, the sado-masochistic element of the interplay, and the clarity of Virginia's perception of Vita's weaknesses, which led to a distancing. The brief, running narrative is excellent. The abstractions of the Introduction contrast with the prosaisms of the short notes, some of which are over-explicit for a work of this nature, such as the gloss 'The reference is to Robert Browning's poem: "How They Brought the Good News from Ghent to Aix".' The text reads, 'I felt like the person who brought the good news from Aix to Ghent.' There are odd mistakes of fact: a sloughi dog is a sloughi, not a saluki, although, to be fair, the error does not originate with the editors. William Bolitho's *Murder for Profit* is a collection of essays on real-life crimes, not 'a famous detective story'. There ought to be an index.

This is not a magnificent correspondence: Orlando is not here in glory—there is the lack of something that vibrates in her of which Virginia tactlessly complained to Vita. Virginia herself wrote better to her own sister, Vanessa. Vita does not do herself justice: she underrated herself as a writer when she tangled with 'Gloomsbury', as she called it. Virginia never thought much of her as a writer. Vita could not match Virginia's intense inner life, although their private exchanges were probably rewarding enough. The elements which attracted each to the other are well known—Vita hooking her 'big silver fish', and Virginia dazzled by Vita's aristocratic splendour, shining in an epiphanic moment 'in the grocer's shop in Sevenoaks with a candle-lit radiance, stalking

on legs like beech trees, pink glowing, grape clustered, pearl hung.' There is ample evidence in the language of the correspondence of more bedding than the two confessed occasions, at its peak probably around 1926-1927, until Orlando strode on to new conquests. There are expressions of longing and pain and jealousy, but the work in progress never faltered. This was not—on either side—the kind of love that forsook hearth and home and husband.

MOLLY TIBBS

## FROM ARCHANGEL TO EDINA

*The House by the Dvina.* Eugenie Fraser. Mainstream Publishing. Edinburgh. £9.95.

Eugenie Fraser has a wondrous tale to tell, and she tells it very well. There is no other autobiography quite like it, and it deserves to be widely read. Cleverly constructed, it recreates with ice-sharp recall and almost Proustian intensity the bygone days of an adventurous childhood in Archangel before, during, and shortly after the Revolution. Social historians will surely benefit from her remembrance of Russian customs, while the courtship and marriage of her Scottish mother by her Russian father is as romantic a story as could be conceived. Eugenie Fraser excels in a poetic evocation of the Russian climate in all its seasons, not only in winter: on the river in spring, 'A few small isolated floes, like swans, sail in the wake of others and vanish in the Arctic depths.' Her set-pieces are memorable, especially the journeys by troika or sleigh, such as a ride in a sledge pulled by four reindeer: 'The sledges are so light that one has the impression that the runners are flying above the snow. . . . On and on we raced, the wind whistling past; houses, gardens, the golden domes of the churches appearing for a moment and vanishing away, until we reached the outskirts of the town where there was only a dreary plain . . . The snow on the river and the shore changed from gold to crimson and deep lilac . . . ' Her grandmother made an epic trip by troika to intercede with Tsar Aleksandr II for her husband's freedom, in frost so rare that 'a crow, frozen in mid-flight, dropped like a stone from the sky . . . The horses also were suffering . . . Stefan was forced to climb down and clear their nostrils of ice.' Mrs. Fraser's characterisation, especially of that grandmother—Babushka—is the stuff of the great tradition of Russian novels, and it is a particular feature of this autobiography that it is so well balanced that events both private and public, characters and background, are evenly constructed into a whole which has considerable artistic integrity.

MOLLY TIBBS

## THE EDINBURGH DIARY OF A VICTORIAN GENTLEMAN

*A Victorian Edinburgh Diary.* John Inglis. Edited by Ena Vaughan. The Ramsay Head Press. £12.50.

John Inglis, the diarist, described as 'a douce, ordinary, middle-class citizen,' emerges from between the alternating copperplate and meticulous shorthand outlines of his diary as anything but an ordinary citizen of genteel Victorian Edinburgh. Chief clerk and assistant cashier in a lawyer's office, he was no stereotype. Politically a radical socialist, he was, in a city of—often discordantly—chiming churches, an upstanding atheist. He had a passion for language and languages, indulged with wide reading and determined onslaughts upon Latin, French, German and Italian. Untypical, too, was the office in Castle Street in which he worked. His granddaughter, Ena Vaughan, who has trans-

lated the Pitmanesque hieroglyphs and edited this glass-front-bookcased family heirloom, had envisioned an Edinburgh legal firm of the period as 'totally Dickensian—cold, miserably lit in winter by spluttering gas brackets, shelves weighed down with enormous leather-smelling ledgers, piles of legal documents . . . the place abounding with veritable God-fearing Scottish Scrooges. Every ounce of work would be squeezed relentlessly from the underlings every minute of every hour from 8 a.m. in the morning till 6 p.m. at night, when they emerged staggering and exhausted into the cold ill-lit Edinburgh streets.' It was not a bit like that. The atmosphere was free, easy and happy, and the partners were pleasant and friendly. The diary covers the years 1878 to 1881. It is delightful and was well worth printing. The excellent atmospheric illustrations, drawn by the editor's husband, Mr. Fred Vaughan, enhance and give real substance to the text. We follow John Inglis about the city where he loved to walk, pause with him as he stands, open grammar book in hand, learning German in the shed radiance of a street lamp, and attend with him the lectures, the magic lantern shows, the mind-improving readings and suchlike self-striver's aids to intellectual betterment.

John Inglis died at the early age of forty-two. His widow, Teen, who was twenty-two and only a short while married to him when he started to keep his diary, lived to be ninety-two, and was laid to rest beside her husband in Morningside Cemetery fifty-five years after his death. The echoes of their voices sound through the rustle of these pages. Here are preserved the breezes of long-ago summers, the flurrying flakes of the snows of frozen Time. Here are the 'treasured innermost thoughts of a bygone chronicler . . . Alive and vital at the time of their composing, they now seem mere voices from another world of an unreal and dusty past.' But lend an ear to the voices . . . they have sweet things to say . . .

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Good English Guide** (Dent. £2.95 paperback). This useful Everyman guide was first published in 1982. It was revised and corrected a year later and is now reprinted with further revisions in a paperback edition. The author, Harry Fieldhouse, aims to provide a sound guide to the use of written English by the average individual. He is concerned with 'the commonest uncertainties and misunderstandings, old and new', grammar syntax and the basic elements of style and composition. The object is not to teach but to inform. His approach is conservative. Standard English 'stands in need of nothing so much as conservation'. Where choices are made, 'the established sense is preferred to the upstart, the native term to the trendy import, the informed pronunciation to the latest guess.' Mr. Fieldhouse has some pertinent comments to make on American English. He notes fairly that in many cases the American spelling and meaning are more orthodox and historically correct than the English variant. A good example of spelling is 'center' which was thus spelt from the sixteenth century until Dr. Johnson entered it in his Dictionary as 'centre' in the eighteenth century. The Americans, of course, continued to use sensibly the earlier established and phonetic spelling.

**Second Nature** (Jonathan Cape. £12.50). The importance of the countryside and all things rural, with particular relation to the urban dweller, is the general background to this anthology edited by Richard Mabey with Susan Clifford and Angela King. 'Somewhere along the line,' writes Richard Mabey in his Introduction, 'many deep and widely shared human feelings—an affection for native landscapes, a basic sympathy towards other living things, a feeling of respect for our rural history—have become regarded as a devalued currency. This is the territory explored by *Second Nature*.' The volume contains articles and photographs by 42 artists and writers. They cover many parts of the country. The editors probably underestimate the growing interest of ordinary city dwellers in the enjoyment and pleasures of the countryside and rural pursuits. For that very reason, this volume may attract a large readership. It is not part of the ecological movement, though sympathetic towards it. The book needs an Index.

**Five Restoration Comedies** (A. & C. Black. £5.95). In this New Mermaid Anthology, Professor Brian Gibbons has chosen 'five plays representing the central tradition of Restoration Comedy.' They are *The Man of Mode* by Sir George Etherege, William Wycherley's *The Plain Dealer*, William Congreve's *Love for Love*, *The Provoked Wife* by Sir John Vanbrugh and *The Recruiting Officer* by George Farquhar. The plays 'share generic and formal elements and all deal with love intrigue and with a critical display of social behaviour.' On the other hand, as Professor Gibbons also points out in his Introduction, 'each play makes a strongly individual shape out of the available conventions.' The texts are annotated.

**With Henry Moore** (Sidgwick & Jackson. £8.95). This photographic tribute to Henry Moore was first published in 1978 in honour of his eightieth birthday. It is now republished in paperback. It consists of numerous photographs by Gemma Levine of the sculptor and artist at home and at work. They are accompanied by Henry Moore's own descriptions and comments. It is a fascinating and memorable publication.

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